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nearly all sectors of society contribute to greenhouses gas emissions and are affected by climate 
change. the magnitude and the impact of the problem require a co-ordinated, effective response 
– both nationally and internationally – to both move societies towards less carbon-intensive 
pathways and make inroads towards achieving the millennium Development goals (mDgs) and 
reducing poverty.
the scale and scope of the challenge means that every policy and investment decision will have  
to be assessed in light of its greenhouse gas reduction capacity and its contribution to long-term 
sustainability. policy makers must also find solutions to directly improve the well-being of millions 
of poor and vulnerable people adversely impacted by the effects of climate change. 
At the international level, governments recently agreed under the united nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (unFCCC) process to step up their efforts to combat climate 
change. With the “Bali road map”, governments will seek to reach agreement on a number  
of forward-looking issues essential for reaching a secure climate future by the 15th Conference  
of the parties in December 2009. this includes the “Bali Action plan” – the unFCCC negotiations  
on long-term cooperative action, which center around the four thematic “building blocks” of 
adaptation, mitigation, technology transfer and deployment, and financing.  
in order to effectively participate in, and develop positions for, such a challenging and complex 
negotiation process, developing countries – in particular those with medium- and small-size 
economies – will be required to involve and increasingly co-ordinate various government policy 
makers across key sectors at the national level, as well as other relevant stakeholders. this will 
require raising the awareness of not only environmental policy makers, but all policy makers about 
the key issues and elements of the Bali road map and the impact it could have on their sectoral 
areas. Strengthening their capacity to develop, implement, and evaluate cross-sectoral national 
policy options in response to climate change and the international negotiations can offer policy 
makers a key opportunity to move toward sustainability.
under the aegis of the unDp Environment & Energy group project, “Capacity development for 
policy makers to address climate change”, unDp commissioned a series of documents that address 
the key issues under consideration for the Bali Action plan building blocks, with a focus on the 
developing country context. We also included a document on land use, land-use change and 
forestry, which is a key sector for many developing countries. the documents have been prepared 
by leading international experts – many from developing countries – and translated into all un 
languages in order to inform policy makers across the entire spectrum of economic sectors.
unDp is committed to capacity development and believes it can play a crucial role in the ability of 
countries to address climate change in a sustainable manner. We hope that this compilation of 
documents will be widely used by developing country negotiators and national climate teams to 
inform policy makers during this critical phase of the international climate negotiations.
Veerle Vandeweerd
Director, Environment & Energy group
Bureau of Development policy
unDp
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financing and capacity-building, in a measurable, 
reportable and verifiable manner. 
Other subjects for the future discussion include the use 
of sectoral approaches; approaches to enhance the 
cost-effectiveness of mitigation actions, including market 
mechanisms; and the issue of reducing emission from 
deforestation and forest degradation in developing 
countries (REDD).  
Two-Track approach:  The UNFCCC and the 
Kyoto protocol
Future international action is being addressed by a 
“two-track” approach. In parallel with the Bali Action 
Plan negotiations under the UNFCCC (also referred to as 
the Convention), negotiations are also underway under 
the Kyoto Protocol. Provisions of the Kyoto Protocol also 
address the key issues being discussed under the Bali 
Action Plan and there are many linkages between the two 
processes. For example, on mitigation, Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol are currently discussing the next round of 
commitments after 2012, when the first round of commit-
ments will expire. Furthermore, Parties are working on an 
analysis of the different tools and rules for developed 
countries to reach reduction targets and ways to enhance 
At the United Nations Climate Change Conference in 
Bali in December 2007, governments from around the 
world – both developed and developing countries – agreed 
to step up their efforts to combat climate change and 
adopted the “Bali Road Map”, which consists of a number 
of forward-looking decisions that represent the various 
tracks that are essential to reaching a secure climate future. 
The Bali Road Map includes the Bali Action Plan, which 
charts the course for a new negotiating process under the 
UNFCCC, with the aim of completing this by 2009. It 
also includes the current negotiations under the Kyoto 
Protocol, and their 2009 deadline, which focus on further 
quantified emission reduction commitments for industrial-
ized countries, as well as negotiations on the ongoing work 
pertaining to key issues including technology, adaptation, 
and reducing emissions from deforestation. 
The Bali action plan
The Bali Action Plan, adopted by the Conference of the 
Parties (COP)1 as decision 1/CP.13, launched a compre-
hensive process to enable the full, effective and sustained 
implementation of the Convention through long-term 
cooperative action, now, up to and beyond 2012, in order 
to reach an agreed outcome and adopt a decision at its 
fifteenth session in Copenhagen in December 2009. The 
COP also decided that the process would be conducted 
under a new subsidiary body – the Ad Hoc Working Group 
on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention 
(AWG-LCA) – that shall complete its work in 2009.
The Bali Action Plan is centred on four main build-
ing blocks – mitigation, adaptation, technology and 
financing. Parties also agreed that the negotiations on a 
long-term agreement should address a shared vision for 
long-term cooperative action, including a long-term global 
goal for emission reductions. Furthermore, the future 
discussion should address enhanced national/international 
action, including the consideration of:
•  measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally appro-
priate mitigation commitments or actions by all 
developed countries, and; 
•  nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing 
country Parties, supported and enabled by technology, 
The CoNveNTioN (UNFCCC) TRaCK
•  Focuses on four “building blocks”: adaptation, mitigation, tech-
nology transfer & deployment, financing
•  Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
(rEDD) also discussed
•  Mitigation actions from developing countries 
•  Mitigation commitments from developed countries
The KYoTo pRoToCol TRaCK
•  Agree on developed country emission reduction targets by 
2009. At their third session in 2007, parties to the Kyoto protocol 
took note of the conclusions by the intergovernmental panel 
on Climate Change (ipCC) that greenhouse gas (gHg) emis-
sion reduction commitments between 25 and 40% below 1990 
levels were needed on the part of industrialized countries for 
the period beyond 2012 to limit a mean global temperature 
increase, with gHg emissions peaking within the next 10 to 15 
years before going down  
•  Means to achieve targets:  market mechanisms, national policies, 
accounting issues, role of land use, land-use change and forestry 
(LuLuCF), etc.
The Bali Road Map
1   The COP is the supreme decision making body of the UNFCCC.
The UNDP project, “Capacity development for policy 
makers to address climate change” seeks to strengthen the 
national capacity of developing countries to assess climate 
change policy options across different sectors and econom-
ic activities. The project will run in parallel with the “Bali 
Road Map” process agreed at the UN Climate Change 
Conference in December 2007, which includes the “Bali 
Action Plan” – the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations on 
long-term co-operative action on climate change set to 
conclude by the end of 2009.   
To effectively participate in, and develop positions for, 
this challenging and complex negotiation process, develop-
ing countries – in particular those with medium- and 
small-size economies – will be required to involve and 
increasingly co-ordinate various government decision-
makers across key sectors at the national level, as well as 
other relevant stakeholders. This will require raising the 
awareness about the key issues and elements under 
discussion and strengthening capacity to develop, imple-
ment and evaluate policy options in the context of the 
international negotiations. 
The overall goals of the project are twofold: 
•  To increase national capacity to co-ordinate ministerial 
views, participate in the UNFCCC process, and 
negotiate positions within the timeframe of the Bali 
Action Plan; and
•  To assess investment and financial flows to address 
climate change for up to three key sectors and/or 
economic activities. 
The project will support these goals by expanding the 
knowledge base on climate change issues and broadening 
access to this knowledge so that policy makers, parliamen-
tarians, technical experts, and other key stakeholders can 
participate and share experiences at the national, sub-
regional, regional and global levels. As a result, both the 
technical understanding of key climate change issues and 
their economic and policy implications within the context 
of the Convention will be enhanced.  
The assessment of investment and financial flows will 
play a particularly important role. At the national level, 
it will help countries understand the magnitude and 
intensity of the national effort needed to tackle climate 
change in key sectors and economic activities. It will also 
help facilitate the integration of climate change issues 
into national development and economic planning. At 
the international level, an assessment of investment and 
financial flows will help maximize national participation in 
the international climate negotiations by providing more 
accurate estimates of funds needed for mitigation and 
adaptation. By providing useful inputs to the international 
debate, a financial flows assessment can help provide that 
an appropriate financial architecture plays a key role in any 
long-term cooperative action.
To assist policy makers in understanding the complex 
issues under discussion in the negotiating process, UNDP 
commissioned a series of background briefing papers 
on the key issues under the four main “building blocks” 
of the current international negotiations – mitigation, 
adaptation, technology and finance – as well as land use, 
land-use change and forestry (LULUCF). 
This document contains summaries for policy makers  
of these briefing papers. All the briefing papers are avail-
able in the UN languages on the UNDP web site at:  
http://www.undp.org/climatechange/documents.html.
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Cop 1 Berlin mandate Launched a process to decide on stronger commitments for Annex i parties
Cop 2 geneva Declaration renewed the momentum of the Kyoto protocol negotiations (taken note of, but not adopted)
Cop 3 Kyoto protocol Set legally binding targets and timetables for cutting the greenhouse gas emissions of  
Annex i parties
Cop 4 Buenos Aires plan of Action Set out program of work on issues under the protocol; Established deadline for completion as 
Cop 6 in 2000




Bonn Agreement part i could not reach agreement, so resumed in Bonn 
part ii reached the Bonn Agreement (political package)
Between part i & ii, the uS announced it would not ratify the Kyoto protocol
Cop 7 marrakesh Accords translated Bonn Agreement into decisions setting out detailed rules for the implementation of 
the protocol and took important steps toward implementation of the Convention
Cop 8 Delhi Declaration on Climate Change 
and Sustainable Development 
reaffirmed development and poverty eradication as overriding priorities in developing coun-
tries and highlighted the importance of adaptation
Cop 9 no declaration president’s summary of round table discussions included in report of the session
Cop 10 Buenos Aires programme of Work on 
Adaptation and response measures; 
seminar of government experts
Calls for action on issues to address the adverse effects of climate change and response meas-
ures; seminar to promote an informal exchange of information on mitigation and adaptation, 
and on policies and measures
Cop 11/ Cmp 1 Decisions establishing the AWg-Kp  
and Dialogue
under the protocol, a new working group was established to discuss future commitments for 
developed countries for the period after 2012. under the Convention, a dialogue on long-
term global cooperative action to address climate change was also launched.  parties to the 
Kyoto protocol also formally adopted the “rulebook” of the 1997 Kyoto protocol, the so-called 
‘marrakesh Accords’, which sets the framework for implementation of the protocol
Cop 12/ Cmp 2 nairobi Work programme on impacts, 
vulnerability and Adaptation
the program was adopted by the SBStA and subsequently re-named by the Cop.  Decisions 
related to financial flows were adopted and the two montreal processes made progress
Cop 13/ Cmp 3 Bali road map includes a number of forward-looking decisions that represent the various tracks.  it includes 
the Bali Action plan, which charts the course for a new negotiating process designed to tackle 
climate change, with the aim of completing this by 2009
poliTiCal oUTCoMeS FRoM pRevioUS SeSSioNS oF The Cop
cooperative action,” mitigation, adaptation, technology 
and finance. Two in-session workshops were held on:
•  Cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-specific 
actions, and policy approaches; and, 
•  Policy incentives on issues relating to reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation  
in developing countries (REDD), and the role  
of conservation, sustainable management of forests  
and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in  
developing countries. 
The Accra climate change talks resulted in the adoption 
of conclusions on long-term cooperative action and on the 
2009 work program under the AWG-LCA. Parties also 
agreed to compile ideas and proposals on the elements of 
the Bali Action Plan for discussion at COP 14 in Decem-
ber 2008 in Poznan, Poland.
ongoing work under the Kyoto protocol
At its most recent session, held in Accra alongside the 
AWG-LCA, the AWG-KP focused on the means for 
industrialized countries to reach emission reduction 
targets, with delegates addressing the flexible mechanisms 
(the market-based mechanisms under the Protocol) and 
land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF). Parties 
also considered an agenda item on “other issues” compris-
ing: greenhouse gases; sectors and source categories; 
approaches targeting sectoral emissions; methodological 
issues; and spillover effects.
UN Climate Change Conference in poznan  
(december 2008)
The next sessions of the AWG-LCA and the AWG-KP 
will be held in conjunction with COP 14 in Poznan, 
Poland. COP 14 will be an important stepping stone on 
the way to COP 15 in Copenhagen. Countries have 
agreed that in Copenhagen, an ambitious climate change 
agreement will be reached to follow on the first phase of 
the Kyoto Protocol, which expires in 2012. At Poznan, 
Parties to the UNFCCC will take stock of progress made 
in 2008 and map out in detail what needs to happen in 
2009 to get to that agreement. 
the effectiveness of tools such as the market mechanisms. 
The Kyoto Protocol also addresses adaptation. Under the 
Kyoto Protocol, the Adaptation Fund was established to 
finance concrete adaptation projects in developing 
countries. Parties are currently continuing their discus-
sions to further operationalize this important fund. 
Meetings of the AWG-LCA and the body working on 
new commitments under the Kyoto Protocol – known as 
the Ad Hoc Working Group on further Commitments for 
Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (the AWG-KP) 
– are held in conjunction with one another. The future 
relationship between these two tracks (i.e., will they 
remain separate or will the discussions be brought 
together) is another question being considered in the 
negotiations.
The road to Copenhagen: progress to date
The first session of the AWG-LCA took place in 
Bangkok, Thailand, from 31 March to 4 April 2008.  
At this meeting, the AWG-LCA agreed to undertake  
its work, seeking progress on all the elements assigned  
to it by the Bali Action Plan, in a coherent, integrated and 
transparent manner, and identified specific workshops to 
be held in 2008. It further agreed to organize its work at 
each session to include each of the elements, taking into 
account the interlinkages among them, and the work of 
the Convention’s subsidiary bodies in the context of the 
Bali Road Map.
The second session of the AWG-LCA took place  
in Bonn from 2 to 12 June 2008. At this session, the 
AWG-LCA focused its work on building a common 
understanding of the elements of the Bali Action Plan.  
The group held three focused in-session workshops on 
advancing adaptation, transfer of technology, and invest-
ment and financial flows. Parties presented a number  
of concrete ideas and proposals on how to address the 
“shared vision”, mitigation, adaptation, technology and 
finance.  The AWG-LCA concluded by inviting Parties  
to submit specific textual proposals on the elements 
contained in the first paragraph of the Bali Action Plan, 
which spells out the key issues to be addressed, taking into 
account the interlinkages among the elements.
The main focus of third session of the AWG-LCA in 
Accra in August 2008 was to continue to exchange ideas 
and clarify key elements of the Bali Action Plan (decision 
1/CP.13), including a “shared vision for long-term 
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and transportation). Triptych was originally used to 
share the burden of the Kyoto targets within the 
European Union. Analysis has considered extending 
this sectoral approach to all countries. Apart from 
taking a sectoral approach, Triptych also takes into 
account the technological opportunities available in 
various sectors.
•   Sectoral Approaches: People can mean many different 
things when they use the term “sectoral” – including: 
sectoral CDM; benchmarks across trans-national 
sectors; technology transfer in specific sectors; the 
sector-based Triptych approach; and sectoral crediting 
mechanisms. Given the various types of sectoral 
approaches, two distinctions may help: Is the proposal to 
implement at the domestic, national level only, or 
transnational?; Is the focus on a new agreement, or the 
efforts that Parties make? Different ends of the spectrum 
would then be domestic sectoral efforts and transna-
tional sectoral agreements.  
Agreeing to actions that are measurable, reportable 
and verifiable – known as MRV mitigation actions – is 
a key component in the Bali Action Plan and central to 
the negotiations about the future of the climate regime. 
Indeed, MRV is central to the balance between action on 
climate change and support, since it applies to both 
nationally appropriate mitigation actions and to the 
provision of technology, financing and capacity building. 
A way of making some progress may be to focus on details 
– clearly defining what is meant by measurable, reportable 
and verifiable. 
particular significance are the gases and sectors 
(forestry) chosen; the end date for analysis; and the 
representation of atmospheric chemistry in the model. 
The approach requires significant data, and this may 
limit applicability. 
•   Emissions intensity: This approach requires reductions 
of emissions relative to economic output (i.e., emis-
sions compared to GDP) and therefore allows for 
growth in emissions if there is economic growth. To 
account for different national circumstances, commit-
ments could be formulated as a percentage decrease 
from each country’ own emissions intensity. These 
goals would be harder to meet if economic growth 
remains lower than expected, given the reduced 
capacity. If successful, reduced intensities should assist 
in de-coupling emissions from economic growth. The 
approach is often considered “softer” than absolute 
targets since it quantifies emissions in relative terms.
•   Sustainable development policies and measures  
(SD-PAMs): This approach suggests that developing 
countries themselves identify more sustainable 
development paths and commit to implementing  
these with financial support. It starts by considering  
a country’s own long-term development objectives. 
Next, policies and measures are identified to make the 
development path more sustainable. Each country 
would define what it means by making development 
more sustainable, but when registering SD-PAMs, the 
international community would have to agree. 
•   Evolution of the CDM: A major way in which develop-
ing countries are already engaging in mitigation is 
through the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM. The CDM is a 
project-based mechanism that allows cooperative 
action between countries that have a cap on emissions 
and those that do not. This shifts the focus from where 
mitigation takes place to who pays for mitigation. 
Extending the CDM beyond a “project basis” is not a 
commitment to reduce emissions domestically, but it 
could be an important form of nationally appropriate 
mitigation action in developing countries. 
•   Global Triptych: The Triptych approach focuses on 
three sectors – electricity generation, energy-intensive 
industries and “domestic sectors” (including residential 
Some approaches emphasize the need to ensure continued 
economic development, while other proposals focus 
primarily on technological approaches. The proposals, 
many of which are complex and detailed, are briefly 
highlighted below:
•   Kyoto-style fixed targets: These targets take the form  
of an agreed percentage reduction against annual 
emissions in a base year, 1990. An absolute number  
of tons of CO2 to be reduced is calculated. By starting 
from the countries’ own emissions, the approach 
“grandfathers” existing differences between countries 
in emissions. This is the approach for industrialized 
countries under the Kyoto Protocol. 
•   Per capita: The “per capita entitlements” approach takes 
as its starting point the equal right of each person to 
use the atmosphere as a global commons. In a pure per 
capita approach, there is no reference to current 
emissions levels, but simply a global budget allocated 
equally to countries based on population. Some 
developing countries favor per capita approaches.  
However, the approach is less attractive to less popu-
lous nations, who would argue that there is more than 
one dimension to equity. 
•   Brazilian Proposal: The Brazilian proposal bases its 
burden-sharing approach on historical responsibility 
for change in temperature to individual countries. A 
key difference to most other approaches is the use of 
cumulative historical emissions rather than current 
annual emissions. For the Brazilian proposal, of 
Summary of “Climate change mitigation  
negotiations, with an emphasis on options  
for developing countries” 
by Harald Winkler, Energy Research Centre,  
University of Cape Town
Mitigation – the reduction of emissions of greenhouse 
gases (GHGs) – has been at the heart of the climate 
negotiations from the outset. As the next round of 
negotiations focuses on what developing countries might 
do on mitigation, the topic takes on an increased impor-
tance. However, reaching agreement on action on mitiga-
tion presents a major challenge. What is common for both 
developed and developing countries is that they take 
“measurable, reportable and verifiable” mitigation action, 
as called for under the Bali Action Plan. For developed 
countries, these should be in the form of commitments to 
absolute emission reductions. For developing countries, 
mitigation actions need to be developed in a bottom-up 
manner to achieve reductions relative to baseline emissions, 
and be supported by technology and finance. There are a 
number of specific proposals under consideration by 
Parties and developing country policy makers will need to 
carefully consider the implications of different approaches 
for their respective countries.
A wide variety of approaches to future actions have 
been proposed. These approaches reflect differing views 
among governments on the criteria to be used for 
considering these actions. The key concern of some 
countries is that any agreed actions be equitable, such  
as ensuring equal entitlements to emit for each person. 
UNdp Bali aCTioN plaN BRieFiNG papeRS: 
SUMMaRieS FoR poliCY MaKeRS
To assist policy makers in understanding the complex issues under discussion in 
the negotiating process, the following section contains summaries of six back-
ground briefing papers prepared by UNDP.  The papers discuss key issues for the 
four main “building blocks” currently under discussion in the international nego-
tiations – mitigation, adaptation, technology and finance – as well as lUlUcf, and 
include short histories of the international negotiations for each of these topics. 
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tion, among other goals may need to be channelled to 
address climate change impacts or to facilitate mitigation 
policies that may be initially be more expensive such as, 
the deployment of the some renewable energies technolo-
gies. On the other, uncertainty on the nature, intensity, 
frequency and timing of impacts may artificially enlarge 
the magnitude of resources needed to tackle the problems 
of adaptation thereby creating additional financial 
constraints and diminishing economic efficiency. Finding 
synergies between sustainable development goals and 
responses to climate change is therefore important. 
Case studies
The case studies provided in this paper offer some 
insights into the approaches used by developing 
country governments and the constraints they face. 
Several of them exemplify situations where explicit 
multiple policies were used successfully to achieve national 
objectives. For example, in promoting energy efficiency 
programs, China has used regulations, financial incentives, 
R&D and information instruments to achieve its objec-
tive. Kenya, over a long period and with support from 
others, has used R&D, financial incentives and informa-
tion instruments to develop and disseminate improved 
cooking stoves, while India has used a combination of 
instruments to encourage the deployment of wind power. 
Several of the case studies relied almost solely on financial 
incentives, e.g., the promotion of wind power in Argen-
tina and natural gas vehicles in Bolivia. Only one of the 
case studies, i.e., the case of an energy efficiency labelling 
program in Brazil, contains an example of a voluntary 
agreement with industry.
In formulating or further enhancing a domestic 
climate policy program, a combination of policy 
instruments may work better than a single instrument. 
Also, the design of instruments may need to consider how 
they interact with existing institutions and regulations in 
other sectors of society. When comparing instruments, 
adjusting for different levels of stringency is important. 
For all instruments, stringency may be set at different 
levels. Over time, all instruments need to be monitored, 
adjusted and enforced. Also, an instrument that works 
well in one country may not work well in another country 
with different economic circumstances, social norms and 
institutions. 
In terms of the policy making process for mitigation 
policies and measures, an essential first step may entail 
enhancing awareness within ministries and across the 
government to ensure consistency and synergies in poli-
cy making and implementation. Each country has a 
policy making process that, regardless of the form of 
government, is complex and unique. It is often the case 
that while individuals may be aware of the benefits of 
actions that have both local and climate change benefits, 
that awareness is not always extended to the whole set of 
governmental decision makers. 
Second, information may be insufficient for adequate 
policy design, for example – developing marginal 
abatement cost curves. Trying to assess the benefits of a 
policy and the costs of inaction may be hindered or 
impeded by fragmentary information. Overcoming this 
barrier may require competing for budgetary resources 
with other programs, and national priorities or finding 
funding from other sources and governments.  
Third, national capacity to elaborate scenarios – eco-
nomic, energy and climate – and to model future trends 
and the evolution of key variables, is sometimes limited 
in developing countries. This can impair the quality of 
decision making, or reducing the scope of policy options 
being considered. At worst, that capacity may be missing 
and the necessary analysis that informs policy design may 
consequently be missing.
While these constraints are inherent to policy making 
in developing countries, it is recognized that climate 
change intensifies the effect of such constraints because 
it creates new challenges. Climate change adds an 
additional dimension to efforts to promote sustainable 
development. On one hand, because resources otherwise 
needed to alleviate poverty or enhance income distribu-
Summary of “National policies and their  
linkages to negotiations over a future  
international climate change agreement”
by Dennis Tirpak, in collaboration with Sujata Gupta, 
Daniel Perczyk and Massamba Thioye
Developing country policy makers will need to 
consider the national policy instruments they will  
need to contribute to the fight against climate change. 
As discussions on the international level are underway 
through the Bali Road Map, a national level discussion  
can help governments reflect on the types of policies they 
should use, as well as how to seek internal and external 
financial resources and how to reflect their views in the 
negotiations of a future climate change agreement.
There is a rich array of policy instruments being used 
by developing countries to achieve national objectives, 
such as improving local air pollution and reducing 
poverty. Most of these policies also reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases. These policies, measures and instru-
ments include: regulations and standards, taxes and 
charges, tradable permits, voluntary agreements, informa-
tional instruments, subsidies and incentives, research and 
development, and trade and development assistance. 
Depending on the legal frameworks available to countries, 
these may be implemented nationally, regionally or locally. 
They may be supplemented with rules, guidelines and 
other administrative mechanisms to achieve different 
goals. They may be legally binding or voluntary and they 
may be fixed or changeable: 
•   Regulations and Standards: Specify abatement 
technologies (technology standard) or minimum 
requirements for pollution output (performance 
standard) to reduce emissions.
•   Tradable Permits: Also are known as marketable 
permits or cap-and-trade systems. This instrument 
establishes a limit on aggregate emissions by specified 
sources, requires each source to hold permits equal to 
its actual emissions, and allows permits to be traded.
•   Voluntary Agreements: An agreement between a 
government authority and one or more private parties 
to achieve environmental objectives or to improve 
environmental performance beyond compliance to 
regulated obligations. Not all are truly “voluntary” – 
some include rewards and/or penalties associated with 
joining or with achieving commitments.
•   Taxes and Charges: A levy imposed on each unit of 
undesirable activity by a source.
•   Financial Incentives: Direct payments, tax reductions, 
price supports, or the equivalent from a government 
to an entity for implementing a practice or performing 
a specified action. 
•   Information Instruments: Required public disclosure  
of environmentally related information, generally by 
industry to consumers. Includes labelling programs 
and rating and certification. 
•   Research and Development (R&D): Direct government 
spending and investment to generate innovation on 
mitigation, or physical and social infrastructure to 
reduce emissions. Includes prizes and incentives for 
technological advances. 
•   Non-Climate Policies: Other policies not specifically 
directed at emissions reduction but that may have 
significant climate-related effects. These include: 
policies on poverty, land use and land use change, 
energy supply and security; international trade, air 
pollution, structural reforms; and population policies. 
These policies could offer an opportunity to assess and 
develop synergistic sustainable development strategies.
Evaluating policy options presents many challenges, 
since the policy making process of most governments 
involves complex choices involving many stakeholders. 
These include the potential regulated industry, suppliers, 
producers of complementary products, labor 
organizations, consumer groups and environmental 
organizations. The choice and design of virtually any 
instrument has the potential to benefit some and to  
harm others. For example, standards set at a high level 
may be achievable by large firms, but not by small or  
new firms entering the market. Voluntary measures,  
often favored by industry because of their flexibility  
and potentially lower costs, are in many cases opposed  
by environment groups because of their lack of 
accountability and enforcement. 
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developing countries that are a Party to the UNFCCC 
have already developed their first national communication 
and, in case of an LDC, a National Adaptation Plan of 
Action (NAPA). Some are already developing their second 
national communication, which will have information 
about measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate 
change. 
Successfully adapting to climate change at the 
national level will likely require a set of conditions and 
elements at the national level. Some possible elements 
for a strategy include:
•  Adequate institutional arrangements, including 
systematic planning capacity in a cooperative institu-
tional setting consistent policies and measures and 
regulatory frameworks; 
•  Strong coordination of ongoing activities on a sub-
national level, which could include activities that are 
driven by NGOs, research institutions, the private 
sector and by local and sub-national governments;
•  Scientific and technical capacities to understand the 
problem and its effects at the national and sub-national 
level, model its long-term impacts, and elaborate 
responses and adaptive strategies to the level of 
implementation;
•  Program and project preparation capacities;
•  Citizen awareness and participation that sustain and 
prioritize climate change actions.
grown over time, as the impacts of climate change have 
become increasingly evident. The international effort to 
date has delivered considerable information, resources and 
capacity building. However, progress on adaptation has 
also suffered from some of the ambiguities in the regime 
itself. Adaptation is not defined explicitly in the Conven-
tion, but is referenced only in the overall context of 
climate change. How adaptation is defined in operational 
terms will have significant political and financial implica-
tions. It could affect level of financing to be expected in 
the light of the commitments under the Convention. 
Much of the negotiations on adaptation have therefore 
focused on finance and there has been lack of agreement 
on how it should be addressed.
While all countries recognize that developed countries 
should fulfil their commitments under the Convention 
and provide finance, technology and capacity building 
support to developing countries, progress on these issues 
has been slow and unsatisfactory for many developing 
countries. Many have expressed frustration at the slow 
progress on the funding mechanisms. Indeed, it took 
about three years for current funds to be made operational 
following their establishment in Marrakesh in 2001. Many 
developing country concerns regarding finance to adapta-
tion relate to:
•   The relatively small amount of funds currently available 
to address adaptation under the Convention and, if the 
current replenishment trend continues, that these 
would not sufficiently address their needs.
•   The experiences of developing countries in accessing 
and receiving support through existing funds, owing 
both to the complex design of the funds and to 
problems of implementation of the guidance. 
•   The recognition that additional financial flows will  
be needed to cope with adaptation needs.
At the national level, governmental institutions 
(ministries, regional governments and agencies), private 
entities and non-govermental organizations (NGOs) 
will need to consider integrating – or more broadly 
integrating – climate change into their planning and 
budgeting in all levels of decision making, and coordi-
nate their actions among themselves. Many developing 
countries already have adaptation efforts underway. Most 
Summary of “adaptation to climate change:  
The new challenge for development in the  
developing world” 
by Dr. E. Lisa F. Schipper, Stockholm Environment Institute; 
Maria Paz Cigarán, Libélula Communication, Environment 
and Development, Peru; and  
Dr. Merylyn McKenzie Hedger, Climate Change Institute of 
Development Studies at the University of Sussex.
Developing country policy makers will need to  
reflect on their national positions on the key issue  
of adaptation, as important decisions will be taken  
in the run-up to COP 15 in late 2009. The Bali Action 
Plan identified the need for action on adaptation, particu-
larly for enhanced action on the provision of financial 
resources, investment and technology to support action  
on adaptation. 
Adaptation to climate change is a complex and 
multi-faceted topic that presents a number of chal-
lenges, particularly for the developing world. Climate 
change impacts are already affecting developing countries, 
particularly the poor and most vulnerable, because they 
have fewer social, technological, and financial resources for 
adaptation. Millions of people, particularly those in 
developing countries, face shortages of water and food and 
greater risks to health. Adaptation measures that reduce 
vulnerability to climate change are critical, especially in 
countries where the risks are “here and now”. Climate 
change also affects the sustainable development of 
countries, as well as their abilities to achieve the UN 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG) by 2015. 
The approximate costs of adaptation are high by all 
estimates. The UNFCCC Secretariat has estimated that  
in 2030 developing countries will require $28-67 billion 
to enable adaptation to climate change. Although the 
figure is large in absolute terms, this corresponds to 
0.2-0.8% of global investment flows, or just 0.06-0.21% 
of projected global GDP in 2030. According to the World 
Bank, incremental costs to adapt to projected climate 
change in developing countries are likely to be of the  
order of $10-40 billion per year. While there are difficul-
ties and uncertainties in calculating an exact figure,  
one fact remains clear:  the amount needed to adapt  
to climate change will be considerable and far exceed  
what is currently available through existing UNFCCC 
funds and other sources.
An important challenge in considering adaptation  
is defining and understanding what is meant by the 
term “adaptation”. Adaptation is currently the topic  
of numerous studies that offer a range of definitions.  
The IPCC offers a starting point by providing a broad 
definition of adaptation: adjustment in natural or human 
systems to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their 
effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial 
opportunities. Adaptation therefore involves a process  
of sustainable and permanent adjustment in response  
to new and changing environmental circumstances.  
Given its far-reaching nature, it is nonetheless a difficult 
topic to define, particularly in operational and financial 
terms. However, some key points may provide a helpful 
framework:
•   Adaptation is not a “stand alone” issue. It has clear 
synergies with important issues such as economic 
development, poverty reduction and disaster manage-
ment strategies. A sustainable development path is vital 
for an adaptation process to succeed.
•   Adaptation will need to be integrated into all development 
planning. This includes the national and international 
levels. Successful adaptation measures will require 
long-term thinking and explicit consideration of 
climate change risks at the regional (cross-national), 
national, sub-national and local levels. 
•   Adaptation will also require the capacity for both 
short- and long-term planning. Strategies will be needed 
to address long-term climate change impacts, such as 
those predicted by the IPCC. At the same time, 
strategies for shorter-term adjustments may also 
necessary, such as those prepared for shorter-term 
climate variability. 
•   Adaptation will require substantial funding. All indica-
tive estimates available suggest that the costs of 
adapting to climate change in the developing world  
are in the order of tens of billions. However, there are 
many difficulties and limitations in estimating the 
exact costs of adapting under various scenarios, as well 
as the ability of countries to self-finance adaptation.
In the UN climate negotiations, recognition of the 
need for all countries to take action on adaptation has 
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•  Increased funding for the financial mechanism of 
the Convention. The fourth review of the financial 
mechanism will inform the fifth replenishment of the 
GEF. Those funds will be disbursed over four years 
beginning in 2011.
•  More stringent commitments for developed 
countries under the Kyoto Protocol to generate 
additional demand for credits from the CDM and 
possibly other mechanisms. Changes to the eligible 
project types and crediting mechanisms may be 
required to increase the supply of credits.
•  New sources of funds for mitigation, adaptation 
and technology cooperation. Several options for new 
funds on the scale needed are available. They need to 
be assessed in terms of their political acceptability and 
their ability to provide predictable financial and 
investment flows on a sustained basis.
Raising substantial additional funds for mitigation, 
adaptation, and technology cooperation will give rise to 
important governance and delivery issues that will need 
to be addressed if the funds are to be used effectively. 
•   Governance: At present the Convention funds are 
managed by the GEF with guidance from the COP. 
Operation of the GEF is directed by the GEF 
Council, which has different representation and rules 
of procedure than the COP. The Adaptation Fund has 
its own Board elected by, under the authority of, and 
accountable to the supreme decision making body 
under the Kyoto Protocol. Many new proposals 
involve the creation of new funds for specific types of 
mitigation actions, adaptation needs, and technology 
development and transfer. Governance issues apply 
both to the funds collected and to the manner in 
which those funds are disbursed. Governance issues 
include accountability to the COP, balanced represen-
tation of all Parties, transparency, and ease of access to 
the funding.
•   Effective disbursement: Disbursement of substantially 
larger amounts for mitigation, adaptation and technol-
ogy cooperation will raise important delivery issues, 
including:
 o   The share of the available funds to be allocated 
for mitigation, adaptation and technology  
cooperation;
 o  Whether the funds are distributed by country  
or project type;
 o   Whether funds are distributed for individual  
projects (like the GEF) or for “national  
programs”; and
 o   Whether, or under what conditions, funds  
can be provided through “direct access”.
Summary of “Negotiations on additional  
investment and financial flows to address  
climate change in developing countries” 
by Erik Haites, Margaree Consultants, Inc. 
Finance has been identified as a key issue for the 
discussion on a post-2012 climate change agreement. 
For future long-term cooperation to address climate 
change, developing country Parties will need considerable 
financial assistance for mitigation, adaptation and 
technology cooperation. They will therefore need to assess 
the current arrangements for financial assistance under the 
Convention and its Kyoto Protocol, as well as options in 
the current negotiations on additional international 
investment and financial flows to address climate change.
The exact amount of investment and financial  
flows needed is not known, but it could amount to  
tens of billions of dollars per year. Addressing climate 
change will require significant shifts and an overall net 
increase in global investment and financial flows. While 
the changes appear large in absolute terms, they are small 
relative to total investment. Approximately half of the 
shifts and net increase will need to occur in developing 
countries. Mitigation investments in developing countries 
are more cost-effective, resulting in larger emission 
reductions per dollar invested. Furthermore, developing 
countries are estimated to suffer more damage as a 
percentage of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) than 
developed countries. Indeed, many studies conclude that 
developing countries, especially the poorest and those 
most vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change, 
will need considerable international financial support for 
mitigation and adaptation.
The Convention and its the Kyoto Protocol already 
foresee financial assistance from developed country 
Parties to developing country Parties and contain a 
number of provisions to address this issue. This 
assistance may be through bilateral, multilateral or 
regional channels or through a financial mechanism 
defined in the Convention. The Global Environment 
Facility (GEF) has been designated as an operating entity 
of the financial mechanism of the Convention on an 
on-going basis, subject to review every four years. Devel-
oped countries must also provide information on their 
bilateral and multilateral assistance in their national 
communications. The Kyoto Protocol created the CDM to 
assist developing countries in achieving sustainable 
development and to assist developed countries in meeting 
their emissions limitation commitments. A small share of 
credits issued for most projects under the CDM is contrib-
uted to the Adaptation Fund, which aims to assist 
developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable 
to the adverse impacts of climate change to meet the costs 
of adaptation.
In the current negotiating processes under the 
Convention and Kyoto Protocol, a number of options 
to enhance international investment and financial flows 
to developing countries have been suggested or 
proposed: 
•   Some options seek to increase the scale of contribu-
tions by developed countries to existing mechanisms 
under the Convention and Kyoto Protocol. 
•   Others seek additional contributions by developed 
countries toward new bilateral and multilateral funds.
 
•   Some proposals would be funded by defined contri-
butions from developed countries, notably proposals 
for a Convention adaptation fund, technology fund 
and insurance mechanism, as well as for an “umbrella” 
financial mechanism under the Convention. 
•   Others are based on contributions from developed 
and developing countries, while some would raise 
funds based on more stringent commitments by 
developed countries.
•   Parties are also considering numerous proposals that 
would draw from other sources. These include an 
extension of the 2% levy on CDM to other market 
mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, an interna-
tional air travel adaptation levy, an international 
maritime emission reduction scheme, access to 
renewable energy programs in developed countries  
and debt-for-clean-energy swaps. 
Ensuring adequate, predictable and sustainable 
financial resources for mitigation, adaptation and 
technology cooperation as an essential component of a 
post-2012 agreement to address climate change will 
require reaching agreement on a mix of investment and 
financial flows, including:
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•  In addition, there is debate on the form that interna-
tional RDD&D cooperation should take (should this 
be decided in the framework of the UNFCCC) and 
the role and ultimate scope of carbon markets and the 
CDM for technology transfer. 
Parties have put forward a number of “proposals” in 
their recent submissions, which policy makers will need 
to consider in the light of their country’s experience 
and specific circumstances. Some useful criteria could 
help guide this effort. For expanding technology research 
and promoting innovation, does the proposal ultimately 
encourage or discourage institutions from undertaking 
R&D on technologies of importance to the country, and 
the requirements needed to take advantage of the new 
proposal. 
For problems relating to the deployment, commerciali-
zation and transfer of technology:
•   Do these problems warrant an international mechanism 
(and its associated bureaucracy) or would they be more 
appropriately addressed on a case-by-case basis? 
•	 		Can	the	“proposal”	be	implemented	to	the	benefit	of	all	 
or only a few countries? 
•	 		Will	it	result	in	additional	investments	for	technology	 
and capacity building? 
For financing aspects: 
•   Is each part of the RDD&D cycle addressed appropriately 
by the proposal? 
•		 	Does	it	address	each	element	of	the	“full	package	
approach”? 
Finally, it is important to recall that the international 
community will need to determine how to monitor, report 
and verify any agreement to enhance RDD&D of 
technology.
technology needs, and ways to encourage innovation and 
the diffusion of the technologies using both public and 
private finances. They also need to consider how the 
international community could help their countries 
through a “full package” approach, consisting of equip-
ment, software, enhanced human capacities, regulatory 
and institutional support and financial mechanisms 
designed for each element.  
Under the UNFCCC, Parties are currently discussing 
ways to enhance innovation and expand the deploy-
ment, transfer and commercialization of new technolo-
gies, particularly in developing countries. For some 
technology-related issues, the ongoing international debate 
reflects a growing international consensus, while others 
remain highly controversial. 
•  A growing consensus is being reached on important 
issues, such as the key technologies needed to achieve 
low-cost mitigation (in particular for developing 
countries and in the energy sector), the main (infor-
mation and incentive) barriers, the need to stimulate 
international technology cooperation and the existence 
of a substantial financing gap that needs to be filled. 
•  Other issues remain controversial, for example: how 
quickly a low carbon energy world can be achieved, 
the policy approach necessary to accelerate technology 
development and deployment (climate policies alone 
or additional technology policy instruments), and 
ways to achieve a significant shift in investments to 
sustainable technologies in an efficient manner. 
•  There is also debate on the role of intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) for the development and 
deployment of climate-friendly technologies (new 
international mechanisms to purchase IPRs for key 
technologies and licensing policies or IPRs and long 
lived patents for innovators to provide sufficient 
incentives). 
Summary of “The Mitigation Technology 
Challenge:  Considerations for National policy 
Makers to address Climate Change” 
by Martina Chidiak and Dennis Tirpak
Reducing greenhouse gas emissions to levels that will 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system presents a major technological chal-
lenge. The good news from the IPCC is that many 
mitigation scenarios for the medium term (i.e., until 
2030) suggest that there is considerable economic 
potential for reducing GHG emissions at costs ranging 
from negative to about $100 per ton of CO2. However, to 
stabilize GHG emissions, for example, at current levels by 
2030 as a first step, additional mobilization of investment 
and finance flows in the order of $200 billion (mostly 
aimed at the energy supply and transportation sectors) 
would be needed. These additional flows are large relative 
to the funds currently available, but low as compared to 
global GDP and investment. 
A mix of existing and new technologies and practices 
will be necessary to achieve the relevant mitigation 
levels predicted in the IPCC stabilization scenarios. 
While there is considerable economic potential for 
reducing GHG emissions, the costs of different mitigation 
options (technologies) vary considerably. There is also a 
large potential for no-cost mitigation, mostly related to 
improving energy efficiency in buildings, which imply 
negative costs (i.e., net benefits) if implemented, but 
require specific action and policies to deal with implemen-
tation barriers.  
Many existing and emerging technologies can help 
achieve a low carbon future and other goals. Each is at a 
different stage of the research, development, demonstra-
tion and deployment cycle (RDD&D). They are not being 
developed and diffused at the rate required because of a 
number of technological, financial, commercial and 
regulatory barriers. Nonetheless, recent evidence indicates 
that, due to policies in some countries, investment in clean 
energy technologies is growing and that new financial 
products and markets are being developed worldwide. 
Some key technologies include: 
•   Advanced fossil fuel power generation: The efficiency of 
coal-fired power plants averaged about 35% from 
1992 to 2005 globally, but the best operating plants 
can achieve 47%. The efficiency of most plants is 
therefore well below the potential offered by state-of-
the-art technologies. Retrofitting existing plants or 
installing new generation technology can achieve 
improved efficiencies. 
•   Biomass and bioenergy: Biomass – i.e., organic material 
grown and collected for energy use – is a source of 
renewable fuel that can be converted to provide heat, 
electricity and transport fuels. The scope for biomass to 
make a large contribution to global energy demand is 
dependent on its sustainable production, improved 
efficiencies in the supply chain, and new thermo-
chemical and bio-chemical conversion processes. 
•   Wind power: Wind power has grown rapidly since the 
1990s. Global installed capacity reached new heights in 
2007 with more than 40 countries having wind farms. 
In 2007, global capacity increased by 40%. The 
outlook is for continued double digit growth.
•   Buildings and appliances: Residential, commercial and 
public buildings encompass a wide array of technolo-
gies in the building envelope, including: insulation, 
space heating and cooling systems, water heating 
systems, lighting, appliances and consumer products. 
Buildings are, however, often refurbished – heating 
and cooling systems are often changed after 15-20 
years. Choosing the best available technology at the 
time of renovation therefore is important to long-term 
energy demand. 
•   Electricity transmission and distribution technologies: 
Much of the electricity that is produced is never used. 
Transmission and distribution losses account to 8.8% 
of the electricity produced worldwide. Developing 
countries often have short falls in electricity production 
that are met by curtailing electricity to different regions 
at certain times of the day. There are several technologi-
cal options available or under development to improve 
efficiencies of the grid.
Given the urgency of the climate change problem, 
policy makers in developing countries need to consider 
how they will contribute to reducing the rate of growth 
of GHG emissions in their countries. This involves 
consideration of their unique circumstances and special 
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non-permanent) and additionality (what additional 
emissions reductions came about because of the project), 
and how to monitor and report emission reductions or 
carbon sinks. These technical and methodological issues 
might need – in general terms – to be reassessed and 
complemented according to the LULUCF activities that 
become an eligible in a post-2012 agreement. In particu-
lar, there is the possibility that REDD and/or forest 
restoration becomes eligible.
LULUCF will therefore play a key role in any 
post-2012 international climate change regime 
emerging from the current negotiating processes  
under the United Nations. Currently there are three 
major negotiation processes under the UNFCCC: the 
AWG-KP (Kyoto Protocol), the AWG-LCA (UNFCCC 
discussion on the Bali Action Plan) and the ongoing 
discussions on REDD by one of the subsidiary bodies. 
In the majority of the submissions for the first 
meeting of the AWG-LCA, LULUCF is mentioned  
as an important option for mitigating climate change 
in developing countries. A major issue for discussion 
focuses on which activities to include. In the submissions, 
the following activities were mentioned: REDD, forest 
conservation, sustainable forest management and 
enhancements of sinks. Some Parties also mentioned 
afforestation and reforestation as well as forest 
management. In the discussions on REDD, there have 
been a number of submissions containing proposals on 
financing mechanisms. 
Summary of “Key issues in negotiations on  
land Use, land Use Change and Forestry,  
with an emphasis on developing countries” 
by Carmenza Robledo and Jürgen Blaser, Intercooperation
The land use sector, including forestry and agricul-
ture, is an important source of anthropogenic GHG 
emissions. Land use change, mainly deforestation, 
contributed to about 20% of the emissions from 
anthropogenic sources between 1989 and 1998. When 
adding all emissions from the LULUCF sector the share is 
over 30%. In addition, the land use sector has great 
potential in mitigating climate change.
Accordingly, the role of LULUCF activities in the 
mitigation of climate change has long been recognized. 
The UNFCCC includes commitments relating to the 
sector and much of the initial discussion relating to 
LULUCF focused on GHG inventories. The main issues 
of concern were how to compile activity data (a particular 
difficulty for poorer countries with problems in accessing 
satellite imageries, inventories or historic data) and how, 
based on this information, to accurately estimate emissions 
and removals by sinks. 
During the negotiations that led to the Kyoto Protocol 
in 1997, many countries highlighted the importance of 
including sinks and emissions from LULUCF in the 
Protocol’s commitments, subject to concerns about 
definitions, timing and scope. As a result, several articles of 
the Kyoto Protocol make provisions for the inclusion of 
LULUCF activities by Parties as part of their implementa-
tion efforts and contribute to the mitigation of climate 
change. Notably, in 2001 Parties agreed that limited 
LULUCF activities could be eligible for inclusion as 
activities under the CDM (afforestation and reforestation 
activities – known as A/R CDM).
A proposal on “reducing emissions from deforesta-
tion in developing countries and approaches to 
stimulate action” (REDD) was first considered by the 
COP in 2005. Since early 2006, discussions under the 
UNFCCC process have focused on:  the identification of 
drivers for deforestation; scientific, technical and meth-
odological issues relating to estimating and monitoring 
emissions from deforestation; and costs and technical 
barriers for the implementation of activities to reduce 
deforestation. Parties have also been considering a range of 
policy approaches and positive incentives and deliberated 
the advantages and disadvantages of various financing 
options. 
At COP 13, the Bali Action Plan was adopted, which 
states that: “Policy approaches and positive incentives on 
issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation in developing countries; and the 
role of conservation, sustainable management of forests 
and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing 
countries”.  Also at COP 13, another major decision to 
stimulate action was adopted, which provides a mandate 
for several elements and actions, including further 
strengthening ongoing efforts and support for capacity-
building, technical assistance and transfer of technology. 
In 2008, a program of work is being undertaken on 
methodological issues, such finding ways to measure forest 
degradation. 
Negotiating LULUCF in the framework of the 
UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol has been demonstrat-
ed to be very difficult for both Annex I (developed) and 
non-Annex I (developing) Parties. The fact that the 
contribution of LULUCF to Annex I Parties’ reduction 
commitments was agreed after the establishment of Kyoto 
targets constituted a major difficulty for using the whole 
potential of LULUCF as a means for mitigating climate 
change. That happened mainly because LULUCF was seen 
during the previous negotiations as a way to offset 
emissions, i.e., to avoid changing energy and consumption 
paths of the major emitters.
Based on the first experiences with LULUCF, stakehold-
ers directly involved in the implementation of LULUCF 
activities expressed a desire for simpler or more cost-effec-
tive ways to support the overall objective of the Conven-
tion through forestry activities. Some developed countries 
want more flexibility to achieve their targets, while some 
developing countries would prefer larger markets for 
CDM or other credits. For other developing countries, the 
concern is creating appropriate incentives. 
There are a number of technical and methodological 
issues that have evolved with the negotiations. Technical 
and methodological issues for carbon accounting have 
been developed to accurately quantify the mitigation 
potential of a particular LULUCF activity. Technical and 
methodological issues relate mainly to how to define a 
baseline or a reference scenario, how to treat leakage 
(sometimes called “displacement of emissions”), perma-
nence (carbon in reservoirs can be emitted at any time,  
e.g., a forest could burn, making emission reductions 
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benchmark being negotiated. This range has not, to date, 
been agreed in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term 
Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA).
In paragraph (b)(ii), the same language of MRV applies 
to mitigation actions by developing countries, but also to 
support through finance, technology and capacity-build-
ing. While there will always be different interpretations of 
agreed text, the Chair of the Group of 77 and China 
(G77) made clear in his interpretive statement in the final 
plenary that MRV applied to both mitigation and 
support10.  Most legal interpretations confirm that the 
comma prior to the last clause in (b)(ii) has the effect of 
applying it to the entire paragraph.
This short paragraph, then, reflects two very significant 
shifts. Firstly, developing countries have agreed to 
negotiate MRV mitigation action. In other words, 
developing countries are now willing to negotiate ‘quanti-
fiable’ mitigation actions, or to use the exact words 
“measurable, reportable and verifiable”. Not only can the 
emissions implications of actions be measured, they could 
also be reported to the international community and be 
capable of verification. 
Secondly, technology transfer and financial resources by 
developed countries need to pass the test of being verifi-
able, too. This similarly is a significant departure from the 
past, when much financing was through voluntary 
contributions to funds and the quantum of technology 
transferred was not measurable. In future, finance and 
technology will be subject to MRV. 
The Bali Action Plan in these key paragraphs refers to 
developed countries and developing countries, rather than 
Annex I and NAI Parties. This opens the possibility of 
defining what is meant by the new categories. The main 
implication is that some developed countries deal with 
mitigation under the AWG-KP, but all developed coun-
tries also address mitigation “commitments or actions, 
including QELROs” in (b)(i). It is the only place where 
mitigation can be discussed for those Annex I Parties that 
have not ratified the Protocol. No further distinction is 
made among developing countries in the Bali Action Plan, 
so that all G77 members would understand their mitiga-
tion actions to be dealt with under (b)(ii).
track was not a formal negotiation process, but initiated a 
discussion in four workshops over two years. Given that 
major developed countries had not ratified the Protocol, 
action for mitigation by such Parties has had to be 
considered under the Convention track rather than the 
Protocol track, i.e., the AWG-KP. (For an overview 
regarding Conference of the Parties (COP) decisions 
relevant to mitigation, please refer to Annex 1).
1.2 The Bali action plan
In Bali,9 the attempt was to retain the Annex I/non-
Annex I balance of mitigation commitments, but also to 
increase the sense of urgency on both sides. The balance 
was outlined in paragraphs (b)(i) and (b)(ii): 
 “(b)  Enhanced national/international action on 
mitigation of climate change, including, 
interalia, consideration of:
  (i)    Measurable, reportable and verifiable 
nationally appropriate mitigation commit-
ments or actions, including QELROs, by 
all developed country Parties, while 
ensuring the comparability of efforts among 
them, taking into account differences in 
their national circumstances; 
  (ii)   Nationally appropriate mitigation actions 
by developing country Parties in the 
context of sustainable development, 
supported and enabled by technology, 
financing and capacity-building, in a 
measurable, reportable and verifiable 
manner;”
One priority for developing countries in Bali was that all 
developed countries, including the US, take on QELROs. 
This was included only as an option in the final text, but 
comparability of efforts was introduced in (b)(i). Raising 
the level of effort for developed countries includes both 
broader participation, (i.e., including Annex I Parties that 
have not ratified the Protocol), but also, in the AWG-KP, 
more stringent efforts by Kyoto ratifiers in the second 
commitment period. In respect of the latter, the range of 
-25% to -40% from 1990 levels by 2020 is the key 
9   COP 13 and COP/MOP 3 were held from 3 - 14 December 2007 in Bali, Indonesia.
10  The Chair (Pakistan) in the final plenary in Bali indicated all the group was “asking for is that we are ready to have measurable, reportable, and verifiable mitigation but then that 
has also to qualify financing and technology.”  The statement can be viewed on the UNFCCC webcast. 
Climate change is one of the greatest threats to our 
planet and its people. Reducing emissions of greenhouse 
gases (GHG) is called mitigation. Responding to the 
impacts of climate change is called adaptation. A certain 
amount of adaptation will be necessary, no matter what we 
do. But, there will come a point where it will not be 
possible to adapt our way out of the problem. 
Mitigation has been at the heart of the climate negotia-
tions from the outset. As the next round of negotiations 
focuses on what developing countries might do on 
mitigation, the topic remains highly relevant. 
The remainder of this introduction briefly sketches the 
history of the climate negotiations, ending with the most 
recent agreements in Bali. The paper then turns to the 
scientific basis of the work on mitigation. Section 3 
introduces background concepts for proposals on mitiga-
tion, leading into the next section, which identifies not 
only different schools of thought but a number of specific 
proposals as well. The “hot” topic of how mitigation 
actions can be made ‘measurable, reportable and verifiable’ 
(MRV) is examined in section 5, before concluding with 
some questions for discussion. Information on the 
terminology used in this paper can be obtained from the 
glossary in Annex 4.
1.1 Background to the climate negotiations
In Rio de Janeiro in 19921,  the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
was negotiated, including its ultimate objective and the 
principles on which climate action is to be based. For 
developing countries, it is important to underscore that 
Article 2, the objective of the Convention, not only refers 
to stabilization of atmospheric concentrations in the 
atmosphere, but also refers to doing this in a way that 
allows sustainable development to proceed – ecologically 
(“ecosystems adapt”), socially (“food security”) and 
economic development. 
The Convention sets a framework for future action, it 
outlines the ‘rules of the game’ to enable to the interna-
tional community to agree on future action as the science 
improves or new tools and technologies become available. 
New information indeed became available through the 
Second Assessment Report from the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1995, informing the 
negotiation of the Berlin Mandate which in turn led to the 
Kyoto Protocol.  
In Kyoto in 1997,2  based on the principle of equity and 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities, it was agreed that Annex I Parties would take 
the leaders through quantified emission limitation and 
reduction objectives (QELROs) (UNFCCC 1997). For 
Annex I Parties, policies and measures (PAMs) are a means 
to achieve QELROs3.  Progress is to be reported by means 
of annual inventories and national communications4.  
In Kyoto, non-Annex I (NAI) Parties continued with 
qualitative mitigation measures5,  without quantifying the 
outcome. Parties considered this appropriate, given that 
development would imply increasing emissions. There is 
no mandatory requirement for particular PAMs, so that 
these could in future be a possible form of commitment in 
themselves. Reporting for NAI Parties includes national 
inventories, as well as “a general description of steps taken 
or envisaged”6 and in practice includes a section on 
mitigation program. 
There was agreement in 1992, that Annex II Parties 
would make available the “full agreed incremental costs” 
for NAI Parties to implement their commitments, 
including those to mitigation, as well as assist with 
technology transfer7. By Montréal in 20058, the Kyoto 
Protocol had entered into force, and Parties agreed to 
launch a two-track approach. The Kyoto track set up an 
Ad-hoc Working Group on further commitments of 
Annex I Parties (AWG-KP) to negotiate commitments for 
Annex I Parties for subsequent commitment periods, as 
mandated by Article 3.9 of the Protocol. The Convention 
1 iNTRodUCTioN
1  United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992.
2  The third Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 3) was held in Kyoto, Japan from 1 - 11 December 1997. 
3  Indeed, PAMs are the first item listed in Protocol Article 2.1(a).
4  Reporting for Annex I in terms of Protocol Articles 5, 7 and 8 and FCCC Article 12.2. 
5  FCCC Article 4.1b mitigation programs for all Parties. 
6  FCCC Article 12.1 on reporting by all Parties, including developing countries, governs inter alia NAI inventories and national communications. 
7  FCCC Articles 4.3, 4.5 and 4.7 on financial and technology transfer, and both (4.7).  
8   COP 11 and the first Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties (COP/MOP 1) were held from 28 November to 9 December 2005 in Montréal, Canada. 
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All work under the Convention and its Protocol is done 
on the basis of the best available scientific information. 
Workshops on mitigation in the AWG-LCA are likely to 
happen in 2009. In the meantime, however, there is 
significant scientific information, in particular from the 
IPCC. The IPCC assesses our state of knowledge on climate 
change.
In 2007, the IPCC issued its Fourth Assessment Report 
(AR4). The science (Working Group I, abbreviated WG I) 
is now “unequivocal” that human activity is contributing to 
climate change, and the impacts (Working Group II) are 
already being observed in all sectors – food, water, health, 
agriculture, energy, etc11. The contribution from Working 
Group III deals with mitigation (IPCC 2007b). 
IPCC AR4 assessed several stabilization levels in the 
literature. This information provides clear information 
about what mitigation is needed to keep stabilization levels 
low and hence avoid the worst impacts of climate change 
(see Table 1). The impacts themselves are outlined in 
Working Group II report (IPCC 2007a). If we are to avoid 
the worst damages and keep concentrations at the lowest 
level assessed (450 parts per million by volume (ppmv), 
which would still see climate impacts), then what is 
required are absolute emission reductions by Annex I 
and relative emission reductions12 for developing 
countries. In fact, the pattern of action applies for 550 
ppmv as well, only with less stringent requirements – but 
also correspondingly higher climate impacts. Only at 650 
ppmv is no ‘deviation from baseline’ emissions required in 
developing countries – and then only up to 2020 – but 
there would also be more dramatic impacts. (For more 
details, please refer to IPCC AR4 Section 3.)
IPCC AR4 also found that “climate policy alone will not 
solve the climate problem” (IPCC 2007a). Development 
policy is at least as important. Policy on technology, 
industry, agriculture, energy, housing and a whole range of 
other areas will be important, not only climate policy 
conceived as environmental policy alone.
2. SCieNTiFiC BaSiS FoR MiTiGaTioN aNd developMeNT 
11  For more information, please refer to the paper produced for this series entitled “Adaptation to climate change:  The new challenge for development in the developing world”.
12  Absolute reductions would be lower than in a previous year, the base year, while relative reductions are typically defined to be below pro-jected future levels. If emissions are 
projected to increase, a relative reduction might still see total, absolute emissions rising.
SCeNaRio CaTeGoRY ReGioN 2020 2050
A-450 Annex i -25% to -40% -80% to 95%
ppmv Co2 -eq
b non-Annex i Substantial deviation from base Line 
in Latin America, middle East, East 
Asia and Centrally-planned Asia
Substantial deviation from baseline 
in all regions
B-550 Annex i -10% to -30% -40% to 90%
ppmv Co2-eq non-Annex i Deviation from baseline in Latin 
America and middle East, East Asia
Deviation from baseline in most 
regions, especially in Latin America 
and middle East
C-650 Annex i 0% to -25% -30% to -80%
ppmv Co2 -eq non-Annex i Baseline Deviation from baseline in Latin 
America and middle East, East Asia
Table 1: Ranges of emission reductions required for various stabilization levels
the range of the difference between emissions in 1990 and emission allowances in 2020/2050 for various 
gHg concentration levels for Annex i and non-Annex i countries as a groupa.
a  the aggregate range is based on multiple approaches to apportion emissions between regions (concentration and convergence, 
multistage, triptych and intensity targets, among others). Each approach makes different assumptions about the pathway, specific 
national efforts and other variables. Additional extreme cases – in which Annex i undertakes all reductions, or non-Annex i undertakes 
all reductions – are not included. the ranges presented here do not imply political feasibility, nor do the results reflect cost variances.
b  only the studies aiming at stabilization at 450 ppmv Co2-eq assume a (temporary) overshoot of about 50 ppmv Co2-eq (see Den Elzen 
and meinshausen, 2006).
Source: IPCC Working Group III (WG III) 2007. Chapter 13. Box 13.7.
The balances between paragraphs b(i) and b(ii) are likely 
to remain central in refining the architecture of the climate 
regime after 2012. The negotiations on mitigation in the 
AWG-LCA on mitigation continue to be difficult, 
reflected in the work plan for 2008, which was unable to 
agree on workshops on mitigation issues such as MRV, 
comparability of effort and others. During this year, 
mitigation will be treated as one of the five agenda items 
(mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology and shared 
vision), with all five being considered by every meeting of 
the AWG-LCA in 2008.  
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As can be seen from section 1, Convention14 negotia-
tions can result in decisions and wording that are broad 
and offer room for different interpretations. This section 
outlines key mitigation concepts and principles that  
must be understood in order to assess mitigation option 
proposals, before specific proposals are outlined in  
section 4.
The principles of the Convention  include that “Parties 
should protect the climate system for the benefit of 
present and future generations of humankind, on the 
basis of equity and common but differentiated respon-
sibilities and respective capabilities”, which leads to the 
requirement that developed countries take the lead (Art 
3.1).  Further principles include: 
•  The specific needs and special circumstances of 
developing countries; 
•  Taking a precautionary approach (i.e, scientific 
uncertainty is no excuse for inaction); 
• The right to promote sustainable development; and 
• Sustainable economic growth15. 
If one wants to quantify responsibility and capability, it 
matters what metric is chosen to approximate these 
concepts. The numerical outcome for a particular country 
will differ, depending on whether we consider:
•  Particular gases (only CO2 or all six Kyoto Protocol 
gases)16; 
•  Which sources of emissions (energy only, or also land 
use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF);17  
•  Which time-frame (annual or cumulative emissions); 
and 
• At what scale (national, or per capita emissions).
3. BaCKGRoUNd CoNCepTS iN pRopoSalS FoR MiTiGaTioN 
14 FCCC Article 3 contains a set of principles. 
15 For the full text, see FCCC Articles 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5
16  The six GHGs listed in Annex A to the Kyoto Protocol are carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N20), hydro fluorocarbons (HFCs), per fluorocarbons (PFCs) and 
sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). 
17 Please refer to the paper produced for this series titled, Key issues on land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) with an emphasis on developing country perspectives. 
It also means that a much wider set of actors need to be 
involved in mitigation, particularly in the context of 
development. Within government, it would not only be 
environmental departments or meteorologists who would 
consider climate policy, but also departments of energy, 
forestry, housing, finance and virtually any other depart-
ment, including sub-national and local governments. For 
mitigation, the role of the private sector will be equally 
important, particularly in countries where most emissions 
are due to industrial activity. Civil society will need to play 
an important role in advocating for climate policy as well.  
Given all of this, the role of focal points on climate 
change may in future require a much greater element of 
coordination. Coordination will be needed to align 
policies across spheres of government, across sectors and 
across the economy and society more broadly. Coordi-
nated work at the national level13 would provide a solid 
basis for considering the various proposals in the multilat-
eral negotiations. 
Making development more sustainable by changing 
development paths can thus make a significant contribu-
tion to climate goals. We should think of development 
paths not as mapped-out paths, but the result of many 
decisions by different actors in various places. To make this 
more concrete, WG III gives a few examples of how this 
might work:
•   GHG emissions are influenced by, but not rigidly 
linked to economic growth: policy choices make a 
difference.
•  Sectors where effective production is far below the 
maximum feasible production with the same amount 
of inputs – i.e,, sectors that are far away from their 
production frontier – have opportunities to adopt 
‘win-win-win’ policies, i.e, policies that free up 
resources and bolster growth, meet other sustainable 
development goals and also reduce GHG emissions 
relative to baseline. 
•  Sectors where production is close to the optimal given 
available inputs – i.e,, sectors that are closer to the 
production frontier – also have opportunities to 
reduce emissions by meeting other sustainable 
development goals. However, the closer one gets to 
the production frontier, the more trade-offs are likely 
to appear. 
•  What matters is not only that a ‘good’ choice is made 
at a certain point in time, but also that the initial 
policy is sustained for a long time – sometimes several 
decades – to truly have effects. 
•  It is often not one policy decision, but an array of 
decisions that are necessary to influence emissions.  
This raises the issue of coordination between policies  
in several sectors, and at various scales.
Not only do development policies matter, but there is 
also much evidence that pursuing local sustainable 
development has co-benefits, also reducing GHG emis-
sions. A development-oriented approach to mitigation is 
of particular interest for developing countries, where 
poverty and development are higher on the agenda than 
climate policy.
13   For more information, please refer to the paper in this series titled National policies and their linkages to negotiations over a future international climate change agreement, sections 
4 and 5.
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The more recent assessment of the IPCC illustrates the 
differences (see Figures 1 and 2). The upper graph shows 
the emissions per capita for different regions on the 
vertical axis, with the population added along the horizon-
tal axis. On the lower graph, emissions by GDP (for the 
year 2004) are shown. For Africa, the bar is higher on an 
annual basis than a per capita basis; while for South Asia, 
per capita is lower. Such comparisons can be made for 
other regions and measures – the point is that it matters 
what you count. In the negotiations, countries will 
typically favor measures that show them in the most 
favorable light or support their interests. 
The IPCC AR4 found that the scenarios in the Special 
Report on Emissions Scenarios (IPCC 2000), without any 
mitigation, project an increase of baseline global GHG 
emissions by a range of 9.7 to 36.7 GtCO2-eq (25-90%) 
between 2000 and 2030. Two thirds to three quarters of 
this increase in energy CO2 emissions is projected to come 
from NAI regions, with their average per capita energy 
CO2 emissions being projected to remain substantially 
lower (2.8-5.1 tons of CO2 (tCO2)/cap) than those in 
Annex I regions (9.6-15.1 tCO2/cap) by 2030.
That is as far as the best available scientific information 
goes. Eventually, however, the allocation of emissions and 
burden sharing is a deeply political matter. There have 
been suggestions that, instead of leaving such 
allocation purely to political horse-trading, it might at 
least be possible to establish some analytical criteria. 
Political concepts, such as responsibility and capability in 
FCCC Article 3.1, could be approximated by analytical 
measures. In that way, principles could be operationalized 
into key criteria that would cut across different approaches 
(Ott et al. 2004): 
•  Responsibility has been defined in the Brazilian 
proposal directly in relation to the contribution to 
temperature increase (see section 4.2.3 for further 
details). A reasonable approximation of the more 
complex measures of responsibility is cumulative 
emissions of fossil CO2 over 1990 to 2000 as an 
indicator of responsibility. The relatively recent period 
avoids ‘punishing’ countries for historical emissions, 
when the consequences were less widely known. At 
least since the IPCC’s First Assessment Report in 
1990, the implications can be said to be well-known 
internationally.
•  A country may have high responsibility for 
contributing GHG emissions, but nonetheless be 
too poor to mitigate. For this reason we include 
indicators reflecting capability. Emissions do not have 
to be linked to human development, but under given 
socio-economic and technological conditions, a 
certain level of emissions will be necessary to guaran-
tee a decent life for poor people. We consider two 
indicators of capability, the human development 
index (HDI) and GDP per capita. Countries with 
higher levels of national income and a higher rank on 
the HDI might be expected to carry a higher burden 
of mitigation. 
•  The potential to mitigate can be related to three 
factors – emissions intensity, emissions per capita 
and emissions growth rate. A high value for CO2/
GDP would suggest high potential to mitigate. The 
more efficient an economy already is (lower CO2 
emissions per unit GDP), the less potential there is 
(at a given cost) to mitigate further through efficiency. 
However, the level of emissions per capita needs to be 
taken into account as well. High per capita emissions 
suggest unsustainable consumption patterns, which 
should provide potential to mitigate without endan-
gering a basic level of development, e.g., by lifestyle 
changes. National circumstances such as resource 
endowments also influence mitigation potential. 
Finally, the growth rate of absolute emissions gives an 
idea of whether the rate of increase is still high or has 
already been curbed. 
Of course there are many other criteria, e.g., natural 
resource endowments or population per square kilometer, 
that could be introduced, or variants to the criteria above 
(see the further information and readings suggested in the 
references and Annex 3 below).
The acceptability of the criteria may be affected by 
whether they apply only to developing countries or to all 
countries. For example criteria that apply to all countries 
might include a longer historical period for cumulative 
emissions than criteria that apply only to developing 
countries. As mentioned below, the appropriate weighting 
of the criteria depends on whether market mechanisms can 
be used to meet the commitments. If they can be used, 
then the ability to pay becomes more relevant and potential 
for emissions reductions becomes less important because 
emissions do not need to be reduced domestically.
 
 
Figure 1: annual emissions by region, per capita
note:  year 2004 distribution of regional per capita gHg emissions (all Kyoto gases, including those from land-use) over the 
population of different country groupings. the percentages in the bars indicate a regions share in global gHg emissions.
Figure 2: annual emissions by region, per $ Gross domestic product (Gdp)
note: year 2004 distribution of regional gHg emissions (all Kyoto gases, including those from land-use) per $ of 
gDpppp (with ppp = purchasing power parity) over the gDpppp of different country groupings. the percentages in 
the bars indicate a regions share in global gHg emissions.
Source: IPCC 2007. Climate Change Synthesis Report
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Table 3: emissions from developing regions by various measures
africa (SUB-SaHaraN 
aND NorTH)19 
NoN-aNNex i aSia20  laTiN america aND  
cariBBeaN21  
Cumulative emissions 1950 - 2000,  
only Co2, only energy
 
mtCo2 21,197 157,085 33,744
% of world total  2.7%  20.0%  4.3%
Cumulative emissions 1950 - 2000,  
only Co2 (energy and LuLuCF)
 
mtCo2 61,553 321,105 138,447
% of world total  5.6%  29.2%  12.6%
Annual emissions in 2000, only Co2 
(energy and LuLuCF)
mtCo2 2,277 11,758 3,681
% of world total 7.2%   37.2% 11.7%   
Annual emissions in 2000, all six gases
 
mtCo2-eq 3,271 15,690 4,918
% of world total 8.0% 38.1%  12.0%  
per capita emissions in 2000, all  
six gases
 
tons Co2-eq per person 4.2
global average  6.8 4.5  9.6
Carbon intensity of economy in 2002 tons of Co2 / mill intl $ 
of gDp
469 562 354
 global average 507
Source: WRI 2003. Climate Analysis Indicators Tool.
19  The region ‘AFRICA’ in this table includes the following non-Annex I countries: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Congo, Dem. Republic , Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauri-tania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
20  The region ‘ASIA’ in this table includes the following Non-Annex I countries: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Chinese 
Taipei, Cook Islands, Fiji, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Korea (North), Korea (South), Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Malaysia, Maldives, 
Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, Niue, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Qatar, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tajikistan, 
Thailand, Tonga, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Vietnam, Yemen.
21  The region ‘LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN’ in this table includes the following Non-Annex I countries: Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salva-dor, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts & Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent & Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela.
The time-frame (annual or cumulative) matters: For 
South Africa, for example, the share of world emission is 
1.4% by annual energy CO2 emissions, but 0.9% by 
cumulative emissions; for China, the share drops from 
17.5% to 9.9%. For Brazil, the inclusion of LULUCF in the 
consideration increases its share from 1.2% to 5.4%, 
reflecting the predominance of this source in the country’s 
emissions profile. Population matters: India may have 4.0% 
to 4.5% of total annual world emissions (depending on 
gases and sources), but on a per capita basis, its emissions 
are well below the global average. Many other comparisons 
can be drawn from Table 2 – and comparing these to other 
countries, including Annex I Parties. In the scope of this 
paper, an indication is given for a few developing countries.
To be more comprehensive, Table 3 presents various 
measures of emissions (annual, cumulative, per capita) for 
three regions of developing countries. Developing regions 
include only NAI Parties, which are listed in endnotes for 
each region. NAI Parties that are not included in any of the 
regions in Table 3 and Table 4: 4 are Albania, Belarus, 
Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cyprus, Macedonia (FYR), Malta, 
Moldova, Serbia & Montenegro; which together comprise 
 arGeN-
TiNa





Annual emissions Emissions in 2004 of Co2, 
energy, excl. LuLuCF, mtCo2 
(mt = megatons, 106 tons)
 146 346  5,205 1,199 415 428  507 29,734 
 % of world total 0.5% 1.2% 17.5% 4.0% 1.4% 1.4% 1.7% 100%
Annual emissions Emissions in 2000, six gases, 
including LuLuCF, mtCo2-eq
347 2,222  4,915 1,861 609 420  522 41,363 
% of world total 0.8% 5.4% 11.9% 4.5% 1.5% 1.0% 1.3% 100%
per capita  
allowances
Emissions per capita in 2000, 
six gases, including LuLuCF, 
mtCo2-eq
9.4 13.1 3.9 1.8 6.2 9.5 11.1 6.8
per capita  
allowances
Emissions per capita in 2000, 
six gases, excluding LuLuCF, 
mtCo2-eq
7.9 5.0 3.9 1.9 5.2 9.5 11.1 5.6
Historical  
responsibility
Cumulative emissions 1950 
- 2000, only Co2 (energy and 
LuLuCF), mtCo2-eq
6916 68,389 110,675 17,581 13,698 10,250  7,800 1,113,122 
 % of world total 0.6% 6.1% 9.9% 1.6% 1.2% 0.9% 0.7% 100%
Ability to pay gDp/capita, int’l $, ppp 2000 
$, value for 2002
 10,134  7,480 4,379  2,555  8,798  9,813  17,662  7,643 
mitigation potential 
in terms of 
emissions intensity
Co2/gDp, kg Co2/int’l $ gDp 
ppp 2000
 343 263 616 399 438 787  563  521 
Table 2:  possible indicators for responsibility, capability and potential to mitigate 
in selected developing countries emissions by various measures18
18  Table 2: Possible Indicators for responsibility, capability and potential to mitigate in selected developing countries emissions by various measures is an updated version of a 
table produced in earlier work (Winkler et al. 2002b). The earlier analysis included information on emission reductions, but these depend on underlying assumptions and are not 
included here. Readers are referred to the earlier work.
Many of the proposals found in the literature have some 
basis in numerical parameters or indicators – be they 
top-down approaches (e.g., the Brazilian proposal based on 
historical cumulative emissions; or per capita approaches) 
or bottom-up (e.g., based on intensity). These are consid-
ered in section 4. One possible set of implications of 
different criteria for selected developing countries are 
shown in Table 2. Historical responsibility would be based 
primarily on cumulative emissions; per capita might be 
another indicator of responsibility; ability to pay uses 
GDP/capita as a key measure; while emissions intensity is 
measured by GHG per unit of GDP. Table 2 illustrates 
with numerical values that it matters which indicators are 
used to assess responsibility, capacity and potential to 
mitigate in developing countries. 
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4.1 different approaches
A wide variety of approaches under the mitigation 
building block for the architecture of the climate regime 
up to and beyond 2012 have been proposed. Some of 
these include: 
• Extending fixed targets Kyoto-style; 
• Universal carbon taxes; 
•  Allocations of emissions per capita (Aslam 2002; 
Meyer 2000; Gupta & Bhandari 1999); 
•  The Brazilian proposal which allocates emissions 
allowances in relation to the contribution to change in 
temperature (Brazil 1997; La Rovere et al. 2002; 
Pinguelli Rosa & Kahn Ribeiro 2001; UNFCCC 
2002); 
•  Common but differentiated convergence (Höhne et al. 
2006a); 
•  Emissions intensity (Herzog et al. 2006; Kim & 
Baumert 2002; Chung 2007); 
•  Sector-based Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
(Samaniego & Figueres 2002; Sterk & Wittneben 
2006); technology agreements (Edmonds & Wise 
1998); 
•  Various sectoral approaches (Ward 2006; Schmidt et 
al. 2006; Ellis & Baron 2005); 
•  Triptych approach extended to the global context 
(Groenenberg et al. 2001; Den Elzen et al. 2007); 
•  Converging markets (Tangen & Hasselknippe 2004; 
Victor et al. 2005); 
•   Safety valve approaches (Philibert 2002); greenhouse 
development rights (Baer et al. 2007); and,
•  Sustainable development policies and measures 
(SD-PAMs) (Winkler et al. 2002a; Winkler et al. 
2007). 
The preceding list does not necessarily cover all propos-
als put forward in the burgeoning literature. The literature 
includes many more, as well as an evaluation of several 
proposals focusing specifically on adequacy and equity 
(Baer & Athanasiou 2007). There have been processes 
bringing together perspectives from North and South, 
including the South-North Dialogue (Ott et al. 2004); an 
on-going future action dialogue among selected negotia-
tors (CCAP 2007) and the Sao Paolo Proposal (BASIC 
Project 2006). IPCC AR4 assessed the proposals, and 
Table 13.2 provides probably the most authoritative 
overview of recent proposals for international climate 
agreements, at least up to the cut-off date for literature 
assessed (mid-2006). The table is reproduced in Annex 3.
Relatively few of these proposals originate from develop-
ing countries, and a smaller sub-set of those have come 
from developing country Parties. The Brazilian Proposal 
stands out as a major exception to this rule, having been 
formally tabled prior to Kyoto (Brazil 1997). At the time, 
it took a scientific approach to burden-sharing among 
Annex I Parties, calculating the contribution to tempera-
ture increase and hence responsibility for mitigation. By 
focusing on responsibility, the Brazilian proposal had a 
strong basis of equity. It also has also has a strong scientific 
basis, since the key factor determining temperature change 
is cumulative emissions, rather than annual ones. 
To understand the multiplicity of proposals, two things 
may be helpful. Firstly, it may be helpful to consider the 
broader, underlying approaches within a simpler 
conceptual framework. This is done in the rest of this 
section. The second part is to elaborate at least some  
of the proposals in a little more detail, which is  
considered in section 4.2 below.
4. oveRvieW oF opTioNS FoR MiTiGaTioN iN developiNG CoUNTRieS
Table 4: emissions from developing regions by the same measures, excluding certain countries22  
africa (SUB-SaHaraN 
aND NorTH)
NoN-aNNex i aSia laTiN america aND 
cariBBeaN
Cumulative emissions 1950 - 2000, only 
Co2, only energy
mtCo2 10,995 55,066 16,904
% of world total 1.4% 7.0% 2.1%
Cumulative emissions 1950 - 2000, only 
Co2 (energy and LuLuCF)
mtCo2 51,303 104,760 56,360
% of world total 4.7% 9.5% 5.1%
Annual emissions in 2000, only Co2 
(energy and LuLuCF)
mtCo2 1,926 3,998 1,489
% of world total 6.1% 12.7% 4.7%
Annual emissions in 2000, all six gases
 
mtCo2-eq 2,851 5,327 2,087
% of world total 6.9% 12.9% 5.1%
per capita emissions in 2000, all six 
gases
tons Co2-eq per person 3.8 5.7 8.6
global average 6.8




Source: WRI 2003. Climate Analysis Indicators Tool.
Having seen in overview some of the key parameters 
and how they differ depending on what indicator is used, 
we turn next to specific proposal for mitigation in 
developing countries. 
22  Developing regions include the same countries as for Table 2, except that in Table 4: , the following countries are excluded: South Africa from AFRICA; Brazil and Mexico from 
LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN; and China, India, Indonesia and South Korea from NON-ANNEX I ASIA.
0.5 % of emissions of six gases in 2000. All countries for 
which no data is available in CAIT (WRI 2005, 2003) are 
also not included. Again, a few observations illustrate the 
differences made by removing the larger countries. Remov-
ing South Africa from Africa reduces Africa’s share from 
2.7% to 1.4%. Per capita emissions in developing Asia 
increase from 4.5 tons to 5.7 t CO2-eq per person, when 
China, India, Indonesia and South Korea are removed. The 
increased level of absolute emissions is more than out-
weighed by not counting the large populations in those 
countries. Not including Brazil in the region Latin America 
and Caribbean increases emissions intensity from 354 to 
386 t CO2-eq/$ of GDP, as Brazil’s hydro-based electricity 
system is no longer taken into account. 
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There are various ways of thinking about the different 
types of architecture that are represented in the diversity of 
proposals, introduced above and elaborated in section 4.2 
below. A paper (prepared jointly by the United Kingdom 
and South Africa) was presented at an informal Ministerial 
discussion in Sweden (DEAT & DEFRA 2007) and 
identified the following four schools of thought or 





In reviewing a range of proposals, the Working Group 
III SPM of AR4 concluded that there was high agreement 
and much evidence “that successful agreements are 
environmentally effective, cost-effective, incorporate 
distributional considerations and equity, and are institu-
tionally feasible” (IPCC 2007c). Thus some criteria can be 
established to evaluate different schools of though on the 
architecture of the climate regime.
It is unlikely that any “pure” approach would be 
adopted in its entirety. Just as there is no single, definitive 
list of elements, though, there is not a single conception of 
a balanced package. Indeed, it seems highly unlikely that 
any single package proposed by anyone would be adopted 
“as is” by everyone. Rather, it is more helpful to think of 
several packages along a theoretical continuum.
Negotiators will need to merge packages while 
carefully balancing key elements and interest. So the 
focus turns to a continuum of packages that might be 
capable of consensus – or to use another phrase, that are in 
the political contract zone. After Bali, the core elements or 
building blocks of a package deal have emerged. The 
balance between adaptation and mitigation is clearly 
reflected. Deeper cuts from all developed countries and 
actions by developing countries are part of the agenda, as 
is comparable effort. And the importance of the means of 
implementation, notably finance and technology, is encod-
ed in the Bali Action Plan.23 On the road from Bali to 
Copenhagen, the details of the four building blocks and 
the shared vision will have to be elaborated. In those 
negotiations, specific approaches to the future of the 
climate regime may become important. 
4.2  More detailed description of selected  
approaches 
A wide variety of approaches to future commitments 
have been proposed – most of them informally or in the 
academic literature, with only few having been officially 
endorsed. This section does not summarize every ap-
proach, but concentrates on selected types of approaches. 
This short document does not allow all approaches to be 
elaborated; the reader is referred to surveys of approaches 
in the further reading (see bibliography below). 
Different people will categorize various proposals in 
different ways. The proposals described in this short paper 
are selected to illustrate different the different schools of 
thought. The approach of putting the ‘atmosphere first’ 
could be represented by extending Kyoto targets to a 
broader set of countries (see section 4.2.1). Putting equity 
first can mean several things, at least two of which – equal 
entitlements for each person and historical responsibility 
– are reflected in per capita approaches and the Brazilian 
proposal (4.2.2 and 4.2.3). 
Others argue that the right to (sustainable) development 
is also a matter of equity. And indeed, equity relates not 
only to mitigation, but also to adaptation, finance and 
technology. Specific approaches that put development first 
would include GDP as a measure of development in 
intensity targets (4.2.4), explicitly start from sustainable 
development policies (4.2.5) or build on the development 
aspects of the CDM (4.2.6). Sectoral approaches are 
linked to putting technology first, while the Global 
Triptych approach disaggregates standards for just three 
sectors (4.2.7 and 4.2.7). 
4.2.1 Kyoto-style fixed targets
Kyoto-style fixed targets take the form of an agreed 
percentage reduction against annual emissions in a base 
year, 1990. An absolute number of tons of CO2 to be 
reduced is calculated. By starting from the countries’ own 
emissions, the approach ‘grandfathers’ existing differences 
between countries in emissions. The challenge for many 
Annex I Parties lies more in returning to base year level of 
emissions, rather than the reduction negotiated. In 
numerical terms, the growth of emissions since 1990 is 
 23 Decision 1/Cp.13, the Bali Action plan.
aTmoSPHere firST eqUiTY firST DeVeloPmeNT firST TecHNoloGY firST
objective Stabilizing gHg concentrations Ensuring fairness of alloca-
tion of mitigation burdens 
(historic contributions)
making development more 
sustainable
Development and transfer 
of low carbon technologies
Stringency Agreement on “safe” gHg con-
centration level or global gHg 
reduction targets & timeframes
Agreement on “safe” gHg 
concentration level
not a distinctive feature Set in terms of technology 
goal or budgetary contri-
bution to rD&D
Quantified GhG related 
commitments
-  Carbon budget is back 
calculated & allocated among 
countries based on current & 
future emissions reduction 
potential
-  Carbon markets vital incen-
tives to join the regime
-  “Trigger” for participation at 
various stages
-  Carbon budget is allocated 
among countries according 
to historical responsibility
-  “Trigger” for participa-
tion, but usually later than 
atmosphere first
-  Carbon markets vital with 
large flows to developing 
countries
not the focus, contribution 
depends on number and 
ambition of SD policies imple-
mented
- not only carbon markets
no quantified commit-
ments, hence limited or no 
carbon markets
Coverage All gHgs including LuLuCF and 
int. transport 80% of global 
emissions. minimum inclusion of 
20-30 main emitters
All gHgs including LuLuCF 
and int. transport. inclusion of 
all countries
unlikely to cover all gases and 
sectors
Several technology agree-
ments to cover all sectors. 
unlikely to cover all gases 
and sectors
policies and measures (SD-)pAms for countries before 
the trigger for e.g, deforesta-
tion and low carbon energy & 
transportation
(SD-)pAms for countries 
before the trigger for e.g, 
deforestation and low carbon 
energy & transportation
Richer countries would pay 
the cost of implementing 
Sd paMs in developing 
countries: e.g,, enforcing the 
efficiency standards
list of good/best practice 
policies could serve as infor-
mation
(Coordinated) energy 





not a distinctive feature no obligation for additional 
technology transfer
provision of finances and 
technology for developing 
countries
Cooperation to increase 
development, transfer 











Funded from levy on market 
mechanisms not distinctive as 
focus on prevention
Compensation of damage 
costs paid according to 
historical responsibility
Funded also through SD-pAms not a distinctive feature
Response measures Funded from levy on market 
mechanisms not distinctive as 
focus on prevention
Historically larger emitters 
to assist losers adjust to the 
transition
tailor made SD-pAms allow for 
diversification
Efforts could be geared 





main 20-30 emitters must be in-
cluded early on or at the outset 
of the agreement
normative definition of 
historical responsibility for the 
trigger
High participation, high 
degree of international 
coordination and information 
exchange
Several technology 
agreements with different 
participation
Table 5: Summary of approaches/schools of thought
note: Bold indicates a distinctive feature of an approach
Source: DEAT & DEFRA 2007. Scenarios for future international climate change policy
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type of mitigation 
commitment:
Each country receives entitlement, i.e, tons of Co2 
allowance, rather than a specified reduction. Enti-
tlements are tradable
participation: potentially all countries
institutional  
requirements:
Would depend on the design of the regime; likely 
that nation-States would still receive allowances on 
behalf of the population





Consequences of exceeding per capita allowances 




Sensitive to population, but not other differences, 
e.g, re-source endowments 
timing: Long-term goal; per capita emissions converge 
over time
Questions: 
•  Is per capita a useful principle for defining equity? 
What other dimensions of equity are there? 
•  Would your country be ready to take on mitigation 
commitments on a per capita basis? What are the 
implications of such an approach for your country? 
•  Does the institutional capacity exist in your country to 
implement this approach? 
type of mitigation 
commitment:
Emission reductions based on historical  
responsibility for existing temperature change




Data requirements, see text





Would need to be defined; original suggestion 
was to contribute to the Clean Development 
Fund
Sensitivity to national 
circumstances:
Historical responsibility would account for 
some; but not explicitly adjusted for
timing: Long-term, taking into account effect of gHgs 
in atmosphere over long time
Questions:
•  Is the data available in your country to calculate 
historical responsibility? Does the institutional capacity 
exist in your country to implement this approach? 
•  Is historical responsibility a useful criterion to inform 
mitigation commitments?  
•  When should we begin counting historical cumulative 
emissions? 1990? 1950? 1860? 
4.2.3 Brazilian Proposal 
The Brazilian proposal (Brazil 1997) bases its burden-
sharing approach on historical responsibility for change in 
temperature to individual countries. The original Brazilian 
proposal attributed responsibility among Annex I coun-
tries for an overall reduction of 30% below 1990 levels by 
2020. While the detailed derivation of emission reductions 
based on this system goes beyond the scope of this paper, a 
key difference to most other approaches is the use of 
cumulative historical emissions rather than current annual 
emissions (La Rovere et al. 2002).
As with other approaches, the detailed parameters used 
will matter – they will define the stringency of the 
mitigation action for specific countries. For the Brazilian 
proposal, of particular significance are the gases and 
sectors (forestry) chosen, the end date for analysis, and the 
representation of atmospheric chemistry in the model. 
The approach requires significant data, and this may 
limit applicability.
The approach has since been extended to a global 
scheme involving developing countries as well (e.g., 
UNFCCC 2002; Pinguelli Rosa & Kahn Ribeiro 2001). 
The proposal is the only approach for a future climate 
regime officially proposed to UNFCCC Parties.
when their per capita emission are a certain percentage 
above the global average. Before then, developing coun-
tries can take voluntary actions.
Questions: 
•  Would your country be ready to take on this type of 
mitigation commitment? What are the implica-tions 
of such an approach for your country? 
•  Does the institutional capacity exist in your country to 
implement this approach? 
•  Can one say that Kyoto-style absolute targets are 
‘harder’ than other types of mitigation commitments?
•  Would ‘growth caps’ (i.e, Kyoto-style targets), but with 
generous increases of emissions above base year levels, 
be an acceptable mitigation commitment for develop-
ing countries? 
type of mitigation 
commitment:
Allowance calculated as reduction (less than 100%) or 
limit (greater than 100%) on emissions in base year, 
yielding tons of Co2 allowance. Flexible mechanisms 
can be used
participation: All countries who agree to commitments inscribed in 
Annex B of the Kyoto protocol
institutional  
requirements:
institutional architecture exists, but new countries 
would have to set up institutions for monitoring, 
reporting and verification under protocol Articles 5, 7 
and 8. internationally, a sufficient number of parties 
must ratify the amendment
Legal nature  
(voluntary/binding):
Binding, once the party has agreed to make a com-
mitment and it is ratified
Accountability 
procedures:
Compliance provisions of the Kyoto protocol
Sensitivity to nation-
al circumstances:
Limited, although differences in percentages possible
timing: Commitment periods, first one is five years, future 
ones may be longer
often larger than the percentage inscribed in Annex B of 
the Protocol. 
Mechanisms exist in the Convention and Protocol to 
bring more countries into Annex I by voluntary commit-
ments from the Parties or a COP decision to amend 
Annex I (Depledge 2002). These could be used to broaden 
the set of countries taking on this type of target. The 
approach has the attraction of directly building on known 
institutions and frameworks, including the CDM, other 
flexible mechanisms and the reporting and monitoring 
system. 
4.2.2 Per capita
Per capita entitlements takes as its starting point the 
equal right of each person to use the atmosphere as a 
global commons. In a pure per capita approach, there is 
no reference to current emissions levels, but simply a 
global budget allocated equally to countries based on 
population. The Centre for Science and Environment has 
promoted per capita approaches from an early stage, 
(Agarwal & Narain 1991) and particularly includes an 
allowance for basic sustainable emission rights (Agarwal 
2000). The targets of absolute emissions in tons of CO2 
thus differ radically from Kyoto-style targets. 
Emissions allowances are tradable in most per capita 
proposals, resulting in large benefits for populous nations 
with low per-capita emissions. It is worth noting that 
India and China stated at COP-8 in New Delhi that they 
would not consider any other approach than one based on 
per capita (Vajpayee 2002). The approach is less attractive 
to less populous nations, who would argue that there is 
more than one dimension to equity. 
Per capita approaches are favored by some developing 
countries. While there is an extensive literature formulat-
ing climate regimes based on this principle, Parties have 
tended to focus on the underlying principle, the negotia-
tions have not yet formally considered an architecture 
based on per capita emissions. For example, the Indian 
Prime Minister indicated at COP 8 in Delhi that “we do 
not believe that the ethos of democracy can support any 
norm other than equal per capita rights to global environ-
mental resources” (Vajpayee 2002). The essential equity-
based argument is that each person should have the same 
right to use the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere. 
Other variations of the per capita approach start  
from current levels, but require convergence on equal per 
capita emissions over a period of time (e.g., Meyer 2000). 
This convergence happens in the context of overall 
contraction of global emissions, with a global emission 
budget set to achieve a particular atmospheric concentra-
tion of GHGs. The combination of contraction and 
convergence results in trajectories of emissions, giving 
absolute numbers of emission allowances over a period  
of time, e.g., up to 2100. 
A variant is “Common but Differentiated Convergence” 
(Höhne et al. 2006a), the key modification being a later 
convergence for developing countries. Annex I allowances 
converge to a low level, but NAI emissions only start later, 
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type of mitigation 
commitment:
pledge to implement sustainable development 
policies, and to report on them under the unFCCC. 
Quantifies gHg reductions as co-benefits of actions 
motivated by local sustainable devel-opment. useful 
interim step
participation: Developing countries only
institutional  
requirements:
Builds on national development capacity. in the 
multi-lateral system would require a Cop decision 
and at least a register of SD-pAms, possibly a new 
Annex to the Convention.





methodologies to quantify both the emission reduc-
tions and local sustainable development benefits 




Built in, as countries set their own development 
objectives
timing:  Could be implemented in short-term; might continue 
in long-term for Least Developed Countries
Questions: 
•  Would your country be ready to pledge the implemen-
tation of SD-PAMs? 
•  Should funding for SD-PAMs be limited to public 
investment, or should they be linked to the  carbon 
markets? 
•  How would we know whether implemented SD-
PAMs reduce emissions, sufficiently? 
•  How would we know whether emission reductions are 
attributable to the implemented policy? 
type of mitigation 
commitment:
no new commitment, but extension of CDm 
architecture to enhance mitigation action in 
developing countries 
participation: Developing countries 
institutional require-
ments:
use established CDm institutions, scaling up to 
programmatic and possibly sector level
Legal nature (volun-
tary/binding):
voluntary, between project participants. parties 
to Kyoto protocol only
Accountability 
procedures:
validation, monitoring and verification proce-
dures at project level. not subject to compliance 
at national level 
Sensitivity to nation-
al circumstances:
Countries choose which projects to approve and 
that these con-tribute to sustainable develop-
ment 
timing: immediate. CDm not available to parties who 
take on Kyoto targets 
4.2.6  Evolution of the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM)
A major way in which developing countries are already 
engaging in mitigation is through the CDM. The CDM is 
a project-based mechanism, and particularly, the one 
which allows cooperative action between countries that 
have a cap on emissions and those that do not. As for 
other market mechanism, this shifts the focus from where 
Questions: 
•  Would your country be ready to extend the CDM to 
other scales? 
•  Does the institutional capacity exist in your country to 
implement this approach? 
•  In which dimensions might CDM best evolve – pro-
grams, sectors, policy? Or some combination thereof? 
mitigation takes place to who pays for mitigation. 
Extending the CDM is not a commitment to reduce 
emissions domestically, but it could be an important form 
of nationally appropriate mitigation action in developing 
countries. The CDM is evolving beyond a strict project 
basis to programmatic CDM. Programmatic CDM is in 
principle agreed, and adjusted PDDs and other mecha-
nisms are being put into place. So the extension of the 
CDM from projects to programs is highly likely. 
CDM could also be extended to sectors. The sectoral 
CDM approach suggests a direct scaling up extended to 
particular economic sectors, or geographic sectors (e.g., 
cities)(Samaniego & Figueres 2002; Sterk & Wittneben 
2006). It could extend the project-based mechanism of the 
CDM to national sectors, e.g., cement or power. Of all the 
approaches discussed above, it builds most directly on the 
CDM. It would extend the current architecture of the 
CDM to allow coverage of an entire sector. 
Finally, “policy CDM” is a possibility. In many respects, 
policy CDM would be similar to SD-PAMs – except that 
the former would be financed from the carbon market, 
while the latter relies on public funding and investments.
internationally. Recent work has identified four broad 
methodologies for quantifying the benefits (Winkler et al. 
2008). A potential weakness of SD-PAMs is that the 
environmental outcome is uncertain – it depends entirely 
on the number and extent of policies implemented. 
type of mitigation 
commitment:
reduction is emissions per unit of economic 
outputs (t Co2/$ gDp)
participation: most suitable for developing countries, as it 
accounts for economic developemnt (gDp). Also 
adopted nationally by some developed countries 
institutional  
requirements:
requires assessment of gDp, as well as emissions 





Compliance could be established if intensity target 
is missed. variant: a weaker compliance target and 
a stronger selling target
Sensitivity to national 
circumstances:
Sensitive to change in gDp; does not explicitly 
adjust for other circumstances 
timing: Could be voluntary for developing countries 
initially, becoming binding at a later date
Questions:
•  Would your country be ready to take on an intensity 
target? 
•  Does the institutional capacity exist in your country to 
implement this approach? 
•  Given that emissions grow if GDP increases, is this 
approach acceptable for both developed and develop-
ing countries? 
•  How might GDP in developing countries be measured, 
reported and verified? 
4.2.5  SD-PAMs: Sustainable development policies and 
measures 
Some countries frame the concern about equity in terms 
of per capita emissions (see 4.2.2 above); others argue that 
consideration of historical responsibility is a basis for a fair 
deal (see 4.2.3), while for others again, the dimension of 
equity relates to development. This approach draws on 
Article 2, in particular that climate protection should 
occur in a manner that “enable[s] economic development 
to proceed in a sustainable manner”. 
More broadly, it argues that sustainable development in 
developing countries, including its ecological and social 
dimensions, are indispensable for an equitable solution, 
given that developed countries went through their process 
of industrialization without carbon constraints. In earlier 
debates under the Convention, the Republic of South 
Africa (RSA) put forward the approach of sustainable 
development policies and measures (RSA 2006b). 
SD-PAMs suggest that developing countries themselves 
identify more sustainable development paths and commit to 
implementing these with financial support (RSA 2006a; 
Winkler et al. 2002a). A similar motivation is expressed in 
‘human development goals with low emissions’ (Pan 2002). 
A more elaborate discussion of national policies may be 
found in the paper by Tirpak, et. al.: “National policies and 
their linkages to negotiations over a future international climate 
change agreement”, which has been produced part of this 
series. 
The approach starts by considering a country’s own 
long-term development objectives. Next, policies and 
measures are identified that would make the development 
path more sustainable. These SD-PAMs aim to encompass 
large-scale policies and measures, not only projects as in the 
CDM. Each country would define what it means by 
making development more sustainable, but when registering 
SD-PAMs, the international community would have to 
accept that the policy constitutes sustainable development. 
Funding for SD-PAMs could build on existing commit-
ments in Convention Article 4.1(b) and Kyoto Protocol 
Article 10, but since they are development oriented, they 
could also mobilize domestic and international develop-
ment finance. Both climate and non-climate funding can 
be mobilized to implement SD-PAMs. 
Progress in achieving both the local sustainable develop-
ment benefits and climate co-benefits might be monitored 
through national institutions, but could also be reviewed 
4.2.4 Emissions intensity
Emissions intensity requires reductions of emissions 
relative to economic output (GHG/GDP). The 
approach therefore allows growth in emissions if there 
is economic growth. To account for different national 
circumstances, commitments could be formulated as a 
percentage decrease from each country’ own emissions 
intensity. Emissions intensity goals would be harder to 
meet if economic growth remains lower than expected, 
given the reduced capacity. If successful, reduced 
intensities should assist in decoupling emissions from 
economic growth. The approach is often considered 
‘softer’ than absolute targets since it quantifies 
emissions in relative terms, but this cannot be known 
without the stringency of both approaches (KEI 2002; 
Ellerman & Wing 2003; Kim & Baumert 2002). A 
recent review of intensity targets has been conducted 
(Herzog et al. 2006).
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4.2.9 Conclusions
In this short paper, it is not possible to describe all 
proposals. Given the different schools of thought, some 
examples of proposals that put atmosphere, equity, 
development and technology first, respectively, have been 
examined. In considering these proposals, decision-makers 
in developing countries will need to consider the implica-
tions for their country. Discussing the questions posed for 
each approach may also lead to the formulation of new 
proposals, combining elements of the existing proposals 
– maybe even entirely new ones. For a summary of 
options to address mitigation actions, see Annex 2.
Most, but not all of the approaches described here relate 
to mitigation commitments. Particularly for those aimed 
at developing countries only (e.g., SD-PAMs or CDM), 
they focus on nationally appropriate mitigation actions, 
consistent with para b(ii) of the Bali Action Plan. It should 
be noted that Annex II Parties also have commitments 
relating to funding and possibly technology cooperation. 
Approaches that make use of market mechanisms allow 
Parties to pay for mitigation elsewhere, in which case 
domestic emission reduction potential becomes a less 
important consideration and ability to pay becomes a 
more important consideration for equity. 
In this respect, the question of how both mitigation 
actions and support can be made MRV is highly relevant. 
The paper considers MRV in the following section. 
type of mitigation  
commitment:
various – technology benchmarks, crediting  
baselines, dual markets, industry initiatives 




involvement of multiple sectors, possibly  
organizations working in sectors internationally 
Legal nature  
(voluntary/binding):
Sectoral efforts would be voluntary (or in pursuit 
of a separately set binding target); transnational 
sectoral agreements could be binding 
Accountability procedures: Sector-specific 
Sensitivity to national 
circumstances:
Countries could select in which sectors to  
participate. However, may imply global  
standards in certain sectors
timing: medium-term 
Questions: 
•  Which sectors are the major sources of emissions in 
your country? Would your country be ready to take on 
transnational sectoral agreement in these sectors? 
•  What are the implications of such an approach for your 
country? 
•  Does the institutional capacity exist in these sectors to 
implement this approach? 
•  Which variant of sectoral approaches has the most 
potential to assist the negotiations?
•  How could the multi-lateral system assist countries and 
industries with sectoral efforts?  
(many of which are implemented at the sectoral level) are 
intended by the Kyoto Protocol achieve national caps or 
QELROs.26 However, there appears to be more agreement 
that – whatever the multi-lateral agreement – sectoral 
efforts are important in implementation at the national 
level. Framed appropriately, sectoral approaches may be 
helpful as one tool for mitigation. 
A recent version may be of particular interest to 
developing countries may be sectoral crediting baselines 
(Ward et al. 2008). This particular variant would be imple-
mented domestically in developing countries, with ‘no 
lose’ meaning that the exceeding a specified benchmark 
entitles a country to trade surplus emission reductions, but 
there is no penalty for not achieving any sectoral standard, 
but an incentive to exceed the benchmark. Beyond the 
advantage of “no lose”, this variant may be attractive due 
to its focus on incentives and being voluntary. 
26 Indeed, PAMs are the first item listed in Protocol Article 2.1(a).
4.2.8 Sectoral Approaches
The Bali Action Plan includes as one option in the 
mitigation building block “cooperative sectoral approaches 
and sector-specific actions, in order to enhance implemen-
tation of Article 4, paragraph 1(c), of the Convention”.24  
People mean many different things by ‘sectoral approaches’ 
(Akimoto et al. 2008; Den Elzen et al. 2008; Höhne et al. 
2006c; Ward 2006; Ellis & Baron 2005; Bosi & Ellis 
2005; Schmidt et al. 2006), including sectoral CDM; 
benchmarks across trans-national sectors; technology 
transfer in specific sectors; the sector-based Triptych 
approach, and sectoral crediting mechanisms. The 
UNFCCC Secretariat was given a mandate in June  
2008 to prepare a paper to better define this term. 
Given the various types of sectoral approaches, two 
distinctions may help clarify: 
•  Is the proposal to implement at the domestic, national 
level only, or transnational?
•  Is the focus on a new agreement, or the efforts that 
Parties make? 
Different ends of the spectrum would then be domestic 
sectoral efforts and transnational sectoral agreements.  
In terms of the Bali Action Plan, domestic sectoral 
efforts would be closer to nationally appropriate mitiga-
tion actions, while transnational sectoral agreements 
probably amount to mitigation commitments – at least for 
the sectors concerned. Whatever one’s interpretation, it is 
clear that sectoral approaches are closely related to 
technology in the Bali Action Plan.25 
Developing countries have expressed concern about 
transnational sectoral agreements, as introducing commit-
ments without recognizing the principles of equity and 
CBDR&RC. For Annex I countries, policies and measures 
24 Sectoral approaches in para 1.b (IV) of decision 1/CP.13.
25  Para b (iv): “Cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-specific actions, in order to enhance Implementation of Article 4, paragraph 1(c), of the Convention”. Article 4.1 refers to 
“development, application and diffusion, including transfer, of technologies”. 
4.2.7 Global Triptych
The Triptych approach focuses on three sectors – 
electricity generation, energy-intensive industries and 
“domestic sectors” (including residential and 
transportation). Triptych was originally used to share the 
burden of the Kyoto targets within the European Union 
(EU) “bubble” (Phylipsen et al. 1998). Analysis has 
considered extending this sectoral approach to all 
countries (Groenenberg et al. 2001). 
Apart from taking a sectoral approach, Triptych also 
takes into account the technological opportunities 
available in various sectors. For domestic sectors, conver-
gence to equal per capita emissions is assumed, while for 
energy-intensive industries, rates of efficiency improve-
ment are set. The sectoral targets are added up to consti-
tute a national target. The calculations involved are 
complex and not easily communicated. Targets eventually 
set are defined in absolute national emissions, but can vary 
from significant reductions (-30%) to ‘growth caps’ 
(+200%). The Triptych approach has more recently been 
examined a method for allocating future GHG emission 
reductions among countries under a post-2012 climate 
regime (Den Elzen et al. 2008). Emission allowances are 
decomposed according to sectors and explicit allowance is 
made for delayed participation by developing countries. 
type of mitigation 
commitment:
national emissions target, ranging from reduc-
tions to growth caps. Based on sectoral and 
technological possibilities
participation: potentially all countires, or for technologies in 
one of the three sectors
institutional  
requirements:
Establishment of sectoral benchmarks or other 
means to promote best available technologies
Legal nature  
(voluntary/binding):




Would depend on sectors
Sensitivity to national 
circumstances:
Could define technological criteria to account 
for for structural differences
timing: Short- to medium-term
Questions: 
•  How important are the three sectors in Triptych in 
terms of your country’s emissions? 
•  Would your country be ready to take on a Global 
Triptych approach?
•  Does the institutional capacity exist in the three 
sectors in your country to implement this approach?
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implementation of SD-PAMs. Such a procedure might be 
elaborated by a group of experts. 
Reporting would ideally include both unilateral 
mitigation actions and those implemented with interna-
tional support (MRV finance and technology). The 
purpose may differ, with unilateral action reported to 
provide recognition of action by developing countries and 
a comprehensive picture of the actions by a country, while 
internationally support action would be reported to enable 
verification. 
Questions: 
•  Should reporting by developing countries continue to 
be done mainly through national communications? If 
not, what are the alternatives? If yes, what needs to be 
improved?
•  Should developing countries report on a regular basis 
on their national inventories? 
5.1.3 Verifiable
The general questions about verification are what can be 
verified, how and by whom. If emission reductions are to 
be real, long-term and measurable, then verification is 
critical. 
Making mitigation actions by developing countries 
verifiable will probably pose the biggest challenges. Should 
the verification be done domestically or internationally? 
Are some combinations of the two possible and useful? 
Under any arrangement, the domestic institutional 
capacity in developing countries to undertake both 
measurement and verification will be significant. For 
example, we should build on national capacity to measure 
and verify energy efficiency savings (examples from India, 
South Africa, other countries). The difference between 
theoretical and actual savings in electricity is examined 
carefully and reported to national utilities or others 
sponsoring part of the investment. Converting energy 
savings to MRV emissions savings essentially only requires 
an emissions factor – and an effective standard has been 
established for grid-electricity factors, for example, in the 
CDM (ACM 0002). 
Perhaps inventories for developing countries could start 
in sectors where there is the best information. This would 
allow for the required human and institutional capacity to 
be developed, improving coverage over time.  
To measure “deviations from baseline” and recognize 
relative emission reductions, one effectively needs to 
establish national baselines. The experience gained from 
the CDM with project baselines provides a valuable basis 
for moving to larger scales. Already, the CDM is evolving 
to include programs, and the discussions for the period 
after 2012 may include further evolution, possibly to a 
sectoral level. The CDM experience indicates we will have 
to consider whether national baselines include provision 
for suppressed demand28 and exclude national policies or 
not? The long-term goal in this context would be to work 
MRV of actions towards MRV based on inventories for all. 
Questions: 
•  What practical experience exists in your country to 
measure emissions, and the activities leading to 
emissions? 
•  What institutions are needed for effective measure-
ment? 
5.1.2 Reportable
All Parties have existing reporting commitments under 
the Convention.29 Rather than adding new provisions on 
reporting, use of the existing provisions could be enhanced 
through new and improved procedures. A simple exten-
sion of existing reporting requirement might be to have 
more regular reporting of GHG inventories by developing 
countries. This could still be less frequent that the annual 
reporting by Annex I Parties, for example every two or 
three years. 
National communications provide an obvious avenue 
for reporting, but arguably an already overloaded one. A 
separate format for reporting might be considered. For 
SD-PAMs, for example, there have been suggestions to 
establish a new register to give recognition to mitigation 
actions by developing countries, voluntarily pledged. A 
new procedure could be developed to report on the 
28  Suppressed demand is found in situation of poverty. If a mitigation project delivers a service where there previously was none, the relevant baseline might be the service deliv-
ered with conventional technology, not the actual situation of any service at all. For example, if solar water heaters were installed, one can compare this to electric water heaters, 
rather than no hot water at all. 
29 FCCC Article 12.1.
MRV mitigation actions are a key component in  
the Bali Action Plan, and likely to be central to the 
negotiations about the future of the climate regime.  
MRV is pertinent in quantifying mitigation actions, and 
the old balance between commitments/QELROs and 
qualitative actions. It is now also being applied to the 
means of implementation, technology and finance. And,  
it is central to the balance between action on climate 
change and support.
Three questions will need to be addressed in negotiating 
paragraphs 1(b)(i) and (b)(ii) of the Bali Action Plan:
•  How measurable, reportable and verifiable mitigation 
commitments by all developed countries should best 
be made comparable?
•  What does measurable, reportable and verifiable mean 
in relation to support by developed countries on 
technology, finance and capacity-building for develop-
ing countries?
•  What does measurable, reportable and verifiable mean 
in relation in relation to nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions by developing countries?
While there are two sub-paragraphs, there are three key 
questions – because the MRV in paragraph (b)(ii) is 
understood to apply both to mitigation and the support. 
The remainder of this section considers each of these 
components in turn. 
5.1  MRv mitigation action by developing 
countries
MRV applies to both nationally appropriate mitigation 
actions and to the provision of technology, financing and 
capacity-building. With the debate around MRV being 
politically charged, a way of making some progress may be 
to focus on details – clearly defining what is meant by 
measurable, reportable and verifiable. 
5.1.1 Measurable
Measurement is a fundamental starting point for any 
kind of mitigation action. Considering measurement in a 
practical way needs to ask what can be measurable. For 
example, promoting renewables may require national 
legislation, regulations, zoning laws, scoping studies, 
contracts, investment packages, construction, etc. These 
different efforts can be measured, but in the end, it is the 
outcome, in terms of electricity produced and emission 
reduction, that needs to be measured. 
Methodologies are available to quantify or measure the 
benefits of various bottom-up approaches, using case 
studies and national modelling; others such as allocation 
models or comparative analysis are more suitable to 
top-down approaches (Winkler et al. 2008 ). It would 
greatly assist developing countries to quantify both the 
local sustainable development benefits and the climate 
co-benefits of particular policies and measures. Method-
ologies could be further elaborated by a group of experts. 
All countries are committed to develop, periodically 
update, publish and make available to the COP invento-
ries of GHG emissions and removals by sinks.27 It is 
difficult to imagine a system of measurement that would 
not draw on this fundamental data – the status of 
emissions in a country. The unit of measurement clearly 
should be tons of CO2-equivalent. 
A key question will be how developing countries should 
report on inventories? Perhaps the periodicity could be less 
often than for Annex I, but establishing trends will be 
important in the long run. 
Inventories measure emissions, not reductions. If 
developing countries implement unilateral mitigation 
actions (e.g., CDM, but also other policies and measures, 
or investment in cleaner technologies), how would one 
assess reductions?
Changes in inventories would reflect not only mitiga-
tion supported with multi-lateral support, but also 
unilateral action. MRV would require separate tracking of 
domestically-financed and internationally-supported 
action. Changes in inventories would reflect reductions 
only if all actions are considered. The question of whether 
such inventories would be reviewed must be addressed 
under verification. 
Another option might be ‘national inventories with 
footnotes’. The idea of the footnotes is be to provide a 
place for describing action for emission reductions. They 
would allow developing countries to report a little more on 
their actions, and thus gain recognition for action taken. 
5. MeaSURaBle, RepoRTaBle aNd veRiFaBle
 27 FCCC Article 4.1(a).
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Table 6: illustrative options for raising additional revenue for addressing climate change 
oPTioN reVeNUe NoTeS
Application of a levy similar to the 2% 
share of proceeds from the CDm to 
international transfers of Erus, AAus 
and rmus
$10 to $50 million Annual average for 2008 to 2012
Depends on size of car-
bon markets post-2012
Any estimate for post 2012 requires assumptions about future commitments
Auction of allowances for international 
aviation and marine emissions
$10 to $25 billion Annual average for aviation rises from 2010 to 2030
$10 to $15 billion Annual average for marine transport rises from 2010 to 2030
international air travel levy $10 to $15 billion Based on charge of $6.50 per passenger per flight
Funds to invest foreign exchange 
reserves
Fund of up to $200 billion voluntary allocation of up to 5% of foreign exchange reserves to a fund to invest in 
mitigation projects determined by the investors to diversify foreign exchange reserve 
investments
Access to renewables programs in 
developed countries
$500 million Eligible renewables projects in developing countries could earn certificates that could 
be used toward compliance with obligations under renewables programs in developed 
countries to a specified maximum, such as 5%
Debt-for-efficiency swap Further research needed Creditors negotiate an agreement that cancels a portion of the non-performing foreign 
debt outstanding in exchange for a commitment by the debtor government to invest 
the cancelled amount in clean energy projects domestically
tobin tax $15 to $20 billion A tax of 0.01% on wholesale currency transactions to raise revenue for Convention 
purposes
Donated special drawing rights $18 billion initially Special drawing rights are a form of intergovernmental currency provided by the imF 
to serve as a supplemental form of liquidity for its member countries. Some special 
drawing rights issued could be donated to raise revenue for Convention purposes
note: CDm = Clean Development mechanism, Eru = Emission reduction unit, AAu = Assigned amount unit, rmu = removal unit,  
imF = international monetary Fund
Source: UNFCCC 2007. Report on the analysis of existing and potential investment and financial flows relevant to the development of an effective and appropriate 
international response to climate change.
The simplest solution may be a mandatory formula for 
collecting money. One option already proposed in the 
AWG-LCA is that developed countries set aside 0.5% of 
GDP to support climate change in developing countries. 
Yet there is a range of potential sources that might 
provide the financial flows to meet an agreed target. The 
UNFCCC Secretariat provided a range of illustrative 
options in a paper on finance and investment flows (see 
also the companion paper on investment and financial 
flows Negotiations on additional investment and financial 
flows to address climate change in developing countries by 
Erik Haites). 
Variants of some of the options in Table 6 below are 
being considered, for example auctioning of allowances. 
The European Commission is proposing to amend the 
Emissions Trading Directive, increasing auctioning of 
allowances, which would generate €50 billion in 2020, 
and would put at least 20% into renewables and efficiency 
(e.g., through the Global Efficiency and Renewable 
Energy Fund, GEREF) and reducing emissions from 
deforestation in developing countries (REDD), i.e., in 
developing countries.  
The Liebermann-Warner bill before the US Congress  
(S. 2191) includes provisions to auction 2.5% of allow-
ances for use in forestry. If EPA estimates of slightly over  
$100 billion are correct, this can potentially generate  
$2.8 billion in 2020, and another 1.8% of auctioning 
revenues in domestic cap-and-trade for international 
adaptation and security, yielding an estimated $2 billion  
in 2020. The bill has not passed, but may be reintroduced 
in future. 
What would be measurable in each of these options 
would be € or $ – the unit for MRV of finance would be 
money. 
“long-term cooperation action”, we should begin with that 
end in mind. 
Questions: 
•  How can we work towards a system where all emission 
reductions by developing countries are verifiable? How 
might a system evolve over time? 
•  What elements from national and international 
experience with verification and validation might be 
useful building blocks? 
5.2 MRv for means of implementation
As outlined in section 1.2, applying MRV to the means 
of implementation (technology and finance) is critical to 
the balance of the Bali Action Plan. Developing countries 
expect developed countries to fulfil their commitments 
on “measurable, reportable, and verifiable” support on 
technology, financing, and capacity building. 
5.2.1 Making finance MRV
The starting point for finance, like all things, is the 
Convention in which Annex II Parties (i.e., Annex I 
Parties that also have commitments to assist developing 
country Parties with funding and technology) agreed to 
provide “adequate and predictable” financial resources for 
agreed full incremental cost of mitigation, adaptation and 
reporting (Article 4.3); to support adaptation in most 
vulnerable countries (Article 4.4) and technology transfer, 
including promoting and financing technology transfer, 
facilitating access to technology, support for the building 
of internal technology related capacity (Article 4.5). 
Unsurprisingly, “finance” is a critical building block in 
the Bali Action Plan. There would be very little of any of 
the other building blocks – mitigation, adaptation, 
technology – without finance. The problem is how to 
ensure that the financial flows actually occur. This is in 
part a question of scaling up, but centrally also of opera-
tionalising MRV of finance. 
What is apparent is that the current scale of funding  
of several orders of magnitude below what is required  
and will be required in future. Adaptation funding of 
$28-$67 billion per year in developing countries will be 
needed by 2030. Investment in mitigation of $200-$210 
billion per year is needed by 2030. Where might such 
funds come from?
More broadly, the experience gained with CDM 
verifying emission reductions in developing countries can 
be a building block for MRV. Countries have built set up 
designated national authorities with experience in 
approving mitigation projects and considering their 
implications for sustainable development. The process of 
validation – and the institutional capacity embodied in 
designated operational entities – could be built upon for 
verification beyond the project level.
Institutional capacity is probably a better guarantor that 
climate-friendly policies would be implemented in 
developing countries than any international agreement. 
Another important factor is broad public support within 
the country. The international review process to make 
mitigation actions verifiable should build on these 
dimensions. For internationally supported mitigation 
action, reporting on how funds have been spent is 
standard practice.  
If mitigation actions in developing countries are 
supported only by national finance and do not involve 
technology transfer, then why would they need to be 
verifiable internationally? The balance struck in Bali 
around b(ii) was that these two matters would go together, 
and so the scope of mitigation actions subject to MRV 
could be limited to those that receive international 
support. This will probably have to be left to the develop-
ing country concerned.
One option to address the issue of verification of 
mitigation actions by developing countries: actions with 
international financial support would be verified interna-
tionally (e.g., using mechanisms under the carbon market, 
or reporting on public funds spent), but unilateral 
mitigation actions would be verified domestically (e.g., 
unsubsidized energy efficiency measures), but then 
reported in one reporting format/instrument under 
Convention.  
Another option to consider might be verification by 
peer-review. Verification could start with national institu-
tions, and verification by other developing countries might 
be more acceptable. Models of peer-review mechanisms, 
for example in the African Union or the WTO, might 
provide useful lessons. Such an approach would make 
reviews of developing country reporting distinct from 
in-depth reviews of Annex I national communications. 
In the longer-term, what is needed is to work towards a 
system where all emissions and all emission reductions are 
measured, reported and verified. Since we are working on 
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formalized in a work plan, with the major steps being (a) 
analysis of mitigation potentials and ranges of emission 
reduction objectives of Annex I Parties; (b) analysis of 
possible means to achieve mitigation objectives; and (c) 
consideration of further commitments by Annex I Parties, 
and at this stage is still focused on the means.30 What 
provided a possible option for comparability is a range of 
-25% to -40% from 1990 levels by 2020 for Annex I 
Parties as a group.31 How such a range would be compared 
to efforts under the Convention will need further work in 
the AWG-LCA.  
Improvements on this system are of course possible. 
Measurement of comparability of efforts would be 
simplest when comparing QELROs, based on the 
compliance system Another option would be to consider 
the outcomes, in particular that the range of emission 
reductions for Annex I Parties is -25% to -40% from 1990 
levels by 2020. 
For reporting, the basis will remain Annex I national 
communications.32 Improvements on the procedures for 
reporting could help to promote best practice.
Procedures for verification could reinforce existing 
work on measurement (incl. IPCC,33 ISO, WRI/WBC-
SD,34 etc.), with a focus on measurement at the facility 
level & local capacity building for implementation of 
IPCC methodologies for national inventory reporting. 
30 FCCC/KP/AWG/2006/4, the report of the AWG-KP on its 2nd session. 
31  “At the first part of its fourth session, the AWG recognized that the contribution of Working Group III to the AR4 indicates that achieving the lowest levels assessed by the IPCC 
to date and its corresponding potential damage limitation would require Annex I Parties as a group to reduce emissions in a range of 25–40 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020, 
through means that may be available to these Parties to reach their emission reduction targets.” See document FCCC/KP/AWG//2007/5 for the complete text.
32 KP Art 5, 7 and 8 and FCCC Article 12.2 (a) and (b). 
33  IPCC 2006. IPCC guidelines for national GHG inventories. Prepared by the National Greenhouse Gas Inventories Program. Eggleston H.S., Buendia L., Miwa K., Ngara T. and Tanabe 
K. (Eds). by E H S, B L, M K, N T and T K (Eds) Kanagawa, Japan, Institute for Global Environmental Strategies. http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/ public/2006gl/index.htm. 
34  WRI & WBCSD 2007. The Greenhouse Gas Protocol: A corporate accounting and reporting standard. Revised edition. Washington, World Business Council for Sustainable Develop-
ment & World Resources Institute. http://www.ghgprotocol.org.
Reporting may be specific, depending on the source of 
the funding. Markets – be they carbon or other markets 
– tend to track financial flows anyway, although robust 
market rules need to be established. A key question is how 
to track scaled-up public investment. As with mitigation 
in developing countries, the most difficult area is probably 
verification. Who verifies financial flows? Particularly if 
funds were collected at the national level, how would they 
be made subject to international scrutiny? 
These questions raise issues of governance of the 
scaled-up funding that is clearly needed. The guiding 
principle should be equal partnership between donors and 
recipients, but also more specific principles recently 
negotiated, including one-country-one-vote; transparency; 
learning by doing approach; full costs of projects; and  no 
duplication with other sources. The ideal would be to use 
the funding structures established under the UNFCCC 
and Kyoto Protocol, e.g., the Adaptation Fund.
5.2.2 MRV Technology
Measurable, reportable and verifiable transfer of 
technology is the second part of the means of implementa-
tion of mitigation actions in developing countries. 
The simplest solution may be to apply MRV to the 
funding for technology. It may be necessary to distinguish 
different kinds of financial support, depending on 
broadly-defined lifestages of technologies:  
• Funding for wider deployment of existing technology;
•  Venture capital to commercialize emerging technology;
•  Public and private investment in long-term R&D of 
new technology.
What needs to be measured on technology is thus 
broader than technology transfer (if the movement of 
technology that is higher cost than the commercial 
standard practice, and also lower-emitting). It also 
encompasses the diffusion of technology through commer-
cialization, as well as long-term R&D. What is “MRV-
able” is not a question of transfer alone, but of generating 
new technologies as well. 
However the technology discussion is defined, an 
institutional mechanism is likely to be needed to deal with 
technology issues, and to address MRV. For the purpose of 
measuring, reporting and verifying technology transfer, 
indicators will assist. Work in the Subsidiary Bodies on 
Implementation and Scientific and Technological Advice 
(SBI and SBSTA) on performance indicators should help 
to address the issue of measurement. 
Indicators would also provide a useful format for 
reporting. What needs to be verified is the actual transfer 
of technology, not just long-term R&D. Useful informa-
tion on technology and climate change is provided in the 
companion paper The Mitigation Technology challenge: 
Considerations for National Governments and an Interna-
tional Agreement by Martina Chidiak and Dennis Tirpak. 
Measurement would also need to include technology 
transfer under the CDM.  
In all cases, the funding for technology would be 
measurable, reportable and verifiable. But at the multilat-
eral level, investment in technology transfer does not earn 
carbon credits (unless we want to re-open the supplemen-
tarity debate). 
The more difficult issue is how to quantify technology 
support where it is not financial. Important aspects 
relating to technology transfer, such as preferential access, 
collaborative R&D in the form of human resources, 
building local institutional capacity to apply technology 
are some of the less tangible forms of support. 
5.3 MRv for developed countries
Having considered MRV for developing countries, both 
for mitigation actions (section 5.1) and for the support 
(5.2), we now turn to MRV for developed countries. Since 
the paper is aimed at developing country decision-makers, 
this complex matter is treated only briefly. 
Mitigation commitments by developed countries are 
negotiated in the AWG-KP and in the AWG-LCA in 
terms of para 1.b(i). The further commitments for Annex I 
Parties under the Protocol would be measured, reported 
and verified according to Articles 5, 7 and 8. To ensure 
comparability of effort with mitigation commitments or 
actions, including QELROs, by developed country Parties 
under the Convention, the same procedures for MRV 
would be simplest. 
What might action be compared to? If a developed 
country adopted “mitigation commitments or actions, 
including QUELROs” under paragraph b(i), to what 
should that be compared? In the two-track negotiations, 
one suggestion is to compare to the Protocol track, that is, 
the negotiations under the AWG-KP. These negotiations 
have been under way since 2006. Negotiations have been 
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Further reading
Surveys of approaches:  For further information on  
 approaches to future commitments, see the Pew Centre 
(Bodansky et al. 2004) is recommended, containing a 
one-page summary of over 40 proposals. Baumert et al 
(2002) provide a more in-depth analysis of most of the 
major approaches, and an excellent introductory chapter 
outlining ‘architectural elements’ required of any proposal. 
For more summaries on types of commitments for 
post-2012 (Höhne & Lahme 2005), and Boeters et al 
(2007) and a web-based resource, www.fiacc.net. 
Criteria: A useful summary of factors underpinning 
action is available in Höhne et al. (2006d).
Many specific approaches are in the references cited in this 
document, see references below. 
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Name (refereNce) DeScriPTioN
Historical responsibility – the Brazilian proposal: 
unFCCC, 1997b; rose et al., 1998; meira Filho and gonzales 
miguez, 2000; pinguelli rosa et al., 2001; den Elzen and Schaeffer, 
2002; La rovere et al., 2002; Andronova and Schlesinger, 2004; 
pinguelli et al., 2004; trudinger and Enting, 2005; den Elzen and 
Lucas, 2005, den Elzen et al., 2005c; Höhne and Blok, 2005; rive 
et al., 2006
reduction obligations between countries are differentiated in 
proportion to those countries’ relative share of responsibility for 
climate change – i.e, their contribution to the increase of global-
average surface temperature over a certain period of time
Ability to pay: 
Jacoby et al., 1998; Lecoq and Crassous, 2003
participation above welfare threshold. Emission reductions as a 
function of ability to pay (welfare)
Equal mitigation costs: 
rose et al., 1998; Babiker and Eckhaus, 2002
reduction obligations between countries are differentiated so 
that all participating countries have the same welfare loss
triptych:
Blok et al., 1997; den Elzen and Berk, 2004; Höhne et al., 2005
national emission targets based on sectoral considerations: 
Electricity production and industrial production grow with equal 
efficiency improvements across all countries. “Domestic” sectors 
converge to an equal per-capita level. national sectoral aggregate 
levels are then adopted
multi-sector convergence: 
Sijm et al., 2001
per-capita emission allowances of seven sectors converge to equal 
levels based on reduction opportunities in these sectors. Coun-
tries participate only when they exceed per capita threshold
multi-criteria: 
ringius et al., 1998; Helm and Simonis, 2001; ringius et al., 2002
Emission reduction obligations based on a formula that includes 
several variables, such as population, gDp and others
alternative types of emission targets for some countries
Dynamic targets: 
Hargrave et al., 1998; Lutter, 2000; müller et al., 2001; Bouille and 
girardin, 2002; Chan-Woo, 2002; Lisowski, 2002; Ellerman and 
Wing, 2003; Höhne et al., 2003; müller and müller-Fürstenberger, 
2003; Jotzo and pezzey, 2005; philibert, 2005b; pizer, 2005b; 
Kolstad, 2006
targets are expressed as dynamic variables – including as a 
function of the gDp (“intensity targets”) or variables of physical 
production (e.g, emissions per tonne of steel produced)
Dual targets, target range or target corridor: 
philibert and pershing, 2001; Kim and Baumert, 2002
two emission targets are defined: (1) a lower “selling target” that 
allows allowance sales if national emissions fall below a certain 
level; (2) a higher “buying target” that requires the purchase of 
allowances if a certain level is exceeded
Dual intensity targets: 
Kim and Baumert, 2002
A combination of intensity targets and dual targets
“no lose”, “non-binding”, one-way targets: 
philibert, 2000
Emission rights can be sold if the target is reached, while no ad-
ditional emission rights would have to be bought if target is not 
met. Allocations are made at a BAu level or at a level below BAu. 
Structure offers incentives to participate for countries not pre-
pared to take on full commitments but still interested in joining 
the global trading regime
growth targets, headroom allowances, premium allocation: 
Frankel, 1999; Stewart and Wiener, 2001; viguier, 2004
participation of major developing countries is encouraged by 
unambitious allocations relative to their likely BAu emissions. to 
ensure benefit to the atmosphere, a fraction of each permit sold 
can be banked and definitely removed
Action targets: 
goldberg and Baumert, 2004
A commitment to reduce gHg emission levels below projected 
emissions by an agreed date through “actions” taken domestically, 
or through the purchases of allowances
Flexible binding targets: 
murase, 2005
A framework for reaching emission targets modelled after the 
Wto/gAtt (World trade organization/general Agreement on 
tariffs and trade) scheme for tariff and non-tariff barriers; targets 
negotiated through rounds of negotiations
Chapter 13 of Working Group III contribution to the 
IPCC’s AR4 deals with “Policies, Instruments and 
Co-operative Arrangements”. A useful table from that 
chapter is reproduced below, summarising recent proposals 
for international climate agreements.
Name (refereNce) DeScriPTioN
National emission targets and emission trading
Staged systems
multistage with differentiated reductions: 
gupta, 1998; Berk and den Elzen, 2001; Blanchard et al., 2003; 
Criqui et al., 2003; gupta, 2003a; Höhne et al., 2003; Höhne et 
al., 2005; michaelowa et al., 2005b; den Elzen and meinshausen, 
2006, den Elzen et al., 2006a
Countries participate in the system with different stages and 
stage-specific types of targets; countries transition between 
stages as a function of indicators; proposal specify stringency of 
the different stages
Differentiating groups of countries: (uSEpA 2002; CAn 2003; ott 
et al. 2004; Claussen & mcneilly 1998)
Countries participate in the system with different stages and 
stage-specific types of targets
Converging markets: 
(tangen & Hasselknippe 2005)
Scenario with regional emission trading systems converging to a 
full global post 2012 market system
three-part policy architecture:
(Stavins 2001
All nations with income above agreed threshold take on different 
targets (fixed or growth); long-term targets (flexible but stringent); 
short-term (firm, but moderate); and market-based policy instru-
ments, e.g,, emissions trading.
allocation methods 
Equal per capita allocation: (Agarwal  & narain 1991; Wicke 2005; 
Baer et al. 2000)




Agreement on a global emission path that leads to an agreed 
long-term stabilization level for gHg concentrations (‘Contrac-
tion’). Emission targets for all individual countries set so per-capita 
emissions converge (‘Convergence’)
Basic needs or survival emissions: Aslam, 2002; pan, 2005
gupta and Bhandari, 1999
Emission entitlements based on an assessment of emissions to 
satisfy basic human needs
Adjusted per capita allocation: 
gupta and Bhandari, 1999
Allocation of equal per capita emissions with adjustments using 
emissions per gDp relative to Annex i average
Equal per capita emissions over time: (Bode 2004) Allocation based on (1) converging per capita emissions and (2) 
average per capita emissions for the convergence period that are 
equal for all countries 
Common but differentiated convergence: 
(Höhne et al. 2006b)
Annex i countries’ per capita emissions converge to low levels 
within a fixed period. non-Annex i countries converge to the same 
level in the same timeframe, but starting when their per capita 
emissions reach an agreed percentage of the global average. 
other countries voluntarily take on “no lose” targets
grandfathering: 
(rose et al. 1998)
reduction obligations based on current emissions
global preference score compromise: 
(müller 1999)
Countries voice preference for either per capita allocation or al-
location based on current national emissions
annex 3.  overview of recent proposals in ipCC aR 4
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Name (refereNce) DeScriPTioN
Technology
technology research and development: 
Edmonds and Wise, 1999; Barrett, 2003
Enhanced coordinated technology research and development
Energy efficiency standards:
Barrett, 2003; ninomiya, 2003
international agreement on energy efficiency standards for 
energy-intensive industries
Backstop technology protocol: 
Edmonds and Wise, 1998
new power plants installed after 2020 must be carbon neutral. 
new synthetic fuels plants must capture Co2. non-Annex i coun-
tries participate upon reaching Annex i average gDp in 2020
technology prizes for climate change mitigation:
newell and Wilson, 2005
incentive or inducement prizes targeted at applied research, 
development and demonstration
Development-oriented actions
Sustainable development policies and measures: 
Winkler et al., 2002b; Baumert et al., 2005b
Countries integrate policies and measures to reduce gHg emis-
sions into development plans (e.g, developing rural electrification 
programs based on renewable energy, or mass transit systems in 
placed of individual cars)
Human development goals with low emissions: 
pan, 2005
Elements include: identification of development goals/basic hu-
man needs; voluntary commitments to low carbon paths via no-
regret emission reductions in developing countries conditional to 
financing and obligatory discouragement of luxurious emissions; 
reviews of goals and commitments; an international tax on carbon
adaptation
unFCCC impact response instrument: 
müller, 2002
A new “impact response instrument” under the auspices of the 
unFCCC for disaster relief, rehabilitation and recovery
insurance for adaptation; funded by emission trading surcharge:
Jaeger, 2003
A portion of the receipts from sales of emissions permits would be 
used to finance insurance pools
financing
greening investment flows: 
Sussman and Helme, 2004
investments through Export Credit Agencies are conditional on 
projects that are “climate friendly”
Quantitative finance commitments: Das-gupta and Kelkar, 2003 Annex i countries take on quantitative financial commitments 
– e.g, expressed as a percentage of the gDp – in addition to emis-
sion reduction targets
Negotiation process and treaty structure
Bottom-up or multi-facet approach, pledge (with review) and 
review: reinstein, 2004; yamaguchi and Sekine, 2006
Each country creates its own initial proposal relating to what it 
might be able to commit to. individual actions accumulate one by 
one. the collective effect of proposals is periodically reviewed for 




A portfolio including: emission reduction policies, government 
research/development, technology standards and technology 
transfer
A flexible framework: 
pEW, 2005
A portfolio including: aspirational long-term goals, adaptation, 
targets, trading, policies, and technology cooperation
orchestra of treaties: 
Sugiyama et al., 2003
A system of separate treaties among like-minded countries (emis-
sion markets, zero emission technology, climate-wise develop-
ment) and among all parties to unFCCC (monitoring, information, 
funding)
Case study approach: 
Hahn, 1998
multiple case studies of coordinated measures, emissions tax, 
tradable emission permits and a hybrid system in industrialized 
countries to learn by doing
a  there is some potential conflict with the terminology here: “non-binding” targets may be interpreted by some as restricting the capacity of countries to trade 
as they do not necessarily set up caps that impose prices and thus established tradable commodities. 
Source: Earlier overviews by Bodansky, 2004; Kameyama, 2004; philibert, 2005a
Name (refereNce) DeScriPTioN
modifications to the emission trading system or alternative emission trading systems
price cap, safety valve or hybrid trading system:
pizer, 1999; pizer, 2002; Jacoby and Ellerman, 2004
Hybrid between a tax and emission trading: after the initial alloca-




if the seller of a permit did not reduce its emissions as promised, 
the buyer could not claim the emission credit. Enforcement is 
more reliable as buyers deal with developed countries with more 
robust legal procedures
Domestic hybrid trading schemes: 
mcKibbin and Wilcoxen, 1997; 
mcKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2002
two kinds of emissions permits valid only within the country of 
origin. (1) long-term permits entitle the permit owner to emit 1 tC 
every year for a long period; permits are distributed once. (2) An-
nual permits allow 1 tC to be emitted in a single year. An unlimited 
number of these permits are given out at a fixed price (price cap). 
Compliance is based on either unit
Allowance purchase fund:
Bradford, 2004
Countries contribute to an international fund that buys/retires 
emission reduction units. Countries can sell reductions below 
their BAu levels
Long-term permits: 
peck and teisberg, 2003
Long-term permits could be used once at any time between 2010 
and 2070. Depending on the time of emission they are depreci-
ated 1% annually for atmospheric decay of Co2. the permit would 
allow the emission of 1 tC in 2070, 1.01 tC in 2069 and 1.0160 
(1.71) tons in 2010
Sectoral approaches
Sector Clean Development mechanism, sector Crediting mecha-
nism : philibert and pershing, 2001; Samaniego and Figueres, 
2002; Bosi and Ellis, 2005; Ellis and Baron, 2005; Sterk and Wit-
tneben, 2005
Sectoral crediting schemes based on emission reductions below a 
baseline. Excess allowances can be sold
Sector pledge approach: 
Schmidt et al., 2006
Annex i countries have emission targets, with the ten highest-
emitting developing countries pledging to meet voluntary, 
“no-lose” gHg emissions targets in the electricity and major 
industrial sectors. targets are differentiated, based upon national 
circumstances, and sector-specific energy-intensity benchmarks 
are developed by experts and supported through a technology 
Finance and Assistance package
Caps for multinational cooperation:
Sussman et al., 2004
A cap/and trade system associated with the operations of associ-
ated enterprises in developing and developed countries
Carbon stock protocol:
WBgu, 2003
A protocol for the protection of carbon stocks based on a world-
wide system of “non-utilization obligations” to share the costs of 
the non-degrading use of carbon stocks among all states
“non-binding” targets for tropical deforestationa: 
persson and Azar, 2004
non-binding commitments for emissions from deforestation 
under which reduced rates of deforestation could generate emis-
sions allowances
Policies and measures
Carbon emission tax: 
Cooper, 1998; nordhaus, 1998; Cooper, 2001; nordhaus, 2001; 
newell and pizer, 2003
All countries agree to a common, international gHg emission 
tax; several of the proposals suggest beginning with a carbon tax 
limited to emissions from fossil fuel combustion
Dual track: 
Kameyama, 2003
Countries choose either non-legally binding emission targets 
based on a list of policies and measures or legally-binding emis-
sion caps allowing international emissions trading
Climate “marshall plan”: 
Schelling, 1997, 2002
Financial contributions from developed countries support climate 
friendly development; similar in scale and oversight to the mar-
shall plan
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Term DefiNiTioN
Deforestation Conversion of forest to non-forest. For a discussion of the term forest and related terms such as afforestation, refor-
estation, and deforestation, see the ipCC Special report on Land use, Land-use Change, and Forestry (ipCC, 2000).
Emission in the climate change context, emissions refer to the release of gHg and/or their precursors and aerosols into 
the atmosphere over a specified area and period of time.
Energy efficiency ratio of energy output of a conversion process or of a system to its energy input.
Energy intensity Energy intensity is the ratio of energy consumption to economic or physical output. At the national level, 
energy intensity is the ratio of total domestic primary energy consumption or final energy consumption to 
gross Domestic product or physical output.
global Efficiency and renewable Energy 
Fund (established by the Eu) (gErEF)
Adopted by the European union (Eu) as a new fund for the promotion of investments in renewable energy 
technologies.
greenhouse gas (gHg) A gas that absorbs radiation at specific wavelengths within the spectrum of radiation (infrared radiation) 
emitted by the Earth’s surface and by clouds. the gas in turn emits infrared radiation from a level where the 
temperature is colder than the surface. the net effect is a local trapping of part of the absorbed energy and a 
tendency to warm the planetary surface. Water vapor (H2o), carbon dioxide (Co2), nitrous oxide (n2o), meth-
ane (CH4) and ozone (o3) are the primary gHg in the Earth’s atmosphere.
international Energy Agency (iEA) paris-based energy forum established in 1974. it is linked with the organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development to enable member countries to take joint measures to meet oil supply emergencies, 
to share energy information, to coordinate their energy policies, and to cooperate in the development of 
rational energy programs.
intergovernmental panel on Climate Change 
(ipCC)
Established in 1988 by the World meteorological organization and the un Environment program, the ipCC 
surveys world-wide scientific and technical literature and publishes assessment reports that are widely recog-
nized as the most credible existing sources of information on climate change. the ipCC also works on method-
ologies and responds to specific requests from the Convention’s subsidiary bodies. the ipCC is independent of 
the Convention.
Land use, land use change and forestry 
(LuLuCF)
A gHg inventory sector that covers emissions and removals of gHg resulting from direct human-induced land 
use, land-use change and forestry activities.
mitigation An anthropogenic intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of gHg.
Quantified emission limitation and reduc-
tion objectives, established under the Kyoto 
protocol (QELros)
Legally binding targets and timetables under the Kyoto protocol for the limitation or reduction of green-
house-gas emissions by developed countries.
renewables, renewable Energy Energy sources that are, within a short time frame relative to the Earth’s natural cycles, sustainable, and 
include non-carbon technologies such as solar energy, hydropower, and wind, as well as carbon-neutral 
technologies such as biomass.
resource resources are those occurrences with less certain geological and/or economic characteristics, but which are 
considered potentially recoverable with foreseeable technological and economic developments.
Sink Any process, activity or mechanism that removes a gHg, an aerosol, or a precursor of a gHg or aerosol from 
the atmosphere.
Source Any process, activity, or mechanism that releases a gHg, an aerosol, or a precursor of a gHg or aerosol into 
the atmosphere.
Special report on Emission Scenarios (of the 
ipCC) (SrES)
the storylines and associated population, gDp and emissions scenarios associated with the Special report 
on Emissions Scenarios (SrES) (nakićenović et al., 2000), and the resulting climate change and sea-level rise 
scenarios. Four families of socio-economic scenario (A1, A2, B1 and B2) represent different world futures in 
two distinct dimensions: a focus on economic versus environmental concerns, and global versus regional 
development patterns.
Sustainable development Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs.
Sustainable development policies and 
measures (SD-pAms)
Sustainable Development policies and measures. An approach to climate protection that builds on sustain-
able development priorities.
united nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (the Convention) (unFCCC)
the Convention was adopted on 9 may 1992, in new york, and signed at the 1992 Earth Summit in rio de 
Janeiro by more than 150 countries and the European Community. its ultimate objective is the ‘stabilization of 
gHg concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system’. it contains commitments for all parties. under the Convention, parties included in 
Annex i aim to return gHg emissions not controlled by the montreal protocol to 1990 levels by the year 2000. 
the Convention entered in force in march 1994.
annex 4. Glossary
Term DefiNiTioN
Adaptation Adjustment in natural or human systems to a new or changing environment. Adaptation to climate change 
refers to adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their 
effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities. various types of adaptation can be distin-
guished, including anticipatory and reactive adaptation, private and public adaptation, and autonomous and 
planned adaptation.
Ad hoc Working group on further commit-
ments of Annex i parties under the Kyoto 
protocol (AWg-Kp)
Article 3, paragraph 9 of the Kyoto protocol provides that the Cop acting as the meeting of the parties (Cmp) 
shall initiate consideration of future commitments for Annex i parties at least seven years before the end of 
the first commitment period. pursuant to that provision the Cmp at its first session held at montreal from 28 
november to 10 December 2005, established the Ad Hoc Working group on Further Commitments for Annex 
i parties under the Kyoto protocol (AWg-Kp).
Ad Hoc Working group on Long-term 
Cooperative Action under the Convention 
(AWg-LCA)
At its thirteenth session, the Cop, by its decision 1/Cp.13, launched a comprehensive process to enable the 
full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention through long-term cooperative action, now, 
up to and beyond 2012, in order to reach an agreed outcome and adopt a decision at its fifteenth session. 
it decided that the process shall be conducted under a subsidiary body under the Convention, the Ad Hoc 
Working group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWg-LCA), that shall complete its 
work in 2009 and present the outcome of its work to the Cop for adoption at its fifteenth session.
Bali Action plan the united nations Climate Change Conference in Bali the conference culminated in the adoption of the Bali 
road map, which consists of a number of forward-looking decisions that represent the various tracks that are 
essential to reaching a secure climate future. the Bali road map includes the Bali Action plan, which charts 
the course for a new negotiating process designed to tackle climate change, with the aim of completing this 
by 2009. it also includes the AWg-Kp negotiations and their 2009 deadline, the launch of the Adaptation 
Fund, the scope and content of the Article 9 review of the Kyoto protocol, as well as decisions on technology 
transfer and on reducing emissions from deforestation.
Baseline the baseline (or reference) is any datum against which change is measured. it might be a “current baseline,” 
in which case it represents observable, present-day conditions. it might also be a “future baseline,” which is a 
projected future set of conditions excluding the driving factor of interest. Alternative interpretations of the 
reference conditions can give rise to multiple baselines.
Berlin mandate An agreement reached in 1995 in Berlin, germany, at the first Cop to the Climate Convention, in which the 
industrialized countries first agreed to take on targets and timetables for quantified reductions and limita-
tions on gHg emissions.
Capacity building increasing skilled personnel and technical and institutional abilities.
Clean Development mechanism (CDm) Defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto protocol, the CDm is intended to meet two objectives: (1) to assist parties 
not included in Annex i in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the ultimate objective 
of the convention; and (2) to assist parties included in Annex i in achieving compliance with their quanti-
fied emission limitation and reduction commitments. Certified Emission reduction units from CDm projects 
undertaken in non-Annex i countries that limit or reduce gHg emissions, when certified by operational enti-
ties designated by Cop meeting of the parties, can be accrued to the investor (government or industry) from 
parties in Annex B. A share of the proceeds from certified project activities is used to cover administrative 
expenses as well as to assist developing country parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects 
of climate change to meet the costs of adaptation.
Climate Climate in a narrow sense is usually defined as the ‘average weather’, or more rigorously, as the statistical descrip-
tion in terms of the mean and variability of relevant quantities over a period of time ranging from months to 
thousands or millions of years. these quantities are most often surface variables such as temperature, precipita-
tion, and wind. Climate in a wider sense is the state, including a statistical description, of the climate system. the 
classical period of time is 30 years, as defined by the World meteorological organization (Wmo).
Climate change Climate change refers to a change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g, using statistical tests) 
by changes in the mean and/ or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period, typi-
cally decades or longer. Climate change may be due to natural internal processes or external forcings, or to 
persistent anthropogenic changes in the composition of the atmosphere or in land use.
note that unFCCC, in its Article 1, defines “climate change” as “a change of climate which is attributed directly 
or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition 
to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods”. the unFCCC thus makes a distinction 
between “climate change” attributable to human activities altering the atmospheric composition, and “climate 
variability” attributable to natural causes.
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Acronyms
ADB Asian Development Bank
Annex I   Annex to the Convention listing industri-
alized and transitioning countries  
Annex II   Annex to the Convention, listing mostly 
OECD countries with additional commit-
ments to assist developing countries with 
funding and technology transfer
Annex B   Developed Country Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol
ASER Senegalese Rural Electrification Agency
AWG-KP   Ad Hoc Working Group on further 
commitments of Annex I Parties under the 
Kyoto Protocol
CDM Clean Development Mechanism
CH4 Methane
CMP  Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol
CNG Compressed natural gas
CO2 Carbon dioxide
ENRE  National Electricity Regulatory Board of 
Brazil
ESCOs Energy Service Companies
ETS Emissions Trading Scheme
EU European Union




IEA International Energy Agency
INMETRO  National Institute of Metrology, Stand-
ardization and Industrial Quality of Brazil
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change
KCI Kenya Ceramic Jiko
KP Kyoto Protocol
LPG Liquefied petroleum gas
MDIC  Ministry of Development, Industry and 
Foreign Trade of Brazil 
MNES   Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy 
Sources
MNRE Ministry of New and Renewable Energy
N2O Nitrous oxide
NDRC National Development and Reform  
 Commission 
NGO Non Governmental Organization
NGV Natural gas for vehicles
O3 Ozone
OECD  Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development
PBE Brazilian Labelling Program
PFCs Perfluorocarbons 
PPP Public/private partnership
PROCEL  National Electricity Conservation 
Program
SELO PROCEL Sub-program of the National Electricity  
 Conservation Program 
SENELEC  National Electricity Company of 
Senegal
PV Phovoltaic
R&D Research and development 
RD&D  Research, development and 
demonstration
SDPAMs  Sustainable development policies and 
measures
SENELEC Senegal National Electricity Company
SERCs State Electricity Regulatory Commission
SEPA State Environmental Protection Agency
SF6 Sulphur hexafluoride
TSP Total suspended particulates
UNDP  United Nations Development 
Programme
UNEP  United Nations Environment 
Programme
UNFCCC  United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (the Convention)
WG I  Working Group I (of the IPCC, see 
above), assesses the literature on the 
physical science basis of climate change
WG II  Working Group II (of the IPCC, see 
above), assesses the literature on the 
impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to 
climate change
WG III  Working Group III (of the IPCC, see 
above), assesses the literature on the 
mitigation of climate change, i.e., 
reducing GHG emissions
Units and measures
GW  Gigawatts (power measurement)  
= 109 Watts
GWh Gigawatt hours
K euros K = 1,000 euros
kW  Kilowatts (power measurement)  
= 1,000 Watts 
kWh Kilowatt-hours
MW  Megawatts (power measurement)  
= 106 Watts 
MWh Megawatt-hours
W Watt = 1 joule of energy per second
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each instrument. Depending on the legal frameworks 
available to countries, these may be implemented nation-
ally, regionally or locally. They may be supplemented with 
rules, guidelines and other administrative mechanisms to 
achieve different goals. They may be legally binding or 
voluntary and they may be fixed or changeable.
A variety of policies, measures, and instruments are 
available to national governments to limit the emission of 
greenhouse gases. These include: regulations and stand-
ards, taxes and charges, tradable permits, voluntary 
agreements, informational instruments, subsidies and 
incentives, research and development, and trade and devel-
opment assistance. Box 1 provides a brief definition of 
2. TYpeS oF poliCieS, MeaSUReS aNd iNSTRUMeNTS
Box 1: definitions of selected greenhouse gas abatement policy instruments
regulations and Standards:   Specify abatement technologies (technology standard) or minimum requirements 
for pollution output (performance standard) to reduce emissions.
taxes and Charges:   A levy imposed on each unit of undesirable activity by a source.
tradable permits:   Also known as marketable permits or cap-and-trade systems. this instrument 
establishes a limit on aggregate emissions by specified sources, requires each 
source to hold permits equal to its actual emissions, and allows permits to be 
traded among sources.
voluntary Agreements:   An agreement between a government authority and one or more private parties 
to achieve environmental objectives or to improve environmental performance 
beyond compliance to regulated obligations. not all voluntary agreements are 
truly voluntary; some include rewards and/or penalties associated with joining or 
achieving commitments2.   
Financial incentives:   Direct payments, tax reductions, price supports, or the equivalent from a govern-
ment to an entity for implementing a practice or performing a specified action. 
information instruments:   required public disclosure of environmentally related information, generally by 
industry to consumers. includes labelling programs and rating and certification. 
research and Development (r&D):   Direct government spending and investment to generate innovation on mitiga-
tion, or physical and social infrastructure to reduce emissions. includes prizes and 
incentives for technological advances. 
non-Climate policies:   other policies not specifically directed at emissions reduction but that may have 
significant climate-related effects. 
Note: Instruments are defined above that directly control GHG emissions. Instruments may also be used to manage 
activities that indirectly lead to GHG emissions, such as energy consumption.
Questions:
•  Which policy instruments have been used in your country to 
achieve environmental, energy, or related objectives? Have 
they been successful? 
•  What are the three most important reasons for their success 
and failure? 
•  In your opinion, what would it take to ensure more wide-
spread success?
2   Voluntary Agreements should not be confused with voluntary actions which are undertaken by sub-national governments, corporations, NGOs and others independent of 
national government authorities.
There is a rich array of policy instruments being used by 
developing countries to achieve national objectives, such 
as, improving local air pollution and reducing poverty. 
Most of these policies also reduce emissions of greenhouse 
gases (GHGs). This paper reviews all policy instruments; 
in particular, the most commonly used policies in 
developing countries. 
Based on the case studies in this paper, these policies are: 
regulations, financial incentives, research and development 
and information instruments. Financial incentives are 
indeed the one policy option used in all but one of the 
cases.  As might be expected, large countries such as China 
and India use a complex set of policies to achieve objec-
tives, while smaller countries tend to have more focused 
objectives and less complicated policies. Non-climate 
change policies in developing countries can have a 
significant effect on GHG emissions. Therefore, any 
consideration of ways to limit emissions needs to include 
such policies. A number of factors, including political will, 
adequate financing, institutional capacity and informa-
tion, appear to affect the extent to which developing 
countries are implementing policies that limit the growth 
of GHG emissions. 
The main purpose of this paper is to help policy makers, 
particularly those in developing countries, think about the 
national policy instruments needed to contribute to the 
fight against climate change, how such needs can be 
articulated in order to seek internal and external financial 
resources and how these needs may be reflected in 
negotiations of a future climate change agreement. This 
paper is an input to a series of workshops which the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) will 
organize in developing countries with the aim of improv-
ing their capacity to respond to climate change.
The paper gives greater weight to instruments and 
experience with the renewable energy and energy efficiency 
sub-sectors, but inferences can be drawn for other sectors. 
It has borrowed heavily from the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) Working Group III (WG III) 
Chapter 131, but has been supplemented with case studies 
1. iNTRodUCTioN
that focus on the experiences of developing countries, 
which for the most part have been implemented for 
non-climate change reasons. Policies that have been in 
place for more than a decade are contrasted with cases that 
are still in the experimental stage. Both success stories and 
failures are included as they provide lessons for others to 
consider. Questions are included in different parts of the 
document to help the reader reflect on the circumstances 
in his/her country. A final section provides insights about 
the linkage of national policies to the current negotiations 
over a future climate change agreement. 
The responsibilities of all countries to develop national 
policies are well grounded in the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
Article 4 of the UNFCCC commits all Parties, taking into 
account their common but differentiated responsibilities 
and their specific national and regional priorities, objec-
tives and circumstances, to formulate, implement, publish 
and regularly update national and, where appropriate, 
regional programs containing measures to mitigate climate 
change by addressing anthropogenic emissions of GHGs 
by sources and removals by sinks. Articles 4.3 and 4.5 of 
the Convention call for developed countries to provide 
new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed 
costs of developing countries in complying with their 
obligations under the UNFCCC. This includes imple-
menting measures to mitigate climate change by address-
ing anthropogenic emissions by sources, such as fossil fuel 
combustion and removals by sinks (UNFCCC 1992). 
In addition, Article 11.5 stipulates that developing 
countries may avail themselves of financial resources 
related to the implementation of the Convention through 
bilateral, regional and other multilateral channels. The 
Kyoto Protocol (KP) also sets up a new mechanism, the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), under Article 12 
that is to help developing country Parties achieve their 
sustainable development objectives and developed country 
(Annex B) Parties comply with their qualified emission 
limitations and reduction commitments under the 
Protocol (UNFCCC 1998).
1   Gupta, S., D. A. Tirpak, N. Burger, J. Gupta, N. Höhne, A. I. Boncheva, G. M. Kanoan, C. Kolstad, J. A. Kruger, A. Michaelowa, S. Murase, J. Pershing, T. Saijo, A. Sari, 2007: Policies, Instru-
ments and Co-operative Arrangements. In Climate change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change [B. Metz, O. R. Davidson, P.R. Bosch, R. Dave, L.A. Meyer (eds)], Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.
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period, with support from others, has used R&D, 
financial incentives and information instruments to 
develop and disseminate improved cook stoves, and India 
has used a combination of instruments to encourage the 
deployment of wind power. Several of the case studies 
relied almost solely on financial incentives, e.g., the 
promotion of wind power in Argentina and natural gas 
vehicles in Bolivia. Only one of the case studies, i.e., the 
case of the energy efficiency labelling program in Brazil, 
contains an example of a voluntary agreement with 
industry. (For additional information on the interaction of 
policies see Section 5.8.)
Questions:
• How are policy decisions made in your country?
•  What decision criteria are used and how are they 
weighted? 
•  How could the policy-making process be improved  
and what technical and financial support would be  
needed to make that happen? 
•  What institutional arrangements would help to 
improve policy design and decision making related  
to climate change?
The policy-making process of most governments 
involves complex choices involving many stakeholders. 
These include the potential regulated industry, suppliers, 
producers of complementary products, labor organiza-
tions, consumer groups and environmental organizations. 
The choice and design of virtually any instrument has the 
potential to benefit some and to harm others. For exam-
ple, standards set at a high level may be achievable by large 
firms, but not by small or new firms entering the market. 
Voluntary measures, often favored by industry because of 
their flexibility and potentially lower costs, are in many 
cases opposed by environmental groups because of their 
lack of accountability and enforcement. 
In formulating a domestic climate policy program, a 
combination of policy instruments may work better than 
relying on a single instrument. Also, the design of 
instruments may need to consider how they interact with 
existing institutions and regulations in other sectors of 
society. When comparing instruments, adjusting for 
different levels of stringency is important. For all the 
instruments discussed in this paper stringency may be set 
at different levels. Over time, all instruments need to be 
monitored, adjusted and enforced. Furthermore, an 
instrument that works well in one country may not work 
well in another country with different economic circum-
stances, social norms and institutions. 
The IPCC identifies four principal criteria by which 
environmental policy instruments can be evaluated: 
•  Environmental effectiveness: the extent to which a 
policy meets its intended environmental objective or 
realizes positive environmental outcomes. The main 
goal of environmental policy instruments is to reduce 
the negative impacts of human action on the environ-
ment. Policies that achieve specific environmental 
quality goals better than alternatives can be said to 
have a higher degree of environmental effectiveness. 
The environmental effectiveness of policies depends on 
design, implementation, participation, stringency and 
compliance. While climate protection may be the 
main goal, any given policy may have other environ-
mental and societal benefits.
•  Cost-effectiveness: the extent to which the policy can 
achieve its objectives at minimum cost to society. 
There are many components of cost, including the 
direct costs of administering and implementing the 
policy, as well as indirect social costs, which are more 
3.  evalUaTiNG aNd SeleCTiNG poliCY iNSTRUMeNTS 
difficult to measure. Cost-effectiveness can be en-
hanced by limiting the creation of new institutions 
and keeping implementation procedures as simple as 
possible while preserving the integrity of the approach.
•  Distributional considerations: the extent to which a 
policy is perceived to be fair and equitable and 
whether it has distributional consequences. Policies 
rarely apportion environmental benefits and costs 
evenly across stakeholders. Even if a policy meets an 
environmental goal at least cost, it may face political 
opposition if it disproportionately impacts, or benefits 
certain groups, within a society or across generations. 
However, equity and fairness may be perceived 
differently, depending on the cultural background of 
the observer.
•  Institutional feasibility: the extent to which a policy 
instrument is likely to be viewed as legitimate, gain 
acceptance, and be adopted and implemented. 
Environmental policies that are well adapted to 
existing institutional constraints have a high degree of 
institutional feasibility; however, institutional realities 
can constrain environmental policy decisions. Policies 
that are not acceptable to a wide range of stakeholders 
and supported by institutions, notably the legal system 
may not prove successful. Other important considera-
tions include human capital, bureaucratic infrastruc-
ture as well as the dominant culture and traditions. 
The decision-making style of each nation is therefore a 
function of its unique political heritage.
Governments often use other evaluation criteria, such as 
“Does it meet our sustainable development strategy?”, “Will it 
help to reduce poverty?” and “Will it help to provide new jobs 
or stimulate a new industry?”. Most of such criteria can fit 
into one of the above four criteria. These criteria can be 
used in advance to select a policy or afterwards to evaluate 
the results of a policy. 
The case studies in the Annexes provide some insights 
into the approaches used by governments and the con-
straints they face, but they do not pretend to assess the 
criteria that shaped government decisions. However, 
several of the case studies exemplify situations where 
explicit multiple policies were (and are being) used 
successfully to achieve national objectives. For example, in 
promoting energy efficiency programs China has used 
regulations, financial incentives, R&D, and information 
instruments to achieve its objectives. Kenya, over a long 
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including the reduction of volatile organic compound 
emissions, improved safety by reducing the potential for 
explosions, and reduced odours for local communities. 
In many cases, countries simply pass laws that mandate 
industry to do certain things.4 For example, targets for 
future shares or amounts of renewables exist in 58 
countries, of which 13 are developing countries. Thirty-six 
countries have developed feed-in tariff polices; 44 coun-
tries, states and provinces have enacted renewable per-
formance standards; and mandates for blending bio-fuels 
have been enacted in 11 developing countries in  
Latin America and Asia (UNEP 2007).
Whether regulatory standards or economic instruments 
are preferable for developing countries is a matter of some 
discussion. One common view is that technology stand-
ards may be more appropriate for building initial capacity 
for emissions reduction because economic incentive 
programs require more specific and greater institutional 
capacity, have more stringent monitoring requirements, 
and may require fully developed market economies to be 
effective (IPCC 2001). Some authors suggest that a 
transitional strategy is appropriate for developing coun-
tries, whereby technology standards are introduced first, 
followed by performance standards and then experimenta-
tion with economic instruments. 
The case studies in the Annexes demonstrate the 
complex array of approaches used by developing country 
governments. In some cases, laws stipulate both the goal 
and the means to achieve the goal. In other cases, govern-
ment ministries are empowered to implement the law by 
designing and issuing regulations. Interestingly, all of the 
case studies used some form of financial incentives to 
motivate industry or consumers to change behavior. 
Where incentives have been poorly designed – either 
because of limited information and/or when they have not 
been evaluated/revised – the results have been poor. It is 
difficult to draw conclusions about whether countries with 
fully developed market economies are better or worse in 
employing financial instruments or regulations as both 
situations are represented by the cases. 
Questions:
•  Does your country have regulations or standards to  
promote energy efficiency or renewable energy? 
•  In the case of renewable energy, what combination  
of national, state and local laws would be required?
•  Do your country’s investment policies encourage  
or limit investments in renewable energy or energy  
efficiency measures? 
•  What specifically has to change or what new actions  
are needed to promote energy efficiency or  
renewables? 
•  What type of assistance would be necessary to  
expand or introduce energy efficiency measures  
and renewable energy?
4.2 Taxes and charges 
Taxes are usually imposed by governments to raise 
revenue for the common good or to discourage the 
consumption of things that are perceived to be bad or  
lead to long-term societal costs. An emission tax on GHG 
emissions requires individual emitters to pay a fee, charge, 
or tax5 for every tonne of GHG released into the atmos-
phere. An emitter must pay this per-unit tax or fee 
regardless of how much of an emission reduction it 
undertakes. Each emitter weighs the cost of emissions 
control against the cost of emitting and paying the tax;  
in the end, polluters undertake emission reductions that 
are cheaper than paying the tax, but do not undertake 
those that are more expensive (IPCC 2001, Section 
6.2.2.2). Taxes and charges are commonly leveled on 
commodities that are closely related to emissions, such  
as energy or road use. 
Taxes and fees levied on imports and exports can also 
affect emissions by limiting the availability of GHG 
friendly products and equipment in different countries. 
Trade ministers from a number of countries met for the 
first time in Bali in 2007 to discuss what could be done  
to support the UNFCCC thorough efforts to remove 
import duties that restrict the flow of goods that could 
reduce GHG emissions.
4   China, in an attempt to mitigate GHG emissions, has set mandatory quantified targets for 2010 (See Annex 1.2 for additional details): reduce the consumption of energy for every 
10,000-yuan of gross domestic product from 1.22 tons of standard coal equivalent in 2005 to below one ton – a reduction of 20%; raise the share of renewable energy in the 
primary energy supply to 10% (from 7% in 2005); extract 10 billion m3 of coal-bed methane; cap nitrous oxide emissions from industrial processes at the 2005 level; increase the 
forest coverage rate to 20%; and increase the carbon sink by 50 million tons over the 2005 level.
5   No distinction is made here among the terms taxes, fees, and charges. In actuality, the revenue from taxes may go into the general government coffers whereas the revenue from 
fees or charges may be earmarked for specific purposes.
the firm. This raises costs without improving environmen-
tal effectiveness and is one of the main drawbacks to 
regulatory standards. 
A performance standard would limit emissions to a 
certain number of grams of CO2 per kWh of electricity 
generated or require, for example, refrigerators to operate 
at a specified level of efficiency. A technology-forcing 
standard would involve setting the refrigerator efficiency 
requirement slightly beyond technological feasibility, but 
announcing that the efficiency requirement will not go 
into effect until a number of years after announcement. 
Performance standards often provide more flexibility than 
technology standards. Costs can generally be lower 
whenever a firm is given some discretion in how it meets 
an environmental target. Performance standards expand 
compliance options beyond a single mandated technology 
and may include process changes, reducing output, 
changes in fuels or other inputs, and selecting alternative 
technologies. Despite this increased flexibility, perform-
ance standards also require well-informed and responsive 
regulators. 
One problem with regulatory standards is that they do 
not give polluters incentives to develop more effective 
technologies. Moreover, firms may be discouraged from 
finding more effective technologies out of fear that 
standards will be subsequently tightened. Finally, although 
it may be possible to force some technological change 
through technology mandates, it is difficult for regulators 
because they often do not have access to corporate data to 
determine the amount of change that is possible at a 
reasonable economic cost. This raises the possibility of 
either costly, overly stringent requirements or weak, 
unambitious requirements.
Although relatively few regulatory standards have been 
adopted solely to reduce GHG emissions, standards have 
been adopted that reduce these gases as a co-benefit. For 
example, there has been extensive use of standards to 
increase energy efficiency in over 50 nations (IPCC 
2001b). Energy efficiency applications include fuel 
economy standards for automobiles, appliance standards, 
and building codes3. Standards to reduce methane and 
other emissions from solid waste landfills have been 
adopted in Europe, the United States, and other countries. 
These standards are often driven by multiple factors, 
Addressing climate change requires actions that range 
from purely technological (such as fuel switching) to 
purely behavioral (such as reducing vehicle kilometres 
travelled) and mixes of technological and behavioral 
actions. Triggering the implementation of such actions 
usually requires the adoption of some form of policy 
instruments which are considered below. 
4.1 Regulations and standards 
Regulatory standards are the most common form of 
environmental regulation, covering a wide variety of 
approaches. A regulatory standard specifies with some 
precision the action that a firm or individual must take to 
achieve environmental objectives. This could include 
specifying technologies or products to use or not use, 
general standards of performance, as well as dictates on 
acceptable and unacceptable behavior. The primary 
advantage of a regulatory standard is that it may be 
tailored to an industry or firm, taking into account the 
specific circumstances of that industry or firm. There is 
also a more direct connection between the regulatory 
requirement and the environmental outcome. This can 
provide some degree of certainty.
Two broad classes of regulatory standards are technology 
and performance standards. Technology standards 
mandate specific pollution abatement technologies or 
production methods, while performance standards 
mandate specific environmental outcomes per unit of 
product. 
For example, a technology standard might mandate 
specific carbon dioxide (CO2) capture and storage 
methods on a power plant. Technology standards involve 
the regulator stipulating the specific technology or 
equipment that the polluter must use. Technology 
standards are best used when there are few options open to 
the polluter for controlling emissions and thus the 
regulator is able to specify the technological steps that a 
firm should take to control pollution. The information 
needs for technology standards are high: the regulator 
must have good information on the abatement costs and 
options open to each firm. Losses in cost effectiveness arise 
when regulators are less well informed. Technology 
standards may be applied uniformly to a variety of firms, 
rather than tailoring the standard to the circumstances of 
4.  NaTioNal CliMaTe aNd RelaTed poliCY iNSTRUMeNTS 
3    See China case study (Annex 1.2) for examples.
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provided by the government include:
•  80% accelerated depreciation of project costs for wind 
power projects (in the initial stages 100% accelerated 
depreciation was allowed);
•  Concessions or full exemption on customs duties of 
certain imported components of wind turbines;
•  Tax holiday for a maximum of 10 consecutive years 
within 15 years of commissioning; and
•  Concessional loans available through Government-
owned agencies. 
The Indian Electricity Act, 2003 requires all state-level 
energy regulatory commissions to ensure that electricity 
distributors procure a specified minimum percentage of 
power generation from renewable energy sources. The 
result of these and other measures has enabled India to 
develop an industry that competes with the largest 
companies in the world. The main problem with some 
financial incentives is cost-effectiveness as there are often 
energy efficiency savings available at a far lower cost to 
society. Also, if the feed-in tariff (or subsidy) is set too low 
by a national law as described in the case study of wind 
power in Argentina (See Annex 2, Section 2.2), it will be 
ineffective instrument for encouraging the installation of 
wind turbines. 
The level of subsidies in developing and transition 
economy countries is generally considered to be higher 
than in member countries of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). One 
example is low domestic energy prices that are intended to 
benefit the poor, but which often benefit high users of 
energy. The result is increased consumption and delayed 
investments in energy efficient technologies. In India 
kerosene and LPG subsidies are generally intended to shift 
consumption from biomass to modern fuels, reduce 
deforestation and to improve indoor air quality, particu-
larly in poor rural areas. In reality, these subsidies are 
largely used by higher expenditure groups in urban areas, 
thus having little effect on the use of biomass. In the 
to the non-subsidy case. If the subsidized industry is a 
source of greenhouse gas emissions, subsidies may result in 
higher emissions. Subsidies to the fossil fuel sector result 
in over-use of these fuels with resulting higher emissions; 
subsidies to agriculture can result in expansion of agricul-
ture into marginal lands and corresponding increases in 
emissions. Conversely, incentives to encourage the 
diffusion of new technologies, such as for renewables or 
nuclear power, may promote emissions reductions. 
One of the significant advantages of subsidies is that 
they have politically positive distributional consequences 
(see, for example, the case of Senegal in Annex 3, Section 3.2, 
which is subsidizing the distribution of compact fluorescent 
lights in rural villages). The costs of subsidies are often 
spread broadly through an economy whereas the benefits 
are more concentrated. This means that subsidies may be 
easier to implement politically than many other forms of 
regulatory instruments. However, subsidies do tend to take 
on a life of their own, making it difficult to eliminate or 
reduce them, should that be desired.
One of the most effective incentives for fostering GHG 
reductions are the price supports associated with 
production of renewable electricity6. These price 
supports tend to be set at attractive levels and have 
resulted in significant expansion of renewable energy in 
OECD countries. They require electric power producers to 
purchase such electricity at favorable prices. In Europe, 
specific prices have been set at which utilities must 
purchase renewable electricity—these are referred to as 
“feed-in tariffs”7. These tariffs have been effective at 
promoting the development of renewable sources of 
electricity, expansion of the industry and creation of new 
jobs. As long as renewables remain a relatively small 
portion of overall electricity production, consumers see 
only a small increase in their electricity rates as in the case 
of Germany. Incentives, therefore, have attractive proper-
ties in terms of environmental effectiveness, distributional 
implications and institutional feasibility. 
In India (see the case study in Annex 1.1), incentives 
6   Based on personal communications from the UNEP office in Paris, the renewable industry is estimated to have grown to $150 billion in 2007, largely as a result of regulatory and 
financial measures in some countries. 
7   The “Feed-in Law” in Germany permits customers to receive preferential tariffs for solar generated electricity depending on the nature and size of the installation. Under the new 
tariff structure introduced in 2004, the base level of compensation for ground-mounted systems can be up to 45.7 euro cents/kWh. Photovoltaic (PV) installations on buildings 
receive higher rates of up to 57.4 euro cents/kWh. In May 2008, the government agreed that subsidies for roof top solar PV systems will be reduced annually by 8% from 2009 to 
2010 and then by 9% annually from 2011 onwards. Currently these subsidies are subject to reductions of 5% per year.
To implement a domestic emissions tax, governments 
must consider a number of issues, such as the level the tax 
should be set, particularly in the case of pre-existing taxes 
(e.g., taxes which already exist on energy) or other 
distortions (e.g., subsidies to certain industries or fuels). 
Consideration must also be given to how the tax is used,  
i.e., whether it goes directly into general government 
coffers, is used to offset other taxes (i.e., the double-divi-
dend effect), is transferred across national boundaries to an 
international body, is earmarked for specific abatement 
projects like renewable energy, or is allocated to those 
most adversely impacted by either the costs of emission 
reduction or damage from climate change. Another 
important issue is the point at which the tax is levied. A 
tax on gasoline may be levied at the pump and collected 
directly from consumers or it may be levied on wholesale 
gasoline production and collected from oil companies. 
Emissions or energy taxes often fall disproportionately on 
the poor, creating negative distributional consequences. In 
developing countries, institutions may be insufficiently 
developed for collection of emission fees from a wide 
variety of dispersed sources. (See, for example, the discussion 
of institutions in China in Annex 1, Section 1.2.) 
Questions:
•  Does your country have a tax on energy, including  
gasoline? Why was it established? Has it been changed 
since it was introduced? How is it collected and what  
use is made of the revenue?
•  Does your country have a tax on cars or tolls on roads? 
Why was it established and how was the tax deter- 
mined? 
•  What information and assistance would be required  
if your country wanted to establish a tax on energy  
or products that use energy? 
4.3 Financial incentives
Direct and indirect subsidies can be important environ-
mental policy instruments, but they have strong market 
implications and may increase or decrease emissions, 
depending on their nature. Financial incentives to reduce 
emissions can take different forms ranging from support 
for R&D, investment tax credits, low interest loans, rebate 
programs and price supports, e.g., feed-in tariffs for renew-
able electricity. Subsidies that increase emissions typically 
involve support for fossil fuel production and consump-
tion. They tend to expand the subsidized industry, relative 
An emissions tax provides some assurance regarding  
the marginal cost of pollution control, but it does not 
ensure a particular level of emissions. Over time, an 
emissions tax needs to be adjusted for changes in circum-
stances, like an international treaty, inflation, technologi-
cal progress, and new emissions sources. Fixed emissions 
charges in the transition economies of Eastern Europe,  
for example, have been significantly eroded by the high 
inflation of the past decade. Innovation and invention 
generally has the opposite effect, reducing the cost of 
emissions reductions and increasing the level of reductions 
made. If the tax is intended to achieve a given overall 
emissions limit, the tax rate will need to be increased to 
offset the impact of new sources.
Most environmentally related taxes with implications 
for GHG emissions in OECD countries are levied on 
energy products (150 taxes) and on motor vehicles  
(125 taxes), rather than on CO2 emission directly. There is 
also a significant number of waste-related taxes in many 
countries (about 50 taxes in all), levied either on particular 
products that can cause particular problems for waste 
management (about 35 taxes), or on various forms of final 
waste disposal, i.e., on incineration and/or land-filling  
(15 taxes in all). 
A very significant share of all the revenues from 
environmentally related taxes arises from taxes on motor 
fuels. Such taxes were introduced many decades ago, 
primarily as a means to raise revenue or to pay for road 
construction programs. Regardless of that, they do impact 
prices car users face, and thus they do have environmental 
and social impacts. They may affect the size of the cars and 
how extensively they are used by consumers, but may have 
disproportionately negative financial impacts on some 
drivers, such as, those in rural areas and with low incomes 
who depend on cars to travel to work. In some countries, 
subsidized gasoline and diesel encourage consumer’s choice 
of cars and driving habits, often to the detriment of the 
environment. One example of the use of a tax is that of 
Bolivia, which has a policy of maintaining a fixed differen-
tial price (based on tax reduction) between gasoline and 
natural gas for vehicles (NGV). Since 1992 the NGV 
price has been linked to the price of gasoline at around 
50% of the retail price as a means to encourage consumers 
to modify their vehicles to use natural gas. (See Annex 2.1 
for more details.)
There is some experience with CO2 taxes in a number of 
OECD countries, e.g., Norway and the United Kingdom. 
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include labelling programs for consumer products, infor-
mation disclosure programs for firms, or public awareness 
campaigns. Some of the most frequently used instruments 
are labels denoting the automobile gas consumption and 
labels denoting the consumption of energy and its cost for 
different electrical appliances.
Information instruments can be used to improve the 
effectiveness of other instruments. They are popular with 
industry because they do not impose penalties for 
environmentally harmful behavior per se. They may also 
be less expensive than other instruments. However, it is 
difficult to measure the environmental effectiveness or  
cost effectiveness of information instruments (See the case 
studies on Brazil, Kenya and China in the Annexes for 
examples of how different countries are using information 
instruments.).
Questions:
•  Have information instruments been used in your  
country to educate and inform the public about the  
environmental consequences or energy consumption  
and costs? 
•  Do you think a labelling program for some sectors  
would be useful in your country? 
•  What assistance would you need to make that happen?
4.6 Tradable permits 
Tradable permit systems have been or are being imple-
mented in a number of OECD countries. This paper does 
not go into depth with regard to such systems because 
relatively few developing countries are currently contem-
plating such an instrument. However, if such systems al-
low for the introduction of emission offsets, such as those 
from CDM projects in developing countries, their design 
features may be of interest to developing countries. 
Briefly, a number of analyses as documented in IPCC 
2007 have found that economy-wide approaches are 
superior to sectoral coverage because they equalize 
marginal costs across the entire economy. They find 
significant cost savings to an economy-wide program 
when compared to a sectoral program coupled with 
non-market-based policies in the United States and the 
European Union.
Permits may be allocated directly to emitters, such as 
energy-using industrial facilities (downstream) or to 
producers or processors of fuels (upstream), or to some 
combination of the two (a “hybrid system”). There are 
and an information instrument. It aims to provide 
information to consumers to facilitate optimizing con-
sumption of electricity in domestic appliances, choose 
more efficient appliances in terms of energy consumption 
and improve use of those appliances allowing the saving of 
energy costs. Participation in the program is voluntary and 
testing of the appliances is only on products made by 
manufacturers and facilities that are willing to participate 
in the PBE. On the basis of the outcome of the tests made 
a scale was created to classify appliances and those tests are 
repeated periodically to update the scale. Those appliances 
that are tested and labelled showing the best performance 
in their class may also receive an energy efficiency endorse-
ment (SELO PROCEL), given to the best products on the 
basis of specific energy consumption. The SELO PROCEL 
program also contributed for the implementation of the 
PBE by creating measurement infrastructure. 
The Brazilian program contained a number of elements 
listed above for a good voluntary agreement, i.e., there was 
an adequate regulatory framework, appropriate institu-
tional arrangements between governmental institutions 
and the companies, economic and technical resources, 
including investment in laboratories to measure perform-
ance and compliance with required standards and a 
dissemination plan and capacity building. 
Questions:
•  Would voluntary agreements fit with the current  
policy environment in your country and be a means  
of educating industry about climate change and  
opportunities for energy efficiency? 
•  If so, which industry is likely to be a test case for a  
voluntary agreement? What would be the main  
elements of such an agreement?
•  What would it take to launch and maintain such  
an activity in your country?
4.5 information instruments
There is an array of instruments (television, newspapers, 
internet, workshops and educational forums) that can in-
form the public about climate change, the local benefits of 
different actions and possible ways they can help to reduce 
emissions. More specific information instruments – such 
as public disclosure requirements and awareness/education 
campaigns – may help consumers to make choices that 
may lead to improved environmental quality or reduc-
tions in energy use. Examples of information instruments 
goals into concrete business practices and persuade other 
firms to follow their example. Often, negotiations to 
develop Voluntary agreements raise awareness of climate 
change issues and potential mitigative actions within 
industry to establish a dialog between industry and 
government, and help to move industries towards best 
practices.
There are widely differing views as to the environmental 
effectiveness of voluntary agreements. Some governments, 
as well as industry, believe voluntary agreements are 
effective in reducing GHG emissions. Agreements in the 
Netherlands have resulted in improvements in energy 
efficiency beyond what would have occurred in the 
absence of such agreements; that is on average, between a 
quarter and a half of the energy savings in the Dutch 
manufacturing industry can be attributed to the policy 
mix of the agreements and supporting measures. 
Others are more sceptical about the efficacy of voluntary 
agreements in reducing emissions. Independent assess-
ments of voluntary agreements, while acknowledging that 
there have been absolute emission improvements brought 
about by investments in cleaner technologies, indicate that 
there is little improvement over business-as-usual scenari-
os, as these investments would have probably happened 
anyway. 
The best voluntary agreements include a clear goal and 
baseline scenario; third party participation in the design of 
the agreement; description of the parties and their 
obligations; a defined relationship with the legal and 
regulatory framework; formal provision for monitoring, 
reporting, and independent verification of results at the 
plant level; a clear statement of the responsibilities 
expected to be self-financed by industry; commitments in 
terms of individual companies, rather than as sectoral 
commitments; and references to sanctions or incentives in 
the case of non-compliance. While imposing lower costs 
on industry they require dedicated government resources 
to be effective. It is the case that voluntary agreements fit 
into the cultural traditions of some countries better than 
others. Japan, for instance, has a history of cooperation 
between government and industry which facilitates the 
operation of “voluntary” programs.  
The Brazilian labelling program (PBE) described in 
Annex 2, Section 2.3 represents both a voluntary agreement 
Dominican Republic subsidies intended for cooking gas 
go in practice to owners of cars that run on natural gas.8 
More recently, high global oil prices have led some 
countries to reconsider their national energy policies, 
including the subsidies for gasoline. Some developed 
countries have faced strikes by truckers and other groups 
calling for governments to reduce taxes or compensate 
high consumption groups. Some developing countries 
who are attempting to reduce subsidies for gasoline have 
also faced protests. Attempts to remove/increase subsidies 
need to be done cautiously, in the absence of substitutes 
and a long-term energy plan. 
Questions:
• Are fossil fuels subsidized in your country? 
•  Have attempts been made to reduce subsidies and  
what was the result? What lessons might be applied  
from this experience? 
•  Would information on the experience of others be  
helpful to your government?
•  Does your government provide any financial incentives 
to promote renewable energy? What form of financial  
incentives would be most likely to succeed? What  
would your government need to make a program  
of financial incentives a success?
4.4  voluntary agreements 
Voluntary agreements are agreements between a govern-
ment authority and one or more private parties to achieve 
environmental objectives or to improve environmental 
performance beyond compliance to regulated obliga-
tions. They tend to be popular with industry and can be 
used when other instruments face strong political op-
position. Voluntary agreements can take on many forms 
with varying levels of stringency andm while all voluntary 
agreements are “voluntary”, some may involve incentives 
(rewards or penalties) for participation. Firms may agree 
to direct emissions reductions or to indirect reductions 
through changes in product design.
 The benefits of voluntary agreements for individual 
companies and for society may be significant. Firms may 
enjoy lower legal costs, can enhance their reputation, and 
may improve their relationships with society and share-
holders. Societies gain to the extent that firms translate 
8   According to Marino Inchaustegui, the former Finance Minister of Dominican Republic.
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UNFCCC was ratified. The capacity of developing 
countries to pursue R&D programs in the main depends 
on the size of their economies and status of their institu-
tions, but is generally more limited. 
Many countries pursue technological R&D as a national 
policy to foster the development of innovative technolo-
gies or help domestic industries to be competitive. 
Countries chose to cooperate with each other in order to 
share costs, spread risks, avoid duplication, access facilities, 
enhance domestic capabilities, support specific economic 
and political objectives, harmonize standards, accelerate 
market learning and create goodwill. Cooperation, 
however, may increase transaction costs, require extensive 
coordination, raise concerns over intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) and foreclose other technology pathways. It 
may also be a path to reducing tension over IPRs if 
developing countries participate from the beginning as 
equal partners in an R&D program. 
Analysts have examined several policy options to 
promote renewables. They indicate that research subsidies 
are an expensive way to achieve emission reductions, in the 
absence of higher prices. A specific example arises from the 
Danish experience with wind technologies. In that case, 
despite significant support for wind energy R&D during 
the 1980s, wind power only boomed in Denmark when 
favorable feed-in tariffs were introduced, procedures for 
construction were simplified and priority was given for 
green electricity. Others have found that the ability to raise 
capital and take risks has played a much larger role in the 
recent expansion of the photovoltaic industry than other 
factors such as learning by experience.  
Questions:
•  Does your government support any R&D  
programs that aim to develop or deploy GHG  
mitigation technologies? If so, what sectors or  
technologies are of particular interest? 
•  What means does it use to share information and  
results with other governments? 
•  What would be necessary to enable your government  
to participate in a cooperative international  
program? 
CDM-relevant issues such as ownership of CDM credits 
or the national-level eligibility of certain project types. 
Other, more general, actions can also help to reduce 
barriers. These include reducing participation/ownership 
restrictions on foreign investment and ownership in 
sectors liable to CDM investments.
Questions: 
•  Does your country have a clear legal framework and  
process for CDM projects? 
•  If your country has not been able to develop a CDM  
project, what are the main domestic issues that need  
to be clarified? 
•  Are there specific ‘immediate’ actions that the CDM  
Executive Board could take to facilitate the develop- 
ment of CDM projects in your country? 
•  What additional steps might be addressed through  
the negotiations to facilitate the development of  
projects?
4.7 Research and development
The need for R&D in changing the trajectory of the 
energy emissions is unquestionable. The IPCC (2007) 
notes that the range of stabilization levels assessed can be 
achieved by deployment of a portfolio of technologies 
that are currently available and those that are expected to 
be commercialized in coming decades. However, it also 
notes that investments in and world-wide deployment of 
low-GHG emission technologies, as well as technology 
improvements through public and private research, devel-
opment & demonstration (RD&D) would be required for 
achieving stabilization targets as well as cost reduction. The 
lower the stabilization levels are, especially those of 550 
ppm CO2-eq or lower, the greater the need for more ef-
ficient RD&D efforts and investment in new technologies 
during the next few decades will be. For some high risk 
technologies government support will clearly be needed.
Governments in OECD countries, which account for 
most energy research, use a number of tools to support 
R&D, such as grants, contracts, tax credits and allow-
ances, and public/private partnerships. Total public 
funding for energy technologies in IEA countries in the 
period 1987-2002 was $291 billion, with 50% allocated 
to nuclear fission and fusion, 12.3% to fossil fuels and 
7.7% to renewable energy technologies. Funding has 
dropped after the initial interest created through the oil 
shock in the 1970s and has stayed constant, even after the 
ment conventional pollution trading programs in most 
developing countries.
The tradable permit systems developed or under 
construction in OECD countries all permit some form of 
offsets for credits generated through either domestic 
projects or the international mechanisms such as CDM of 
the Kyoto Protocol. Under the CDM, more than 3,000 
projects are in the pipeline of which 1,090 are registered.9 
However, there is an uneven distribution of CDM projects 
by type, gas and country as documented in IPCC 2007. 
Ellis and Kamel (2007) have identified a number of 
barriers to CDM projects, including: 
•  National-level barriers not related specifically to the 
CDM, such as the policy or legislative framework 
within which a CDM project operates, e.g., electricity-
related regulations that constrain generation by 
independent power producers;
•  National-level CDM-related barriers such as institu-
tional capability/effectiveness or lack of awareness 
about CDM potential. For example, delays in host 
country approval of CDM projects can dampen 
interest in CDM project development;
•  Project-related issues including availability (or not) of 
underlying project finance, or other country or 
project-related risks that render the performance of the 
project uncertain;
•  International-level barriers such as constraints on 
project eligibility (e.g., on land use and forestry 
projects), available guidance and decisions (e.g., with 
respect to the inclusion of carbon capture and storage 
projects).
Barriers to CDM development can arise at different 
parts of the CDM project cycle. The relative importance 
of particular barriers varies between countries as well as 
over time. A combination of factors is needed to drive 
growth in a country’s CDM activity. This includes the 
presence of attractive CDM opportunities, a positive 
investment climate, and an enabling policy and legislative 
framework (in general, as well as CDM-specific). Some 
barriers to CDM development can be reduced relatively 
simply and cheaply. These include CDM-specific actions 
such as establishing a simple, timely and transparent 
CDM project approval process and a clear policy on 
two basic options for the initial distribution of permits: 
free distribution of permits to existing polluters or 
auctions. Auctions provide a source of revenue that could 
potentially address inequities brought about by a carbon 
policy, creating equal opportunity for new entrants, and 
avoiding the potential for “windfall profits” that might 
accrue to emissions sources if allowances are allocated at 
no charge. Government revenues from auctions may be 
used to address equity issues through reductions in taxes 
or other distributions to poor households. Recently, 
Germany has indicated that it will use a portion of its 
auction proceeds to fund adaptation projects in develop-
ing countries. 
Although a tradable permits approach can ensure that a 
certain quantity of emissions will be reduced, it does not 
provide certainty of price. Price uncertainty may be 
addressed by a “price cap” or “safety valve” mechanism, 
which guarantees that the government will sell additional 
permits if the market price of allowances hits a certain 
price. The reasoning is that GHGs are of concern as they 
accumulate over an extended period in the atmosphere. 
There may therefore be less concern about short-term 
increases in CO2 as long as the overall trajectory of CO2 
emissions is downward over an extended period.  
While no current emissions trading scheme (ETS)  
has initiated a price cap, such an approach could have 
long-term implications for the price of emission offsets. 
(For a more expansive consideration of emission trading 
systems, including different types of targets, banking and 
borrowing provisions, enforcement requirements and the 
European Union’s ETS, see the IPCC 2007 report.).
There have been several experiments with tradable 
permits for conventional pollution control in developing 
countries and economies in transition. For example,  
there was an experiment with tradable permits for total 
suspended particulates in Santiago, Chile, which revealed 
that the permit market was underdeveloped due to high 
transaction costs, uncertainty, and poor enforcement,  
but that such a system improved documentation of 
historic emissions inventories and increased flexibility to 
address changing market conditions. Several analysts  
have suggested that strengthening the monitoring and 
enforcement capacity that would be required to imple-
9   As of June 24, 2008. See: www.unfccc.int. 
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4.8.2. Institutions
A number of the case studies in the Annexes point to 
the need for well-functioning institutions and/or, when 
none are present, for reforms. Such was the case of 
Senegal, which, when faced with the need to provide 
greater access to electricity for the poor, passed new laws 
that liberalized the electricity sector, set up a commission 
to develop regulations, created the Senegalese Rural 
Electrification Agency dedicated to the implementation 
the rural electrification policy, and allowed the creation of 
Public/Private Partnerships. Other countries such as 
China, with its heavily centralized institutions, are 
reorganizing, downsizing, and decentralizing over-bur-
dened institutions. In China’s case, the institutional 
capacities at the provincial and county level are very weak. 
China recognizes this issue. To strengthen the system, the 
energy bureau within the National Development and 
Reform Commission was upgraded to a State Bureau of 
Energy in March 2008.
The lessons from these and other case studies is that if 
national policies are to be well designed and implemented 
There are several requirements for applying an environ-
mentally and economically effective instrument mix. First, 
there is a need to have a good understanding of the 
environmental issues to be addressed. In practice, many 
environmental issues can be complex. A tax can affect the 
total demand for a product and the choice between 
different product varieties, but is less suited to address, for 
example, how a given product is used and when it is used. 
Hence, other instruments could be needed. A second 
requirement is to have a good understanding of the links 
with other policy areas. In addition to coordinating 
different environmental policies, co-ordination with other 
related policies and consistency among policy goals is 
needed. A third requirement is to have a good understand-
ing of the interactions between the different instruments 
in the mix. In this regard, depending on their designs, 
modelling tools can provide some insights into policy 
interactions. Finally, the exchange of information among 
ministries is essential to the implementation of good 
policies. (See IPCC 2007 for a more elaborate discussion of 









































China X X X X X X
guatemala X





philippines X X X
Sri Lanka X
thailand X X X X
turkey X X
vietnam
Table 1: examples of renewable energy promotion policies in selected developing countries
Source: Erik Martinot 
Box 2: examples of standards, regulations, rules and 
financial incentives used in some countries to promote  
the deployment of renewable technologies
regulations, standards and rules: 
renewable performance Standards
performance standards for new facilities
green power purchasing requirements
interconnection standards
net metering rules
generation disclosure rules 
Contractor licensing
Equipment certification









Equity investments, including venture capital
insurance programs
Source: Adapted from DSIRE website http://dsireusa.org/Index.
cfm?EE=0&RE=1
4.8  Non-climate change policies and other  
national priorities
A number of non-climate national priorities and poli-
cies can have an important influence on GHG emissions. 
These include: policies that focus on poverty, land use and 
land use change, energy supply and security; international 
trade, air pollution, structural reforms, and population 
policies. These non-climate policies could offer countries 
an opportunity to assess and develop synergistic sustain-
able development strategies at a time of limited financial 
and human resources in developing countries. 
For example, poverty reduces the resilience of vulner-
able populations and makes them more at risk to the 
potential impacts of climate change, but it also leads 
communities to take measures that may increase emis-
sions. If poverty can be reduced without raising emissions, 
a strategy to reduce poverty will be seen as a way to reduce 
emissions as well as enhance resilience. Typical areas of 
synergy included small-scale renewables and community 
forestry. The case study of efficient cook stoves in Kenya 
(Annex 3.1) is an example of how the climate may benefit 
from efforts to improve the lives of the poor, reduce local 
air pollution, and reduce wood consumption.  
Land use policies (or lack thereof ), whether terrestrial 
(agriculture, forestry, nature), aquatic (wetlands) or urban, 
can lead to enhanced emissions. Policies that aim to 
integrate climate change concerns with those of local 
people may yield major synergies. For example, within the 
Netherlands, a major program is currently underway to 
understand how spatial planning and climate change 
policy can be effectively linked. Regional (acid rain 
abatement), local and indoor air pollution policies can also 
have climate change co-benefits. 
Consumption of natural resources is ultimately one of 
the major drivers of global emissions. The global popula-
tion and income levels affect the consumption of natural 
resources, particularly energy, food and fiber, and hence 
can also affect GHG emissions. Consumption patterns 
vary significantly between developed and developing coun-
tries. The IPCC 2007 notes that changes in lifestyle and 
behavior patterns can contribute to climate change 
mitigation across all sectors and lifestyles and that 
consumption patterns that emphasize resource conserva-
tion can contribute to developing a low-carbon economy 
that is both equitable and sustainable. It further notes, 
among several examples that management practices, 
education and training programs, and industrial manage-
ment tools can affect consumption patterns. 
4.8.1.  National policy interactions/ linkages and  
packages
Single instruments are unlikely to be sufficient for 
many environmental problems, including climate change 
mitigation; rather it is likely to take a portfolio of poli-
cies (see IPCC, 2001). However, the application of two or 
more overlapping instruments could diminish economic 
efficiency while increasing administrative costs. In prac-
tice, however, there are market failures that make a mix of 
instruments desirable. We note for example, that the rapid 
increase in renewable investments has come about largely 
because of a combination of regulations and financial 
incentives shown in Box 2. Also to be noted, the lists in 
Box 2 contain a combination of regulations, standards, 
and rules at different levels of government. Vertical policy 
integration is an important requirement to overcome 
many implementation barriers as demonstrated by the 
developing countries with multiple policies in Table 1 and 
by the case studies.
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Evaluating instruments based on the criteria we have 
discussed is challenging for two reasons. First, practitioners 
must be able to compare potential instruments based on 
each of the evaluative criteria. However, in many cases it 
can be difficult to rank instruments in an objective 
manner. For example, ranking environmental policy 
instruments based on their technology-stimulating effects 
is particularly difficult, as is assessing distributional 
considerations in some cases. Second, policy makers must 
determine how much weight to assign each of the 
evaluative criteria. Consider two instruments that are 
equally environmentally effective and both institutionally 
feasible, but one has unfavorable distributional implica-
tions while the other is less cost-effective. To choose one 
instrument over the other one must assess the relative 
importance of distribution vs. cost-effectiveness. Deter-
mining these weights is a subjective question, left to policy 
makers to decide. 
5. aSSeSSiNG poliCY iNSTRUMeNTS
criTeria





Emissions level set directly, 
though subject to  
exceptions. Depends on 
deferrals and compliance.
Depends on design,  
uniform application often 
leads to higher overall 
compliance costs. 
Depends on level playing 
field. Small/new actors may 
be disadvantaged.
Depends on technical capacity. 
popular with regulators, in countries 
with weak functioning markets.
taxes and Charges Depends on ability to set 
tax at a level that induces 
behavioral change. 
Better with broad applica-
tion. Higher administrative 
costs where institutions are 
weak.
regressive. Can be 
ameliorated with revenue 
recycling. 
often politically unpopular. may be 
difficult to enforce with underdevel-
oped institutions.
tradable permits Depends on emissions  
cap, participation and  
compliance.
Decreases with limited 
participation and fewer 
sectors.
Depends on initial permit 
allocation. may pose dif-
ficulties for small emitters.
requires well functioning markets 
and complementary institutions. 
voluntary Agreements Depends on program  
design, including clear 
targets, a baseline scenario, 
third party involvement 
in design and review, and 
monitoring provisions.
Depends on flexibility and 
extent of government 
incentives, rewards and 
penalties.
Benefits accrue only to 
participants.
often politically popular. requires 
significant number of administrative 
staff.
Subsidies and other 
incentives
Depends on program design. 
Less certain than regulations/
standards. 
Depends on level and pro-
gram design. Can be market 
distorting.
Benefits selected partici-
pants, possibly some that 
do not need it.
popular with recipients; potential 
resistance from vested interests.  
Can be difficult to phase out.
research and Develop-
ment
Depends on consistent 
funding, when technologies 
are developed, and polices 
for diffusion. may have high 
benefits in long-term.
Depends on program 
design and the degree  
of risk.
Benefits initially selected 
participants. potentially 
easy for funds to be misal-
located.
requires many separate decisions. 
Depends on research capacity and 
long-term funding.
information policies Depends on how consumers 
use the information. most 
effective in combination with 
other policies.
potentially low cost, but de-
pends on program design. 
may be less effective for 
groups (e.g,, low-income) 
that lack access to informa-
tion.
Depends on cooperation from spe-
cial interest groups.
Table 2: National environmental policy instruments and evaluative criteria
Note: Evaluations are predicated on assumptions that instruments are representative of best practice rather than theoretically perfect. this assessment is based 
primarily on experiences and literature from developed countries, as peer reviewed articles on the effectiveness of instruments in other countries was limited. 
Applicability in specific countries, sectors and circumstances – particularly developing countries and economies in transition – may differ greatly. Environmental 
and cost effectiveness may be enhanced when instruments are strategically combined and adapted to local circumstances.
Source: IPCC 2007
effectively, strong institutions are needed. The cases 
demonstrate that there are still substantive needs for 
institutional capacity building at both central and local 
levels in most developing countries for the smooth 
implementation of policies.
Questions: 
•  Can you identify the non-climate national policies  
that are likely to have the greatest impact on GHG  
emissions in your country? 
•  Is there a way to quantify the effects of a possible  
change in policy over the next 10-20 years? What  
would it take to implement such a policy?
•  Given your knowledge of the policies in your country  
and reflecting on the case studies in the Annexes,  
what additional local, state or national policies,  
institutions, financing and/or other arrangements are  
needed to promote renewable/energy efficiency in  
your country?
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The reasons for an international agreement are well 
covered in the IPCC 2001 and 2007, in particular, the 
global nature of the problem and the fact that no single 
country has more than approximately 20% of global 
emissions. This means that successful solutions will need 
to engage multiple countries. Similarly, the fact that no 
one sector is responsible for more than about 25% of 
global emissions (the largest sector is that of electricity 
generation and heat production at 24% of the global,  
six-gas total) implies that no single sector will be uniquely 
required to act. 
Recent literature has noted the limitations of existing 
international agreements to address climate change.  
In fact, there are no authoritative assessments of the 
UNFCCC or its Kyoto Protocol that assert that these 
agreements have succeeded – or will succeed without 
changes – in fully solving the climate problem. As its 
name implies, the UNFCCC was designed as a broad 
framework and the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment 
period for 2008 to 2012 only as a first detailed step.  
Both the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol include 
provisions for further steps as necessary. 
A number of limitations and gaps in existing agreements 
are cited, namely:
•  The lack of an explicit long-term goal means countries 
do not have a clear direction for national and interna-
tional policy10; 
• The targets are not sufficiently stringent;
•  The agreements do not engage an adequate comple-
ment of developed and developing countries;
•  The agreements are too expensive;
•  The agreements do not have adequately robust 
compliance provisions; and
•  The agreements do not adequately promote the 
development and/or transfer of technology.
To address these limitations in the post 2012 period, 
Parties to the UNFCCC and to the Kyoto Protocol met in 
Bali, Indonesia, from December 3 to 14, 2007. Negotia-
tors agreed on a two year process to finalize a post 2012 
regime by December, 200911. The key elements are 
contained in UNFCCC decision 1/CP.13 on the Bali 
Action Plan, adopted by consensus on December 15 
(UNFCCC 2007).
The Bali Plan of Action seems to provide an opportunity 
to foster a global response to climate change. The Plan 
retains distinctions between the responsibilities of 
developed and developing countries with respect to their 
mitigation actions12. Actions by developed countries may 
include measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally 
appropriate mitigation commitments, or actions including 
quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives, 
while ensuring the comparability of efforts among them, 
taking into account differences in their national circum-
stances; while those of developing countries are to include 
nationally appropriate mitigation actions in the context of 
sustainable development, supported and enabled by 
technology, financing and capacity-building, in a measur-
able, reportable and verifiable manner.13 
Each of the Bali Action Plan building blocks (i.e., 
mitigation, adaptation, technology transfer, and financing) 
will represent a special challenge for the negotiators over 
the next several years, but finding a means to reduce the 
level and growth rates of emissions and to improve the 
cost-effectiveness of, and generate sufficient, predictable 
and sustainable financial resources for mitigation will be  
a particularly crucial task.
An analysis of the financial resources and investment 
that would be required for mitigation and adaptation 
undertaken by the UNFCCC secretariat indicates that 
significant changes in the existing patterns of public and 
private investment and financial flows will be required 
(UNFCCC 2007b). Additional investment and financial 
flows in 2030 to address climate change amounts to 
0.3-0.5% of global domestic product and 1.1-1.7% of 
global investment. This is a small amount in overall global 
GDP, but large compared to the currently available public 
6.  RelaTioNShip oF NaTioNal poliCieS To a FUTURe iNTeRNaTioNal 
CliMaTe ChaNGe aGReeMeNT 
10   The IPCC report notes that under regime designs for low and medium concentration stabilization levels, i.e, 450 ppm CO2-eq, GHG emissions from developed countries would 
need to be reduced substantially during this century, i.e, 25 to 40% by 2020 and that, substantial deviation from baseline would be required in Latin America, Middle East, East 
Asia and Centrally-Planned Asia by 2020. 
11   This process will build on the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments of Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) and a “Dialogue” to consider 
long-term cooperation under the Convention as initiated at COP11 in Montreal in December 2005. The main purpose of both processes was to exchange information and ideas 
regarding a follow-up to the Kyoto Protocol.
12   See the paper by Harald Winkler that is part of this series titled Climate change mitigation negotiations, with an emphasis on options for developing countries.
13   See decision 1/CP.13 for full text (UNFCCC, 2007a).
Nevertheless, it is possible to make general statements 
about each instrument according to the criteria we have 
selected. For instance, it is generally believed that market-
based instruments will be more cost effective than 
regulations and standards. However, this belief implicitly 
assumes that a country has well-functioning institutions, 
the lack of which can make market-based instrument more 
costly to implement. Table 2 (previous page), taken from 
the IPCC 2007, summarizes the seven climate-related 
instruments presented in this chapter for each of the  
four criteria.
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Each country has a policy making process, that regard-
less of the form government, is complex and unique. It is 
often the case that while individuals may be aware of the 
benefits of actions that have both local and climate change 
benefits, that awareness is not always extended to the 
whole set of governmental decision makers. Hence, in 
terms of mitigation policies and measures, an essential first 
step may entail enhancing awareness within ministries and 
across the government to ensure consistency and synergies 
in policy making and implementation.
Secondly, even if a problem is recognized, information 
may be insufficient for adequate policy design, for example 
developing marginal abatement cost curves. Trying to 
assess the benefits of a policy and the costs of inaction may 
be hindered or impeded by fragmentary information. 
Overcoming this barrier may require competing for 
budgetary resources with other programs, and national 
priorities or finding funding from other sources and 
governments.  
Third, national capacity to elaborate scenarios – 
economic, energy and climate, and to model future trends 
and the evolution of key variables, is sometimes limited in 
developing countries. This can impair the quality of 
decision making, or reducing the scope of policy options 
being considered. At worst, that capacity may be missing 
and the necessary analysis that informs policy design may 
consequently be missing.
While acknowledging that these constraints are inherent 
to policy making in developing countries, it is recognized 
that climate change intensifies the effect of such 
constraints as it creates new challenges. Climate change 
adds an additional dimension to efforts to promote 
sustainable development. On the one hand, because 
resources otherwise needed to alleviate poverty or enhance 
income distribution, among other goals may need to be 
channelled to address climate change impacts or to 
facilitate mitigation policies that may be initially be more 
expensive such as, the deployment of the some renewable 
energies technologies. On the other hand, uncertainty on 
the nature, intensity, frequency and timing of impacts may 
artificially enlarge the magnitude of resources needed to 
tackle the problems of adaptation thereby creating 
additional financial constraints and diminishing economic 
efficiency. Finding synergies between sustainable 
development goals and responses to climate change is 
therefore important. 
More broadly, there are dynamic tensions in developing 
countries between economic growth, development, 
environmental preservation, poverty alleviation, or energy 
security, among other critical goals. In that regard 
mitigation policies might be seen as improving the overall 
efficiency and security of an economy, e.g., by reducing 
the need for imported oil. However, this is not always the 
case as they may be viewed as an unnecessary diversion of 
key resources. 
Questions: 
•  Are the institutional arrangements and policy making 
processes in your country adequate in the short term 
(the next couple of years) to tackle the broad set of 
issues that need to be addressed?
•  How can the constraints noted above be measured and 
needs quantified in order to justify funding and 
capacity building? 
•  What are the effects of these constraints when defining 
national positions at the negotiations? 
•  What are the effects of those constraints in terms of 
prioritization of sectors/planning/policy development/
opportunities? 
•  What can you personally do to overcome them?
7. The poliCY MaKiNG pRoCeSS 
and private financial resources for climate change. Total 
investment in new physical assets is projected to triple 
between 2000 and 2030. Due to rapid economic growth, 
a large share of these investments will occur in developing 
countries using internally generated funds, through 
foreign direct investment, the carbon market and through 
other financial mechanisms related to the Convention.  
As with any such global analysis, the circumstances of any 
individual country will differ.14
There is little doubt that additional investments are 
needed. Yet, a dilemma that has faced climate change 
negotiations since 1992 has been how to separate out 
development needs from the extra cost of addressing 
climate change. What should the international community 
pay for versus developing countries because it is in their 
national development and economic interest? One way to 
overcome this dilemma is for developing country negotia-
tors to articulate how they will contribute to the global 
effort by changing the trajectory of their emissions as 
noted in IPCC 2007 through the adoption/modification 
of national policies, if additional technological and 
financial assistance is forth coming. Moreover, careful 
consideration of the state of national policies in develop-
ing countries would seem to be a useful step even without 
any consideration of how such information might be 
applied in the context of the negotiations.  
Finally, one additional concept needs consideration, that 
is, the concept of sustainable development policies and 
measures (SD-PAMs) as a contribution to the global 
effort. The basic idea behind this concept is that in many 
cases addressing the sustainable development goals of 
developing countries may also be the most effective way  
of stimulating reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. In 
most cases, these SD-PAMs do not need to be based on 
emission limits or on a carbon price. They can be aimed 
directly and wholly at meeting the sustainable develop-
ment goals of the host country. Critics have noted the 
difficulty of quantifying the benefits of such actions, 
however, if the link between the two can be made clearer,  
a hurdle in the negotiations may be overcome.15
14   See the paper by Erik Haites that is part of this series titled Negotiations on additional investment and financial flows to address climate change in developing countries for additional 
details on investment needs and options to increase funding to developing countries.
15   See the paper by Harald Winkler that is part of this series titled Climate change mitigation negotiations, with an emphasis on options for developing countries for more details.
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aNNex 1. aSia
1.1 Renewable/wind policy in india
1.1.1. Background 
India is endowed with abundant renewable energy 
sources – solar, wind, biomass, and small hydroelectric 
– and the government is working proactively to develop 
them. Under the “Power for All by 2012” initiative, the 
government has envisaged universal electricity supply by 
2012. So far only 56% of the households have access to 
electricity.
India is the third largest electricity consumer in Asia 
behind China and Japan. As of 31 December 2006, 
installed power generation capacity in India was 127,753 
MW. Thermal power plants, mostly coal-fired, provide 
66% of the installed capacity. Hydropower accounts for 
26% of the capacity, with gas and oil fired thermal plants, 
renewable energy plants, and nuclear plants providing the 
remaining 8%.16
As the Indian power sector has grown, India has become 
increasingly dependent on fossil fuels. With continued and 
sustained hikes in oil and gas prices in recent years, as well 
as the expected fossil fuel shortages in the future, the 
security of energy supply in India has generated increasing 
concern. The environmental concern over excess use of 
fossil fuels is also on the rise. In this context, India 
urgently needs to explore sustainable energy development, 
and the government has been working proactively to 
promote the use of renewable energy sources.
Among the renewable power resources available in 
India, wind energy is a promising source for further 
development. India has over 45,000 MW of gross 
potential and 13,000 MW of technical potential for wind 
power. As of September 2007, India had over 7,200 MW 
of installed wind power capacity, ranking the country 
fourth in the world after Germany, United States, and 
Spain. While the 10th Five Year Plan (2002-2007) 
targeted a 2,200 MW increase of installed wind power 
capacity, over 5,400 MW was actually installed.17
The government has provided support measures to 
increase renewable energy contributions in the country.  
It has also issued policy guidelines for the state govern-
ments to establish and maintain state-specific policies to 
promote renewable power projects. The promotional 
measures available to renewable energy projects comprise a 
wide range of fiscal and financial incentives, including soft 
loans, concessional customs duties, exemption from excise 
duty, tax holidays, and accelerated depreciation benefits.
1.1.2. Objective of the policy
To support the development of renewable energy, the 
government has stipulated a national objective of achiev-
ing 10% of the capacity additions for the period 2002-
2012 from renewable energy sources.
1.1.3.  What policy instruments were used/had to be 
passed to achieve the objective? 
The government is proactively encouraging development 
of renewable energy sources. The government’s efforts to 
promote renewable energy started in the early 1980s after 
the first and second global oil price shocks. The govern-
ment created the Commission for Additional Sources of 
Energy in 1981 and Department of Non-Conventional 
Energy Sources in 1982. The Department of Non-Con-
ventional Energy Sources was transformed into the 
Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy Sources (MNES) 
in 1992, and then was renamed the Ministry of New and 
Renewable Energy (MNRE) in 2006. The National 
Electricity Policy, issued by the Ministry of Power in 2005, 
contains a major thrust toward the development of 
renewable energy sources. MNRE is the nodal ministry in 
the government for all matters relating to new and 
renewable energy. Its main functions include:
• Policymaking and planning;
• Program formulation and implementation;
• Research and development;
• Technology development and commercialization;
• Promotion of demonstration and pilot projects; and
• Implementation of fiscal and financial incentives.
The MNES (now MNRE) established the Centre for 
Wind Energy Technologies at Chennai as an autonomous 
R&D institution of the government and as a technical 
aNNexeS
16   Ministry of Power. 2007. Report of the Working Group on Power for Eleventh Plan (2007–2012). New Delhi.
17   Ministry of New and Renewable Energy Annual Report 2006–2007. New Delhi.
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not be feasible or not cost effective, off-grid solutions 
based on stand-alone systems may be taken up for 
supply of electricity. Where these also are not feasible 
and if only alternative is to use isolated lighting 
technologies like solar PV, these may be adopted. 
However, such remote villages may not be designated 
as electrified. 
•  State government should, within six months, prepare 
and notify a rural electrification plan, which should 
map and detail the electrification delivery mechanism. 
The plan may be linked to and integrated with district 
development plans. The plan should also be intimated 
to the appropriate commission. 
•  Gramapanchayat shall issue the first certificate at the 
time of the village becoming eligible for declaration as 
electrified.  Subsequently, the Gramapanchayat shall 
certify and confirm the electrified status of the village 
as on 31 March each year. 
1.2 energy efficiency policies in China
1.2.1. Background
China has the largest population in the world and is amongst 
the highest rate of economic growth. However, many of its 
people live in poverty. The government’s objective is to lift 
its people out of poverty through continued economic de-
velopment. China is the second largest consumer of energy 
in the world and its future growth will increase its energy 
requirements significantly making it the largest energy con-
sumer by 2015. 
China’s relative dearth of high-quality energy resources 
hinders its supply capability. Its imbalanced distribution 
makes it difficult to secure a continued and steady supply; 
and the pattern of economic growth, irrational energy 
structure, unsatisfactory energy technology and relatively 
poor management have resulted in higher energy con-
sumption per-unit GDP for the major energy-consuming 
products. Constrained supply is, thus, further intensified 
by high energy intensity. Consequently, meeting increasing 
energy demand just by increasing energy supply has its 
limitations and it is well recognized that action to lower 
energy intensity is essential.
In recent years, a host of programs have been formulated 
to address the problem of low energy efficiencies, includ-
ing: 10 energy conservations, top 1,000 energy-using 
enterprises, retirement of inefficient power-generation 
National Electricity Policy 2005  
The National Electricity Policy 2005 stipulates that the 
share of electricity from non-conventional sources would 
need to be progressively increased; with purchase by 
distribution companies through a competitive bidding 
process. Considering that it will take some time before 
non-conventional technologies compete, in terms of cost, 
with conventional sources, the state commission may 
determine an appropriate deferential in prices to promote 
these technologies.  
Tariff Policy 2006 
The Tariff Policy announced in January 2006 has the 
following provisions:
•  Pursuant to provisions of Section 86 (1) (e) of the Act, 
the Appropriate Commission shall fix a minimum 
percentage for purchase of energy from such sources 
taking into account availability of such resources in the 
region and its impact on retail tariffs. Such percentages 
for purchase of energy should be made applicable for 
the tariffs to be determined by the State Electricity 
Regulatory Commission (SERC) latest by April 1, 
2006. 
•  It will take some time before non-conventional 
technologies can compete with conventional sources in 
terms of cost of electricity. Therefore, procurement by 
distribution companies shall be done at preferential 
tariffs determined by the Appropriate Commission.
•  Such procurement by Distribution Licensees for future 
requirements shall be done, as far as possible, through 
competitive bidding process under Section 63 of the 
Act within suppliers offering energy from same type of 
non-conventional sources. In the long-term, these 
technologies would need to compete with other 
sources in terms of full costs.
•  The Central Commission should lay down guidelines 
within three months for pricing non-firm power, 
especially from non-conventional sources, to be 
followed in cases where such procurement is not 
through competitive bidding.
National Rural Electrification Policies, 2006 
•  Goals include provision of access to electricity to all 
households by 2009, quality and reliable power supply 
at reasonable rates, and minimum lifeline consump-
tion of 1unit/household/day as a merit good by 2012. 
•  For villages/habitations where grid connectivity would 
wind-based electricity generation in India. On the 
technical side, the government undertook extensive wind 
mapping studies in the mid-80s. Besides providing policy 
support it also established the India Renewable Energy 
Development Agency to channel concessional finance into 
renewable energy projects. Wind energy projects capital-
ized on this facility in a significant manner. The govern-
ment further set up the Centre for Wind Energy Tech-
nologies to cover R&D, technology upgrading, testing, 
certification and standardization in association with the 
wind turbine industry. The technological support and the 
fast growth in the sector as a result of the various policies 
encouraged local industry to collaborate with foreign firms 
and establish local manufacturing capacity.
1.1.5.  What has happened as a result of the policy and 
instruments that were introduced? 
The policies and instruments and their constant 
adaptation and modification have resulted in the commer-
cialization of the wind electricity technology in the 
country. At present, wind turbines of 1 MW and above are 
being manufactured in India. A major evolution in the 
policy was a shift in focus from “capacity additions” to 
“generation based incentives”. The initial growth in 
capacity was followed by a lull in capacity additions. 
However, international policy instruments like the CDM 
added fillip to the growth in wind based power generation 
in India. The sector continues to benefit from the national 
and state level policies for promoting renewables. For 
example, innovative business models are being developed 
where firms with technical capability develop projects that 
are sold to the private investors. The technical firms 
continue to operate and maintain the wind farms through 
a maintenance contract. 
1.1.6.  List of relevant laws, regulations and rules
Electricity Act 2003 
Section 86. (1): “The State Commission shall discharge 
the following functions… (e): promote cogeneration and 
generation of electricity from renewable sources of energy 
by providing suitable measures for connectivity with the 
grid and sale of electricity to any person, and also specify, 
for purchase of electricity from such sources, a percentage 
of the total consumption of electricity in the area of a 
distribution licensee”.
focal point for India’s wind power development. The 
centre provides developers with technical services, 
including wind resource assessment for project sites, 
testing and certification services for equipment, and 
training and capacity-building services. Technological 
advancements are gradually increasing the commercial 
viability of wind power projects. 
Fiscal and financial incentives provided by the national 
and state governments have traditionally driven the 
development of wind power projects in India. The 
incentives being provided by the government include:
•  80% accelerated depreciation of project costs for  
wind power projects (in the initial stages 100%  
accelerated depreciation was allowed); 
•  Concessions or full exemption on customs duties  
of certain imported components of wind turbines;
•  Tax holiday for a maximum of 10 consecutive years  
within 15 years of commissioning, which is available  
for infrastructure projects; 
•  Concessional loans available through Government- 
owned agencies, including Indian Renewable Energy  
Development Agency Limited, Power Finance  
Corporation Limited, and Rural Electrification  
Corporation Limited. 
The Electricity Act, 2003 requires all state-level energy 
regulatory commissions to ensure that electricity distribu-
tors procure a specified minimum percentage of power 
generation from renewable energy sources. The midterm 
appraisal of the 10th Five Year Plan by Planning Commis-
sion included the following recommendations for the 
renewable energy sector:
•  Explore alternative subsidy structures that encourage  
utilities to integrate wind, small hydroelectric,  
cogeneration, etc., into their systems;
•  Phase out capital subsidies linked to the creation of  
renewable capacity in favor of subsidies linked to  
renewable energy generated;
•  State electricity regulatory commissions should  
mandate the purchase of energy from renewable  
sources, as per the provisions of the Electricity Act;
•  Improve coordination and synergize the programs of  
MNRE with similar programs of other central  
ministries and state governments.
1.1.4. Key factors needed to make something happen    
Several factors supported the development of the 
NaTioNal PolicieS & THeir liNkaGeS To NeGoTiaTioNS oVer a fUTUre iNTerNaTioNal climaTe cHaNGe aGreemeNT98 NaTioNal PolicieS & THeir liNkaGeS To NeGoTiaTioNS oVer a fUTUre iNTerNaTioNal climaTe cHaNGe aGreemeNT                     99
dependence on foreign technologies. 
•  Coordination. Fiscal, financial, and environmental 
policies are formulated by the Ministry of Finance, 
Central Bank, and State Environmental Protection 
Agency (SEPA), respectively. Energy sector operations 
and large project approvals are controlled by the 
National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC). Relevant line ministries (e.g., Ministry of 
Construction, Ministry of Science and Technologies, 
Ministry of Agriculture) have been playing their own 
roles. Apparently, coordination among these govern-
ment agencies needs to be further strengthened.   
•  Institutional Arrangements. The central government 
has been reorganized and downsized and implementa-
tion for energy development and conservation has 
been decentralized and assigned to various agencies, 
many of which are claiming to be over-burdened. The 
institutional capacities at the provincial and county 
level are very weak. China recognizes this issue and to 
strengthen the system the energy bureau within 
NDRC was upgraded to a State Bureau of Energy in 
March 2008. But there are still substantive needs for 
institutional capacity building at both central and local 
levels for the smooth implementation of these policies.
•  Implementation Procedures. Many policies in China 
have focused on laying out broad guidelines and 
overall targets. Implementation procedures need to be 
worked out in detail in order to carry out these polices. 
For example, the procedure to measure and monitor 
energy savings and pollution reduction needs to be 
systematically established to ensure actual award of 
fiscal incentives (e.g., subsidies, tax privileges, and 
allowances for accelerated depreciation). Energy 
efficiency standards and labelling systems need to be 
put in place to phase out energy-inefficient appliances. 
Approximately 2 billion m2 of floor area is being 
constructed annually in China, accounting for half of 
the world’s total. Based on this trend, China will build 
another 20-30 billion m2 of floor space between now 
and 2020. Despite the issuance of a number of 
building standards and regulation, so far, among the 
existing 40 billion m2 of buildings, only 4% have been 
considered for energy efficiency improvements, mainly 
by adopting energy-efficient heating and cooling 
systems. There is a need for stronger enforcement of 
existing law, rules and regulations.
China recognizes that only with improved energy 
technologies can it achieve its targets for development and 
economic growth while avoiding energy shortages and 
coping with global climate change. In 2006, the Outline 
of National Medium- and Long-term Science and 
Technology Development Plan (2006–2020) were issued. 
The latter identified innovation as a new national “strat-
egy” for which China will:
• Invest more than 2.5% of its GDP in R&D;
•  Ensure that the contribution of science and technology 
to economic development exceeds 60%; and
•  Reduce its dependence on foreign technologies  
to under 30%.
1.2.4.  What has happened as a result of the policy and 
instruments that were introduced? 
Energy intensity has started to decline recently, although 
less than the annual target of 4%. This was mainly the 
result of aggressive adjustments made to the structure of 
the economy, increases in productivity, technological 
progress, and more efficient ways of using energy. 
From 1991 to 2005, China had an annual GDP growth 
rate of 10.2%, supported by an annual energy consump-
tion growth rate of 5.6%. This resulted in an energy 
consumption elasticity of 0.55. Other examples of energy 
efficiency measures include the following. By December 
2007, China had shut down 553 small (average capacity 
23 MW) and inefficient power generation units, totalling 
14.38 GW and 43.8% more than the 2007 target. 
Electricity generation from the old units has been replaced 
by larger and more efficient units. New energy efficiency 
labels, similar to the US ENERGY STAR program, were 
introduced to encourage consumers to use the more 
energy efficient appliances. More examples are listed in 
Section 1.2.6.
1.2.5. Key factors needed to make something happen
China has achieved significant improvement in its 
energy intensity and energy efficiency. However, it is below 
the stated and ambitious target and there is scope for 
further improvement in the following areas: 
•  Consistency. Many policies and regulations are 
developed over several stages, by various government 
agencies, for different purposes, and with targeted 
focuses. They may not necessarily consistent with each 
other. For example, the policy of promoting high 
efficiency technologies but at the same time reduced 
A three-tier energy and resource conservation management 
system has been set up at the central, local, industrial and 
enterprise levels. It has also established standards, label-
ling, and certification of energy efficiency, and included 
“energy efficiency” in procurement requirements. In 1997, 
the Energy Conservation Law was issued in support of 
these efforts. The law was amended in 2007 to strengthen 
its provisions. Some policies and measures undertaken are 
listed in the last section.
At the turn of the 21st century, China responded to the 
stresses on natural resources with a “green strategy,” which 
sought to:
•  Improve overall planning for regional economic  
development, especially with respect to the efficient  
use of land, water, and energy resources and local  
environmental absorption capacity;
•  Improve technologies and management practices  
thereby promoting efficient resource use;
•  Replace or retrofit old equipment so as to attain  
higher energy and resource efficiency;
•  Explore new sources for resource substitution  
(e.g., clean and renewable energy, energy-efficient  
construction materials).
In May 1996, the State Planning Commission, the State 
Economic and Trade Commission, and the State Science 
and Technology Commission jointly formulated the Policy 
Outlines for Energy Conservation Technologies in China, 
which provided targets for energy saving by the various 
sectors of the economy. They recommended 106 energy-
saving technologies for large-scale adoptation, and 
introduced policies that promoted market development 
for technological services on energy conservation, restruc-
turing of corporate energy management systems, and 
privatization of energy utilities.
In November 2006, the Ministry of Finance increased 
export taxes on energy-intensive industries. This included 
a 15% export tax on copper, nickel, aluminium, and other 
metals, a 10% tax on steel primary products, and a 5% tax 
on petroleum, coal and coke. Simultaneously, import 
tariffs on 26 energy and resource products, including coal, 
petroleum, aluminium, have been cut from their current 
levels of 3–6% to 0–3%. These tax changes aim to 
discourage the export of energy-intensive products and to 
conserve energy. They were triggered when elevated 
international prices started stimulating large investments 
in energy-intensive industries, particularly copper, 
aluminium, and steel.
stations and industrial plants, power generation dispatch 
scheduling based on energy efficiency, demand-side energy 
efficiency management, clean coal initiative, use of 
coal-bed methane and waste coal, green light stimulation, 
energy efficiency in transportation, urban and rural 
environment management, and energy-efficient labelling 
and certification. (See 1.2.6 for more details.)
1.2.2. Objective of the policy
China has set itself the goal of quadrupling its GDP by 
2020 (from 2000) while only doubling its energy con-
sumption. Although as a non-Annex I country China 
is not obliged to commit itself to binding quantified 
emission reduction during the first period of the Kyoto 
Protocol (2008–2012), in an attempt to mitigate GHG 
emissions, the national climate change program has set the 
following mandatory quantified targets for 2010: 
•  Reduce the consumption of energy for every 10,000- 
yuan of gross domestic product from 1.22 tons of  
standard coal equivalent in 2005 to below one ton  
– a reduction of 20%;
•  Raise the share of renewable energy in the primary  
energy supply to 10% (from 7% in 2005);
•  Extract 10 billion m3 of coal-bed methane;
•  Cap nitrous oxide emissions from industrial  
processes at the 2005 level;
•  Increase the forest coverage rate to 20%;
•  Increase the carbon sink by 50 million tons over  
the 2005 level.
1.2.3.  What policy instruments were used/had to be passed 
to achieve the objective?
In the early 80s, China adopted the principle of 
“promoting both development and conservation, but 
conservation first,” making energy and resource conserva-
tion a priority in energy and industrial policy. In the late 
80s, China began paying more attention to growth 
patterns and economic structural adjustment with an eye 
to reducing the consumption of energy and other resourc-
es, promoting cleaner production, and reducing industrial 
pollution. A series of industrial policies were instituted 
with the goal of accelerating the growth of tertiary 
industry (normally low energy intensity), improving 
energy efficiency in secondary industry, and discouraging 
quick expansion of energy-intensive industries. Since then, 
the State Council and relevant ministries have issued a 
series of energy and resource conservation rules.  
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upgrading monitoring equipment, strengthening 
personnel training, and popularizing contractual 
energy management. These centers would provide a 
package of services including diagnosis, design, 
financing, renovation, operation, and management for 
enterprises, governmental organs, and schools.
1,000 Enterprise Programs
In 2006, NDRC launched a major program to improve 
energy efficiency in the 1,000 largest energy-consuming 
enterprises,19 which in 2004, accounted for 33% of the 
total and 47% of the industrial energy use. Each enterprise 
under the “1,000 Enterprise Program,” signed an energy 
conservation agreement with the local government 
outlining its 2010 energy-saving target. The enterprise will 
be monitored and supervised on its energy use. Advanced 
domestic and international standards are used to set the 
targets for the energy intensity for products produced. 
Incentives will be offered to encourage enterprises to 
exceed their targets. Overall and individual targets for the 
1,000 enterprises were established in 2006.
Retiring Inefficient Power Plants
In early 2007, the State Council issued an order to retire 
50 GW of small, inefficient power plants, amounting to 
8% of China’s total generating capacity. Large and more 
efficient coal-fired generation units can be constructed 
only when the smaller and older ones are fully decommis-
sioned. Certain compensations (up to 3 years’ economic 
benefits) could be provided to smooth and accelerate the 
closure processes. By 2010, approximately 40 GW of 
coal-fired and 10 GW of fuel oil-fired capacities will be 
retired before the completion of their design life. In 
addition, all coal-fired plants of less than 50 MW capacity 
and 50-100 MW capacity plants that have been in 
operation for more than 20 years will be retired by 2010. 
Generators with unit coal consumption 10% above the 
provincial average or 15% above the national average are 
also targeted for closure.
Energy Efficient Power Generation Dispatch Scheduling
The current power generation scheduling and dispatch 
system allows about the same utilization hours to large-
efficient plants and to small but less efficient coal-fired 
alcohol as fuels; step up coal-liquefaction projects; and 
develop alternative fuels. 
•  Energy Conservation for Electrical Motor Systems. 
Currently, 420 million-kW electrical motors, which 
consume 60% of the total electricity, operate at an 
efficiency which is 10-30% lower than that in other 
countries. In the 11th 5-year period, the country will 
popularize high efficiency electrical motors and those 
that use rare earth permanent magnets, launch 
systematic renovation to and operation of high-effi-
ciency wind turbines, pumps and compressors and 
promote variable speed motors and automated system 
control.
•  Energy System Optimization. Optimization of 
energy systems in major industries (mainly metallurgi-
cal, petrochemicals, and chemicals) will be launched.
•  Energy Conservation for Buildings. The country will 
adopt strict standards that save energy by 50% in 
residential buildings and public structures, speed up 
the reform in heat-supply system, and tighten efforts 
in promoting building energy efficiency technology 
and related products. 
•  Green Lighting. Thirteen percent of the total power 
use of the country is in lighting. 70% to 80% of 
power can be saved by replacing ordinary candescent 
lamp with high-efficiency energy-saving fluorescent 
lamp and an additional 20-30% can be saved by 
replacing traditional electromagnetic ballast with 
electronic ballast. Ninety percent of power use in 
traffic lights can be saved by replacing candescent 
lamps with light emitting diodes.
•  Energy Conservation in Governmental Agencies. 
Energy consumption in government and public 
institutions is increasing rapidly and expenditure on 
energy is relatively high. Energy efficiency measures 
include: reconstruction and renovation of the build-
ings, heating, air-conditioning, and lighting systems 
according to building energy efficiency standards, 
procurement of high-efficiency products, and purchase 
of fuel efficient business vehicles.
•  Energy Conservation Monitoring and Technical 
Services System. Establish and improve the capability 
of the energy-saving monitoring centers in provinces 
and in major energy-consuming industries through 
19   http://www.iea.org/textbase/pm/?mode=pm&id=3542&action=detail. 
around 65%. Three measures are planned to raise the 
efficiency by 5 and 2 percentage points respectively: 
 i.   Use quality coal; 
 ii.   Renovate boilers and kilns employing 
advanced techniques, like circulating fluidized 
bed and pulverized coal firing; and 
 iii.  Establish a scientific management and 
operation system. 
•  District Co-generation. Combined heat and power 
systems, can raise efficiency by 30% over that of 
separated generation. Centralized heat supply is 50% 
more efficient than small boilers. In the 11th five-year 
period, the focus will be on the heat load and measures 
to be taken, which will include: 
 o  Installing high efficiency 300 MW cogenera-
tion units;
 o  Constructing back-pressure units; 
 o  Developing centralized heat supply for areas 
where heat demand is small and mainly for 
warming; 
 o  Developing combined heat and electricity 
supply systems in medium-sized and small 
cities; 
 o  Transforming existing coal-burning small 
boilers for decentralized heat supply. 
 The goal is to cover 40% of urban centralized heat 
supply systems by 2010. 
•  Residual Heat and Pressure Utilization. Iron and 
steel enterprises will apply coke dry quenching and 
power generation from the waste energy from blast 
furnaces, renovate all blast furnace gas power genera-
tion, and implement converter gas recovery. 
•  Petroleum Conservation and Substitution. Specific 
steps include: replacing fuel oil (light oil) with clean 
coal, petroleum coke, and natural gas in the power, 
petroleum and petrochemical, metallurgy, and 
construction material industries and in transport; 
accelerate the development of the west-east power 
transmission to replace small oil-burning units; 
implement policies and regulations on fuel use and 
petroleum conservation measures; implement the 
policy for clean automobiles; promote hybrid vehicles; 
popularize compressed natural gas buses and taxis in 
cities and speed up the promotion of methanol and 
•  Support to Market Mechanism Development. 
Currently, most policies in China are implemented 
through administrative means (e.g., allocating energy 
conservation requirements to provinces and large 
industrial enterprises, linking results of energy 
conservation to the performance evaluation of local 
officials). Insufficient efforts have been put to inducing 
enterprises to voluntarily participate in energy 
conservation and pollution control (that would also 
enhance long-term competitiveness and profitability), 
to encourage local financial institutions and banks to 
invest in energy conservation (even though many 
energy conservation projects have high returns and 
relatively short pay-back periods), and to boost 
development of domestic energy service companies. 
1.2.6. List of relevant laws, regulations and rules
Mandatory Reduction of Energy Intensity
The 11th Five-Year Development Plan (2006-10) 
includes a major program to improve energy efficiency 
nationwide, including a goal of reducing the energy 
intensity to 20% below 2005 levels by 2010. This energy 
intensity reduction target is part of a broader goal of 
quadrupling per-capita GDP while only doubling energy 
consumption between 2000 and 2020. The government 
has allocated the reduction target to provinces and 
industrial sectors.18 Energy efficiency improvement is now 
among the most important criteria used to evaluate the 
performance of local officials. Progress to date has been 
slower than the expected annual reduction of 4%. 
Ten Energy Conservation Programs
In 2004, the NDRC launched the Medium and 
Long-term Plan of Energy Conservation, which covers two 
phases: 2005–2010 and 2010–2020. In this plan, detailed 
energy conservation targets and implementation plans 
were set up. Key actions and comprehensive policy 
measures were put forward. The following ten key 
programs for energy conservation were stipulated in the 
plan:
•  Upgrade Coal-Burning Industrial Boilers (kilns). 
China has about 500,000 medium- and small-sized 
boilers, which on an average have an actual efficiency 
18   ADB is providing advisory technical assistance to NDRC for the exploration of innovative mechanisms that promote energy improvement, as a part of a regional project TA-6392-
REG. Supporting the Implementation of the Energy Efficiency Initiative in Developing Member Countries.
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tation. In urban areas, light rails and subways are being 
constructed and tariffs are subsidized to popularize 
mass transport systems.
•  Use of Alternative Fuels. Twenty percent ethanol has 
been introduced in six provinces.
•  Developing New Transport Technologies. An 
automobile emission tax is under consideration,  
which will fund the development of cleaner transport 
technologies.
Efficiency in Urban Housing and District Heating
China has realized that adoption of energy-efficient 
technologies in buildings is a promising path to ease 
expanding energy shortages and reduce GHG emissions. It 
began investigating energy efficiency in buildings in early 
1980s. A number of standards, regulations, related 
incentives, and administrative rules have been issued. The 
11th Five-Year Development Plan calls for energy savings 
of 50% for new buildings nationwide and up to 65% for 
buildings in four large municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, 
Tianjin, and Chongqing). In early 2006, the government 
issued the Designing Standard for Energy Conservation in 
Civil Building to encourage contractors to use energy-
efficient materials and adopt energy-saving technologies 
for heating, cooling, ventilating, and lighting in public 
buildings.
through government procurement policy. In 2004, the 
Ministry of Finance, in coordination with NDRC, 
modified the National Procurement Policy to include the 
preferential purchase of labelled energy efficient products 
in public procurement. The program started in 2005 and 
by the end of 2006 it was rolled out to all levels of 
government: central, provincial, and local. The State 
Council ordered in June 2007 that air-conditioning units 
in most office buildings be set no cooler than 26oC.
Phasing Out Incandescent Bulbs
In 1996, the China Green Lights Program was launched 
to raise the awareness of available energy efficient lighting 
technologies. The program has contributed to the increase 
in production and use of these efficient lighting technolo-
gies. By 2017, China will have phased out incandescent 
bulbs through a program initiated through the Global 
Environment Facility.
Energy Efficiency in Transportation
The transportation sector is currently not a big consum-
er of energy in China, but takes an increasingly large share 
in the longer term. The increase in vehicles has doubled oil 
consumption in the last 20 years, turning China from a 
net oil exporting country into a large oil importing 
country. Measures for improving energy efficiency and 
reducing emissions in the transport sector include:
•  Investing in Energy-efficient Transportation 
Infrastructure. China has implemented a massive plan 
to build and renovate high-speed railway systems that 
will be more energy efficient, less polluting, less 
vulnerable to extreme weather events, and likely to 
replace many passenger and cargo vehicles on roads.
•  Requiring High Fuel Economy Standards. China’s 
fuel economy standards are more stringent than those  
in Australia, Canada, and the US, including California 
(but less stringent than those in the European Union  
and Japan). The vehicle standards will be implemented 
in two phases (2005–6 and 2008–9) for all classes of 
vehicles.
•  Encouraging Use of Public Transport. The Ministry 
of Construction held a “no car day” on 22 September 
2007 to encourage people to travel by public transpor-
power generation units, resulting in a large waste of 
energy. Since the newly installed 300 MW or more 
coal-based power plants have a designed efficiency close to 
the international standards, their utilization has to be 
maximized to reduce coal consumption. NDRC has taken 
the initiative to implement a new energy-efficient and 
environment-friendly dispatch system20 that maximizes the 
use of renewable energy, gives priority to nuclear energy, 
and ranks coal-fired units according to their marginal fuel 
consumption. When fully implemented, it will signifi-
cantly reduce coal consumption and GHG emissions from 
the rapidly expanding power sector. The implementation 
guidelines for the new dispatch system were approved in 
August 2007. Five provinces, namely, Guangdong, 
Guizhou, Henan, Jiangsu, and Sichuan, have been selected 
to test the new system.
Closing Inefficient Industrial Plants
NDRC announced in early 2007 that it would close 
many inefficient industrial plants manufacturing a range 
of products, including cement, aluminum, ferroalloy, 
coke, calcium carbide, cement, and steel.
•  All cement plants with an annual capacity of less than 
200,000 tons are to be closed by the end of 2008, with 
250 Mt of outdated cement capacity to be eliminated 
by 2010. 
•  In the steel sector, outdated pig iron capacity is to be 
reduced by 100 Mt, and steel capacity by 55 Mt by 
2010.
NDRC has set reduction quotas at the provincial and 
regional levels, and provincial officials are required to sign 
agreements with the central government holding them 
accountable for their targets. Potential disciplinary action 
is possible for provincial officials failing to comply.
Promoting End-Use Energy Efficiency
The 1997 Energy Conservation Law initiated a range of 
programs to increase energy efficiency in buildings, 
industries, and consumer goods. China has established 
efficiency standards for many energy-consuming appli-
ances and is adopting building energy standards in regions 
with high heating and cooling demands. China also 
promotes end-use energy efficiency improvement21 
20   ADB is providing advisory technical assistance to NDRC concerning the structuring and implementation of the proposed energy-efficient generation scheduling and dispatch 
system.
21 ADB is working on two loan operations, in Guangdong and Shandong, to assist China in improving demand-side energy efficiency.
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2.1.4. Key factors needed to make something happen
•  The difference between NGV and gasoline price is the 
only incentive car owners have to adapt their cars to 
NGV. A sustained (through years) difference provides 
a clear signal to car owners and also to NGV stations 
owners and requires a delicate balance between 
demand (cars adapted) and supply (NGV stations). 
•  An NGV business requires a significant investment in 
the station. Natural gas is compressed at 250 bars. The 
difference between the NGV price (paid by cars) and 
natural gas cost (paid by stations) should be high 
enough to recover the investment. 
•  The repayment period of a car conversion is in the 
order of eight months. Even with this short period, as 
car owners don’t have access to financial institutions 
(banks, credit cards), a specific credit line should be 
provided.
On top of that, an additional creative scheme of 
incentives for adapting cars to consume NGV was 
implemented by the private sector. Since 2001, an 
association between private companies including Transre-
des (gas distribution company), Sergas (distribution) 
dispensing stations and replacement facilities, under the 
name Feria del Gas, reimburses up to 80% of the cost of 
replacement to end users, in kind (NGV). There are no 
credit or government incentives for distributors. The only 
government intervention is related to the tax and the price 
of NGV and gasoline.
2.1.5.  What has happened as a result of the policy and 
instruments that were ntroduced? 
•  The volume of NGV sold today is equivalent to 40% 
of the volume of gasoline sold;
•  Approximately 90.000 vehicles were converted out of 
a total fleet of 550.000 vehicles;
•  In the short term replacement is mainly from gasoline 
to NGV, but when consumers buy new vehicles they 
change from diesel to NGV (e.g., taxi fleet in Santa  
Cruz which was 95% diesel and is now 95% gasoline 
converted to NGV). The owner of the car covers the 
conversion costs.
2.1.6. List of relevant laws, regulations and rules
Ley Nacional de Hidrocarburos, Resolución 120/1992 del Ministerio 
de Energía (National Hydrocarbons Law, Resolution 120/1992 of the 
Department of Energy)
•  Established the objective of the policy: substitution of 
liquid fuels by natural gas in mobile applications;
•  Approved the rules for NGV stations, including the 
differential price between NGV and gasoline.
National Law N° 3058
In 2005, the oil and gas institutional framework was 
completely changed, moving to a system with a high level 
of government intervention. The general policy indicates 
that hydrocarbons should be used to promote comprehen-
sive, sustainable and equitable development, ensuring the 
supply of hydrocarbons to the domestic market, encourag-
ing the expansion of consumption in all sectors of society, 
developing industrialization in the national territory and 
promoting the export of surplus in a position favoring the 
interests of the state. It also has a specific prescription for 
NGV pertaining to tax exemptions (custom duties and 
value added) for imports of materials and equipment for 
the NGV sector.  
 
2.2 Wind power in argentina
2.2.1. Background 
The demand for electricity in Argentina has grown 
constantly over the last decade despite the economic 
downturn of the late 1990s as shown in Table 4. The cost 
of electricity in Argentina, however, is difficult to estimate. 
Government intervention is extensive: fixing the price 
of natural gas to producers, importing natural gas and 
liquid fuels, and finally fixing different rules for electric-
ity prices. There are two price levels. In the first level the 
price is determined by the cost of the most expensive unit 
dispatched using natural gas. Hydro, nuclear, wind and 
thermal units using natural gas are included in this level. 
The second level applies to units using liquid fuels. 
As a result of these government interventions, the price 
of electricity is low, and as a consequence private invest-
ment in generation is small. The production of natural 
gas is declining. On the other hand, the consumption of 
gas has grown at 5% per year since 2003. The situation is 
further complicated because gas supplies from neighboring 
countries are unstable due to the political issues.  
aNNex 2. SoUTh aMeRiCa
 
2.1 Natural gas for vehicles in Bolivia
2.1.1. Background 
During the past decade, Bolivia has experienced major 
increases in its gas reserves, production, and exports. 
In recent years, this process has been followed by a rise 
in world energy prices of natural gas, as well as, more 
recently, by a sharp increase in the government’s tax take 
from the hydrocarbons sector. This combination of factors 
has transformed the Bolivian natural gas sector so that it 
now constitutes not only the main component of country’s 
exports (43% of total exports in 2006) but also is a large 
source of revenues for the government (about 27% of total 
revenues in 2006).
The hydrocarbons sector has thus become increasingly 
important. In terms of contribution to growth, the key 
economic sectors in Bolivia since 1990 have been manu-
facturing, agriculture, and transport and communication. 
Despite those positive trends, Bolivia still has an 
unbalanced availability of fossil fuels. While the country 
has important reserves of natural gas, 30% of the diesel 
consumed is imported. Being one of the countries with 
a lower GDP per capita in South America and currently 
having per capita income of less than a quarter of the aver-
age for the rest of Latin America, the reduction of imports 
by replacement with local production has been a priority 
for all Bolivian governments. Furthermore, the aim is to 
have increased gasoline domestic surplus in order to export 
gasoline, as value per energy unit traded is far higher (two 
or three times) for liquid fuels than for natural gas.
The replacement of gasoline by compressed natural gas 
is a very well known technology in the region. Two neigh-
boring countries (Argentina and Brazil) have the largest 
NGV fleets in the world (more than 1.3 million cars in 
each country).
Bolivia is now benefiting from the replacement of 
gasoline by compressed natural gas in two ways: reducing 
fuel imports while consuming a fuel that the country is 
abundantly endowed with and in addition reducing 
pollution.
There are many actors in the NGV chain: government, 
dispensing stations, distributors, producers and transport-
ers of natural gas, small facilities to convert vehicles, and 
consumers.
The Ministry of Energy and Hydrocarbons is the key 
actor responsible for policy making and implementation 
while the Superintendencia de Hidrocarburos regulates 
NGV dispensing stations and replacement facilities.
2.1.2. Objective of the policy  
The objective of the policy was to foster the substitution 
of liquid fuels in mobile applications with natural gas. The 
only instrument used by government was to fix a different 
tax and a different price for NGV and for gasoline in 
1992. Since that time, there has been no change in the 
policy or the tax. The policy did not include a quantitative 
objective, as it was not completely clear in the beginning 
how ambitious the target could be in terms of effective 
replacement. 
2.1.3.  What policy instruments were used/had to be 
passed to achieve the objective? 
The policy was based on a fixed differential price (based 
on tax reduction) between the gasoline and the NGV. 
Since 1992, the NGV price has been linked to the price of 
gasoline at around 50% of the retail price.
There are technical rules that govern how the producers 
of natural gas, replacement facilities and distributors 
operate, fixing parameters as pressure level, and standards 
for security in NGV stations and cars (mainly for the 
cylinders) and measuring.
Table 3: Relation between NGv price (in std m3) and gasoline (in liter) at retail level
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.44 0.44 0.44
Source: Ministry of Energy and Hydrocarbons
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around $0.03/kWh. The value of subsidies fixed in the 
National Law 25019 was $0.01/kWh, only around a third 
of the differential cost. The situation was not improved by 
the National Law 26190 in 2006. Although the value of 
the subsidies was increased to $0.015/kWh, the actual 
value was equivalent to only $0.005/kWh due to the 
devaluation of the Argentine peso – that is, less than 
before the adjustment.
The last barrier is related to the second one, as due to 
longer capital recovery, these types of projects are highly 
vulnerable to a changing tax and fiscal environment.  
Both laws granted 15 years of fiscal stability for wind 
energy projects. 
It should be noted that importing the equipment is not 
a barrier. Duties are not too high, maximum levels are in 
the order of 15%.
2.2.5.  What has happened as a result of the policy and 
instruments that were introduced? 
There is a fundamental inconsistency between the policy 
and its implementation. As a result, the policy is not 
effective. The wind power installed capacity increased from 
12 MW (1997) to 28 MW (1998). The instruments 
provided by the law provided non-effective solutions for 
two of the barriers, while not considering other ones. It is 
clear that the subsidies provided are not enough to cover 
the difference between wind power production costs and 
the market price. It could be concluded that there is no 
consistency between the objective enunciated and the 
instruments provided. 
2.2.6. List of relevant laws, regulations and rules
National Law 25019
Declares that the generation of electricity from wind or 
solar resources is in the national interest and provides tax 
benefits: value-added tax on capital investment could be 
deferred up to 15 years and 15 years of fiscal stability. It 
also establishes subsidies: a value of $0.01/kWh produced 
for 15 years. The resources for the subsidies are obtained 
from a specific charge in the electricity tariff. 
National Law and 26190
This law declares that the generation of electricity from 
renewable sources, and also the research and manufactur-
ing of renewable energy equipment, is in the national 
interest. It establishes a quantitative objective: by 2016, 
eight percent of the electricity national consumption 
should be produced from renewable resources. Renewable 
energy sources included in the law regime are defined as: 
wind power, solar energy, geothermic energy, hydropower 
(less than 30 MW), tidal power, biomass, landfill gas and 
biogas. It provides tax benefits for a 10-year period on 
value added and income taxes. It also established subsidies: 
for all renewable sources (but solar), a value of $0.005/
kWh produced for 15 years. For solar, the value is $0.3/
kWh. The procedure to obtain the resources for the 
subsidies fixed in the Law 25019 is maintained.
2.3  an energy efficiency labelling program in 
Brazil
2.3.1. Background 
Brazil, with its 190 million inhabitants, has the largest 
population in Latin America. The country has very 
important renewable resources, and has been implement-
ing policies in order to increase the participation of 
renewables in the energy matrix.
The country had limited oil production and reserves in 
the past. The impact of fuel imports on domestic prices – 
due to fuel price increases – and trade balances led the 
country to implement a very extensive bio-ethanol 
program and to consolidate an electric system based on 
hydropower in the beginning of the 80s. As a result, the 
Brazilian energy system is currently one of the most 
efficient in the world in terms of CO2 emissions per unit 
of energy supplied.
Brazil is also one of the largest producers of hydroelec-
tricity in the world: in 2006, Brazil was the third world 
producer (after China and Canada), with 11.5% of total 
world hydro-electrical production. Table 5 provides the 
value of hydro-electrical production in Brazil, per year 
(1965-2005) in Terawatt hours.
Source: British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy 2007
1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
24.0 72.3 178.4 253.9 337.5
Table 5:  The value of hydro-electrical production in Brazil, 
per year, 1965-2005
Wind power resources
Argentina has large wind resources. According to the 
Centro Regional de Energía Eólica (CREE), which has 
extensively researched wind resources and made invento-
ries at the regional and national level, the technical 
potential of wind power resources can be estimated at 
around 500.000 MW.
Some regions, mainly the Patagonia, in the southern 
part of the country, are among the best locations in  
the world for wind power production. Data available  
from existing power units operating in Comodoro 
Rivadavia (Chubut Province) show that average wind 
speeds are higher than 11 m/s, and load factors are in  
the order of 40%.
The national grid
The information provided by the Secretariat of  
Energy, indicates that total installed power in Argentina 
was 25,678 MW in 2006. Hydropower represents 39%  
of the total installed capacity, while thermal facilities  
(fossil fuel fired) contribute 57% and nuclear approxi-
mately 4%. Installed wind power capacity is 27 MW 
(0.1% of the total).
Relevant institutions
Policies and regulations are determined by the Secre-
tariat of Energy. Ente Nacional Regulador de la Electrici-
dad (ENRE) is in charge of enforcing the regulations and 
of the supervision of the electric market. CAMMESA is 
responsible for decisions on the dispatch of the system, 
determines wholesale prices and administers transactions 
in the electric markets. 
2.2.2. Objective of the policy
The objective of the national policy, enacted through  
the National Law 25019 (1998), is to promote the 
installation of additional wind power generation capacity. 
No quantitative objective (in absolute terms or as a 
proportion of the total capacity) has been fixed.
2.2.3.  What policy instruments were used/had to be 
passed to achieve the objective? 
The above-mentioned law declared that the generation 
of electricity from wind or solar resources is in the national 
interest, and established subsidies and specific tax condi-
tions for these activities. The law did not include quantita-
tive targets to be achieved through the application of the 
new framework. 
Further, the National Law 26190 (2006) confirmed the 
objective of the previous law, expanded its applicability to 
other renewable sources (e.g., small hydro, landfill gas, 
biogas, biomass, geothermal) and updated the value of the 
subsidies. The National Law 26190 established that by 
2016, eight percent of the electricity national consump-
tion should be produced from renewable resources.
2.2.4. Key factors needed to make something happen    
In this case, four factors can be identified as barriers  
for the development of a successful wind power program 
in Argentina:
• Information on resource availability;  
• Long term capital recovery;
• Cost of production; and
• Tax framework instability.
The first barrier is related to the nature of the resource 
itself: renewable and difficult to quantify (high unpredict-
ability). The law should have made provisions to promote 
research in order to quantify the availability and determine 
the characteristics of wind resources in Argentina.
The second barrier is common to all renewable energy 
projects. When compared to fossil fuel power generation 
projects, capital costs are higher while variable costs are 
very low. Hence, renewable energy projects in Argentina 
face constraints, particularly in access to project finance. 
The period required to recover the investment is higher in 
renewable projects compared to the period required in 
fossil fuel projects.
Wind power electricity production costs in 1998 had 
(and still have) higher costs than the wholesale price of 
electricity in the national market. The difference was 
Table 4: Relation between NGv price (in std m3) and gasoline (in liter) at retail level
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
69.892 72.998 74.137 80.710 88.943 90.088 84.420 91.996 100.261 105.750
Source: Secretariat of Energy
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2.3.6. List of relevant laws, regulations and rules
Resolution N° 1877, 1985. Creation of the PROCEL
Decree December 8, 1993. Creation of the Energy Label and Award. 
This decree established the Green Label of Energy 
Efficiency, aiming to identify the equipment that achieves 
optimal levels of energy efficiency.
Law Nº 10.295, 2001 National Policy of Rational Use of Energy
Established maximum levels of specific consumption of 
energy, or minimum energy efficiency, for machinery and 
consumer appliances, energy manufactured or marketed in 
the country, based on technical indicators relevant. Levels 
will be established based on values that are technically and 
economically feasible. 
In 2005, hydroelectricity was 85% of total electricity 
production. However, due to its characteristics the system 
became vulnerable to natural events (e.g., droughts). The 
crises suffered in 2001 and 2002, when the government 
had to implement very stringent water rationing schemes, 
is an example of how vulnerable the system is to climate 
conditions.
Since the early 80s, the Brazilian government has 
implemented different energy efficiency programs.  
The institutions involved in those programs were: 
• Eletrobrás (government is the major share owner);
•  INMETRO (National Institute of Metrology, 
Standardization and Industrial Quality, within the 
Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign 
Trade). 
2.3.2. Objective of the policy
The purpose of PROCEL, the National Electricity 
Conservation Program, was to integrate the energy 
conservation actions in the country.
The PROCEL Label (a subprogram of PROCEL) was 
created in order to indicate to consumers the equipment 
and appliances available in the domestic market that have 
the highest rates of energy efficiency in each category. The 
scheme stimulates the production and marketing of more 
efficient products, in terms of energy efficiency, reducing 
environmental impacts in Brazil.
2.3.3.  What policy instruments were used/had to be 
passed to achieve the objective? 
In 1984, on the basis of a protocol (a voluntary agree-
ment) between the government (MDIC) and the Brazilian 
Electrical and Electronics Industry Association (ABINEE), 
the Brazilian Labeling Program (PBE) was created. The 
program is coordinated by INMETRO. PBE aims to 
provide information to consumers to facilitate optimization 
of consumption of electricity in domestic appliances; choose 
more efficient appliances in terms of energy consumption; 
and improve use of those appliances allowing the saving of 
energy costs. Participation in the program is voluntary and 
testing of the appliances is made only on those products 
made by those manufacturers and facilities that are willing to 
participate. On the basis of the outcome of the tests, a scale 
was created to classify appliances. The tests are repeated 
periodically to update the scale.
PROCEL, now coordinated by ELETROBRÁS, was 
created in 1985. PROCEL includes several subprograms of 
electric energy efficiency: Evaluation of Energy Efficiency 
Measures, Energy Efficiency in Buildings, Energy Efficiency 
in Public Facilities, Municipal Energy Management, 
Industrial Energy Efficiency, Energy Efficiency in Public 
Lighting, and Energy Efficiency in Environmental Sanita-
tion.
The SELO PROCEL subprogram was created in 1993 
and, along with the PBE, is responsible for significant results 
obtained. Appliances that are tested and labelled showing the 
best performance in their class can receive an energy 
efficiency endorsement (SELO PROCEL), given to the best 
products with respect to specific energy consumption. The 
SELO PROCEL program also contributed to the implemen-
tation of the PBE by creating measurement infrastructure.
Finally in 2001, an important milestone was the Law  
N° 10.295. The law establishes “maximum levels of specific 
energy consumption or minimum levels of energy efficiency 
of machines and energy-consuming devices produced and 
sold in Brazil”. Performance levels have been defined for 
electric engines and fluorescent lamps. There are advanced 
proposals for other devices. The law defines compulsory 
performance levels. Therefore, it is different from the 
labelling programs (PBE and SELO PROCEL) which are 
voluntary.
2.3.4. Key factors needed to make something happen
The success of the program was due to a combination of 
elements that included:
• An adequate regulatory framework;
• Appropriate institutional arrangements:
 o  Between governmental institutions and entities 
(INMETRO, Eletrobras, others);
 o  Between the government and industry, which 
were based on voluntary agreements;
•  Economic and technical resources, including invest-
ment in laboratories to measure performance and 
compliance with required standards;
•  Dissemination and capacity building. 
2.3.5. What has happened as a result of the policy and in-
struments that were introduced? 
The outcomes of the implementation of the PROCEL 
Label in 2006 were: 
• Savings of 2,900 GWh of energy consumption;
•  Savings in domestic appliances including also domestic 
lighting, air conditioning, refrigerators, electric engines 
and solar energy equipment.
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3.1.5.  What has happened as a result of the policy and 
instruments that were introduced? 
The Kenyan efficient stove can now be purchased in a 
variety of sizes and styles. Prices have decreased to roughly 
$1-$324. This has opened the market for these stoves. More 
than 13,000 energy efficient stoves are sold each month in 
Kenya and there are more than 700,000 energy efficient 
stoves in use in the country. 
As a consequence, there are now more than 200 
businesses of different sizes, legal entities, or informal 
sectors that are involved in this production activity. The 
Kenyan ceramic efficient stove is used in more than 50% 
of the households in urban area, and more than 15% in 
rural area.  
The charcoal savings of the energy-efficient stoves reduce 
the energy-related expenditures of users that are generally 
low income populations.  
3.1.6. List of relevant laws, regulations and rules
Parliament passed the Energy Act No.12 in 2006. 
Section 6 (p) of this Act gives power to the Energy 
Regulatory Commission. Under the Act, the Commission 
is empowered to make proposals to the Minister on 
regulations that are necessary for the energy sector, 
particularly for charcoal. 
 
3.2  promotion of energy efficient lighting as 
part of Senegal’s rural electrification   
3.2.1. Background 
In sub-Saharan Africa, access to modern energy in rural 
areas remains a complex issue with multiple constraints in 
relation to the low income of the populations, the disper-
sion of the habitat, and increases in international energy 
prices. This situation is particularly exacerbated for the 
countries that don’t have energy resources. The electricity 
sector conforms to this general rule. With 35.5% of the 
population electrified in 2002, Africa has the lowest rate 
While the program of energy efficient stoves diffusion 
has been implemented without direct subsidies, other 
forms of soft subsidies have been provided. Free training 
sessions have been provided and research results trans-
ferred without fees payment to producers by a number of 
organizations. Loans with low interest rates have been 
provided for the acquisition of efficient equipment for 
stove production and design and to implement communi-
cation schemes to raise awareness about stove performance 
by Winrock International22. This support was needed to 
facilitate the dissemination of the new technology to the 
portion of the population with low incomes.  
3.1.4. Key factors needed to make something happen
The Minister for Energy is empowered under section 
103 of the Energy Act N°12 of 2006 to promote the 
development of renewable energy technologies, including 
biomass, biodiesel, charcoal, fuel wood, biogas, solar, and 
wind. This includes providing an enabling framework for 
the efficient and sustainable production, distribution, and 
marketing of renewable energy technologies. The Ministry 
undertook a study of wood fuel in 2000 and plans to 
undertake another study in 2009/10 to determine the 
impact of the policy measures implemented over the last 
10 years in redressing the balance between supply and 
demand for fuel wood.
In addition, the inadequate data on the development of 
markets for efficient stoves will be addressed by doing 
surveys. Also, the legal and regulatory framework for wood 
fuel development and an effective mechanism for coordi-
nation of different stakeholders, as identified in an 
Integrated Assessment of the Energy Policy study23 that 
was requested by the Kenyan Ministry of Planning and 
National Development in Household Energy Sector, will 
be addressed. The assessment identifies gaps in the energy 
policy for the household sector and provides recommenda-
tions, but it does not formulate clear actions relating to 
the recommendations.
22  Household Energy for Improved Health and Livelihoods: Winrock International. See: http://www.winrock.org/publications.asp.  
23  Kenya: Integrated Assessment of the Energy Policy, UNEP, August, 2006. 
24  Walubengo, D., 1995: Commercialization of improved stoves: the case of the Kenya Ceramic Jiko (KCI). In Stove Images: a Documentation of Improved and Traditional Stoves in 
Africa.
aNNex 3. aFRiCa
 3.1.  efficient stoves dissemination policy  
in Kenya 
3.1.1. Background
Sub-Saharan Africa countries, except South Africa, still 
depend heavily on wood to meet their basic energy needs. 
The share of fuel wood is estimated to be 61%-86% of 
primary energy consumption, with a major part (74%-
97%) consumed by households. Fuel wood is also used to 
a significant extent in many of these countries in cottage 
industries such as bread baking, metal smelting operations, 
and brick kilns. The management of fuel wood resources 
and demand is a major issue to be accounted for in energy 
policies and strategies in Africa. 
Furthermore, fuel wood production has been identified 
as one of the causes of forest degradation and deforestation 
in many African nations, in particular in regions sur-
rounding large towns (e.g., N’Djamena in Chad). Indeed, 
the most important share of total wood removal is due to 
fuel wood consumption, which represents around 92% 
of total African wood consumption, and contributes to 
GHG emissions. Fuel wood use is therefore a major local 
and global environmental issue in Africa, and should be 
fully integrated into forestry management and environ-
mental protection policies.  
In Kenya, wood fuel is the dominant primary energy 
source for most households and small industrial establish-
ments. This was confirmed by a 2000 energy survey, which 
indicated that biomass accounted for more than 68% of 
Kenya’s total direct primary energy consumption. The 
survey also revealed that 89% of rural households relied on 
fuel wood, while 82% of the urban households relied on 
charcoal for their energy needs. 
In most Sub-Saharan Africa countries, women  
devote most of their time to fuel wood gathering and 
cooking tasks. Children in rural area are also involved  
in fuel wood gathering tasks that can take most of their 
time, depending on the region. In Kenya, a lot of effort 
has gone into the promotion of fast-growing energy trees 
for the supply of fuel wood. In 2000, 84% of the fuel 
wood consumed in rural households was supplied from 
these farms, as opposed to 47% in the 80s. In 2007, 85% 
of the households could access fuel wood at close proxim-
ity to their homes – within a 4km radius However, as a 
consequence of continuous urbanization, a change in the 
use of wood for fuel wood and charcoal is taking place. 
Charcoal will play a more important role in the achieve-
ment of the sustainable development objectives of the 
country.  
In this context, a demand-side, energy-efficiency 
program was needed to reduce the negative impact of the 
growing charcoal demand.   
Sessional Paper No. 4 of 2004 on Energy in Kenya, 
which constitutes the government policy on energy, recog-
nizes that fuel wood will continue to be a primary source 
of energy for years to come. As a consequence, it lays 
out strategies and policies for biomass development and 
exploitation, including the promotion of energy-efficient 
stoves and study and research for additional efficiency 
improvement of the stoves.  
3.1.2. Objective of the policy
The policy aims to promote the dissemination of energy-
efficient stoves, mainly through R&D activities that 
increase the efficiency of stoves and lower their price, 
thereby facilitating access to urban and rural poor 
populations. The aim is to increase the adoption of 
charcoal stoves from 47% to 100% by 2020.
3.1.3.  What policy instruments were used to achieve the 
objective? 
R&D activities are the main policy instruments used  
for the promotion of high-quality, energy-efficient and 
low-cost stoves. The research activities also encompass the 
development of appropriate distribution strategies for the 
stoves. Indeed, the Kenyan Ceramic Efficient Stove is the 
result of research on stove design, materials, and produc-
tion processes for the purpose of increasing quality and 
decreasing costs. The program was initiated in the 70s and 
continued through the 80s with support from GTZ of 
Germany.
In Kenya, commercial energy-efficient stove production 
and dissemination is not directly subsidized. Initially, 
stoves were expensive (~$15/stove) and quality assurance 
and control was not established for the production 
process. As a consequence, the stoves were not attractive  
to the poorer part of the population. The studies and 
research initiated since the early 80s, the experience 
accumulated by the manufacturers, and the competition 
that has been generated have led to innovations in 
materials and production processes and, ultimately,  
to better quality stoves, more choices, and lower costs.
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aims to increase access in rural areas from its current value 
of 16% to 50% by 2012, as access to modern energy is seen 
as a human right by the Senegalese population. This will 
lead to a very significant increase in demand for electricity, 
which the government will have difficulties satisfying.  
Senegal has a vast potential to generate electricity from 
renewable sources. There is substantial wind energy 
potential in the northern coastal areas and significant solar 
energy and biomass potential. This suggests the need to 
develop renewable energy as these resources are locally 
available, secure, and not exposed to exogenous disrup-
tions or higher prices. However, the success of this option 
depends to a large extend on a policy framework with all 
the instruments necessary to achieve its objectives. A 
national renewable energy policy was needed in Senegal to 
ensure that national energy resources are adequately 
tapped. In particular, an optimized energy system cascade 
– in which renewable energy and fossil fuel energy are 
integrated and utilized efficiently to satisfy the most 
appropriate demands – was needed to provide the modern 
energy needed for the country development.
3.3.2. Objective of the policy
The objective of the policy is to strengthen the electricity 
market and increase access to modern energy, while 
protecting the global environment and diversifying the 
sources for electricity generation through the development 
of public and private investment in electricity production 
from renewable sources. For that purpose, an attractive 
regulatory framework has been set up and implemented.
3.3.3.  What policy instruments were used to achieve the 
objective? 
The existing laws relating to the purchase and cost of 
renewable energy in the electricity sector (the 98-29 law of 
14 April 1998 and the 2002-01 of 10 January 2002) were 
updated. The updated law obligates the grid operator – 
that is, the national electricity company owned by the 
state – to buy and pay for electricity produced from 
renewable sources. It guarantees the purchase of electricity 
from independent power producers using renewable 
sources and establishes a national system of subsidies to 
cover the cost differences among different regions. The 
subsidy does not vary with different renewable sources. 
The grid is the property of the state. The updated law also 
established a Ministry for Bio-fuels and Renewable Energy, 
which is responsible for its implementation.
Local stakeholders consultations are to be carried out to 
enhance the awareness of the rural population concerned 
by the project. Their commitment is needed for the 
success of the project.
3.2.5.  What has happened as a result of the policy and 
instruments that were introduced? 
This demand-side, energy-efficiency program will 
facilitate the implementation of the rural electrification 
program. It will allow more people to be connected to the 
grid while reducing the need for additional new electricity 
supplies. One contract has been already signed by an 
electricity operator for the electrification of the concession 
of Saint-Louis/Dagana/Podor. Through this contract, the 
electricity operator is committed to electrify 16,400 
households corresponding to 114,600 compact fluorescent 
light bulbs. If the rural electrification agency continues to 
subsidize the installation of the internal equipment as 
planned, it is foreseen that this program will be a success. 
Other operators have showed interest in signing for the 
other concessions. The fact that the purchase of the 
compact fluorescent light bulbs is subsidized by ASER 
reduces the electricity operator’s investment and has 
helped to reduce the investment risk for the electricity 
operator.
3.2.6. List of relevant laws, regulations and rules 
The ASER is an autonomous public entity created in 
1998 under Senegal’s Electricity Reform Law 98-29 to 
provide technical and financial assistance for rural 
electrification in Senegal.  
3.3  Renewable energy development policy in 
Senegal 
3.3.1. Background  
While almost 100% of modern energy generated in Sen-
egal is fossil fuel based, the country is not endowed with 
conventional energy resources. The import of fossil fuel for 
modern energy production has had a very negative effect 
on the availability of hard currency and on national export 
earnings. This reliance also increases the vulnerability of the 
country to fuel price increases. As a result, a diversification 
in modern energy generation is now the key goal of the 
Senegalese energy strategy.
In Senegal, actual electricity demand growth has been 
estimated to be higher than 7% per year. The government 
install the compact fluorescent light bulbs, which will be 
subsidized by ASER.
3.2.2. Objectives of the policy
The demand-side energy efficiency measures aim to 
reduce energy consumption in newly electrified house-
holds in rural areas, for the same service provided by 
electricity operators. This will lead to an increase of the 
access of rural population to electricity. The objective is to 
increase electricity access in Senegalese rural areas from 
16% to 50% by 2012.
3.2.3. What policy instruments were used/had to be 
passed to achieve the objective? 
An in-depth change has occurred compared to the 
traditional tariff models. A new tariff system has been 
introduced for low-energy consumers based on a fixed 
price authorized by the Commission of Regulation. 
Low-energy consumers are the ones that consume 
electricity mainly through lighting and use a radio as their 
only appliance. Indeed, for these consumers, the tariff is 
fixed and based on whether or not they use a radio and on 
the number of lighting points in the household. Instead of 
the energy consumed, these clients will pay for a level of 
service. This promotes the implementation of demand-
side, energy-efficiency measures.  
3.2.4. Key factors needed to make something happen   
The main factor influencing the success of this program 
is the guarantee that the use of the compact fluorescent 
light bulbs will be sustainable. For this purpose, power 
limitation devices calibrated according to the level of 
service purchased will be installed. The client is discour-
aged from using incandescent light bulbs or adding other 
appliances. The electricity operator has the obligation to 
provide a compact fluorescent light bulb on request to the 
client after the recovery of the old one.
A local network of distributors is needed to collect, 
install, and replace the compact fluorescent light bulbs. 
The light bulbs that are to be installed should be of good 
quality. A Terms of Reference is to be elaborated for the 
compact fluorescent light bulbs, with very precise charac-
teristics concerning the life time and the capability to 
operate in an environment with fluctuating voltage. 
of electrification of the world under development.25 If only 
sub-Saharan Africa is accounted for, households that have 
access to electricity are limited to 23.6%. However, the 
disparities are even more marked within the sub-Saharan 
Africa countries, between urban and rural areas, where the 
latter areas have a rate of electrification that is generally 
lower than 5%.
In Senegal, the situation that preceded the reform of the 
energy sector was characterized by: 
• Weak rate of rural electrification: 5% in 1998; 
•  Single player: the government which subsidizes access  
to electricity;
•  Single technical solution of the national operator:  
connection to the grid;
•  Weak commercial interest for the national operator in  
a tariff context whereby subsidies did not allow the  
real costs of electricity to be reflected, particularly in  
rural areas.
At the end of the 90s, catalyzed by the emergence of the 
fight against poverty and concerns of the international 
community, new laws with important changes were passed 
which promoted in-depth reforms of the energy sector. 
The new laws liberalized the electricity sector, set up a 
commission to develop regulations, and created the 
Senegalese Rural Electrification Agency (ASER), dedicated 
to the implementation of rural electrification policy.
In this new environment, an energy efficiency program 
has emerged as an important part of the rural electrifica-
tion strategy of the Senegalese government. It aims to 
promote the use of energy-efficient devices as compact 
fluorescent light bulbs to displace incandescent light bulbs 
in newly electrified households in rural areas. It will be 
undertaken within a nation-wide rural electrification plan 
implemented under the supervision of ASER. ASER 
coordinates and monitors the implementation of the 
national rural electrification plan which includes a Public/
Private Partnership scheme. For the purpose of the plan, 
the Senegalese territory has been divided in 12 geographi-
cal concessions. Each concession will be granted to 
investors/operators through an international competitive 
bidding process. Standardized contracts have been drawn 
up by ASER to provide a framework for the activities of 
the concessionaires. The concessionaire will purchase and 
25  African Bank of Development and the Center of Development of OECD, Economic Outlooks in Africa, 2005-2006.
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which is highly ranked on the list of projects for energy 
production by the ministry. The project was presented by 
the national private sector at the employers’ national 
council workshop as an example of a renewable energy 
project that can be implemented in a short term. A draft 
contract for the sale of electricity was proposed by 
SENELEC, the Senegal National Electricity Company. 
There was a legal barrier to the implementation of this 
project that needed to be clarified. The consortium of 
companies behind this project originally wanted the 
electricity for their own use and to pay the electricity 
company fees for the transport of the electricity in its 
lines. The concept of self-production does not exist in the 
laws and regulations in force in Senegal. The project was 
thus perceived to be selling energy to the companies in the 
consortium, whereas the electricity company SENELEC 
has the monopoly for the sale and the distribution – a 
monopoly which it does not plan to reassign to self 
producers. The new approach of the independent power 
producers, in the context of the new regulatory framework 
for renewable energy production and sale, seems to be 
more appropriate for SENELEC and will remove the 
barrier to the implementation of this project. The compa-
nies have to sell their entire production to the grid and 
purchase electricity from the grid.
3.3.6. List of relevant laws, regulations and rules
The 98-29 law of 14 April 1998.
The 2002-01 of 10 January 2002.
Only one law is for the time being identified as instru-
ment for the achievement of this policy. It is the law on 
the purchase and cost of renewable energy.
mitigated. The key factors and stakeholders needed to 
ensure implementation must be identified for each step of 
the process.
To expand the program beyond its current scope, CDM 
revenues could be used as an incentive to increase the 
attractiveness of projects using renewable sources of 
electricity. However, there are still some barriers (e.g., non 
involvement of the local financial institutions in the CDM 
capacity building process, the lack of official data publicly 
available for demonstration projects, and the eligibility 
assessments of CDM projects) that prevent CDM 
development in Senegal. 
3.3.5. What has happened as a result of the policy and 
instruments that were introduced? 
There are two projects under development as a result of 
the law. The first is a project to generate electricity using 
typha biomass, an invasive water plant that is abundant in 
the Senegal River. This plant colonizes the flood plains, 
reduces the available cropland in the irrigated areas, 
impedes river traffic, and provides habitat for carnivorous 
birds. So, this project will also contribute to sustainable 
development because the plant must be harvested, thereby 
providing jobs for local people. In the first phase, the 
investors aim to implement a 12 MW power plant and 
add two 12 MW plants in a second phase. The feasibility 
studies have been done and if the project proponents 
finalize the contract with the electricity company, the 
project will be launched. 
The second is the development of a wind farm project at 
Saint-Louis, on the north coastal area of Senegal. The 
region of Saint-Louis, with a subsidy from the Midi 
Pyrenees region and the Agence Française de Développe-
ment, the French bilateral cooperation agency, is under-
taking preliminary studies for a 50 MW wind park. This 
project will be carried out in two phases: a first pilot of 
15MW and a complementary phase of 35MW. The 
estimated cost of the first phase is about 16,500 K Euros. 
The annual net producible electricity will be 28,775 
MWh. Training will be provided for the operation and the 
maintenance of the wind park as part of the project 
activity.
The Saint-Louis region has clearly stated its interest in 
this wind park. A contract providing a long-term conces-
sion of the land to accommodate this park has been 
signed. The government of Senegal, through the Ministry 
for Energy, is very interested in implementing the project, 
The elaboration of a law on the purchase and cost of 
renewable energy is the instrument used by the Senegalese 
government for the development of renewable energy and 
its use for electricity sector development. A legal frame-
work consisting of laws and regulations will permit 
different stakeholders to play their role in a sound and 
attractive environment. This law defines the obligation of 
companies that operate the electricity grid to purchase and 
to pay for electricity produced from renewable sources. It 
applies to the following renewable sources:
• Micro and mini hydroelectric power plants;
• Wind farms;
• Solar based electricity generation;
• Waste heat recovery; and
• Renewable biomass based electricity generation. 
3.3.4. Key factors needed to make something happen
The use of renewable resources is, in most cases, not cost 
competitive when compared to conventional fossil-based 
energy generation. There is therefore a need for the 
Senegalese government to create an attractive environment 
through the introduction of fiscal and financial support 
mechanisms within this legal and regulatory framework to 
allow renewable energy technologies to compete with 
fossil-based technologies.
For the development and deployment of solar PV in 
rural electrification projects, an assessment of the most 
suitable technology for a given region, accounting for the 
notion of subsidiary, is required. This means that in times 
of scarce electricity, the most suitable option to satisfy a 
given energy need should be based on both economical 
criteria and the availability of the supply. For example, in 
times of high demand, the satisfaction of energy demand 
for lighting by low power consumers in villages should be 
met by off grid sources of electricity, while the needs of 
industry should be met by the grid as their requirements 
cannot easily be met by solar PV. This is the first step of an 
integration that will satisfy each type of demand with the 
type of sources of quality just required. 
The law must be properly enforced so that investors can 
be confident that they can earn a return on their invest-
ment. For that purpose, the Regulatory Commission for 
Electricity is to be strengthened and supported.
A holistic approach is to be used for policy definition 
and implementation. Otherwise, if one key factor for the 
achievement of the policy objective is not accounted for, 
even if important measures are taken, the result can be 
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 Term DefiNiTioN
Climate change Climate change refers to a change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g, using 
statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/ or the variability of its properties and that persists for 
an extended period – typically, decades or longer. Climate change may be due to natural internal 
processes or external forcings or to persistent anthropogenic changes in the composition of the 
atmosphere or in land use.
note that unFCCC, in its Article 1, defines “climate change” as “a change of climate which is attrib-
uted directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere 
and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods”. the 
unFCCC thus makes a distinction between “climate change” attributable to human activities alter-
ing the atmospheric composition, and “climate variability” attributable to natural causes.
Co-generation the use of waste heat from electric generation, such as exhaust from gas turbines, for either indus-
trial purposes or district heating.
Deforestation Conversion of forest to non-forest. For a discussion of the term forest and related terms such as 
afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation, see the ipCC Special report on Land use, Land-use 
Change, and Forestry (ipCC, 2000).
Demand-side management policies and programs designed for a specific purpose to influence consumer demand for goods 
and/or services. in the energy sector, for instance, it refers to policies and programs designed to 
reduce consumer demand for electricity and other energy sources. it helps to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions.
Emission in the climate change context, emissions refer to the release of greenhouse gases and/or their 
precursors and aerosols into the atmosphere over a specified area and period of time.
Energy efficiency ratio of energy output of a conversion process or of a system to its energy input.
Fossil fuels Carbon-based fuels from fossil carbon deposits, including coal, oil, and natural gas.
greenhouse gas (gHg) A gas that absorbs radiation at specific wavelengths within the spectrum of radiation (infrared ra-
diation) emitted by the Earth’s surface and by clouds. the gas in turn emits infrared radiation from 
a level where the temperature is colder than the surface. the net effect is a local trapping of part 
of the absorbed energy and a tendency to warm the planetary surface. Water vapor (H2o), carbon 
dioxide (Co2), nitrous oxide (n2o), methane (CH4) and ozone (o3) are the primary gHgs in the Earth’s 
atmosphere.
intergovernmental panel on Climate 
Change (ipCC)
Established in 1988 by the World meteorological organization and the un Environment program, 
the ipCC surveys world-wide scientific and technical literature and publishes assessment reports 
that are widely recognized as the most credible existing sources of information on climate change. 
the ipCC also works on methodologies and responds to specific requests from the Convention’s 
subsidiary bodies. the ipCC is independent of the Convention.
mitigation An anthropogenic intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases.
renewables/renewable energy Energy sources that are, within a short time frame relative to the Earth’s natural cycles, sustain-
able, and include non-carbon technologies such as solar energy, hydropower, and wind, as well as 
carbon-neutral technologies such as biomass.
research, development, and demon-
stration (rD&D)
Scientific and/or technical research and development of new production processes or products, 
coupled with analysis and measures that provide information to potential users regarding the 
application of the new product or process; demonstration tests; and feasibility of applying these 
products processes via pilot plants and other pre-commercial applications.
renewable energy Energy sources that are, within a short time frame relative to the Earth’s natural cycles, sustain-
able, and include non-carbon technologies such as solar energy, hydropower, and wind, as well as 
carbon-neutral technologies such as biomass.
resources resources are those occurrences with less certain geological and/or economic characteristics, 
but which are considered potentially recoverable with foreseeable technological and economic 
developments.
 Term DefiNiTioN
Abatement refers to reducing the degree or intensity of greenhouse gas emissions.
Adaptation Adjustment in natural or human systems to a new or changing environment. Adaptation to 
climate change refers to adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or 
expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial oppor-
tunities. various types of adaptation can be distinguished, including anticipatory and reactive 
adaptation, private and public adaptation, and autonomous and planned adaptation.
Anthropogenic emissions Emissions of greenhouse gases, greenhouse gas precursors, and aerosols associated with 
human activities. these include burning of fossil fuels for energy, deforestation, and land-use 
changes that result in net increase in emissions.
Ad Hoc Working group on Further 
Commitments of Annex i parties under  
the Kyoto protocol (AWg-Kp)
Article 3, paragraph 9 of the Kyoto protocol provides that the Cmp shall initiate consideration 
of future commitments for Annex i parties at least seven years before the end of the first com-
mitment period. pursuant to that provision the Cmp at its first session held at montreal from 28 
november to 10 December 2005, established the Ad Hoc Working group on Further Commit-
ments for Annex i parties under the Kyoto protocol (AWg-Kp).
Bali Action plan the united nations climate change conference in Bali culminated in the adoption of the Bali 
road map,  which consists of a number of forward-looking decisions that represent the various 
tracks that are essential to reaching a secure climate future. the Bali road map includes the Bali 
Action plan, which charts the course for a new negotiating process designed to tackle climate 
change, with the aim of completing this by 2009. it also includes the AWg-Kp negotiations and 
their 2009 deadline, the launch of the Adaptation Fund, the scope and content of the Article 9 
review of the Kyoto protocol, as well as decisions on technology transfer and on reducing emis-
sions from deforestation.
Biomass fuels or biofuels A fuel produced from dry organic matter or combustible oils produced by plants. these fuels 
are considered renewable as long as the vegetation producing them is maintained or replanted, 
such as firewood, alcohol fermented from sugar, and combustible oils extracted from soy beans. 
their use in place of fossil fuels cuts greenhouse gas emissions because the plants that are the 
fuel sources capture carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.
Capacity building increasing skilled personnel and technical and institutional abilities.
Clean Development mechanism (CDm) Defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto protocol, the CDm is intended to meet two objectives: (1) to 
assist parties not included in Annex i in achieving sustainable development and in contribut-
ing to the ultimate objective of the convention; and (2) to assist parties included in Annex i in 
achieving compliance with their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments. 
Certified Emission reduction units from CDm projects undertaken in non-Annex i countries 
that limit or reduce gHg emissions, when certified by operational entities designated by Cop 
meeting of the parties, can be accrued to the investor (government or industry) from parties in 
Annex B. A share of the proceeds from certified project activities is used to cover administrative 
expenses as well as to assist developing country parties that are particularly vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change to meet the costs of adaptation.
Climate Climate in a narrow sense is usually defined as the ‘average weather’, or more rigorously, as the 
statistical description in terms of the mean and variability of relevant quantities over a period 
of time ranging from months to thousands or millions of years. these quantities are most often 
surface variables such as temperature, precipitation, and wind. Climate in a wider sense is the 
state, including a statistical description, of the climate system. the classic period of time is 30 
years, as defined by the World meteorological organization (Wmo).
annex 4. Glossary
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adapTaTioN To  
CliMaTe ChaNGe: 
The NeW ChalleNGe  
FoR developMeNT iN The  
developiNG WoRld
dR. e. liSa F. SChippeR
StoCKHoLm EnvironmEnt inStitutE
MaRia paz CiGaRáN
LiBéLuLA CommuniCAtion, EnvironmEnt AnD DEvELopmEnt, pEru
dR. MeRYlYN MCKeNzie hedGeR
inStitutE oF DEvELopmEnt StuDiES At tHE univErSity oF SuSSEX
Term DefiNiTioN
Sink Any process, activity or mechanism that removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol, or a precursor of a 
greenhouse gas or aerosol from the atmosphere.
Source Any process, activity, or mechanism that releases a greenhouse gas, an aerosol, or a precursor of a 
greenhouse gas or aerosol into the atmosphere.
Subsidy Direct payment from the government to an entity, or a tax reduction to that entity, for implementing 
a practice the government wishes to encourage. greenhouse gas emissions can be reduced by low-
ering existing subsidies that have the effect of raising emissions, such as subsidies to fossil-fuel use, 
or by providing subsidies for practices that reduce emissions or enhance sinks (e.g., for insulation of 
buildings or planting trees).
Sustainable development Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future gen-
erations to meet their own needs.
voluntary measures measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions that are adopted by firms or other actors in the 
absence of government mandates. voluntary measures help make climate-friendly products or proc-
esses more readily available or encourage consumers to incorporate environmental values in their 
market choices.
united nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (the Convention) 
(unFCCC)
the Convention was adopted on 9 may 1992, in new york, and signed at the 1992 Earth Summit in 
rio de Janeiro by more than 150 countries and the European Community. its ultimate objective is 
the ‘stabilization of gHg concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system’. it contains commitments for all parties. under 
the Convention, parties included in Annex i aim to return greenhouse gas emissions not controlled 
by the montreal protocol to 1990 levels by 2000. the Convention entered in force in march 1994.
Sources: IPCC and UNFCCC glossaries, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/glossary/index.htm and  
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/glossary/items/3666.php.
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Cooperative Action under the Convention
BAP Bali Action Plan
CBA Cost Benefit Analysis
CDM Clean Development Mechanism
CEA Cost Effectiveness Analysis
CEC Commission of the European Countries 
CGE  Consultative Group of Experts on National 
Communications from Parties not included in 
Annex I
COP Conference of Parties (to the UNFCCC)
CMP  Conference of the Parties serving as the 
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Issues relating to finance are crucial for addressing 
adaptation and this paper highlights many of the funda-
mental aspects. A fuller discussion of issuing relating to 
adaptation financing is available in a separate paper 
produced for this series.2
The global climate is changing: the impacts associated 
with the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmos-
phere from human activities–changes in mean tempera-
ture, shifts in seasons and an increasing intensity of 
extreme weather events–are already occurring and will 
worsen in the future. Millions of people, particularly  
those in developing countries, face shortages of water  
and food and greater risks to health. Adaptation measures 
that reduce vulnerability to climate change are critical, 
especially in many countries where the risks are here  
and now.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) predicts serious effects of climate change across 
sectors and scales. By 2020, up to 250 million people in 
Africa could be exposed to greater risk of water stress. 
Other impacts include an increased risk of floods as 
glaciers retreat, sea level rise inundating coasts worldwide 
and completely inundating some small island States, and 
an increased severity and frequency of tropical cyclones 
(IPCC 2007). In 2007, the IPCC concluded that the 
unavoidable impacts and changes resulting from climate 
change will go beyond current coping capacity, and society 
and ecosystems will have to implement adaptation 
measures. 
The approximate costs of adaptation are high by all 
estimates. The UN Climate Change secretariat has 
estimated that by 2030 developing countries will require 
$28–67 billion to enable adaptation to climate change.1  
This corresponds to 0.2–0.8% of global investment flows, 
or just 0.06–0.21% of projected global GDP in 2030. 
Incremental costs to adapt to projected climate change in 
developing countries are likely to be of the order of 
$10–40 billion per year (World Bank 2006). In addition, 
the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change 
estimates that if no action is taken to mitigate climate 
change, overall damage costs will be equivalent to losing at 
least 5% of global GDP each year, with higher losses in 
most developing countries (Stern, 2007). Current global 
funding for adaptation is a fraction of the amount needed. 
Adaptation to climate change is a complex and 
multi-faceted topic that presents a number of chal-
lenges, particularly for the developing world. Climate 
change impacts are already affecting developing countries, 
particularly the poor and most vulnerable, because they 
have fewer social, technological and financial resources for 
adaptation. Climate change also affects the sustainable 
development of countries, as well as their abilities to 
achieve the United Nations Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG) by 2015. The 2007/8 Human Develop-
ment Report (HDR) warned that the achievements of a 
number of MDG targets, most notably in poverty 
reduction, will be compromised by five climate change-
induced human development tipping points: reductions in 
agricultural productivity; heightened water insecurity; 
exposure to extreme events; collapse of ecosystems; and 
increased health risks (UNDP HDR, 2007).
Successful adaptation strategies require action at 
different levels: community, national, regional and/or 
international. There is growing scientific, economic, 
political and social consensus these adaptation measures 
will require long-term thinking and explicit consideration 
of climate change risks at the regional (cross-national), 
national, sub-national, and local levels. They require a 
combination of many components, such as an assessment 
of vulnerabilities to climate change, appropriate technolo-
gies, capacity assessment, local coping practices and 
government actions.
The many aspects of adaptation cannot be addressed in 
a single document. This paper will therefore limit its scope 
to the key aspects of these issues and provide policymakers 
with a starting point, including background information 
and questions for further reflection. 
The paper focuses on:
•   The contours of the adaptation issue, as well as  
its relationship to other important issues;
•  The consideration of adaptation within the current 
international negotiations under the United  
Nations Framework Convention on Climate  
Change (UNFCCC), including the issues relating  
to adaptation finance;  
•  The challenge of approaching adaptation at every  
level in a country: community, local, regional,  
sectoral and national.
1 iNTRodUCTioN
1   http://unfccc.int/4053.php. 2   See the paper by Erik Haites in this series titled, Negotiations on additional investment and financial flows to address climate change in developing countries.
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all of the social, physical and economic factors that 
influence the magnitude of and are affected by the 
threat. Consequently, the cycle of disaster management 
has been expanded to incorporate lessons from disaster 
impacts into planning, placing more focus on making 
profound changes to reduce risk, rather than focus on 
reconstructing the same conditions as prior to a disaster, as 
is often the case when disaster management is limited to 
humanitarian relief efforts.  
2.3 adaptation and climate data
There are many challenges to planning successful 
adaptation. One of these is the need for information about 
impacts of climate change and their secondary effects. 
Climate variability and change add uncertainty to decision 
making, but the uncertainty in these phenomena add even 
more complexity to the planned adaptation process. 
Uncertainty dominates all of the approaches aimed  
at understanding the potential impacts of climate. 
Attempts to overcome these uncertainties mean designing 
adaptation strategies that would be robust against a range 
of future climate outcomes. However, it is difficult to 
imagine an adaptation option that would address extended 
wetter and drier conditions simultaneously – these would 
likely need to be addressed by different strategies.
So-called ‘win-win’ or ‘no-regrets’ adaptation measures 
are those whose benefits outweigh their costs.  These often 
address adaptation, while simultaneously meeting other 
needs. They are not in conflict with development objec-
tives, nor do they lead to circumstances that will increase 
vulnerability to climate change in the short and medium 
term. These could potentially be designed without 
accurate climate information.
Climate data is not always necessary to warrant adapta-
tion actions. For example, if model projections for the 
future suggest that an already observed trend will con-
tinue, detailed climate data will not be necessary to justify 
adaptation measures. It is important to recognise that in 
such cases, lack of climate data should not inhibit action. 
2.4 adaptation and finance
Adaptation will require substantial funding. As noted 
earlier, all indicative estimates available suggest that the 
costs of adapting to climate change in the developing 
world are in the order of tens of billions. However, there 
climate change, coupled with a general lack of clarity on 
how to integrate it into planning. 
Another aspect of mainstreaming adaptation into 
development relates to different approaches to adapta-
tion across sectors, where one sector may take an 
approach that is inconsistent with the approach taken 
in another sector. For example, if energy managers decide 
to build new dams for hydropower, while the agriculture 
managers advocate expanded irrigation downstream, there 
could be inconsistencies and adverse consequences for the 
downstream farmers, whose water supply might become 
more unreliable.
Lastly, it is important to understand adaptation as a 
process and think carefully about how it is implement-
ed. In particular, thinking about adaptation as a process 
explains why measures to adapt now may need to be 
adjusted in the future in response to changes, including 
environmental, social, political and financial. Framing 
adaptation in this way also explains why adaptation is not 
a tangible outcome that can be measured exhaustively at 
any given time, but an evolving objective.  
2.2 adaptation and disaster risk reduction
Frequently there are conceptual and practical linkages 
drawn between adaptation and disaster risk reduction. It 
may seem obvious that these two approaches function 
together as part of a repertoire of risk reduction tech-
niques. But on the ground, the two approaches are 
supported by entirely different sets of institutions, 
individuals, methodologies and policy frameworks. 
Further discrepancies range from the intellectual develop-
ment of the fields to implementation of risk reduction 
measures, resulting in policy inconsistency, redundant 
investment, and competing approaches to addressing the 
same problems, among other things.  
Recently, dialogue between the disaster risk reduction 
and climate change adaptation communities has focused 
on creating stronger linkages, putting greater effort on 
learning more from each other, and collaborating concep-
tually and practically. In part, this common interest has 
come from a simultaneous recognition that risk reduction 
requires a far more holistic approach than has been 
previously been applied.  
This convergence in efforts recognises that neither 
disaster risk reduction nor climate change adaptation is 
about disasters or climate change only, but rather about 
Adaptation to climate change is a complex topic that 
presents a number of challenges. Indeed, one important 
challenge lies in defining adaptation and understanding 
the full scope of its implications. Adaptation is currently 
the topic of numerous studies that offer a range of 
definitions. The IPCC offers a starting point by providing 
a broad definition of adaptation: adjustment in natural or 
human systems to actual or expected climatic stimuli or 
their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial 
opportunities. However, adaptation is increasingly difficult 
define in practical and operational terms. To aid in this 
effort, some key points can be identified to provide a 
helpful framework for understanding the complex nature 
of adaptation.
Adaptation involves a process of sustainable and 
permanent adjustment in response to new and chang-
ing environmental circumstances. Although humanity 
has constantly adapted to their surroundings, planned 
anticipatory adaptation has only recently emerged as a 
response to the impacts of anthropogenic climate change 
around the world. Policy makers have accepted that the 
world is facing a real and immediate threat and adapting 
to the change is necessary. Adaptation has been identified 
as an appropriate response because it is associated with 
supporting development processes and can facilitate the 
continuation and improvement of existing livelihoods. 
Climate change will affect every aspect of society, 
environment and economy. This means adjusting 
behavior, livelihoods, infrastructure, laws and policies 
and institutions in response to experienced or expected 
climatic events. These adjustments can include increasing 
flexibility of institutions and management systems to deal 
with uncertain future changes, or they can be based on 
experienced impacts and threats and/or predicted changes. 
Planned adaptation requires careful thinking about how 
systems will function in the short, medium and long term.
An overview of climate change impacts and vulnerability 
is contained in Annex 1. 
2.1 adaptation and development 
Adaptation is closely linked with development and 
this linkage is critical to reducing vulnerability to 
climate change. Economic growth is essential for 
developing countries to improve the health, economic live-
lihood and quality of life of their citizens. It is also 
essential to increase the capacity of developing countries to 
adapt to the negative impacts of climate change. However, 
development in line with ‘business-as-usual’ is often not 
sufficient to adapt to climate change. Indeed, some 
dimensions of development can impede the adaptation 
process, focusing on growth at the cost of higher exposure 
and sensitivity to climate change. There is also a risk that 
development efforts will be misaligned with future changes 
in climate, leading to maladaptation, i.e., a process that 
initially looks like a response to a hazard but ultimately 
exacerbates vulnerability to the hazard.  
All of the development objectives that fall under the 
MDGs influence how vulnerable any individual, group 
or society is to climate change. The IPCC agrees that 
“sustainable development can reduce vulnerability to 
climate change” (IPCC, 2007). At the same time, climate 
change is a direct threat to sustainable development. One 
of the pivotal issues underlying the growing popularity of 
adaptation is the belief that adaptation is fundamentally 
linked to sustainable development and must be part of the 
development and planning process.  
Most development processes that are sustainable and 
equitable will also be able to bridge the “adaptation 
deficit” – i.e., the gap between the adaptation that is 
possible without additional policy or projects and the level 
that is needed to avoid adverse effects of climate change 
(Burton, 2004). The adaptation deficit describes the 
additional effort needed to manage the impacts of climate 
change in order to make up for the failures in managing 
existing climate variability, emphasising the massive scale 
of the gap. Indeed, this “deficit” is a central element 
drawing together adaptation and sustainable development. 
Adaptation measures are concerned with human develop-
ment, because factors that constrain and facilitate adapta-
tion are often the same factors that constrain or enable 
human development. While some survive under difficult 
conditions with current weather patterns, the addition of 
climate change impacts may push the system over a 
threshold into unviable existence.  
Efforts to “mainstream” adaptation can be found in 
national development plans (as in Bangladesh and the 
Caribbean), development projects (by non-governmen-
tal organizations (NGOs) and institutes carrying out 
action research) and in aid agencies of countries such as 
Denmark, the UK, Germany and Norway. This work is 
in early stages, with few results on which to assess levels of 
success.  Nevertheless, even in the most climate sensitive 
countries, numerous other priorities remain ranked above 
2.  WhaT iS adapTaTioN?
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•  In what sectors would you see possible “win-win” 
options that could promote adaptation while benefit-
ing other national priorities through the same 
activities? 
•  What do you think are the key data limitations to 
assess vulnerability and identify adaptation options in 
your country?
•  Are you involved in, or aware of, the Hyogo 
Framework for Action for building resilience to 
disasters?4 Does your country have a coordinated 
strategy regarding climate change and disaster risk 
reduction?
•  What has been the experience of your country in 
developing and considering the funding needed for 
projects? What, in your view, are the important 
elements to consider?
4   Disaster risk reduction efforts are guided by the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters to which 168 Govern-
ments agreed in Hyogo, Kobe, Japan, in 2005. The Framework aims for “the substantial reduction of disaster losses, in lives and in the social, economic and environmental assets 
of communities and countries.” As part of its text, governments agreed to integrate climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction.
ly adapted to current climate, including its variabil-
ity and extremes. Evidence for the existence and size 
of the adaptation deficit can be seen in the mount-
ing losses from extreme weather events such as 
floods, droughts, tropical cyclones and other storms. 
These losses have been mounting at a rapid rate over 
the last 50 years. This widespread failure to build 
enough weather resistance into existing and expand-
ing human settlements is the main reason for the 
adaptation deficit. This topic is also considered in 
section 2.1 of this paper. 
Beyond the difficulties in estimating the global cost of 
adaptation to climate change, other areas of uncertainty or 
lack of clarity also influence the level of financing avail-
able. For example, the absence of a universally accepted 
operational definition of adaptation could affect the level 
of financing to be expected in the light of the commit-
ments under the UNFCCC. Questions also arise with 
regard to how adaptation finance should be the delivered 
and how its effectiveness can be tracked. 
In addition, questions arise with regard to how different 
costs will be covered under different development 
scenarios. While mainstreaming adaptation measures into 
a sustainable development policy scenario would cover 
some of the expected costs, some costs for adaptation may 
arise from measures that address adaptation alone. 
Despite these difficulties and uncertainties, one fact 
remains clear: the amounts needed to adapt to climate 
change will be considerable and far exceed what is 
currently available through existing UNFCCC funds 
and other sources. There are a number of different 
proposals that have been recently submitted to the 
UNFCCC negotiating process or have been discussed in 
other related forums that focus on ways to increase the 
level of funding for adaptation. For further information 
on these proposals, see a separate paper on adaptation 
funding produced for this series.3
Questions:
•  What are the key development priorities in your 
country; for which would adaptation be necessary? 
What would be the first steps to integrate adaptation 
into such priorities?
are many difficulties and limitations in estimating the 
exact costs of adapting under various scenarios, as well as 
the ability of countries to self-finance adaptation. These 
include:
(1)  Differences in adaptive capacity: Adaptive capacity 
is a key limitation in estimating the costs of adapta-
tion. Adaptive capacity is essentially the ability to 
adapt to stresses such as climate change. Its does not 
predict what adaptations will happen, but gives an 
indication of the differing capacities of societies to 
adapt on their own to climate change or other 
stresses. 
(2)  Most adaptation measures need not be imple-
mented solely for the purpose of adapting to 
climate change: Most activities that need to be 
undertaken to adapt to climate change will have 
benefits even if the climate does not change. For 
example, improvements in the management of 
ecosystems to reduce stresses on them or water 
conservation measures can typically be justified 
without considering climate change. Climate change 
provides an additional reason for making such 
changes because benefits of the adaptations are larger 
when climate change is considered. Indeed, the need 
for these adaptations may not depend on specific 
greenhouse gas concentration levels and thus climate 
change associated with scenarios. It may well be 
justified to introduce water use efficiency or reduce 
harm to coral reefs no matter what scenario is 
assumed.
(3)  The uncertainties associated with any readily 
available methods to estimate adaptation costs: 
Most all methods for estimating adaptation costs 
contain a number of uncertainties. For example, the 
existing information for using a complete “bottom-
up approach”, which involves estimating costs of 
specific adaptations across the world, is far from 
being comprehensive and complete. For other 
methods, uncertainties can arise because the 
assumptions that must be made can result in quite 
different estimates of magnitudes. 
(4)  The existence of an adaptation deficit: In many 
places, property design and activities are insufficient-
3  See the paper by Erik Haites in this series titled, Negotiations on additional investment and financial flows to address climate change in developing countries. 
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Since the initial phases of the Convention, it was 
recognized that developing countries needed financial and 
technical support to assess their vulnerabilities to impacts 
of climate change and develop plans to adapt to these 
impacts during the preparation of their national commu-
nications. Parties agreed that adaptation should be 
implemented in the context of short, medium and 
long-term strategies, and set up a three-stage approach to 
adaptation funding in developing countries: 
Figure 1: development of financial instruments for adaptation under the UNFCCC and the GeF
Source: Adapted from Möhner and Klein (2007).
•  Stage I and II encompass planning, vulnerability 
assessments, developing policy options and capacity 
building for adaptation; and,
•  Stage III envisions actual measures to facilitate 
adequate adaptation. 
The COP requested the GEF to provide full-cost 
funding for adaptation activities in the context of formu-
lating national communications. See Figure 1 for informa-
tion on the development of financial instruments for adap-
tation under the UNFCCC and the GEF.
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The UNFCCC, also referred to as the Convention, 
provides the basis for international action to mitigate 
climate change and to adapt to its impacts. The UNFCCC 
entered into force in 1994 and now has 191 Parties 
(member countries). It commits these Parties to:  launch 
national strategies for adapting to expected impacts 
including the provision of financial and technological 
support to developing countries by developed countries 
and to cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the 
impacts of climate change. It also refers to adaptation in 
several of its articles. 
In addition, the supreme body of the Convention, the 
Conference of the Parties (COP), has made several 
decisions over the years pertaining to adaptation. These 
decisions relate to support and funding by developed 
country Parties to assist developing countries with impact, 
vulnerability and adaptation assessment; capacity-building, 
training, education and public awareness; implementing 
concrete adaptation activities; promoting technology 
transfer; and exchanging experience through regional 
workshops. Adaptation is also addressed by ongoing work 
relating to national communications, research and 
systematic observation, and guidance to the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF). 
3.1 Milestones in the process
Although early on the focus of the UNFCCC was 
mainly on mitigation, adaptation is now recognized as an 
important component of any response to climate change. 
The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) in 2007 made 
it clear that accumulated historical emissions have already 
“committed” the Earth to some level of warming and that 
the impacts of this warming are already being felt. 
Accordingly, efforts to understand how adaptive capacity 
might be enhanced and how adaptation is supported have 
increased exponentially in the last few years. 
3.1.1 Initial discussions
When the UNFCCC was adopted at Rio in 1992, only 
the First Assessment Report of the IPCC had been 
completed and although the nature of the climate change 
problem was well defined, there were many uncertainties. 
While it was known that human activities had been 
substantially increasing the atmospheric concentration of 
greenhouse gases, all the consequent impacts were to be 
seen and addressed in the future. The focus of the Con-
vention was on reducing emissions of greenhouse gases (in 
industrialized countries), with the aim of reducing the 
cause of the problem so its effects could be minimized and 
easily managed. Capacity to adapt was considered to be 
inherent in ecosystems and society, therefore not requiring 
explicit policy.5 Furthermore, adaptation was seen at the 
time as a defeatist recourse that reflected a failure to meet 
the mitigation challenge. 
UNFCCC Parties, at the first session of the Conference 
of the Parties (COP 1) in 1995, agreed to create an ad hoc 
group6 to address mitigation and negotiate what ultimately 
became the Kyoto Protocol. Adaptation was considered to 
be a lower and longer-term priority and early discussions 
on the topic took place in the context of the negotiations 
on guidance to the financial mechanism of the Conven-
tion and the negotiations on guidelines and support for 
preparing national communications.7 
The UNFCCC commits developed countries to assist 
developing countries in meeting costs of adaptation to the 
adverse effects of climate change. This assistance is 
operationalized primarily through the financial mechanism 
of the Convention, which is currently operated by the 
GEF, subject to review every four years. The financial 
mechanism is guided by, and accountable to, the COP, 
which decides on its climate change policies, program 
priorities and eligibility criteria for funding, which is 
normally adopted based on advice from the Convention’s 
Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI). 
3.  adapTaTioN iN The UN CliMaTe NeGoTiaTioNS 
5  UNGA: Paragraph 14.
6  This group subsequently became known as the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate.
7   Parties to the Convention must submit national reports on implementation. The required contents of national communications and the timetable for submission are different for 
Annex I Parties (developed countries) and non-Annex I Parties (developing countries). This reference pertains to discussions on non-Annex I national communications.
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Table 1: Funding sources for adaptation under the Convention and Kyoto protocol
fUNDS coNVeNTioN/kYoTo  
ProTocol maNDaTeS
GoVerNaNce cUrreNT leVel of fUNDS
gEF trust Fund strategic priority for 
adaptation (SpA)
FCCC Art. 11: Financial mecha-
nism of the Convention
gEF Council $50 million (gEF 4, 2007-2010)
Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) FCCC Art. 11: Financial mecha-
nism of the Convention
SCCF Council (under the gEF) $74 million (until march 2008)
Least Developed Countries Fund 
(LDCF)
FCCC Art. 11: Financial mecha-
nism of the Convention
LDCF Council (under the gEF) $173 million pledged (until march 
2008) 
Adaptation Fund Kyoto protocol Art. 12.8: Clean 
Development mechanism 
Adaptation Fund Board (directly 
elected by the Cmp)
Depending on quantity and price 
of CErs (until 2012). $80−300 
million per year
3.1.3 UNFCCC expert groups contributing to adaptation
In addition to the LEG, two other constituted expert 
groups under the UNFCCC also contribute to adaptation 
(see Table 2):
Table 2: expert groups relating to adaptation
exPerT GroUP maNDaTeS STaTUS fUrTHer iNformaTioN
Least developed countries expert 
group (LEg)
Advise on the preparation and 
implementation strategy for 
nApAs
mandate extended in 2007 
for three more years. Cop will 
review progress at Cop 16 (2010)
http://unfccc.int/2666.php
Expert group on technology transfer 
(Egtt)
Enhance the implementation 
of Article 4.5 of the Convention; 
Advance technology transfer 
activities under the Convention; 
make recommendations to the 
SBStA and the SBi
mandate renewed in 2007 for 
additional 5 years.  A work plan 
was prepared and agreed in 
June 2008 
http://unfccc.int/1126.php
Consultative group of Experts on na-
tional Communications from parties 
not included in Annex i (CgE) 
new mandate: improve the 
process of the preparation of 
the second and subsequent 
national communications by 
providing technical advice and 
support 
on hold – the mandate of this 
expert group has not been re-
newed since Cop 13 in 2007.  its 
status is under negotiation
http://unfccc.int/2608.php
3.1.2 COP 7 (2001)
At COP 7 in 2001, Parties made major strides forward 
on the issue of adaptation.
The COP adopted a decision dedicated to the issue of 
adaptation (decision 5/CP.7), which identified 14 
adaptation-related activities needing support and further 
work. These included: enhancing technical training for 
integrated climate change impact, vulnerability and 
adaptation assessments; promoting the transfer of adapta-
tion technologies; establishing adaptation pilot projects; 
and, supporting systematic observation and monitoring 
networks and early warning systems in developing 
countries. 
In recognition of the special needs of the Least Devel-
oped Countries (LDCs), the COP adopted a work 
program to address the needs of LDCs (decisions 28/CP.7 
and 29/CP.7). This work program, inter alia:
•  Established a process for developing National 
Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPAs), through 
which LDCs identify the priority activities that 
respond to their urgent and immediate adaptation 
needs through a multi-stakeholder bottom-up 
assessment; 
•  Established the Least Developed Countries Expert 
Group (LEG) to provide advice to LDCs in preparing 
and implementing NAPAs.
The COP also created two special funds under the 
Convention to support adaptation, in order to enhance 
the support provided by the GEF trust fund8 (see Table 1): 
•  The Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) was 
established to support the above-mentioned work 
program, which currently assists the LDCs to carry 
out, inter alia, the preparation and implementation of 
NAPAs; 
•  The Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) was 
established to finance projects relating to adaptation; 
technology transfer and capacity building; energy, 
transport, industry, agriculture, forestry and waste 
management; and economic diversification. This fund 
should complement other funding mechanisms for the 
implementation of the Convention. 
Parties also established the Adaptation Fund9 under the 
Kyoto Protocol to finance concrete adaptation projects 
and programs in developing countries that are Parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol. Unlike other funds in the Convention 
that rely mainly on donor contributions, this fund is to be 
financed with a 2% share of proceeds from clean develop-
ment mechanism (CDM) project activities. However, it is 
also open to receiving contributions from other sources of 
funds. Because of its innovative means of funding, and 
because the Kyoto Protocol only entered into force in 
2005, the Fund was only fully operationalized in 2007.
The Adaptation Fund has an innovative governance 
system, as it is managed by an “Adaptation Fund Board” 
which:
•  Has government representation following UN regional 
distribution and a majority of developing countries; 
•  Is elected and directly accountable to the supreme 
body of the Kyoto Protocol, the Conference of the 
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol (CMP).
The first two meetings of the Adaptation Fund Board 
were held in Bonn in March and June 2008. The members 
elected a chair and a vice-chair for 2008–2009. The Board 
agreed on: the role and responsibilities of the Adaptation 
Fund Secretariat,10 the 2008 work plan and budget, and 
draft legal arrangements for the Adaptation Fund Secre-
tariat. The Board began, but did not complete, the rules of 
procedure of the Board, provisional operational policies 
and guidelines for Parties to access resources from the 
Fund, legal status of the Fund, monetization of CERs, the 
role and responsibilities of the Trustee, and the responsi-
bilities of implementing and executing entities.11 In 
summary, the Adaptation Fund is just becoming opera-
tional. 
Further information on the Adaptation Fund, as well as 
other funds, is available in a separate paper produced for 
this series, Negotiations on additional investment and 
financial flows to address climate change in developing 
countries.
8   Information regarding the financial mechanism of the Convention, the LDCF, the SCCF and the Adaptation Fund can also be found at: http://unfccc.int/2807.php.  
9    For more information on this fund please refer to: http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/items/3659.php and to: http://www.adaptation-fund.org/
home.html. 
10   With the exception of one bracketed paragraph.
11   Adaptation Fund Board, 2008.
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While all countries recognize that developed countries 
should fulfil their commitments under the Convention 
and provide finance, technology and capacity building 
support to developing countries, progress on these issues 
has been slow and unsatisfactory for many developing 
countries. Many have expressed frustration at the slow 
progress on the funding mechanisms. Indeed, it took 
about three years for funds (the SCCF, LDCF) to be made 
operational following their establishment in Marrakesh in 
2001. Many of their concerns regarding finance to 
adaptation relate to:
•  The relatively small amount of funds currently 
available to address adaptation under the Convention 
and, if the current replenishment trend continues, that 
these would not sufficiently address their needs;
•  The experiences of developing countries in accessing 
and receiving support through existing funds, owing 
both to the complex design of the funds and to 
problems of implementation of the guidance;
•  The recognition that additional financial flows will be 
needed to cope with adaptation needs (see also Stern 
(2008) and UNFCCC (2007)).
first time in Bangkok in April 2008. Parties agreed on a 
work program that structures the two-year negotiations on 
a long-term agreement. Given the strong interlinkages 
between the issues, they also agreed to discuss all five main 
elements – adaptation, mitigation, technology, finance and 
a shared vision for long-term cooperative action – in 
conjunction at each of the sessions in 2008. In addition, 
each session will address specific subjects under these 
elements. 
At the second meeting of the AWG-LCA in June 2008, 
adaptation was considered at an in-session workshop on 
“advancing adaptation through finance and technology”. 
As an outcome of these discussions, issues were identified 
under four clusters of adaptation categories that could 
serve as future tracks of discussion:
• National Planning for Adaptation;
•  Streamlining and scaling up financial and  
technological support;
• Enhancing knowledge sharing; and
• Institutional frameworks for adaptation.
At the fourth AWG-LCA meeting, which will be held in 
Poznan in conjunction with COP 14, a special workshop 
will be dedicated to risk management and risk reduction 
strategies, including risk sharing and mechanisms such as 
insurance. 
3.2  Negotiations on adaptation: the contours of the 
debate
Recognition of the need for all countries to take action 
on adaptation has grown over time, as the impacts of 
climate change have become increasingly evident. The 
international effort to date has delivered considerable 
information, resources and capacity building. However, 
progress on adaptation has also suffered from some of the 
ambiguities in the regime itself. Adaptation is not defined 
explicitly in the Convention, but is referenced only in the 
overall context of climate change. 
How adaptation is defined in operational terms will 
ultimately have significant political and financial implica-
tions. It could affect level of financing to be expected in 
the light of the commitments under the Convention. 
Much of the international negotiations to date on 
adaptation have therefore focused on finance and there has 
been lack of agreement on how it should be addressed (see 
Box 1 next page).
•  The Consultative Group of Experts on National 
Communications from non-Annex I Parties (CGE), 
established at COP 5, offers technical advice and 
support in the area of tools, methodologies and 
process for vulnerability and adaptation assessments in 
the context of national communications; and
•  The Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT), 
established at COP 7, provides an interface between 
planning and implementation through guidance on 
sources of funding and support for pilot projects in the 
area of the development and transfer of environmen-
tally sound technologies for adaptation. 
3.1.4 COP 10 (2004), COP 11 (2005) and COP 12 (2006)
By COP 10, Parties recognized that adaptation should 
be considered on a par with mitigation. By its decision  
1/CP.10 (known as the Buenos Aires Programme of Work 
on Adaptation and Response Measures), the COP 
established two complementary tracks for adaptation:  
•  The development of a structured program of work on 
the scientific, technical and socio-economic aspects of 
vulnerability and adaptation known as the Nairobi 
Work Programme on impacts, vulnerability and 
adaptation to climate change (NWP); and, 
•  The adoption of concrete implementation measures 
for furthering information and methodologies, 
concrete adaptation activities, technology transfer and 
capacity-building. 
The NWP, launched in 2005, has a twofold objective: 
•  To assist countries, in particular developing countries, 
including the LDCs and small island developing States 
(SIDS), to improve their understanding and assess-
ment of impacts, vulnerability and adaptation; and, 
•  To assist countries to make informed decisions on 
practical adaptation actions and measures to respond 
to climate change on a sound scientific, technical and 
socio-economic basis, taking into account current and 
future climate change and variability. 
Initial activities were defined for the first two years. 
Three regional workshops and one expert meeting for 
SIDS were organized before COP 13 to facilitate the 
exchange of information and integrated assessments to 
assist in identifying specific adaptation needs and con-
cerns.12 In the first phase, these activities have enhanced 
capacity at international, regional, sectoral and local levels 
to understand and implement practical effective and high 
priority adaptation actions.
At the twenty-eighth session of the Convention’s 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice 
(SBSTA) in June 2008, Parties agreed to activities for the 
second phase of the NWP, to be implemented in the 
period leading up to the end of 2010. The program  
is an international framework implemented by Parties, 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), NGOs, the 
private sector, communities and other stakeholders.  
It is structured around nine areas of work, each vital  
to increasing the ability of countries to adapt and consist-
ent with the action-orientated sub-themes of decision  
2/CP.11.13
A comprehensive list of articles and decisions related to 
adaptation under the UNFCC and the Kyoto Protocol is 
presented in Annex 2.
3.1.5 COP 13 (2007) and the Bali Action Plan
At its most recent session in Bali (COP 13), the COP 
adopted a decision entitled the Bali Action Plan that 
charts the course for a new negotiating process designed to 
tackle climate change, with the aim of completing this 
process by 2009. It also identified the need for enhanced 
action on adaptation. In particular, the Bali Action Plan 
process will address the issue of enhanced action on the 
provision of financial resources, investment and technol-
ogy to support action on adaptation. 
To conduct the process, a subsidiary body under the 
Convention was established called the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the 
Convention (AWG-LCA). The AWG-LCA met for the 
12  Further information on these workshops can be found on the UNFCCC web site at: http://unfccc.int/3582.php. 
13   The areas are:  methods and tools; data and observations; climate modelling, scenarios and downscaling; climate related risks and extreme events; socio-economic informa-
tion; adaptation planning and practices; research technologies for adaptation; and economic diversification. For detailed information on the NWP, see: http://unfccc.int/3633.
php, http://www.wmo.ch/pages/prog/wcp/cca/documents/nwp_en_070523.pdf and http://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/sbsta_agenda_item_adaptation/application/pdf/
ids_pledge_10dec.pdf. 
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In addition to the levels of funding, part of the debate 
on adaptation finance has focused on how it should be the 
delivered and how its effectiveness can be tracked.
The need for concerted international action on adapta-
tion continues to receive increased attention under the 
UNFCCC process. The sense of urgency is particularly 
true for developing countries, as demonstrated at the 
UNFCCC meetings in June 2008, where nine different 
developing countries made presentations on adaptation on 
behalf of themselves or regional groups (AOSIS, LDCs). 
Questions
•  What were the key messages of your country’s 
delegation or Minister at COP 13 in Bali (2007)? 
•  What is your country’s negotiating position on 
adaptation? Does it need changes?
•  What is the position on adaptation of the regional 
group/constituency to which your country belongs?  
Do you agreed with this position?
•  Has your country been represented or involved in any 
expert groups under the Convention?
•  Has your country participated in regional workshops 
regarding implementation of adaptation measures  
and/or workshops relating to the Nairobi Work 
Programme?
•  What has been the experience of your country in 
receiving support from the financial mechanism for 
adaptation? 
•  What is your country’s position on the guidance to the 
financial mechanism and/or the Adaptation Fund?   
What should be emphasized? What arguments could  
you advance to enable your country to obtain urgent  
funding assistance on adaptation?
•  Are you aware of the guidelines for preparation of 
national communications with regard to vulnerability 
assessment and selection of adaptation options for 
your country?  Have you been involved in preparing 
the national communication of your country?  
•  How can the Nairobi Work Programme and work 
being developed by experts groups under the Conven-
tion be used to support adaptation in your country?
•  What adaptation-related issues do you think should be 
further emphasized in a future climate change regime?
This list provides a general overview of positions and views on the issue of adaptation. There are variations and 
differences among the countries and groups of countries. 
common concerns
•  The need for a methodological shift from climate change impacts studies to increased understanding of 
how to make adaptation happen
• How to examine adaptation needs and identify priorities
• The relative roles of adaptation and mitigation actions
•  The lack of clarity on the relationship between climate change adaptation measures and the mainstream of 
development, particularly in relation to financial assistance
•  What institutions and funding mechanisms are used for delivery at international and national level
Developed countries
•  The need to meet obligations and provide financial assistance to cover costs of impacts caused by histori-
cally accumulated greenhouse gas stocks is generally accepted
•  Issues relating to potential climate change impacts have been raised during discussions on support for in-
country studies and on engaging developing countries more directly on mitigation
• The financial mechanism should deliver effectively for their taxpayers
• Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) should integrate climate change into its activities
• There should be no proliferation of new funds under the Convention
• There should be minimum conditions for accessing funding 
Developing countries
•  Equity and justice issues about damage of climate change to vulnerable countries due to emissions from 
“rich” developed countries are a primary concern
•  Developed countries must deliver on their obligations under the Convention on finance, technology and 
capacity building
•  Funding for adaptation should cover the additional costs of climate change and existing ODA commit-
ments should not be diverted (also, no new conditionalities should be added to oDA) 
•  Governance of financial mechanisms should transparent, include an equitable and balanced representation 
by all parties, and operate under the authority of the Cmp. it should provide “direct access” to funding and 
ensure that recipient countries are involved during all stages. “predictable” sources of funding are needed, 
not just more funding 
•  Support should be provided through the UNFCCC instruments rather than through fragmented efforts 
outside these instruments
•  New institutional arrangements should be created, such as an adaptation committee or an expert body like 
the one covering technology transfer (Egtt) within the Convention
Box 1: overview of developed and developing country positions and views on adaptation
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Regardless the area, sector or institution, some basic 
issues need to be considered in order to effectively 
implement adaptation. A description of these issues is 
presented below.
4.2  Take stock of the progress made in your 
country 
As a party to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, it 
is very likely that some adaptation efforts are already being 
implemented in your country with the support in most 
cases of international cooperation. Most developing 
countries that are a Party to the UNFCCC have already 
developed their first national communication and, in case 
of an LDC, a NAPA. Some of them are already developing 
their second national communication (SNC), which, 
according to the UNFCCC guidelines,14 will have some 
information about measures to facilitate adequate adapta-
tion to climate change. Some of this information could 
include: 
•  Human systems, sectors and/or areas that are vulner-
able (or most critical) to climate change;
•  Main limitations of the vulnerability and adaptation 
assessments, i.e,, methodological, technical, institu-
tional and financial limitations;
•  Vulnerabilities to current climate variability and future 
climate changes;
•  Difficulties or barriers to adaptation in critical areas or 
sectors; and
•  Opportunities and priorities for adaptation to climate 
change.
Some countries have developed or are also developing 
adaptation projects financed by sources such as the SPA, 
the SCCF and other bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
activities.15 The UNFCCC or GEF National Focal Points16 
are also a source of information on projects. 
Once this basic information is in your hands, you 
should identify the key sectors or areas in your country, 
and who the main players are or should be. A workshop 
could be organized in order to have an exchange of 
experiences, information and perceptions about the 
importance of climate change adaptation. The workshop 
should be oriented towards collecting the following 
information: 
•  What sectors or areas are most vulnerable to climate 
change?;
•  Who are the key actors and what are they doing 
regarding adaptation?;
•  What has been done and which needs have been 
already identified?;
•  What is being currently implemented? Are there 
synergies related to what could be done in your sector/
area?;
•  What needs to be done to further facilitate adaptation 
in your sector/area?
4.3    identify adaptation options, set priorities, 
do adaptation planning and introduce it as 
part of your national policy framework and 
planning. 
Adaptation will need a variety of responses and extensive 
resources to prevent future damage. It will also need to 
balance tradeoffs with sustainable development and 
poverty reduction efforts, as well as disaster risk reduction. 
A cost benefit analysis of different adaptation measures 
responding to different threats, among other criteria, 
should be applied in order to decide which policies and 
measures to implement or modify. 
Unquestionably, poverty, access to resources, health and 
education and all of the other development objectives that 
fall under the MDGs influence how vulnerable any 
individual is to climate change. The following issues 
should therefore be considered in order to establish 
adaptation priorities:  
•  What is the vulnerability to climate change of national 
planning instruments and processes?  Is compliance of 
national development objectives in jeopardy due to 
climate change? How should strategies and plans be 
realigned to deal with potential climate change 
impacts?;
14   Decision 17/CP.8 and decision 8/CP.11 refer specifically to SNCs. See http://unfccc.int/national_reports/non-annex_i_natcom/items/2816.php. See also “Reporting on climate 
change. User manual for the guidelines on national communications from non-Annex I Parties”, (UNFCCC 2003). 
15   See Funding for adaptation at http://unfccc.int/2807.php. 
16   See http://maindb.unfccc.int/public/nfp.pl.  
4.1 approaching adaptation at national level
Adapting to climate change requires adjustments at 
every level in a country: community, local, regional, 
sectoral and national. Even though the choice of 
adaptation interventions depends on national circum-
stances and internal and priorities, it should be framed by, 
and influence, international negotiations and efforts. 
Governmental institutions (ministries, regional 
governments and agencies), private entities and NGOs, 
must consider integrating climate change in their 
planning and budgeting in all levels of decision 
making, and coordinate their actions among them-
selves. At a local level, communities can build their 
resilience by adopting appropriate technologies, making 
the best use of traditional knowledge and diversifying their 
livelihoods to deal with climate threats. 
Adaptation cannot be treated as a stand-alone issue, 
since climate change impacts will hinder almost all 
efforts of development. Synergies among the multiple 
objectives of sustainable development, poverty reduction, 
disaster risk reduction and adaptation policies are essential. 
Local strategies also need to be implemented in synergy 
with national government interventions. The design of 
adaptation plans and strategies is then crucial.
Climate change impacts do not happen in isolation. 
Sectors can be affected directly or indirectly by climate 
change and a change in one sector can offset the effects 
of climate change in another sector. Adaptation to 
climate change is essentially a cross-cutting issue and 
therefore should not by considered on a purely sectoral 
basis, but in a multi-sectoral and cross-sectoral way. As a 
first step, however, the simpler way is to analyze vulner-
ability and adaptation options at a national level, by sector, 
and then link it to other related issues (i.e., development, 
poverty and risk reduction). Another approach, which is 
particularly useful for community-level assessments, is to 
analyze vulnerability and adaptation options by hazard. 
However, one single community is sometimes threatened 
by more than one hazard, so a multi-hazard analysis may 
be needed. 
Adaptation will also require the capacity for both 
short- and long-term planning. Strategies will be needed 
to address long-term climate change impacts, such as those 
predicted by the IPCC. At the same time, strategies for 
shorter-term adjustments may also necessary, such as those 
prepare for shorter-term climate variability. 
4.  The adapTaTioN ChalleNGe aT The NaTioNal level 
Sectoral adaptation measures look at actions for individual sectors that could be affected by climate change. 
For example, in agriculture, reduced rainfall and higher evaporation may call for the extension of irrigation; 
and for coastal zones, sea level rise may necessitate improved coastal protection such as reforestation. often 
adaptation measures in one sector will involve a strengthening of the policy that already exists, emphasiz-
ing the importance of including long term climate change considerations along with existing local coping 
mechanisms and integrating them into national development plans.
multi-sectoral adaptation options relate to the management of natural resources that span sectors, for 
example, integrated management of water, river basins or coastal zones. 
Cross-sectoral measures also span several sectors and can include: improvements to systematic observa-
tion and communication systems; science, research and development and technological innovations such 
as the development of drought-resistant crop varieties or new technologies to combat saltwater intrusion; 
education and training to help build capacity among stakeholders; public awareness campaigns to improve 
stakeholder and public understanding on climate change and adaptation; strengthening or making changes 
in the fiscal sector such as new insurance options; and risk/disaster management measures such as emer-
gency plans.
Box 2: examples of adaptation measures
Source: Climate change: impacts, vulnerabilities and adaptation in developing countries. UNFCCC, 2007
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If urgent and immediate adaptation is needed, a 
different approach – such as the one for NAPAs – could 
be used. NAPAs use existing information; no new research 
is needed. Such an approach focuses on enhancing 
adaptive capacity to climate variability, which helps 
address the adverse effects of climate change. Existing 
coping strategies at the grassroots level must be taken into 
account and built upon to identify priority activities, 
rather than focusing on scenario-based modelling to assess 
future vulnerability and long-term policy at state level. The 
steps under this approach include: synthesis of available 
information; participatory assessment of vulnerability to 
current climate variability and extreme events and areas 
where risks would increase due to climate change; and, 
identification of key adaptation measures. It is important 
to highlight, however, that this should only be a first step 
in the adaptation strategy, since climate change scenarios 
will continue to pose challenges to vulnerable countries. 
2.  identifying adaptation options to deal with vulner-
abilities and increase adaptive capacity, and setting 
priorities 
The process of identifying adaptation options should 
make use of different sources: scientific and technical 
information (i.e., IPCC, UNFCCC); countries experi-
ences (through, i.e., the NWP); local expertise; coping 
strategies; and traditional knowledge.
Once all options have been identified, a prioritization 
exercise should be performed (first, in cabinet, then with 
stakeholder involvement). It will have to be used to 
determine what current and future problems to solve first 
(i.e., on a sectoral and/or territorial level) and what 
adaptation options to use to deal with them. Some 
examples of criteria are: the level of current and future 
vulnerability, the percentage of population and/or poor 
population that will be benefit; technical and institutional 
feasibility; alignment with national priorities; replicability 
potential; sustainability; cost benefit; cost effectiveness; 
and, barriers to overcome. 
According to the APF, four main methods should be 
particularly useful to the prioritization process. These are:
• Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA);
• Cost Effectiveness Analysis (CEA);
• Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA);
• Expert judgement.
Formal methods for prioritization can most easily be 
applied to project-type adaptation measures. In the case of 
Table 3: assessments needed as a base to identify adaptation options
aSSeSSiNG VUlNeraBiliTY aSSeSSiNG cUrreNT climaTe 
riSkS
aSSeSSiNG fUTUre climaTe 
riSkS
aSSeSSiNG cUrreNT aND 
cHaNGiNG Socio-ecoNomic 
coNDiTioNS
1.  Structure the vulnerability as-
sessment: determine and agree 
on definitions, frameworks and 
objectives
2.  identify vulnerable groups in 
terms of exposure and assess-
ment boundaries
3.  Assess sensitivity (current 
vulnerability of the selected 
system and vulnerable group) 
and adaptive capacity.
4. Assess future vulnerability
5.  Link vulnerability assessment 
outputs with adaptation policy
1. Build conceptual models
2.  Characterize climate variability, 
extremes and hazards
3.  Do an impact assessment 
(by qualitative quantitative 
methods)
4. Define risk assessment criteria
5. Assess current climate risks
6. Define the climate risk baseline
1. Select an approach
2.  gather information on future 
climate (ipCC Emission Scenarios 
and projected climate changes)
3. Conduct sensitivity experiments
4.  Select planning and policy 
horizons
5. Construct climate scenarios
6.  Conduct climate change risk 
assessments
1. Set up study boundaries
2. Develop and use indicators
3.  Characterize socio-economic 
conditions today
4.  Explore specific characteristics 
(demography, economy, use of 
natural resource, governance and 
policy, culture)
5.  Characterize current adaptation 
measures
6.  Characterize changing socio-
economic conditions using 
storylines and projections of 
socio-economic changes
Source:  Elaboration based on the Adaptation Policy Framework, Technical Papers, UNDP
1.  developing vulnerability and adaptation assessments 
for prioritizing adaptation policies and measures
Vulnerability and adaptation assessments are aimed at 
informing the development of policies that reduce the 
risks associated with climate change, based on tools that 
combine qualitative and quantitative data.  They can range 
from simple approaches based on household survey data 
and in-depth interviews with stakeholders, to complex 
models requiring extensive data input. They are normally 
based on knowledge about the physical impacts of climate 
change, and seek to understand the social and economic 
dynamics of these impacts and the possible solutions. They 
can provide a good overview of where and how adaptation 
could be beneficial or necessary. Vulnerability and 
adaptation assessments should serve as a basis to prioritize 
adaptation measures and policies. 
How much information do we really need? The APF 
identifies four key assessments that need to be carried out 
in order to identify adaptation options: vulnerability, 
current climate risks, future climate risks, and current and 
changing socio-economic conditions. Table 3 shows steps 
to be taken within these assessments:
•  Do national, regional, sectoral and/or local policy 
frameworks identify climate change as a threat? What 
policy changes should be made to cope with the 
current and expected impacts of climate change?
What are the steps for assessing vulnerability, 
identifying and prioritizing adaptation options, 
formulating adaptation plans and introducing them 
into the national policy framework? The practical steps 
needed to carry out the main activities of the adaptation 
process may vary within each region, country and 
community. However, there are a number of structured 
frameworks that countries can use to guide the process.  
The UNDP Adaptation Policy Framework (APF) and 
the guidelines such for the formulation of NAPAs can 
provide us with as a set of practical actions and steps to be 
taken in order to achieve adaptation. In addition, the UK 
Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP) risk decision 
framework17 and the Australian government’s adaptation 
guide for business and government18 both contain a 
step-wise description of the process, detailed guidance on 
how to perform each step and pointers to sources of 
information and data underpinning the relevant steps.
This paper will focus on the APF, which contains an 
important principle to be considered during the process: 
“the adaptation strategy and the process by which it is 
implemented are equally important”. Adaptation should 
be seen as a learning process. In addition, stakeholder 
involvement is key to achieve mainstreaming of adaptation 
at different levels. One of the challenges that climate 
changes poses is the urgent need of designing and 
implementing coordinated activities among different 
stakeholders and levels (international, national, regional, 
local, communities). 
17   “Climate adaptation: Risk, uncertainty and decision-making”, UK Climate Impacts Programme, UKCIP Technical Report, May 2003. See:  http://www.ukcip.org.uk/images/stories/
Pub_pdfs/Risk.pdf.  An online version (adaptation wizard) is also available: http://www.ukcip.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=147&Itemid=297.
18   “Climate Change Impacts & Risk Management:  A Guide for Business and Government”, Australian Greenhouse Office in the Department of the Environment and Heritage, 2006. 
See: http://www.climatechange.gov.au/impacts/publications/pubs/risk-management.pdf.
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Figure 2: activities involved in formulating an adaptation strategy
Source: Adaptation Policy Framework, Technical Paper 8: Formulating an Adaptation Strategy, UNDP  
cross-sectoral measures, such as institutional capacity 
building and legislation, it may be necessary to employ 
informal, qualitative and subjective methods. 
3.  adaptation planning:  formulating an adaptation  
strategy
According to the APF, the adaptation strategy consists of 
a plan containing the measures selected for implementa-
tion, a time frame and modalities for implementation. The 
five different activities involved in formulating an adapta-
tion strategy (see Figure 2) are: 
• Synthesize assessments and studies;
• Design the adaptation strategy;
•  Formulate adaptation options for policies and  
measures;
• Prioritize and select adaptation policies and measures;
• Formulate an adaptation strategy.
During this formulation and adoption process, it is 
important to include stakeholders at all levels (national to 
local) not only to gain public acceptance of the strategy, 
but also to include all traditional, local knowledge and 
priorities in the exercise. Also, it is important to establish 
and implement monitoring and evaluation mechanisms 
for the adaptation strategy.
4.  introducing adaptation planning as a part of national 
policy framework and planning:  mainstreaming  
adaptation into development 
Climate change adaptation will be cost effective if 
“mainstreamed” into the development processes. The APF 
provides basic steps for introducing adaptation planning as 
part of national policy framework and planning:
•  Defining system boundaries and identifying entry 
points, this means being specific about the scale and 
type of intervention. Also, the entry point for the 
adaptation should be identified, a “top-down” 
approach could involve changes in policies and 
procedures at the strategic, programming and opera-
tional levels. For community-based actions, the entry 
points could be at the household level;
•  Describing the socio-economic context and identifying 
opportunities;
•  Analysing socio-economic barriers (such as legislation 
at national level or social institutions at a local level);
• Identifying partners and change agents.
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4.4  institutional arrangements needed to plan 
and implement adaptation: What roles 
should the different stakeholders have? 
how would you ensure public, private and 
social participation?
Due to the cross cutting nature of the issue, there is a 
need for stakeholder engagement in the development of 
adaptation plans or strategies. Climate change calls for 
wide participation, since structural changes and changes in 
paradigms are likely to be needed. 
A wide range of sectors will need to adapt and there are 
considerable implications for policy development, 
businesses and communities. The implementation of 
adaptation will be carried out mainly at a local level and 
by public and private sector stakeholders. It is then helpful 
to define how the roles and responsibilities are currently 
seen, taking into account that they will change over time 
as new policies develop or are adjusted (see Table 4). It is 
vital to ensure wide, continuous and coordinated partici-
pation from different stakeholders. 
Table 4: potential roles and responsibilities of stakeholders21
iNSTiTUTioN PoTeNTial roleS aND reSPoNSiBiliTieS
national government and its ministries: 
economy and finance, agriculture, 
health, education, housing
Leadership regulation, introducing economic instruments and setting per-
formance management frameworks. Appropriate policies, standards, regula-
tions and design guidance, and where necessary, appropriate funding
guidance on climate proofing to justify additional investment or ensure 
sustainability of investments 
Local governments many of the changes that need to be delivered in housing, transport and 
other issues will depend on local authorities. they bring together economic, 
social and environmental concerns and they have the potential to link their 
own actions with others through community strategie.
private sector there will be a variety of roles depending on the organization, its size and it 
purpose. However the key issues concerning climate adaptation that need 
to be considered by all include:
• Awareness raising within the organization
• Preparing for the loss and opportunities
• Using the available to tools to investigate the impacts
• Contribute to sustainable Investments and development gaps
Scientific and academic organizations • Provide policy oriented research
• Information for decision makers
investment promotion agencies •  Ensure climate proof investments and promote investments to bridge 
development gaps
poverty reduction agencies • Address climate change impacts as part of their priority actions
risk reduction community • Address climate change impacts as part of the risk
21   Based on “Adaptation Policy Framework”. The UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), 2005.
National policies and instruments should be able to 
respond and anticipate the demands from local govern-
ments and communities, based on the studies and 
processes developed. A worthwhile exercise would be to 
identify whether national objectives are “vulnerable” to 
climate change and if so, what policies, objectives, 
measures and instruments should then developed or 
modified, and what processes and platforms should be put 
in place to go to its actual implementation at local levels.
One example of this is the need for an assessment of the 
way the national budget is allocated to poverty reduction 
programs. If regional vulnerability assessments to climate 
change are not developed, then the national budget would 
continue to be allocated in a traditional way, not taking 
into account that new threats need to be tackled to ensure 
sustainability of poverty investments, i.e., resources should 
not only be allocated to nutrition or water infrastructure; 
but to economic diversification of agricultural communi-
ties (very vulnerable to climate change) that would make 
communities able to respond properly to climate change.
Another example is analyzing the Macroeconomic 
Framework Objectives, i.e., GDP growth. If it is not 
recognized that climate change poses new threats, then 
measures to prevent loses will not be prioritized, such as: 
implementing or strengthening hydrometeorological and 
ocean observation systems; developing climate change 
scenarios to guide investments and poverty strategies; 
implementing guidelines for climate proofing public 
investments; and, creating capacities in local governments 
to deal with the new challenges of climate change. 
Box 3 provides information on a number of platforms 
and options under the UNFCCC that would be useful for 
the process. 
•  The Nairobi Work Programme provides information to help all countries improve their understanding and 
assessment of the impacts of climate change and to make informed decisions on practical adaptation 
actions and measures.
•  The UNFCCC secretariat has developed a local coping strategies database to facilitate the transfer of 
long-standing coping strategies and knowledge from communities that have adapted to specific hazards 
or climatic conditions, to communities that may be starting to experience such conditions as a result of 
climate change.19
•  The Adaptation Learning Mechanism (ALM), which is a knowledge sharing platform, contributes to the 
implementation of the nairobi Work programme, which aims to increase the ability of countries to adapt  
to climate change, with an emphasis on exchanging experience.20 
•  Workshops covering adaptation issues have been held under different subsidiary bodies: During 2006-
2007, a series of workshops and an expert meeting, mandated by decision 1/Cp.10, helped facilitate 
information exchange and integrated assessments to assist parties in identifying specific adaptation needs 
and concerns.
•  The Ad Hoc Working on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) also held a  
focused workshop on “advancing adaptation through finance and technology, including national  
adaptation programs of action”. 
•  The NAPAs provide an important way to prioritize urgent adaptation needs for LDCs. They are developed 
based on existing information and community-level input to identify adaptation projects required in order 
to enable these countries to cope with the immediate impacts of climate change.
Box 3: adaptation options under the UNFCCC
19   See http://maindb.unfccc.int/public/adaptation. 
20   For more information on the ALM, see: http://www.adaptationlearning.net/. 
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much needs to be done to determine how much is 
required for adaptation to climate change and where these 
resources should be allocated. 
4.7 Technology: a means for adaptation 
Different forms of technology will be often employed, 
whether “hard” forms, such as new irrigation systems, or 
“soft” technologies, such as insurance schemes. Or, they 
could use a combination of hard and soft, as with early 
warning systems that combine hard measuring devices 
with soft knowledge and skills that can raise awareness  
and stimulate appropriate action (see Box 4 for more 
information about adaptation technologies for coastal 
zones). 
Many of these technologies are already available and 
Sea-level rise, floods and storms are a threat to coastal cities, with the consequent loss of crops, lands and 
impose damages to human settlements. therefore, climate change poses a big challenge to develop and de-
veloping countries that are located below sea level. Some developed countries face big challenges against 
the risk of abrupt sea-level rise and are already investing in the construction of appropriate infrastructure 
like dykes and dams. many cities have expanded and moved to coastal areas, which means that currently 
there is more population exposed to the impacts of climate change.
With climate change coastal areas will become more hazardous. therefore, adaptation technologies that 
consider coastal areas are most necessary. there are three strategies for adaptation in this case: protect, 
retreat and Accommodate. Examples of each strategy are outlined in the table below.
more importantly, information is crucial. there is a need to gather information in order to acknowledge the 
current conditions of the coastal areas that can be done by satellite observation complemented by human 
experience in the areas. Also, geographic information Systems (giS), which combine data coming from 
different sources and presents them as maps, can be very useful. giS applied in coastal areas can show the 
zones that could be impacted by overlaying scenarios of sea level rise on land elevation.
 
Box 4: adaptation technology for coastal areas: protect, retreat, accommodate
ProTecT reTreaT accommoDaTe
•  Hard Structures - dykes, sea-
walls, tidal barriers, detached 
breakwaters
•  Soft Structures - dune or 
wetland restoration or creation, 
beach nourishment
•  indigenous options walls of 
wood, stone or coconut leaf, 
afforestation
•  Establishing set-back zones
•  relocating threatened build-
ings
•  phasing out development in 
exposed areas
•  Creating upland buffers
•  rolling easements
•  Early warning and evacuation 
systems
•  Hazard insurance
•  new agricultural practices, such 
as using salt-resistant crops
•  new building codes
•  improved drainage
•  Desalination systems
Source: UNFCCC Technologies for Adaptation to Climate Change: 2006
widely used. The global climate system has always 
confronted human societies with extreme weather events. 
Thus it should be possible to adapt to some extent by 
modifying or extending existing technologies. 
Whatever the level of technology, its application  
is likely to be an iterative process. Although many of  
these technologies are already available and in place,  
they often need further investment to make them more 
effective. Such technology transfer has mostly been for 
purposes of mitigation, for the energy sector and has 
typically involved transferring ideas or equipment from 
developed to developing countries. Unlike mitigation, 
which is a relatively new approach, adaptation is generally 
the continuation of an ongoing process for which many  
of the technologies are already being applied even in  
some of the LDCs. 
4.5  The need to catalyze investments: the role 
of public and private entities
Adaptation has to be mainstreamed in investment 
planning, whether public or private. Feasibility studies 
need to include risk assessments that take into account 
climate change in order to promote the construction of 
infrastructure strong enough to cope with extreme climate 
variability and to face climate events such as El Niño. 
Besides preventing disasters, the development of commu-
nity-infrastructure can also anticipate future stresses, i.e., it 
can help gather and store water to help reduce vulnerabil-
ity and enhance the capacity to face droughts. 
There is, therefore, a need to consider what governmen-
tal structure is needed to ensure that climate change is 
mainstreamed into development planning and poverty 
reduction plans. Would an inter-ministerial committee be 
useful to give national priority to adaptation and address 
its international dimension?
A large part of investments come from the private sector, 
and the amount of money that needs to flow in order to 
address adaptation strategies surpasses the capacities of 
governments. Governments therefore need to devise 
policies, incentives and regulation to turn private initiative 
toward strengthening adaptation. A combination of 
markets and public policy could refine risk sharing 
through: innovative insurance schemes and improved 
natural resource management; the creation of environmen-
tal markets and climate-proofing infrastructure; and, 
public-private partnerships. 
Investment is required in various sectors, where 
funding from both public and private sources are 
needed.
•  In infrastructure: Developed countries have recog-
nized that preventing disasters is less expensive than 
investing in reconstruction projects. Hence, it has 
become an important strategy to encourage govern-
ments to invest in infrastructure. Thus, when design-
ing new buildings, climate change considerations 
should be taken into account to avoid inadequate 
housing conditions. The development of adequate 
infrastructure can be an efficient way of improving 
disaster risk management. 
•  In preventing water scarcity: Irrigation systems need 
to be technified, and water must be recycled and 
re-used in houses, offices, cities, businesses and 
agricultural activities. Water also needs to be preserved. 
This requires the improvement of water quality 
standards and the treatment of industrial grey-water 
before dumping to the sea, lakes and rivers. Moreover, 
Payment for Environmental Services schemes can be 
implemented in order to protect and preserve water in 
the upper watersheds, where reforestation projects 
could also be developed.
•  In agriculture: In countries where agriculture 
activities are crucial and producers are working in 
water-stressed rain fed environments, some investment 
has been made to develop water harvesting systems 
that enable the conservation of rainfall. Additionally, 
research on the generation of new crop varieties is in 
progress in some regions, which in turn promotes 
improved management practices, new irrigation 
systems and reduced fertilizer use. Hence, investment 
in technology transfer is also crucial for adaptation in 
agriculture.
The insurance sector has a vital role to play in 
adaptation, since its business requires that it evolve in 
order to cope with the new varieties of risks that 
climate change poses. Currently, insurance covers around 
4% of losses in the world’s poorest countries, mainly 
because the cost of insurance products is not affordable for 
poor people or is not designed for covering their needs. 
Insurance is mainly created to provide relief after losses 
occur. However, insurance type approaches or credit 
schemes could also be designed to motivate proactive risk 
or vulnerability reduction efforts. Innovative risk-sharing 
mechanisms are needed to respond to the new challenges 
posed by the adverse effects of climate change, including 
biodiversity loss and land degradation.
4.6  determine resources needed to implement 
adaptation 
Developing countries need international assistance and 
resources to support adaptation in the context of national 
planning for sustainable development, capacity-building, 
transfer of technology and finance. Systematic planning 
and capacity-building are also needed to reduce the risk of 
disasters and increase resilience of communities to more 
frequent and intense extreme climate events such as 
hurricanes, droughts and floods. As previously mentioned, 
existing estimates indicate that additional funding needed 
for adaptation for developing countries is around tens of 
billions of dollars annually. At a national level, however, 
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stakeholders are involved in such institutional 
framework?
•  What are the key stakeholders playing a role in 
promoting adaptation measures in your country? 
Which ones need to be further involved?  How would 
you go about promoting further awareness? 
Resources and funding
•  What level of funding does your country need for 
meeting its national adaptation needs?
•  To what areas and activities would these resources be 
allocated?
•  What criteria should be used to allocate resources? 
•  How should adaptation options be prioritized? What 
criteria should be used?
•  Could these criteria be also used for allocating 
resources through international funds? 
international and national level linkages
•  What kinds of networks, mechanisms and platforms at 
an international level would be useful for implement-
ing adaptation at a national level? 
•  Do current UNFCCC instruments (i.e., National 
Communications, NWP) need to be adjusted? 
•  What should be done to place climate change at the 
top the international agenda? 
•  What policies and incentives could be put in place at 
national and international levels so that a substantial 
part of the necessary additional resources for adapta-
tion can catalyse larger commercial flows?
Moreover, adaptation, rather than being concentrated 
in one sector, will essentially be dispersed across all 
socio-economic sectors including water, health, 
agriculture and infrastructure, each of which presents 
its own challenges, and will involve stakeholders in 
different if overlapping groups.
Adaptation measures are also likely to be less capital 
intensive and more amenable to small-scale interventions. 
They should therefore be more flexible and adaptable to 
local circumstances, which means that in addition to being 
socially and legally acceptable they can be made reasonably 
cost-effective. Policymakers need to ensure that new forms 
of adaptation do not heighten inequality but rather 
contribute to a reduction in poverty.
4.8  New and strengthened scientific and  
technical capabilities 
Information and research is needed in order to take the 
right decisions. Nonetheless, most countries lack informa-
tion. Climate change requires adequate information 
development and management. And for that, policy 
oriented research needs to be enhanced. New and 
strengthened scientific and technical capabilities (hard-
ware, software, know how) will have to be put in place to 
face adaptation challenges. Some of the key ones are: 
systematic climate, hydrological and ocean observation 
systems; developing climate change scenarios and downs-
caling them to regional and local areas; performing policy 
relevant vulnerability and adaptation assessments. 
Vulnerability and adaptation assessments should 
serve as a basis to prioritize adaptation measures and 
policies. Some of the challenges with vulnerability 
assessments however are related to the lack of underlying 
data to identify the impacts of climate change. Generally, a 
limited number of hydro-meteorological stations are 
available in developing countries, and data have in some 
cases only been collected recently. Mountainous countries 
have an additional challenge: their topography is such that 
very little can be said about averaged climate data for an 
area, since this will include peaks of several thousand 
metres above sea-level down to low valleys. This means 
that the strengthening of Systematic Observation systems 
need to be a priority at a national level and investments 
should be strengthened to this end. This would not only 
generate information for better short-term weather 
forecasts, but would help reduce uncertainties of Global 
Circulation Models that are used to develop global climate 
scenarios that are downscaled to national and local scales 
for vulnerability assessments. 
4.9  Supporting institutions for the  
implementation of adaptation 
In addition to funds generated from the international 
level, in terms of implementing and funding adaptation, 
as well as establishing regional networks and executing 
adaptation projects, the work of global and regional 
development banks and other institutions is worth 
highlighting. Annex 3 provides more information 
resources on these and other initiatives. 
4.10 public awareness and participation
Global awareness of the risks posed by climate change is 
rising rapidly. Nonetheless, there is still much to do, 
especially in developing countries, where policy makers, 
policy takers, and the public in general still need to 
understand the importance of integrating concerns of 
climate change into their daily operations, as well as their 
policies, programming and projects. Nearly all sectors of 
society – spanning from businesses to humanitarian aid 
organizations to schools – have to do their part in it in 
order to create awareness and make society participate in 
the whole process leading to adaptation to climate change. 
In the end, the world needs a behavioral change through 
education, public information campaigns and regulation. 
NGOs and media, with their experience in generating 
political incidence and participation and inclusion 
processes, have a big role to play in this. 
Questions:
National planning
•  What are key sectors/areas for which adaptation 
options are identified in your national communica-
tions and/or NAPA? Do these correspond to national 
development priorities?
•  What should in your view be priority sectors/areas of 
action regarding adaptation?
•  What are the existing national institutional frame-
works for coordinating climate change in your 
country? Is there a specific group for coordination 
action and positions on adaptation? What kind of 
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•  Strong coordination of ongoing activities on a 
sub-national level, which could include activities that 
are driven by NGOs, research institutions, the private 
sector and by local and sub-national governments;
•  Scientific and technical capacities to understand the 
problem and its effects at the national and sub-nation-
al level, model its long-term impacts, and elaborate 
responses and adaptive strategies to the level of 
implementation;
• Program and project preparation capacities;
•  Citizen awareness and participation that sustain and 
prioritize climate change actions.
The challenges for developing countries arising from 
climate change impacts and the need for adaptation are 
many. A number of the key challenges have been outlined 
in this paper and detailed questions have already been 
posed in several sections to provide a starting point for 
discussion. Developing country policymakers and 
negotiators may wish to consider these questions when 
developing and refining their adaptation policies, as well as 
their negotiating positions under the international climate 
change process. The following points and questions may 
also help provide a useful framework for further reflection: 
What is adaptation?
An important challenge in considering adaptation is 
defining and understanding what is meant by the term 
“adaptation”. Given its far-reaching nature, it is a difficult 
topic to define, particularly in operational and financial 
terms. However, some key messages may provide a helpful 
framework for understanding adaptation:
•  Adaptation is not a “stand alone” issue. It has clear 
synergies with important issues such as economic 
development, poverty reduction and disaster manage-
ment strategies. A sustainable development path is 
vital for an adaptation process to succeed.
•  Adaptation will need to be integrated into all 
development planning. This includes the national 
and international levels. Successful adaptation 
measures will require long-term thinking and explicit 
consideration of climate change risks at the regional 
(cross-national), national, sub-national and local levels. 
•  Adaptation will also require the capacity for both 
short- and long-term planning. Strategies will be 
needed to address long-term climate change impacts, 
such as those predicted by the IPCC. At the same 
time, strategies for shorter-term adjustments may also 
necessary, such as those prepared for shorter-term 
climate variability. 
•  Adaptation will require substantial funding. All 
indicative estimates available suggest that the costs of 
adapting to climate change in the developing world are 
in the order of tens of billions. However, there are 
many difficulties and limitations in estimating the 
exact costs of adapting under various scenarios, as well 
as the ability of countries to self-finance adaptation.
adaptation in the UN climate negotiations:  possible next 
steps
Important decisions will be taken in the run-up to COP 
15 in Copenhagen in late 2009. How could your country 
develop a national strategy for successfully engaging in the 
Bali Action Plan discussions on adaptation? Such a 
strategy could include:
•  Understanding the issues in order to define positions 
and strategies, as well as background knowledge of the 
positions of other countries;
•  Awareness of the country’s main vulnerabilities, 
adaptation options, priorities and needs for support, 
including among financing, capacity building and 
technology transfer;
•  Awareness of national, sub-national and local experi-
ences, processes and actors that have being dealt with 
adaptation to climate change; in addition to the 
country’s experience with the UNFCCC adaptation 
resources and initiatives.
When developing or refining national positions, the 
following questions may be helpful: 
•  How much will climate change impacts affect the 
economic growth and social development of the 
country and how much should the country invest to 
minimize those impacts?;
•  What mechanisms should be put in place, nationally 
and internationally, to provide effective means for 
adaptation to climate change, including financing?;
•  What adaptation-related issues should be further 
emphasized in a future climate change regime? Are 
current tools, process and platforms available through 
the UNFCCC enough or need to be changed in a 
future climate change regime? 
adaptation at the national level:  possible elements
Successfully adapting to climate change at the national 
level will likely require a set of conditions and elements at 
the national level.  Some possible elements for a national 
level strategy could include:
•  Adequate institutional arrangements, including 
systematic planning capacity in a cooperative institu-
tional setting consistent policies and measures and 
regulatory frameworks; 
5.   CoNClUSioNS:  KeY MeSSaGeS aNd poiNTS FoR  
FURTheR ReFleCTioN
a Da P TaT i o N To c l i m aT e c H a N G e: T H e N e w c H a l l e N G e f o r D e V e lo Pm e N T i N T H e D e V e lo P i N G w o r l D152 a Da P TaT i o N To c l i m aT e c H a N G e: T H e N e w c H a l l e N G e f o r D e V e lo Pm e N T i N T H e D e V e lo P i N G w o r l D 153
ties and Adaptation in Developing Countries’ UNFCCC: 
Bonn.
Adaptation and disaster risk reduction
Schipper, L., M. Pelling (2006) ‘Disaster Risk, Climate  
  Change and International Development: Scope for, 
and Challenges to, Integration’, Special issue of 
Disasters, 30 (1): 19-38. 
Soussan, J., I. Burton (2002) ‘Adapt and Thrive:  
  Combining Adaptation to Climate Change, Disaster 
Mitigation, and Natural Resources Management in a 
New Approach to the Reduction of Vulnerability and 
Poverty’, Paper presented at the UNDP Expert Group 
Meeting, “Integrating Disaster Reduction and 
Adaptation to Climate Change”, Havana, Cuba.
17-19 June 2002, UNDP: Havana. http://www.climate- 
  adaptation.info/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/
undp_book1.pdf.
Sperling, F., F. Szekely (2005) ‘Disaster Risk Management  




Climate Proofing: A Risk-Based Approach to Adaptation:  
  by the Asian Development Bank: http://www.adb.org/
Documents/Reports/Climate-Proofing/climate-proof-
ing.pdf.
Final report of workshop on Climate Change,  
  Humanitarian Disasters, and International Develop-
ment: Linking Vulnerability, Risk Reduction and 
Response Capacity, Oslo, April 2007: http://www.
climate-adaptation.info/wp-content/uploads/2007/08/
final_workshop_report_03-07-07.pdf.
IPCC WGII Summary for Policymakers of the IPCC  
  Fourth Assessment Report volume on Impacts, 
Adaptation and Vulnerability. http://www.ipcc.ch/
SPM13apr07.pdf.
Climate Change Adaptation, Institute for Development  
  Studies (UK), “In Focus,” Issue 2, November 2007. 
http://www.ids.ac.uk/UserFiles/File/publications/in_
focus/InFocus2.0ClimateChangeAdaptation.pdf.
Response Measures”, 14-15 May 2003, Bonn.
Yamin, F., J. Depeldge (2004) The International Climate  
  Change Regime: A Guide to Rules Institutions and 
Procedures, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
Adaptation and Development
Agrawala, S. (ed.) (2005) ‘Bridge over Troubled Waters— 
  Linking Climate Change and Development’, Organi-
sation for Economic Cooperation and Development: 
Paris.
Burton, I. (2000) ‘Adaptation to Climate Change and  
  Variability in the Context of Sustainable Develop-
ment’ in Gómez-Echeverri, L. (ed.) Climate Change 
and Development, Yale School of Forestry and 
Environmental Studies & UNDP: New Haven and 
New York.
Burton, I., M. van Aalst (1999) ‘Come Hell or High  
  Water - Integrating Climate Change and Adaptation 
into Bank Work’ World Bank Environment Depart-
ment, Environment Department Papers No. 72, 
World Bank: Washington, D.C.
Huq, S., A. Rahman, M. Konate, Y. Sokona and H. Reid  
  (2003) ‘Mainstreaming Adaptation to Climate Change 
in Least Developed Countries’ IIED: London.
Klein, R.J.T., S. Huq, J.B. Smith (2003) Climate Change,  
  Adaptive Capacity and Development Imperial College 
Press: London.
McGray, H., Hammill, A., Bradley, R. with Schipper, E.  
  L., Parry, J.E. (2007) ‘Weathering the Storm: Options 
for Framing Adaptation and Development’ World 
Resources Institute (WRI) Report, WRI: Washington, 
D.C. http://pdf.wri.org/weathering_the_storm.pdf.
Sperling, F. (ed.) (2003) ‘Poverty and Climate Change:  
  Reducing the Vulnerability of the Poor through 
Adaptation’ Inter-agency report by the African 
Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), Department for International Development 
(DFID, UK), Federal Ministry for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (BMZ, Germany), Directo-
rate-General for Development European Commission 
(EC), Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Development 
Cooperation (DGIS, The Netherlands), Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), and the World Bank.
UNFCCC (2008) ‘Climate Change: Impacts, Vulnerabili-
References
Adaptation Fund Board, 2008. Report of the Second   
  Meeting of the Adaptation Fund Board, AFB/B.2/16. 
The Adaptation Fund, June 19, 2008. http://www.
adaptation-fund.org/ images/Report_of_the_Second_
Meeting_of_the_Adaptation_Fund_Board_06.19.08.
pdf. Access July 2008.
Adaptation Working Group, 2008.  Submission to  
  GLOBE Brasilia. G8+5 Legislators Forum.
DEFRA, 2005. Adaptation Policy Framework, a  
  consultation by the Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs.
IPCC, 2007. Fourth Assessment Report.  
  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Secre-
tariat. Geneva, Switzerland. http://www.ipcc.ch. 
Klein, R.J.T., S. Huq, F. Denton, T.E. Downing, R.G. 
  Richels, J.B. Robinson, F.L. Toth (2007) ‘Inter-rela-
tionships between adaptation and mitigation’ Chapter 
18 in M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van 
der Linden and C.E. Hanson (eds.) Climate Change 
2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contri-
bution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assess-
ment.
Möhner, Annett/Klein, Richard J.T. (2007). The Global 
  Environment Facility. Funding for Adaptation or 
Adapting to Funds?
OECD, 2008. Economic aspects of Adaptation to Climate 
  Change:  Costs, benefits and policy instruments. 
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2008. Benito  
  Mueller. International Adaptation Finance: 
The Need for an Innovative and Strategic Approach. 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate  
  Change, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK.
Stern, Nicholas, 2007. The Economics of Climate  
  Change:  The Stern Review. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, UK.
Stern, Nicholas, 2008. Key elements of a global deal on  
  climate change.
UNDP, 2007. Human Development Report, 2007/2008.
UNFCCC Secretariat, 2008. Technologies for adaptation  
 to climate change.
UNFCCC Secretariat, 2007. Impacts, Vulnerabilities and  
 Adaptation in Developing Countries. 
UNFCCC Secretariat, 2007. Analysis of existing and  
  potential investment and financial flows relevant to the 
development of an effective and appropriate interna-
tional response to climate change
World Bank, 2006. Clean Energy and Development:   
  Towards an Investment Framework. DC2006-0002, 
World Bank, Washington, DC, USA.
Further reading
Adaptation Theory and Related Concepts
Adger, W.N., S. Agrawala, M. Mirza, C. Conde, K.  
  O’Brien, J. Puhlin, R. Pulwarty, B. Smit, K. Takahashi 
(2007) ‘Chapter 17: Assessment of Adaptation 
Practices, Options, Constraints and Capacity’, IPCC 
Working Group II contribution to the Fourth 
Assessment Report, Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge.
Burton, I., B. Challenger, S. Huq, R. Klein, G. Yohe  
  (2007) ‘Chapter 18: Adaptation to Climate Change in 
the Context of Sustainable Development and Equity’, 
IPCC Working Group II contribution to the Fourth 
Assessment Report, Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge.
Smit, B., I. Burton, R.J.T. Klein, R. Street (1999) ‘The  
  Science of Adaptation: A Framework for Assessment’ 
Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global 
Change, 4 (3-4) 199-213.
Adaptation under the UNFCCC
Burton, I., E. Diringer, J. Smith (2006) ‘Adaptation to  
  Climate Change: International Policy Options’ Pew 
Center on Global Climate Change Research: Arling-
ton, VA. http://www.climate-adaptation.info/
wp-content/uploads/2007/08/pew_adaptation.pdf
Harmeling, S., C. Bals (2008) ‘Adaptation to climate  
  change–where do we go from Bali? An analysis of 
COP-13 and the key issues on the road to a new 
climate change treaty’ Germanwatch: Bonn.
Lim, B., E. Spanger-Siegfried, I. Burton, M. Malone, S.  
  Huq (2005). ”Adaptation Policy Frameworks for 
Climate Change: Developing Strategies, Policies and 
Measures”. A Project by the UNDP and GEF, 
Cambridge University Press: New York.  
Linnerooth-Bayer, J. M.J. Mace, R. Verheyen (2003)  
  ‘Insurance-Related Actions and Risk Assessment in the 
Context of the UNFCCC’ Paper commissioned by the 
UNFCCC Secretariat for the UNFCCC Workshop on 
Insurance-Related Actions to Address the Specific 
Needs and Concerns of Developing Country Parties 
Arising from the Adverse Effects of Climate Change 
and from the Impact of the Implementation of 
a Da P TaT i o N To c l i m aT e c H a N G e: T H e N e w c H a l l e N G e f o r D e V e lo Pm e N T i N T H e D e V e lo P i N G w o r l D154 a Da P TaT i o N To c l i m aT e c H a N G e: T H e N e w c H a l l e N G e f o r D e V e lo Pm e N T i N T H e D e V e lo P i N G w o r l D 155
The poorest countries and most vulnerable citizens will 
suffer the earliest and most damaging effects, even though 
they have contributed least to the problem and even if 
serious efforts to reduce emissions start immediately. 
Looking to the future no country, regardless it wealth or 
power, will be immune to the impact of global warming.
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annex 1: impacts and vulnerability
The science is now “unequivocal” that human activity is 
contributing to climate change (WGI, IPCC 2007) and 
the impacts are already being observed in all sectors – 
food, water, health, agriculture, and energy (WGII, IPCC 
2007). The Fourth Assessment Report (AR4, 2007) of the 
IPCC projects a warming of about 0.2°C per decade for 
the next two decades, which will bring about serious 
economic, social and environmental problems, all of 
which will cause even more poverty and less development, 
affecting all countries but especially the developing world. 
Therefore, to acknowledge the current and future impacts 
of climate change is of primary concern for any adaptation 
strategy. According to the Human Development Report 
(UNDP, 2007-2008) based on the IPCC AR4 (2007) 
scenarios, climate change is already having an impact on 
various systems and sectors of society and will continue 
impacting as follows: 
1. ecosystems and biodiversity
•  Climate change is already transforming ecological 
systems. With an increase of up to 2.5°C between  
20 to 30% of species of the earth could disappear. 
•  Marine ecosystems are suffering due to the accumula-
tion of carbon dioxide, which will impact fish stocks, 
especially upon the main coastal cities and also small 
island states. This will have an impact over biodiversity 
and ecosystem goods and services such as water and 
food security.
2. agriculture and Food Security
•  The African region is threatened by declining crop 
yields, which affects food security of a population that 
already suffers of malnutrition, and threatens the 
dependence on agriculture activity for food security. 
•  Precipitation, temperature and water availability for 
agricultural purposes will be affected by climate 
change. Sub-Saharan Africa will be mostly affected and 
food security threatened, but also other regions of the 
world like Latin America and certain parts of Asia. By 
2080 it is projected that approximately 600 million 
could suffer from malnourishment.
3. Sea level rise and exposure to meteorological disasters
•  Sea level could increase rapidly due to accelerated ice 
sheet disintegration. Global temperature rise of 3 to 4 
°C could cause the permanent or transitory 
displacement of 330 million people due to flooding 
and threaten approximately 4 million km2 of land, 
where 5% of the world’s population is located.  
This will affect millions of people from developing 
countries and from large coastal cities of the  
developed countries.
•  During wet seasons floods will become more intense 
due to the melting glaciers, putting in risk water 
availability of one-sixth of the world’s population, 
especially the South American Andean region, certain 
parts of China and the Indian sub-continent.
4. human health
•  The main impacts over health conditions will be felt 
especially on developing countries due to poverty 
conditions and limited capacity to have access to 
adequate public health systems. 
•  200 to 400 million people could suffer malaria, which 
already kills around 1 million people per year. It is 
already possible to find cases of dengue at unusual 
high altitudes in Latin America and certain parts of 
Asia. Climate change could worsen this situation. 
5.  industry, settlements and society
•  Those industries, settlements and societies located in 
coastal and river flood plains, or in areas where 
extreme weather event occur, and whose economies are 
dependent on climate-sensitive resources, are the most 
vulnerable to climate change.
The consequences of climate change will become 
disproportionately more damaging with increased 
warming (Stern Review 2006). With higher temperatures 
(see the chart below), the chance to face abrupt and 
large-scale changes will be harder and this will lead to 
regional disruption, migration and conflict.
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iSSUe DeciSioNS ProViSioNS
Funding under the protocol Decision 10/Cp.7 Establishment of an Adaptation Fund to finance concrete adaptation projects and 
programs in developing countries that are also parties to the protocol
Fund to be financed by share of proceeds from CDm activities







guidelines for nApA preparation
Establishment of the LDC Expert group to advise on nApA preparation, and advise on 
other adaptation efforts relevant to LDCs
Work of the Least Developed Countries Expert group
Extension of the mandate of the Least Developed Countries Expert group
Further guidance for the operation of the Least Developed Countries Fund
ipCC Decision 10/Cp.9
Decision 5/Cp.13
the consideration of the scientific, technical and socio-economic aspects of impacts of, 
and vulnerability and adaptation to, climate change in the context of the ipCC tAr
Fourth Assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on Climate Change
other Decision 6/Cp.1
Decision 13/Cp.3
Adaptation technology to be addressed by SBStA
SBStA, with SBi, to assess comprehensiveness and effectiveness of adaptation meas-
ures
Decision 7/Cp.4 inclusion of adaptation in work program on Kyoto protocol, also under CDm to deter-
mine share of proceeds from CDm
Decision 11/Cp.8 Delhi Work programme on Article 6: consider linkages between implementing this and 
implementing p&ms on adapting to climate change 
Decision 1/Cp.11 Dialogue on long-term cooperative action to address climate change by enhancing 
implementation of the Convention
Decision 1/Cp.13 Bali Action plan (enhanced action on adaptation)
CMP (Kyoto Protocol) decisions on issues related to adaptation 
iSSUe DeciSioNS ProViSioNS
Adaptation Fund Decision 28/Cmp.1
Decision 5/Cmp.2
Decision 1/Cmp.3
initial guidance to an entity entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism of 
the Convention, for the operation of the Adaptation Fund
Details and guidance for the design of the Adaptation Fund
operationlization of the Adaptation Fund
Second review of the Kyoto protocol Decision 7/Cmp.2
Decision 4/Cmp.3
review aim to further enhance the implementation of the protocol and elaborate in 
particular adaptation
annex 2: decisions on adaptation under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto protocol
COP decisions 
iSSUe DeciSioNS ProViSioNS
nairobi Work programme on impacts, 




Buenos Aires program of work on adaptation and response measures
Five-year program of work of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and technological 
Advice on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change
non-Annex i national communications Decision 10/Cp.2
Decision 8/Cp.5
Decision 31/Cp.7
national communications to include information on policy frameworks for implement-
ing adaptation measures and response strategies and technological needs related to 
facilitating adequate adaptation
Establishment of the Consultative group of Experts on non-Annex i national communi-
cations (CgE).  CgE to link with LDC Expert group (LEg) on adaptation issues




ipCC technical guidelines for Assessing impacts and Adaptations be used for national 
communications
national communications to include information on expected impacts of climate 
change, and action taken to implement Article 4.1 with regard to adaptation.
Also report on meeting costs of adaptation







Development of technologies for adapting to climate change
Synthesis and dissemination of information on adaptation technologies
Secretariat to work on synthesis and dissemination of information, technologies and 
know-how relating to adaptation and to accelerate development of adaptation meth-
odologies
tools to evaluate different adaptation strategies





Definition of three stages of funding for adaptation
gEF should provide funding for Stage i and ii activities
Establish pilot or demonstration projects on how adaptation planning and assessment 
can be translated into projects
Capacity building Decision 2/Cp.7 
Decision 3/Cp.7
Decision 5/Cp.12
Capacity building for implementation of adaptation measures
Capacity building for carrying out adaptation and vulnerability assessments and nApAs






Decision to start a process to consider Article 4.8 and 4.9
process should identify adverse effects, impacts of the implementation of response 
measures, needs of developing countries arising from such impacts, and identification 
and consideration of actions to address these
BApA adopted to consider adverse effects, among other issues, before Cop6
program of work from Cop4 to Cop6
Decision to consider Article 4.8 and 4.9 at Cop-6 and beyond
•  that the gEF and other bilateral and multilateral sources should fund work on vulner-
ability and adaptation assessments, training, capacity building, technology transfer 
relating to adverse effects
•  that adaptation fund and SCCF should fund the implementation of adaptation activi-
ties where sufficient information exists to warrant such activities
•  the Convention should support the nApA process
•  Establishment of LDC Fund
•  Workshop requests






Establishment of SCCF to fund activities, programs and measures on adaptation
Establishment of LDC Fund to fund nApAs
guidance on LDC Fund for speedy disbursement of funds for nApA preparation
Further guidance on SCCF
a Da P TaT i o N To c l i m aT e c H a N G e: T H e N e w c H a l l e N G e f o r D e V e lo Pm e N T i N T H e D e V e lo P i N G w o r l D158 a Da P TaT i o N To c l i m aT e c H a N G e: T H e N e w c H a l l e N G e f o r D e V e lo Pm e N T i N T H e D e V e lo P i N G w o r l D 159
A CRMA approach – the most effective strategy to 
address climate change, according to Bank Group 
experts – integrates the management of current climate 
variability and extremes with adaptation to climate 
change. The strategy will review and elaborate on the 
adequacy of existing financing and non-financing 
instruments. It will also assess Bank capacity to access 
external finance such as UNFCCC/GEF financing and 
explore opportunities to establish or access new 
internal and external financing mechanisms. 
•  The Asia Development Bank (ADB) has been 
working with partners across Asia and the Pacific to 
build knowledge of climate change impacts and 
adaptation measures for almost a decade. Bolstering 
these efforts are long-standing programs of support for 
disaster preparedness and response, as well as produc-
tive relations with development partners – from 
government agencies, to academia, think tanks, green 
businesses, civil society organizations, and both 
bilateral and multilateral development agencies. ADB 
also has direct access to climate change adaptation 
funds administered by GEF. 
annex 3: information resources guide
Publications
•  Bo Lim, et al., Adaptation Policy Frameworks (APF) for 
Climate Change, United Nations Development 
Programme: 2004. http://www.undp.org/climate-
change/adapt/apf.html#about.
•  Frankel-Reed, Jennifer and Nick Brooks, Proposed 
Framework for Monitoring and Evaluation Framework 
of Adaptation to Climate Change, United Nations 
Development Programme: 2008.
•  Lu, Xianfu and Nick Brooks, Quality Standards for 
Climate Change Adaptation, United Nations Devel-
opment Programme: 2008.
•  Nick Brooks, et al., Operational Guidance for Climate 
Change Adaptation: Technical Papers for Six Priority 
Thematic Areas, United Nations Development 
Programme: 2008.
•  United Nations Development Programme, Briefing 
Note: Adaptation to Climate Change: Doing Develop-




•  United Nations Development Programme, Climate 
Change Adaptation: Knowledge Needs Survey, United 
Nations Development Programme: 2007. http://www.
energyandenvironment.undp.org/undp/index.cfm?mo
dule=Library&page=Document&DocumentID=6508.
•  United Nations Development Programme, Climate 
Risk Profiles, United Nations Development Pro-
gramme: 2008.
•  United Nations Development Programme, Hot Spot 
Analysis from Vulnerability and Hazard Data, United 
Nations Development Programme: 2007.
•  United Nations Development Programme, Human 
Development Report 2007/08 – Fighting Climate 
Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World, United 




•  Adaptation Basics, provides an overview of the 
relationship between climate change impacts and 
development, including impacts by sector (e.g, land 
degradation, health, etc.) as well as impacts affecting 
the achievement of the Millennium Development 
Goals. http://www.undp.org/climatechange/adapt/basics1.
html.
•  Adaptation Definitions, highlighting commonly used 
terminology. http://www.undp.org/climatechange/adapt/
definitions.html.
•  Adaptation Learning Mechanism (ALM), a collabora-
tive knowledge-sharing project, offers a library of case 
studies and a database of adaptation profiles for 
individual countries. www.adaptationlearning.net. 
•  Country Adaptation Profiles database, a UNDP-devel-
oped tool hosted by the Adaptation Learning Mecha-
nism, provides information on climate change and the 
national initiatives for over 140 developing countries. 
http://www.adaptationlearning.net/profiles/.
•  National Communications Support Program (NCSP), 
jointly managed by UNDP and UNEP, provides 
support to more than 130 developing countries as they 
prepare Second (or Third) National Communications 
to the UNFCCC. Together with the implementing 
agencies, the NCSP provides technical and policy 
guidance on vulnerability and adaptation assessment, 
and on linking climate risks with national develop-
ment priorities. http://ncsp.undp.org/.
•  UNDP Environment & Energy e-Library, a broad-




•  Web-based training module on Climate Change, a 
3-hour training including three lessons: The Science of 
Climate Change, Global Responses to Climate 
Change, and Climate Change and UNDP’s Develop-
ment Efforts. To be released in late 2008.
Global and regional development banks
•  The World Bank has adopted a climate risk manage-
ment approach to development, which calls for 
development that is resilient to both present-day 
variability and projected climate change. The Bank is 
increasing collaborative efforts on adaptation with 
other multilateral development banks and is working 
with the IFC on exploring ways to involve the private 
sector.
•  The African Development Bank (AfDB) has some 
experience in the design of specific climate risk 
management and adaptation (CRMA) interventions. 
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financial mechanism, which is scheduled to be completed 
by the COP at its 15th session (2009). The COP has 
adopted objectives and methodology for the review of the 
financial mechanism.10 The fourth review will inform the 
fifth replenishment of the GEF. The second process is the 
Ad Hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperative 
Action established by the Bali Action Plan. Its mandate 
includes enhanced action on the provision of financial 
resources and investment to support action on mitigation 
and adaptation and technology cooperation. That process 
is also scheduled to conclude at COP-15 in 2009.
The financial component of the Bali Action Plan will 
consider, inter alia: 
•  Improved access to adequate, predictable and sustain-
able financial resources and the provision of new and 
additional funding for developing country Parties;
•  Positive incentives for developing country Parties for 
the enhanced implementation of national mitigation 
strategies and adaptation action;
•  Innovative means of funding to assist developing 
country Parties particularly vulnerable to the adverse 
impacts of climate change to meet the cost of adapta-
tion;
•  Incentives to implement adaptation actions on the 
basis of sustainable development policies;
•  Mobilization of public- and private-sector funding and 
investment; and
•  Financial and technical support for capacity building 
in the assessment of the costs of adaptation in 
developing countries.
For an overview of COP and CMP decisions, please 
refer to Annex 1 of this report.
10   Decision 6/CP.13.
1.1 purpose and scope
The purpose of this paper is to help developing coun-
tries to assess options in negotiations on additional 
international investment and financial flows to address 
climate change. This paper covers:
•  Estimates of the investment and financial flows needed 
to address climate change;
•  Existing funding mechanisms of the United  
Nations Framework Convention on Climate  
Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol;
•  Options to enhance international investment and 
financial flows to developing countries;
•  Governance of the international investment and 
financial flows;
•  Effective disbursement of the international funds.
This paper does NOT deal with national policies 
relating to investment and financial flows to address 
climate change in developing countries – that is addressed 
in a separate paper produced for this series1. In addition, 
separate guidelines that developing countries can use to 
assess their national needs are available. Information on 
the terminology used in this paper can be obtained from 
the glossary in Annex 2.
1.2 Background
The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol foresee financial 
assistance from developed country Parties to developing 
country Parties. Developed country Parties (Annex II 
Parties) committed to provide new and additional 
financial resources to assist developing country Parties 
comply with their obligations under the Convention (Arti-
cle 4.3) and the Kyoto Protocol (Article 11.2).2 The 
financial assistance may be provided through a “financial 
mechanism” established by Article 11 of the Convention 
1. iNTRodUCTioN
or through bilateral, regional or other multilateral 
channels.3 
The Global Environment Facility (GEF) was designated 
as an entity entrusted with the operation of the financial 
mechanism of the Convention on an interim basis in 
1995.4 The financial mechanism is accountable to the 
Conference of the Parties (COP), which decides on its 
policies, program priorities and funding criteria. A 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the 
COP and the Council of the GEF was concluded in 
1996.5 After its first review of the financial mechanism, the 
COP decided to grant the GEF its status on an ongoing 
basis, subject to review every four years.6 
Parties have also established two special funds under the 
Convention managed by the GEF; the Special Climate 
Change Fund (SCCF) and Least Developed Countries 
Fund (LDCF) (see section 3.1.2).7
The Adaptation Fund under the Kyoto Protocol was 
established to assist developing country Parties to the 
Protocol that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse 
effects of climate change to meet the costs of adaptation.8 
A “share of proceeds” consisting of 2% of the certified 
emission reductions (CERs) issued for most Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) projects is contributed 
to the Adaptation Fund. The operating entity of the Fund 
is the Adaptation Fund Board serviced by a secretariat and 
a trustee. The GEF and World Bank have been appointed 
the secretariat and trustee respectively on an interim basis.9 
The Board, subject to the guidance and under the 
authority of the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP), will 
develop strategic priorities, policies and guidelines, decide 
on projects and develop rules of procedure. 
Financial support is currently being addressed in two 
negotiating processes. One is the fourth review of the 
1   Please refer to the paper by Dennis Tirpak, Sujata Gupta, Daniel Perczyk, and Massamba Thioye, National Policies and Their Linkages to Negotiations over a Future International Climate 
Change Agreement.
2   Article 4.3 of the Convention states that developed country Parties shall provide new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing 
country Parties to prepare national communications and to meet the agreed full incremental costs of implementing measures covered by Article 4.1. Article 4.4 stipulates that 
developed country Parties shall assist particularly vulnerable developing country Parties to meet the costs of adaptation and Article 4.5 commits developed country Parties to 
take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance the transfer, or access, to environmentally sound technologies and know how.
3   Parties are required to report such financial assistance in their national communications.
4   Decision 9/CP.1.
5   Decision 12/CP.2.
6   Annex to decision 3/CP.4.
7   Decision 7/CP.7.
8   Article 12.8 of the Kyoto Protocol and decisions 10/CP.7 and 28/CMP.1.
9   Decision 1/CMP.3.
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some regions. Shifting domestic investments into more 
climate friendly alternatives may require national policies 
and/or financial incentives.
Increased energy efficiency requires additional invest-
ment for electrical and fossil fuel equipment in industry 
and buildings. Some CCS is also projected for the 
industrial sector. Improved vehicle efficiency, including 
hybrid vehicles, increases energy efficiency in the trans-
portation sector. Actions to reduce emissions of non-CO2 
gases and from waste (landfills and wastewater treatment 
plants) require small investments. Finally, annual spending 
on energy research, development and demonstration 
(RDD&D) is projected to double from the current level. 
Currently, most research is undertaken in a few developed 
countries; what share of the research will be conducted in 
developing countries in 2030 is difficult to predict.
As discussed below, the net increase involves reduced 
investment for fossil fuel supply and large shifts in the 
investment for electricity generation.
Annual investment in fossil fuel supply and associated 
infrastructure in 2030 is almost $60 billion lower due to 
the increased energy efficiency. However, global fossil fuel 
consumption is still about 30% higher than in 2000.
Substantial shifts in investment for electricity supply 
will be needed. Mitigation is projected to reduce 
investment for fossil-fired generation, transmission and 
distribution by $156 billion in 2030. Almost all of that 
amount, about $148 billion, needs to be shifted to 
renewables, nuclear and CO2 capture and storage 
(CCS). Currently investment in the power sector is mostly 
domestic (about 70%), with significant international 
foreign direct investment and international borrowing in 
Table 1: Change to the annual investment and financial flows in 2030 for climate change mitigation
notes:  nAi parties: parties to the united nations Framework Convention on Climate Change that are not included in 
Annex i, developing countries. 
rD&D: research, development and demonstration
Source:  UNFCCC 2007. Investment and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change, Tables IX-61, IX-62 and IX-63, pp. 173 
and 174.
SecTorS GloBal (BillioNS of 
$ 2005)
SHare of Nai ParTieS 
(PerceNTaGe)
Fossil Fuel Supply (-) 59 50 to 55%
Electricity Supply (-) 7 50 to 55%
     Fossil –fired generation, 
     transmission and distribution
(-) 156 50 to 55%
     renewables, nuclear and carbon, 
     capture & storage (CCS)
148 50 to 55%
industry 36 50 to 55%
Building 51 25 to 30%
Waste 0.9 66 to70%
transport 88 40 to 45%
Forestry 21 Almost 100%
Agriculture 35 35 to 40%
Energy rD&D 35-45 -
Net change 200-210 35 to 40%
In 2007, the UNFCCC Secretariat prepared a report on 
“Investment and Financial Flows to Address Climate 
Change”.11 The report covers mitigation and adaptation in 
various sectors over the period to 2030. The report defines 
an investment as the initial (capital) cost of a new physical 
asset with a life of more than one year, such as the capital 
cost of a gas-fired generating unit or a water supply 
system. A financial flow is an ongoing expenditure related 
to climate change mitigation or adaptation that does not 
involve physical assets, such as research or health care. 
These investment and financial flows are NOT the same as 
the cost of addressing climate change; changes to the 
operating costs of investments are not considered nor are 
damages due to climate change estimated.
Total investment and relevant financial flows are 
estimated for both a reference scenario and a mitigation 
scenario. The scenarios are a composite of several sources 
covering energy-related emissions, industrial process 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, non-CO2 emissions, and 
agriculture and forest sinks. A comparison of those 
scenarios indicates the investment and financial flows 
needed to address climate change.
Addressing climate change will require significant shifts 
and an overall net increase in global investment and 
financial flows. While the changes appear large in 
absolute terms, they are small relative to total invest-
ment. Most of the changes and additional investment are 
likely to be made by corporations and households, 
although this may require government policies and 
incentives. But additional public sector investment and 
financial flows will be required, primarily for adaptation.
Approximately half of the shifts and net increase in 
investment and financial flows needed to address climate 
change occur in developing countries. Mitigation invest-
ments in developing countries are more cost-effective; 
larger emission reductions per dollar invested. On average 
developing countries are estimated to suffer more damage 
as a percentage of their GDP than developed countries.
The UNFCCC report and other studies conclude that 
developing countries, especially the poorest and those 
most vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change, 
will need international financial support for mitigation 
and adaptation.
The estimated investment and financial flows are distinct 
from development needs. The energy sector investment, 
for example, does not reduce the number of people 
without access to modern energy services. The UNFCCC 
analysis does not systematically address individual 
countries or groups of developing countries. However, the 
data indicate that official development assistance plays a 
much larger role in least developed countries (LDCs) than 
other developing countries.
2.1 Mitigation
Mitigation investment and financial flows depend on 
the scale of the emission reductions. The reference scenario 
used in the UNFCCC report assumes that global emis-
sions rise from 38.87 Gigatons CO2-eqivalent (GtCO2-eq) 
in 2000 to 61.52 GtCO2-eq in 2030; about 1.5% per 
year.12 Most of the growth occurs in developing countries. 
Under the mitigation scenario, global emissions peak in 
2015 at 41.81 GtCO2-eq and then decline to 29.11 
GtCO2-eq in 2030; 25% below 2000 emissions.
The lower emissions under the mitigation scenario are 
due to major changes to energy demand and supply and to 
shifting forests and agriculture from a source to a sink. 
Energy demand is estimated to be about 15% lower in 
2030 due to aggressive implementation of energy efficien-
cy measures – industry, buildings and transportation – by 
energy consumers and electric utilities. Electricity generat-
ing capacity is about 10% lower in 2030 and the mix of 
sources used is less carbon-intensive. Forests shift from an 
emissions source to a large sink.
The changes to the investment and financial flows in 
2030 for climate change mitigation are shown in Table 1. 
The net change to the annual investment and financial 
flows in 2030 for climate change mitigation is estimated 
increase of $200-$210 billion globally, of which about  
$75 billion is projected to occur in developing countries. 
2.   eSTiMaTeS oF The iNveSTMeNT aNd FiNaNCial FloWS 
Needed To addReSS CliMaTe ChaNGe
11   UNFCCC, 2007.
12   The reference and baseline scenarios for mitigation used by the UNFCCC correspond to scenarios from IEA World Energy Outlook (WEO) 2006; the non-CO2 emissions projections 
from the United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) extrapolated to 2030 (US EPA, 2006) and industrial process CO2 emissions from the World Business Council on 
Sustainable Development (WBCSD) (WBCSD, 2002). For more detail, please see UNFCCC, 2007, Chapter II, p. 22 and Table 5, p. 216.
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For human health the adaptation cost is estimated as 
the cost of the additional cases of diarrhoeal disease, 
malnutrition and malaria due to climate change in 
developing countries. This cost is estimated at $5 billion 
per year for 2030, all in developing countries.
The additional investment needed for coastal protec-
tion was estimated using the dynamic interactive vulner-
ability analysis (DIVA) model, which analyses adaptation 
options for more than 12,000 segments of the world’s 
coasts. The model was run with and without sea level rise. 
It estimates the costs of beach nourishment, the costs of 
building dykes, land loss costs, number of people flooded, 
and losses from flooding. Only the costs of beach nourish-
ment and dykes were counted as climate change adapta-
tion costs. The annual investment in 2030 was estimated 
The capital cost of the water supply18 infrastructure 
needed to meet the projected population and economic 
growth to 2030 given the projected climate in 2050 is 
about $800 billion. A little over 25% of this – $225 
billion – was estimated to be due to climate change. 
Spreading the capital cost over the 20-year life of the 
facilities leads to an annual adaptation cost of $11 
billion.19 About 85% of the additional investment would 
be needed in developing countries.
Table 2: Change to the annual investment and financial flows in 2030 for climate change adaptation
Source: UNFCCC 2007. Investment and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change, Table IX-65, p. 177





Water supply 11 85%
Human health 5 100%
Coastal protection 11 45%
infrastructure 8 to 130 25 to 35%
Total 49 to 171 35 to 60%
18   The model used to develop the estimates for water supply considered changes in demand due to population and economic growth and changes in supply due to projected cli-
mate change. The estimates in the UNFCCC report includes water supply, but not water quality, flood protection, unmet irrigation needs or water distribution systems. UNFCCC 
2007, Chapter 5.4.2, p. 105. 
19   These estimates do not include the cost of sanitation facilities, storm water management, or flood protection. They also do not include the cost of meeting Target 10 of the 
Millennium Development Goals – halving the number of people without people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation by 2015 – which is 
estimated to require an annual expenditure of $10 billion over that period.
20   Flood and land losses are climate change damages. In practice, adaptation costs would be incurred in responding to those damages, so the adaptation costs are under esti-
mated.
at $11 billion of which $5 billion is in developing 
countries.20 
Infrastructure, such as buildings and roads, may be 
damaged due to severe weather events, flooding or other 
impacts of climate change. New infrastructure can be 
adapted to the impacts of the projected climate. To 
estimate the adaptation cost for new infrastructure, the 
share of infrastructure vulnerable to the adverse impacts of 
climate was estimated by region based on historical data 
for damages due to extreme weather events. Adapting the 
vulnerable new infrastructure to the potential impacts of 
climate change was estimated to increase the capital cost 
by 5-20%. The adaptation cost for new infrastructure in 
2030 is estimated at $8-$130 billion globally, of which 
$2-$41 billion is in developing countries.
A little over half of the incremental investment for 
energy supply, electricity generation and industry is 
projected for developing countries, which reflects the 
relatively rapid economic growth projected for those 
countries and the cost-effective emission reduction 
opportunities available there. The shares are lower for 
buildings and transportation because building stocks with 
heating and/or cooling and vehicle fleets are concentrated 
in developed countries. 
The agriculture sector offers opportunities to reduce 
nitrous oxide emissions from soils (fertilizer use) and 
manure management as well as methane emissions from 
animals, manure management and rice cultivation. The 
annual cost of such measures is estimated at $20 billion in 
2030, mostly ($13 billion) in developing countries. 
Agroforestry offers the potential to increase carbon sinks; 
expanding agroforestry by 19 million ha/year would 
require an annual investment of about $15.billion with 
virtually all of this potential in developing countries.
Deforestation and forest degradation currently lead to 
emissions of 5.8 GtCO2 per year globally, all from 
developing countries. Halting those emissions would cost 
an estimated $12.billion per year. In addition forest 
management – reducing harvest rates and harvest damage 
– could increase the forest carbon stock in developing 
countries. The estimated annual cost of such measures is 
$8 billion per year. The forest carbon stock can also be 
increased through afforestation and reforestation of cleared 
land, but the potential is relatively small and the associated 
annual investment is less than $0.5 billion annually.
2.2 adaptation
The global cost of adaptation to climate change is 
difficult to estimate, largely because adaptation measures 
will be widespread and heterogeneous. More analysis of 
the costs of adaptation at the sectoral and regional levels is 
required to support the development of an effective and 
appropriate international response to the adverse impacts 
of climate change. Nevertheless it is clear that large new 
and additional investment and financial flows will be 
needed to adapt to climate change. Based on the available 
literature, the UNFCCC Secretariat was able to compile 
partial estimates of the investment and financials flows for 
adaptation for agriculture, forestry and fisheries; water 
supply; human health; coastal protection; and infrastruc-
ture. The UNFCCC estimates are partial estimates for a 
limited number of sectors, so they do not represent the full 
incremental cost of adaptation.
Since they are drawn from available literature, the 
UNFCCC estimates of the investment and financial flows 
for adaptation in 2030 are based on a different scenario for 
each sector.13 For water supply and coastal zones, adapta-
tion costs are the capital costs of measures designed for the 
projected climate over the life of the facility; 2050 and 
2080 respectively.
According to the UNFCCC estimates, the incremental 
investment and financial flows needed to adapt to climate 
change in selected sectors are estimated to be $49-$171 
billion globally in 2030 with $28-$67 billion of this total 
being needed in developing countries. Other recent 
estimates of adaptation costs for developing countries 
include: World Bank ($9–$41 billion),14 Oxford Institute 
for Energy Studies ($2–$17 billion),15 Oxfam (greater 
than $50 billion),16 and UNDP ($86 billion).17 While 
these estimates differ in terms of their scope and approach, 
and hence are not directly comparable, they all show that 
tens of billions of dollars annually will be needed by 
developing countries to adapt to climate change.
The estimated additional investment and financial flows 
needed for climate change adaptation in 2030 are shown 
in Table 2.
The agriculture, forestry and fisheries sector is 
estimated to need an additional investment of $11 billion 
annually in new capital such as irrigation systems, 
equipment for new crops and fishing practices, and 
relocation and modification of processing facilities. An 
additional $3 billion will be needed annually for research 
and extension activities to facilitate adaptation. About half 
of the total requirement will be for developing countries.
13   The differences in temperature, precipitation and sea level rise between a reference and mitigation scenario would be quite small in 2030.
14   World Bank, 2006, Table K.1. Current needs, based on share of investment estimated to be climate sensitive.
15   Müller and Hepburn, 2006, p. 14. Current needs, based on extrapolations of LDC NAPAs.
16   Oxfam 2007, p. 3. Current needs, based on extrapolations of NAPAs.
17   UNDP 2007. Needs in 2015.
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Most of the additional investment and financing needed 
for climate change mitigation and adaptation is expected 
to be financed by corporations, although this may require 
government policies and incentives, e.g., electric utilities 
are usually government-owned or regulated private 
corporations. Changing the mix of generation types they 
build may require government policies. Facility owners 
should make the extra investment for energy efficiency in 
industry and buildings because it will yield an attractive 
return, but polices may be needed to address market 
barriers. Households will bear the higher initial cost of 
efficient vehicles, but policies are likely to be needed to 
induce manufacturers to produce more efficiency vehicles.
Governments are likely to play a larger role in providing 
the additional funds needed for adaptation. While most of 
the additional investment needed for agriculture, forestry 
and fisheries will be provided by households and corpora-
tions, a substantial part of the additional research and 
extension activity will be funded by government. Most 
water supply systems and coastal protection measures are 
funded by governments. Health care relies on a mix of 
public and private funding that varies widely across 
countries. Most infrastructure is privately owned, but 
government policies may be needed to ensure that new 
facilities are well suited to the future climate.
Questions:
•  What are the major mitigation measures to reduce 
global greenhouse gas emissions? How will they affect 
future investment flows? How will investments by 
different types of entities – households, corporations, 
governments – be affected? How will investments in 
developing countries be affected? What role(s) will 
governments play?
•  What types of adaptation measures will be needed to 
cope with the impacts of climate change? What are the 
estimated costs of those measures? How will invest-
ments by different types of entities be affected? What 
share of the adaptation investment is expected to occur 
in developing countries?
•  What are the annual investment flows in your 
country? What are the main mitigation options in 
your country? What changes to the investment and 
financial flows would implementing those options 
entail? What are the main adaptation options in your 
country? What changes to investment and financial 
flows would implementing those options entail? 
2.3 Sources of investment and financial flows
The additional investment and financial flows needed 
for climate change mitigation and adaptation in 2030 is 
$249-$381 billion (in 2005 $). While that figure is large 
in absolute terms, it is only 1.1-1.7% of projected global 
investment in 2030. The sources of future investment and 
financial flows are not available from the economic models 
used. The sources of investment in 2000 are shown in 
Table 3.
Most investments are made by corporations (60%) with 
the balance being made by households (26%) and 
governments (14%). Household investments are for 
vehicles, homes, farms, and small businesses and are 
financed by the owner.21 Corporate investments are 
financed by foreign direct investment (37%), domestic 
sources (35%) and foreign loans (28%). Government 
investments are financed mainly from domestic sources 
(91%) with some foreign loans (8%) and official develop-
ment assistance (1%). Official development assistance for 
new physical assets provides 30% of the government 
investment in least developed countries. The significant 
shares of foreign direct investment (22%) and foreign debt 
(18%) of global investment attests to the importance of 
international capital markets and financial institutions to 
address climate change.
21  The household may borrow funds from financial institutions, but the financial institution would get the money from deposits by households and corporations. The available data 
do not allow the sources of domestic funding to be tracked.
Table 3: Sources of investment in 2000
note:  official Development Assistance (oDA) investment only; oDA for new physical assets with a life of more than one year.  
total oDA is much larger.
Source: UNFCCC 2007. Investment and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change, Table III-3, p. 31.
amoUNT (BillioNS of $ 2000) SHare of ToTal (PerceNTaGe)
Households total investment 1,184 26%
Corporations Domestic funds 1,429 21%
Foreign direct investment 1,540 22%
Foreign debt 1,156 17%
total investment 4,125 60%
governments Domestic funds 850 12%




total investment 937 14%
total Domestic funds 4,093 60%
Foreign direct investment 1,540 22%




total investment 6,875 100%
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allocation framework (RAF) to increase the predictability 
and transparency of its resource allocation.25 The resources 
each eligible country can expect from the GEF are 
specified at the start of the four-year replenishment period 
with an update in the middle of the period. Each country 
receives a minimum allocation of $1 million with a 
maximum allocation of 15% of the resources available. 
Within that range the GEF Benefits Index and the GEF 
Performance Index are used to determine the resources 
allocated to each country.26
Table 4: GeF Trust Fund allocations and Co-financing (millions of $)
Source: UNFCCC 2007. Investment and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change, Table VII-56, p. 164.
Gef PHaSe Gef GraNT co-fiNaNciNG
pilot phase (1991-1994) 280.60 2,402.89
gEF 1 (1995-1998) 507.00 2,322.10
gEF 2 (1999-2002) 667.20 3,403.40
gEF 3 (2003-2006) 881.80 4,609.69
gEF 4 (2007-2010) 990.00
From which in the first half of 2007 76.35 1,651.82
Total 3,326.60 14,389.90
25  The RAF does not change the GEF project cycle. A country still needs to work with a GEF implementing/executing agency to develop and prepare concepts for review, pipeline 
entry and inclusion in a work program.
26  China, India and the Russian Federation are likely to receive the most under the RAF formula, followed by Brazil, Mexico and South Africa, followed by a group of countries that 
includes Argentina, Egypt, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Romania, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine and Venezuela (GEF, 2005b).
Table 5: allocation of GeF Resources to Climate Change activities (millions of $)
Source: UNFCCC 2007. Investment and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change, Table VIII-58, p. 167.
PiloT PHaSe Gef 1 Gef 2 Gef 3 Gef 4 ToTal SHare
op 5: Energy efficiency 70.6 128.6 200.1 286.7 33.8 719.8 29.8%
op 6: renewable energy 108.8 191.3 251.8 299.2 10.0 861.1 35.7%
op 7: Low-gHg emitting energy technologies 10.1 98.4 98.6 111.1 318.2 13.2%
op 11: Sustainable transport 46.4 82.2 32.0 160.6 6.7%
Enabling activities 20.2 46.5 45.3 73.9 185.9 7.7%
Short term response measures 70.8 42.2 25.1 3.7 141.8 5.9%
Strategic pilot approach to adaptation 25.0 25.0 1.0%
Total 280.5 507.0 667.3 881.8 75.8 2,412.4 100.0%
The Benefits Index measures the potential of a country 
to generate global environmental benefits (emission 
reductions) and the Performance Index measures a 
country’s capacity, policies and practices relevant to 
successful implementation of GEF projects.
The COP requested the GEF to provide information on 
the initial application of the RAF to the allocation of 
resources in the fourth replenishment period and how the 
funding available to developing countries is likely to affect 
implementation of their commitments under the 
The Convention and its Kyoto Protocol foresee financial 
assistance from developed country Parties to developing 
country Parties. This assistance may be through bilateral, 
multilateral or regional channels or through a financial 
mechanism defined in Article 11 of the Convention. The 
GEF has been designated as an operating entity of the 
financial mechanism of the Convention on an on-going 
basis, subject to review every four years.
Annex II Parties are expected to provide information on 
the bilateral and multilateral assistance they provide in 
their national communications. Due to gaps and incon-
sistencies in reporting approaches in the third and fourth 
national communications, it is not possible to calculate the 
financial assistance provided by Annex II Parties through 
such channels.
The Kyoto Protocol created the CDM to assist non-
Annex I (NAI) Parties in achieving sustainable develop-
ment and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the 
Convention and to assist Annex I Parties in meeting their 
emissions limitation commitments.22 The CDM provides 
financial assistance for mitigation projects in NAI Parties 
by issuing CERs credits for the emission reductions or 
removals achieved. A small share (2%) of the CERs issued 
for most projects is contributed to the Adaptation Fund. 
The Adaptation Fund will assist developing country Parties 
that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of 
climate change to meet the costs of adaptation.
3.1  Financial Mechanism under the  
Convention23 
The GEF receives guidance from the COP on policy, 
program priorities, and eligibility criteria. The COP has 
provided general guidance with regard to operation of the 
financial mechanism, and has also provided specific 
guidance related to:
• Support to national communications of NAI Parties;
• Capacity-building;
• Public awareness and outreach (Article 6 activities);
• Development and transfer of technologies;
• Support to adaptation;
•  Support to activities referred to in Article 4, paragraph 
8(h) of the Convention;
• Support to mitigation.
The GEF is replenished on a four-year cycle. The donors 
agree on the amount of the replenishment and the 
contribution of each country is then calculated using a 
pre-defined “basic” burden share.24 In anticipation of a 
replenishment, the COP makes an assessment of the funds 
needed to assist developing countries to fulfill their 
commitments under the Convention over the next cycle. 
The fourth review of the financial mechanism started at 
COP 13 (December 2007) and will be completed at COP 
15 (December 2009). It will provide an input to the fifth 
replenishment of the GEF.
3.1.1.  GEF Trust Fund allocations and co-financing and 
allocation of GEF resources to climate change 
activities
The funds contributed to the GEF Trust Fund for the 
pilot phase and the first four replenishments are shown in 
Table 4. The total is over $3.3 billion. The GEF has used 
these funds to support projects that have provided over 
$14.3 billion of co-financing.
The allocation of GEF resources to climate change 
activities is shown in Table 5. Most of the resources have 
been allocated to long-term mitigation projects, including 
renewable energy, energy efficiency, and low-greenhouse 
gas emitting technologies.
A key feature of the GEF Trust Fund is the requirement 
that projects meet the agreed incremental costs for 
delivering global environmental benefits. Many mitigation 
actions are able to meet this requirement; limiting climate 
change is a global benefit and the incremental costs can be 
calculated by comparing the measure with the cost of the 
conventional alternative. In contrast, the benefits of 
adaptation measures – reduced damage due to the adverse 
impacts of climate change – tend to be local and the 
incremental costs can be difficult to estimate.
In 2005 the GEF Council adopted the resource 
3.   exiSTiNG FUNdiNG MeChaNiSMS oF The CoNveNTioN 
aNd The KYoTo pRoToCol
22  Kyoto Protocol, Article 12, paragraph 2.
23  Please refer to http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/items/2807.php for more information.
24  GEF, 2005a.
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to a particular country may not be sufficient to support its 
commitments under the Convention such as preparation 
of national communications.
Most of the funding for adaptation comes from the 
LDCF and SCCF. The LDCF supports the immediate 
adaptation needs of the LDCs. The SCCF Program for 
Adaptation supports adaptation projects in all developing 
countries, including LDCs. The SCCF Program for 
Transfer of Technology is the only mechanism that 
supports technology cooperation. The COP provides 
regular guidance to the GEF on the allocation and use of 
the funds.
Questions:
•  Does a defined burden share, such as that used by the 
GEF Trust Fund, generate larger total contributions 
than voluntary contributions?
•  Do the current funds provide sufficient support for 
mitigation? Adaptation? Technology transfer?
•  What share of the total cost should be covered by 
Convention funds in the case of mitigation actions? 
Adaptation measures? Technology Transfer?
•  Should all bilateral and multilateral assistance for 
climate change by Annex II Parties go through 
Convention funds?
Convention.27 The COP subsequently requested the GEF 
to report the resources available to each developing country 
Party through the initial implementation of the RAF 
including a list of climate change activities funded with 
these resources.28
3.1.2. Special funds
The Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) finances 
activities, programs and measures relating to climate 
change that are complementary to those funded by the 
climate change focal area of the GEF and by bilateral and 
multilateral funding, in the following areas: 
a) Adaptation, 
b) Transfer of technologies, 
c)  Energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry and 
waste management; and, 
d)  Activities to assist developing countries whose 
economies are highly dependent on income generated 
from the production, processing and export, and/or 
on consumption of fossil fuels and associated 
energy-intensive products in diversifying their 
economies.29
As of March 2008, pledges to the SCCF totalled $90 
million of which $74 million had been received.30 Of this 
sum, $60 million was pledged for the SCCF Program for 
Adaptation and $14 million for the SCCF Program for 
Transfer of Technology. As of March 2008, nine adapta-
tion projects had been approved with SCCF funding of 
$33.5 million and another eight adaptation projects 
seeking grants of $45.4 million were in the pipeline.31 
Donors are urgently requested to make further contribu-
tions to the SCCF Program for Adaptation.
The Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) is 
designed to support projects addressing the urgent and im-
mediate adaptation needs of the least developed countries 
(LDCs) as identified by their national adaptation plans of 
action (NAPAs). The LDCF contributes to the enhance-
ment of adaptive capacity to address the adverse effects of 
climate change. 
The priority sectors that are expected to receive the most 
attention under the NAPA are water resources, food 
security and agriculture, health, disaster preparedness and 
risk management, infrastructure and natural resources 
management. Community-level adaptation may also be a 
crosscutting area of concern.
As of March 2008, $173 million had been pledged and 
$92 million had been paid.32 At that time 46 of 49 eligible 
LDCs had been allocated funds to prepare their NAPAs, 
of which 29 had completed their NAPA.33 In addition, 10 
NAPA implementation projects involving LDCF funding 
of $29.6 million had been approved.
3.1.3 Summary
In summary, the financial mechanism of the Conven-
tion relies on voluntary contributions by Annex II Parties. 
There is a pre-defined “basic” burden share for the GEF 
Trust Fund, but not for the SCCF and LDCF. The COP 
provides input to the replenishment of the GEF Trust 
Fund through its review of the financial mechanism, but 
can only support appeals for contributions to the SCCF 
and LDCF when needed. The fourth review of the 
financial mechanism, which will inform the fifth replen-
ishment of the GEF, is currently underway and is sched-
uled for completion at COP 15 in 2009. The SCCF needs 
additional contributions to support projects that have 
been submitted.
Most of the contributions to the GEF Trust Fund have 
been allocated to long-term mitigation projects. Mitiga-
tion actions can more easily meet the GEF requirement of 
delivering global environmental benefits. However, a small 
amount of money has been allocated for a strategic pilot 
approach to adaptation. The Resource Allocation 
Framework determines the funds available to each eligible 
country. A transparent allocation process may be necessary 
given the limited funds available, but the funds allocated 
27  Decision 5/CP.11.
28  Decision 3/CP.12.
29  GEF, 2004.
30  GEF, 2008a.
31  GEF, 2008b.
32  GEF, 2008a.
33  GEF, 2008b.
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Figure 1: distribution of CdM projects by Type
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Source: Fenhann 2008. The CDM Pipeline.
The CDM is supervised by the CDM Executive Board 
under the authority and guidance of the Conference of the 
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the 
Protocol.41 A CDM project must use a methodology 
approved by the CDM Executive Board and be validated 
by an accredited designated operational entity (DOE).42 
CERs are issued by the CDM Executive Board only after 
the emission reductions achieved have been verified and 
certified by an accredited DOE. Thus, a CDM project 
incurs costs (validation of the project) before it can be 
registered, and further costs (certification of the emission 
reductions) before CERs are issued.43
3.2.1 Distribution of CDM projects by type
At the end of March 2008, 3188 projects were in the 
CDM pipeline, including 978 registered projects.44 These 
projects are projected to reduce emissions by 464 million 
tCO2-eq. Figure 1 shows the distribution of these projects 
and their projected emission reductions by project type.
Over half of the projects are renewable energy – hydro, 
biomass, wind, solar and geothermal – but they account 
for about 30% of the projected reductions. On the other 
hand, less than 5% of the projects involve destruction of 
HFCs, N2O, coal bed methane and PFCs, but they 
represent over 30% of the estimated emission reductions.
3.2 The Kyoto mechanisms
The Kyoto Protocol established emissions limitation 
commitments for developed country (Annex.B) Parties34 
for 2008–2012 and established three mechanisms – the 
CDM,35 Joint Implementation (JI),36 and International 
Emissions Trading (IET) – they can use to help meet those 
commitments. 
Most Annex B Parties plan to use domestic emissions 
trading systems to regulate the emissions of fossil-fired 
electricity generators and large industrial emitters to help 
comply with their Kyoto Protocol commitments.37 Those 
emissions trading systems are already operational in the 
Member States of the EU and Norway.38 Participation in 
JI and IET is limited to Annex B Parties.
The CDM enables a project to mitigate climate  
change in a NAI Party to generate CERs.39 Most domestic 
emissions trading systems allow participating firms to use 
CERs toward compliance.40 Those CERs are transferred  
to the government and it can use them for compliance 
with its Kyoto Protocol commitment. Some Annex B 
governments also purchase CERs directly to help meet 
their Kyoto Protocol commitment. The CDM was 
launched in November 2001, the first project was 
registered about three years later, and the first CERs  
were issued in October 2005.
34  Parties included in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol.
35  Please refer to http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/clean_development_mechanism/items/2718. php or http://cdm.unfccc.int/index.html.
36  Please refer to http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/joint_implementation/items/1674.php or http://ji.unfccc.int/index.html.
37  An emissions trading system regulates total emissions by specified sources. The government sets a limit on total emissions by the sources during each compliance period and 
distributes emissions allowances equal to that limit. Each source must accurately measure its actual emissions during the period. At the end of a period, each source must remit 
allowances equal to its actual emissions to achieve compliance. With full compliance, the combined emissions of the specified sources can not exceed the overall limit. Emissions 
trading encourages participating sources to implement the lowest cost emission reduction measures. Some trading systems allow sources not covered by the system to earn 
credits for emission reductions they implement. Those credits can be used by system participants toward compliance.
38  In addition, emissions trading schemes began operation in Switzerland and New Zealand in January 2008.
39  Afforestation and reforestation projects under the CDM can generate temporary CERs (tCERs) or long-term CERs (lCERs), which have limited lifetimes. For ease of exposition CERs 
will include tCERs and lCERs unless explicitly stated otherwise.
40  But not tCERs or lCERs.
41  Annex to Decision 17/CP.7 and Decision 3/CMP.1.
42  DOEs are accredited by the CDM Executive Board.
43  This approach to issuing CERs increases environmental integrity.
44  Fenhann, 2008. As part of the validation process the project design document of a proposed comment must be posted for public comment. A project that has reached this stage 
is said to be in the CDM pipeline.
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3.2.3. Investments and Revenues of CDM Projects
To help defray the cost of implementing the CDM 
project, proponents often agree to sell some of the 
expected CERs before the project has been implemented. 
Capoor and Ambrosi (2008) indicate that expected CERs 
from projects at an early stage of regulatory and opera-
tional preparation transacted at around €8-10 during 
2007, while registered projects attracted prices between 
€11-13. The lowest prices reflect risks that the proposed 
project might not be registered and might not deliver the 
expected emission reductions.46 Projects demonstrating 
strong sustainability attributes and community benefits 
(such as projects certified under the Gold Standard) could 
fetch a €1-1.5 premium.
Capoor and Ambrosi (2008) report total sales by CDM 
project proponents at 551 million tCO2-eq with a value of 
2007 $7,426 million during 2007, an average price 
$13.60 (€9.90) per tCO2-eq. As the quantity of issued 
CERs increased, some of those CERs were sold by the 
project proponents or entities that had contracted to buy 
them. Such “spot market” transactions yielded a price of 
about €16.50 per tCO2-eq.
47 The past year witnessed a 
ten-fold growth of the secondary market for CERs. In this 
market, sellers guarantee delivery of the specified quantity 
of CERs by the agreed date. The guarantee is based on 
CERs from a designated project or portfolio of projects 
enhanced by credit guarantee by a highly rated bank. 
During 2007 secondary market transactions amounted to 
240 million tCO2-eq with a value of 2007 $5,451 million, 
an average price $22.70 (€16.70) per tCO2-eq.
The UNFCCC estimated that over $26.4 billion would 
be invested in CDM projects that entered the pipeline 
during 2006.48 Over 80% of the investment was for 
renewable energy and energy efficiency projects. Approxi-
mately half of the total investment is capital invested in 
unilateral projects by host country proponents.49 Capoor 
and Ambrosi (2008) estimate that in 2007 the CDM led 
to investment of $33 billion (€24 billion) for renewable 
energy and energy efficiency.
Although the CDM does not have an explicit technol-
ogy transfer mandate, it contributes to technology transfer 
by financing projects that use technologies currently not 
available in the host countries. Roughly 39% of all CDM 
projects accounting for 64% of the annual emission 
reductions claim to involve technology transfer.50 Technol-
ogy transfer usually involves both knowledge and equip-
ment with equipment imports accounting for most of the 
remaining transfer. Technology transfer is more common 
for larger projects and projects with foreign participants. 
Technology transfer is very heterogeneous across project 
types. The host country can have a significant impact on 
the prevalence of technology transfer.
The operation of the CDM responds to the number and 
types of projects proposed. During its short life there has 
always been some part of the CDM administration that 
has been under strain due to the large number of projects. 
The CDM Executive Board has tried to address the 
problems as they arise. In early 2008 strains include the 
limited capacity of accredited DOEs, the complexity of 
and frequent changes to the rules, and inconsistent 
treatment of proposed projects leading to delays and 
higher costs.51 Proposals to modify or abolish the addition-
ality requirement and to move from individual projects to 
larger emission reduction initiatives have been floated.52 
And expansion of the CDM to include CCS, HFC 
destruction at new HFCF plants and reduced deforesta-
tion and degradation in developing countries (REDD) has 
been suggested.
The main use of CERs is to help meet the emission 
reduction commitments of Annex B Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol. These commitments are currently limited to the 
2008-2012 period. Unless and until post-2012 commit-
ments are agreed by developed countries, the market for 
46  In each contract the price also depends on how the risks are shared between the buyer and the seller through penalty provisions or requirements to replace CERs that could not 
be delivered.
47  In a spot market the CERs are delivered to the buyer’s registry account within a day or two.
48  UNFCCC, 2007, pp. 140-141.
49  A unilateral project is one for which the project proponent in the developing country bears all of the costs before selling the CERs.
50  Seres, 2007.
51  Capoor and Ambrosi, 2008, pp. 5-6.
52  The Kyoto Protocol requires that CDM emission reductions must be “additional to any that would occur in the absence of the certified project”. The CDM Executive Board has 
developed a tool to help project proponents demonstrate the additionality of their projects. But assessing additionality almost always involves judgment, so this remains a 
controversial requirement. Defining some project types, such as wind projects, as additional or adopting defined benchmarks for the baseline emissions of specified project types 
have been proposed as alternatives to assessment of additionality for individual projects.
3.2.2. Distribution of CDM Projects by Host Country
Sixty-eight countries have at least one CDM project in 
the pipeline.45 Several countries had only one project in 
the pipeline at the end of March 2008 but China had over 
1100 projects representing over 55% of the total projected 
emission reductions. Figure 2 shows other countries 
Figure 2 distribution of CdM projects by host Country
Source: Fenhann 2008. The CDM Pipeline.














hosting a relatively large share of the projects or the 
forecast emission reductions. The ten countries with the 
largest number of projects are China, India, Brazil, 
Mexico, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia, Chile, South 
Korea and Thailand. The projects in China and South 
Korea are larger than average, while those in the other 
countries are smaller than average.
45  Fenhann, 2008.
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The first two meetings of the Adaptation Fund Board 
were held in Bonn in March and June 2008. The members 
elected a chair and a vice-chair for 2008–2009. The Board 
agreed on: the role and responsibilities of the Adaptation 
Fund Secretariat,57 the 2008 work plan and budget, and 
draft legal arrangements for the Adaptation Fund Secre-
tariat. The Board began, but did not complete, the rules of 
procedure of the Board, provisional operational policies 
and guidelines for Parties to access resources from the 
Fund, legal status of the Fund, monetization of CERs, the 
role and responsibilities of the Trustee, and the responsi-
bilities of implementing and executing entities.58
In summary, the Adaptation Fund, financed by a levy of 
2% of the CERs issued for most CDM projects, is just 
becoming operational. It could have $80–300 million per 
year for adaptation projects and programs in developing 
countries during 2008-2012. Post-2012 the Adaptation 
Fund depends on the continuation of the CDM and the 
level of demand in the carbon market.
Questions:
•  What should be the Board’s priorities for disbursement 
of funds? How should eligible Parties access the Fund?
57  With the exception of one bracketed paragraph.
58  Adaptation Fund Board, 2008.
credits to be supplied by a large fraction of the potential 
emission reductions from all existing and some new 
categories of sources. That is likely to require new mecha-
nisms in addition to the current types of CDM projects.
Questions:
•  What impact does the negotiation of a post-2012 
agreement have on the CDM?
•  How could the CDM be improved?
3.3 The adaptation Fund
The Adaptation Fund was established under the Kyoto 
Protocol to finance concrete adaptation projects and 
programs in developing country Parties to the Protocol, in 
particular those that are particularly vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change. The Adaptation Fund is 
supervised and managed by the Adaptation Fund Board 
under the authority and guidance of the CMP. The 
Adaptation Fund Board is serviced by a secretariat, the 
GEF, and a trustee, the World Bank – both on an interim 
basis.
The Adaptation Fund is financed through a share of pro-
ceeds from CDM projects and other sources of funding. 
The share of proceeds is 2% of CERs issued for CDM 
projects with exemptions for some project types.55 The 
revenue received by the Adaptation Fund will depend on 
the quantity of CERs issued and the price of CERs. 
Assuming annual sales of 300-450 million CERs and a 
market price of €17.50 (range of €10–25), the Adaptation 
Fund would receive $80–300 million per year for 2008 to 
2012.56
Post-2012 funding for the Adaptation Fund depends on 
the continuation of the CDM and the level of demand in 
the carbon market. Assuming the same price levels and a 
share of proceeds for adaptation of 2% continues to apply 
post-2012, the level of funding could be $100–500 
million per year in 2030 for low CDM demand ($5 – 25 
billion representing purchases of 400 – 600 Mt CO2 
equivalent per year (CO2-eq/yr)) and $1 to $5 billion per 
year for high CDM demand ($100 billion with 4,000 
– 6,000 Mt CO2-eq/yr).
CERs generated by post-2012 emission reductions is 
uncertain.53 The UNFCCC found that estimates of 
potential post-2012 demand vary widely.54 The low 
estimates of demand are in the range of $5–25 billion per 
year (representing purchases of 400 – 600 Megatons (Mt) 
CO2 per year); roughly the same as the current market. 
The high estimates suggest an annual demand of the order 
of $100 billion with 4,000 – 6,000.Mt CO2-eq per year, 
which requires ambitious commitments by all Annex I 
Parties, no commitments of any type by any NAI Party, 
and CERs for a large fraction of the potential emission 
reductions from all existing and some new categories of 
sources.
3.2.4 Summary
In summary, the CDM has grown rapidly and is now a 
significant market and source of renewable energy and 
energy efficiency investment in developing countries. 
Although the number of host countries is growing, CDM 
activity is concentrated in a small number of countries.
The CDM was designed as a responsive mechanism that 
approves proposed projects individually. The Executive 
Board has broad powers to engage assistance as necessary 
and to modify its administrative procedures. The rapid 
growth of the number of projects has strained the opera-
tion of the CDM and this continues to be the case despite 
changes implemented by the Executive Board. As part of 
its annual guidance to the Executive Board, the COP can 
also change CDM procedures.
Approval on a project-by-project basis is costly and 
cumbersome. Numerous changes to administration of the 
CDM have been proposed to reduce the administrative 
burden for individual projects or to enable larger reduc-
tions to be approved by a single decision, sectoral CDM 
for example. The success of the CDM has also generated 
proposals to expand its scope to new categories of emission 
reductions.
The absence of post-2012 commitments by developed 
countries creates uncertainty for the CDM. The ambition 
of those commitments will be a major determinant of the 
future demand. A large post-2012 demand would require 
53  Capoor and Ambrosi, 2008, p. 5.
54  UNFCCC, 2007, Section 7.4, pp. 156-160.
55  Article 12.8 of the Kyoto Protocol and decisions 17/CP.7 and 3/CMP.1.
56  UNFCCC, 2007, p. 169.
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4.2.2 The CDM and other crediting mechanisms
The scale of the CDM depends on commitments by 
developed countries, which determines the demand, and 
the availability of eligible, cost-effective mitigation 
measures in developing countries, which determines the 
supply. The supply can be increased by expanding the 
range of eligible mitigation actions, for example to include 
CCS, REDD, and by expanding the range of crediting 
approaches, for example to include sectoral CDM or 
sectoral crediting.
Increasing the number of countries with commitments 
and/or the stringency of the commitments is the only way 
to increase the demand. The demand can be reduced by 
restrictions on the use of CDM credits (CERs) for 
example by restrictions on the eligible countries or project 
types. Developed countries may also restrict the quantity 
or types of CERs that will be accepted. A requirement that 
use of the market mechanisms be supplemental to 
domestic action by developed countries may also reduce 
the demand for CERs.
Due to the uncertainties affecting the potential supply 
and demand, estimates of the potential scale of the CDM 
span a wide range. The UNFCCC reported that the 
post-2012 market is likely to be between $25 and $100 
billion per year.59
Despite the uncertainty, it appears the CDM could 
supply a substantial part of the funding needed for 
mitigation measures in developing countries. The UN-
FCCC estimated the additional investment needed for 
mitigation in developing countries in 2030 at $176 
billion.60 About $69.billion is for energy efficiency with a 
financially attractive payback that may require policy 
direction but likely would be funded mainly by private 
investors. About $73 billion is for renewables, nuclear and 
CCS most of which reduces investments in conventional 
generation. The balance is for reduced deforestation and 
forest management and agriculture.
Aviation and Marine Emissions
 o  Funds to Invest Foreign Exchange Reserves
 o  Access to Renewables Programs in  
Developed Countries
 o Tobin Tax
 o Donated Special Drawing Rights
 o Debt-for-clean-energy Swap
4.2 increasing the scale of existing mechanisms
More funds could be contributed to the GEF Trust 
Fund, the SCCF and LDCF. And the CDM could be 
expanded, which would increase the support for mitiga-
tion actions in developing countries and also raise more 
revenue for the Adaptation Fund.
4.2.1 The Convention funds
The fourth review of the financial mechanism will 
inform the fifth replenishment (2011-2014) of the GEF 
Trust Fund. The COP has adopted objectives and method-
ology for the review of the financial mechanism. The COP 
will complete the review at its 15th session (2009). 
Replenishment of the GEF Trust Fund occurs on a fixed 
four-year cycle and follows a pre-defined “basic” burden 
share formula. A country that feels its share of the 
proposed replenishment is higher than it wishes to 
contribute may argue for a lower amount thus reducing 
the contributions by all countries. 
Contributions to the SCCF and LDCF are voluntary 
and may occur at any time. The SCCF and LDCF have 
defined roles that meet specific needs of developing 
countries, rather than their overall mitigation and 
adaptation needs. The COP can only support appeals for 
contributions to the SCCF and LDCF when needed. The 
SCCF needs additional contributions to fund projects that 
have been submitted.
Questions:
•  What are the roles of the respective funds? Are there 
overlaps or gaps in their roles?
•  Are the replenishment methods appropriate to their 
roles?
60  UNFCCC, 2007, Figure VII-37, p. 158.
61  UNFCCC, 2007, Table IX-64, p. 175.
4.1 introduction
The UNFCCC report on investment and financial flows 
to address climate change concluded that to meet the 
additional investment and financial flows would require a 
combination of: 
•  Commitments by Annex II Parties to provide addi-
tional financial assistance to developing countries 
under the Convention;
•  Appropriate national policies to encourage private 
investment and domestic government investment in 
mitigation and adaptation measures;
•  Optimal use of the funds available under the Conven-
tion and from other sources to spread the risk across 
public and private sources;
•  Expansion of the carbon market through more 
stringent commitments by Annex I Parties to increase 
demand and possible additional mechanisms to 
increase supply; and 
•  New sources of predictable funds to provide additional 
external financial flows to developing countries for 
adaptation and mitigation.
If the funding available under the financial mecha-
nism of the Convention remains at its current level and 
continues to rely mainly on voluntary contributions, it 
will not be sufficient to address the future financial flows 
estimated to be needed for mitigation and adaptation.
With appropriate policies and/or incentives, a substan-
tial part of the additional investment and financial flows 
needed could be covered by the currently available sources. 
National policies can assist in shifting investments and 
financial flows made by private and public investors 
into more climate-friendly alternatives and optimize 
the use of available funds by spreading the risk across 
private and public investors. 
However, improvement in, and an optimal combina-
tion of, mechanisms, such as the carbon markets, the 
financial mechanism of the Convention, ODA, national 
policies and, in some cases, new and additional resources, 
will be needed to mobilize the necessary investment and 
financial flows to address climate change.
The carbon market, which is already playing an 
important role in shifting private investment flows, would 
have to be significantly expanded to address needs for 
additional investment and financial flows for mitigation. 
New and additional external funding for climate 
change mitigation and adaptation will be needed, 
particularly for sectors in developing countries that 
depend on government investment and financial flows. 
Several other options for generating additional funds have 
been suggested. Some of these options, such as auctioning 
a share of the assigned amount and auctioning allowances 
for emissions from international bunkers, could generate 
revenues commensurate with the additional needs. 
This section summarizes options that have been 
proposed to enhance funding. The options are categorized 
as follows:
• Increasing the Scale of Existing Mechanisms
 o The Convention Funds
 o  The CDM and Other Possible Crediting  
Mechanisms
 o The Adaptation Fund
• Additional Contributions by Developed Countries





 o  Proposals Funded by Defined Contributions 
from Developed Countries
	 •		Convention	Adaptation	Fund,	Technology	




ments under the Convention
	 •		Efficiency	Penny
 o  Proposals Funded by Contributions from 
Developed and Developing Countries
	 •	World	Climate	Change	Fund
	 •	Multilateral	Adaptation	Fund
•  More Stringent Commitments by Developed  
Countries
 o Auction of Assigned Amount Units
 o Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions
• Other Sources of Funds
 o  Extension of the 2% levy on CDM to other 
Market Mechanisms
 o  International Air Travel Adaptation Levy
 o  International Maritime Emission Reduction 
Scheme
 o  Auction of Allowances for International 
4.  opTioNS To eNhaNCe iNTeRNaTioNal iNveSTMeNT aNd 
FiNaNCial FloWS To developiNG CoUNTRieS
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energy supply projects. The projects will include both 
investment and capacity building in emerging, developing 
and transition economies for improved energy efficiency, 
renewable energy and fluorocarbon reductions. The other 
€60 million will support climate change adaptation and 
measures to conserve climate-relevant biodiversity, mainly 
through bilateral projects. 
Questions:
•  Why will future allocations decline, when the share of 
allowances auctioned is rising?
•  How much of the money will go to transition 
economies?
•  Will the support be in the form of grants or loans?
•  How is the level of support for a particular project 
determined?
Climate Investment Funds. The World Bank and 
regional development banks have established the Climate 
Investment Funds – the Clean Technology Fund (CTF) 
and the Strategic Climate Fund (SCF). The CTF is 
designed to promote scaled up demonstration, deploy-
ment and transfer of low-carbon technologies in power 
sector, transportation, and energy efficiency in buildings, 
industry and agriculture. The SCF will provide financing 
to pilot new development approaches or to scale-up 
activities aimed at a specific climate change challenge 
through targeted programs. The SCF will pilot national 
level actions for enhancing climate resilience in a few 
highly vulnerable countries. Other programs under 
consideration include: support for energy efficient and 
renewable energy technologies to increase access to “green” 
energy in low income countries; and investments to reduce 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
through sustainable forest management. The funds have 
an initial target of $5 billion. Each fund will be managed 
by a committee with equal representation from donor and 
recipient countries.
Questions:
•  Which countries will be eligible? What types of 
projects will be funded?
projects would reduce the revenue received by the 
Adaptation Fund. Proposals to extend the share of 
proceeds to other mechanisms are discussed below.
Questions:
•  How does a change to the share of proceeds affect the 
Adaptation Fund?
•  How does a change to the size of the CDM affect the 
Adaptation Fund?
4.3  increased contributions by developed  
countries
Currently, financial assistance under the Convention 
relies on voluntary contributions by developed countries 
(Annex II Parties) to the Convention Funds or through 
bilateral or multilateral assistance.
4.3.1 New bilateral and multilateral funds
New bilateral and multilateral funds supported by 
voluntary contributions are being established to address 
climate change.
Cool Earth Initiative. As part of its Cool Earth 
Initiative, Japan announced the establishment of a 
five-year, $10 billion fund to support efforts in developing 
countries to combat climate change. The fund will support 
climate change alleviation policies, adaptation policies for 
developing countries vulnerable to climate change and 
support for access to clean energy.
Questions:
•  Which countries will be eligible? Will the support be 
in the form of grants or loans?
International Climate Protection Initiative.63 Ger-
many has decided to use some of the revenue raised from 
auctioning allowances for its domestic emissions trading 
scheme for national and international climate initiatives. 
The international component has a budget of €120 
million in 2008 with a smaller allocation in subsequent 
years. Half of this amount will be used to fund sustainable 
63  http://www.bmu.de/files/pdfs/allgemein/application/pdf/klimaschutzinitiative_flyer_en.pdf.
Numerous new mechanisms, such as no lose targets, 
sectoral crediting and REDD targets, have been proposed. 
The mechanisms would differ from the CDM in terms of 
the process for approving the target and/or issuing the 
tradable credits, or they would create tradable credits that 
are not fully fungible with CERs. The operational details 
of most of these proposed mechanisms remain to be 
developed. If Parties agree to any of these mechanisms, 
there would be a need for modalities to define baseline 
emissions and verify the actual emissions to determine the 
credits earned.
Questions:
•  What are the effects of adding new types of mitigation 
actions, such as CCS, to the CDM? How do those 
effects change if the cost per ton of CO2 reduced is low 
(high) relative to the market price for CERs?
•  What are the effects of adding new project types to the 
CDM?
•  What are the effects of restricting the eligibility of 
particular host countries or project types?
•  How would other crediting mechanisms differ from 
the CDM?
•  What is the effect of a supplementarity requirement 
for developed countries?
4.2.3 The Adaptation Fund
A share of proceeds, currently 2% of the CERs issued 
for most projects, is the main source of revenue for the 
Adaptation Fund. Thus the revenue received by the 
Adaptation Fund depends mainly on the scale of the 
CDM. If the post-2012 market for CERs is $25 to $100 
billion per year, the contribution to the Adaptation Fund 
would be $0.5 to $2 billion annually. This could be 
increased by increasing the share of proceeds from the 
current 2%. Further exemptions from the share of 
proceeds for groups of host countries of categories of 
The CDM supports annual investments of roughly the 
same order of magnitude as the size of the market.61 If the 
post-2012 market is $25 to $100 billion as projected, the 
CDM and possible new mechanisms could support the 
investments needed for renewables and non-CO2 emis-
sions. At the upper end of the range, the CDM might also 
be able to support investment in CCS and reduced forest 
emissions.
Most proposals for expansion of the international 
carbon market for NAI Parties focus on the CDM, 
increasing the supply of credits from countries with no 
target or a non-binding target. The suggestions cover both 
expansion of the types of projects eligible under the CDM 
and possible new mechanisms. Suggestions for expansion 
of the project types:62
•  HFC-23 destruction projects at new HCFC-22 plants;
• CO2 CCS;
• REDD;
•  Sustainable development policies and measures 
(SD-PAMs);
• New nuclear generation stations;
• Sectoral CDM; and
• Policy CDM.
Other options for REDD, SD-PAMs and sectoral 
targets propose financial or other incentives, rather than 
tradable credits. The appropriate mechanism for an option 
depends on the marginal cost of its emission reductions 
and its scale relative to the size of the CDM. If the 
marginal cost of its emission reductions is higher than the 
market price of CERs the projects will not be economic 
and they will not be implemented even if they are eligible 
for the CDM. If the marginal cost of its emission reduc-
tions is low relative to the price of CERs and the potential 
scale is large, it could drive down the price of CERs and 
displace many other CDM project types. In both cases, 
financial or other incentives are better than including the 
option in the CDM.
61  The UNFCCC (2007, p. 140) estimated the revenue to projects registered during 2006 at $1 to $1.5 billion and the total investment in those projects at $7 billion, equivalent to 4.5 
to 7 years of revenue. For projects that entered the pipeline during 2006 the corresponding figures are revenue of $2 to $2.5 billion and investment of $26.4 billion or 10.5 to 13 
years of revenue. Capoor and Ambrosi (2008, pp. 1 and 3) estimate the primary CER sales at $7.43 billion and total investment in clean energy projects (not all projects) at $33 bil-
lion, or about 4.5 years of revenue. These figures suggest that the investment is of the same order of magnitude as the sales revenue for the initial crediting period – 7 or 10 years. 
This means that if total emission reductions are stable, the investment in new projects is of the same magnitude as total sales.
62  Almost all of these proposals are being considered under various CMP agenda items or the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto 
Protocol (AWG-KP). Additional material can be found in the UNFCCC documents for the agenda item or AWG-KP. Background on some of these proposals is also found in the 
paper: Climate Change Mitigation Negotiations with Emphasis on Developing Countries.
NeGoTiaTioNS oN aDDiTioNal iNVeSTmeNT & fiNaNcial flowS To aDDreSS climaTe cHaNGe iN DeVeloPiNG coUNTrieS 188 NeGoTiaTioNS oN aDDiTioNal iNVeSTmeNT & fiNaNcial flowS To aDDreSS climaTe cHaNGe iN DeVeloPiNG coUNTrieS                     189
Questions:
•  Would participation by developed countries be 
mandatory; as net contributors they have no incentive 
to join? How will the governance regime ensure that 
members are able to agree a contribution scale and 
allocation of money among mitigation, adaptation and 
technology?
•  Would funds be disbursed on a project basis or on a 
formula basis to member countries?
Multilateral Adaptation Fund.69 Switzerland has 
proposed a global CO2 levy of $2/tCO2. Every country, 
except those with per capita emissions less than 1.5tCO2 
would impose and collect the tax and forward a part of the 
revenue to the fund. The tax would generate an estimated 
$48.5 billion. Low-, medium- and high-income countries 
would forward 15%, 35% and 60% respectively of the tax 
revenue collected. The remaining tax revenue ($30.1 
billion globally) would go into each country’s National 
Climate Change Fund. The tax revenue forwarded to the 
Multilateral Adaptation Fund ($18.4 billion) would be 
divided equally between a prevention pillar and an 
insurance pillar.
Questions:
•  What measures would be supported by the prevention 
pillar and the insurance pillar? What countries would 
be eligible for financial support from the prevention 
pillar and insurance pillar?
•  What conditions would be imposed on the National 
Climate Change Funds?
4.4  More stringent commitments by developed 
countries
As mentioned above, the scale of the CDM depends, in 
part, on the stringency of developed country commit-
ments. Other proposals increase the stringency of devel-
oped country commitments to raise funds for adaptation, 
mitigation or technology cooperation. 
mitigation, adaptation, technology deployment and 
diffusion, and other actions by developing countries.
Questions:
•  What principles would be used to divide the money 
between mitigation, adaptation, technology deploy-
ment and diffusion, and other purposes?
 
Efficiency Penny.67 A UN Foundation report on 
“Realizing the Potential of Energy Efficiency” proposes 
that G8 countries impose a small surcharge (e.g., 0.5 to 
1%, 1 cent per dollar of sales, or 1 cent per unit of 
consumption) on end-use energy consumption (e.g., 
electricity, natural gas, and transportation fuels). The 
“efficiency penny” surcharge would raise about $20 billion 
per year in G8 countries ($8 billion from electricity, $6 
billion from natural gas, and $6 billion from oil) without 
significantly affecting macroeconomic conditions. The 
revenue would be invested in energy efficiency measures 
with at least 25% of revenue going to energy efficiency 
policies, programs, and projects in developing and 
transition economies.
4.3.3  Proposals funded by contributions from developed 
and developing countries
In some proposals, both developed and developing 
countries contribute but developing countries are net 
recipients.
World Climate Change Fund.68 Mexico has proposed 
the establishment of a World Climate Change Fund with 
revenue of at least $10 billion per year. The fund would be 
open to all countries with annual contributions based on 
agreed criteria such as greenhouse gas emissions, popula-
tion and GDP. All members could benefit from the fund, 
although it is expected that developed countries would be 
net contributors and developing countries would be net 
beneficiaries. The contributions would be divided among 
mitigation, adaptation and clean technology as agreed by 
the members.
67  UN Foundation, 2007. 
68  http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/application/pdf/mexico.pdf. 
69  http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/application/pdf/switzerland.pdf.
Questions:
•  What is the proposed formula for the assessed 
contributions? How would the proposal ensure that 
the funds are additional to ODA? How would priority 
for SIDS and LDCs be implemented?
Adaptation Fund and Multilateral Technology 
Acquisition Fund.65 China has proposed that developed 
countries should contribute 0.5% of GDP for climate 
change, almost $170.billion per year.66 The funds could 
come from various sources, including auctioned allow-
ances, in addition to government contributions. The 
money would go to enhance action on mitigation, 
adaptation and technology cooperation by establishing 
specialized funds such as a multilateral technology 
acquisition fund. 
Questions:
•  How would the money be divided between adaptation 
and technology acquisition? Would the technology 
fund focus on acquisition of proven technologies for 
mitigation or development and diffusion of new 
technologies?
•  Is the 0.5% for climate change a mandatory or 
voluntary contribution? If a country’s ODA is less 
than 1.2% of GDP how are the development and 
climate contributions determined?
Mechanism for Meeting Financial Commitments 
under the Convention. The G-77 and China have 
proposed the establishment of a new mechanism for 
meeting financial commitments under the Convention. 
The mechanism would be accountable to the COP, which 
would elect the members of its governing board. The main 
source of funds would be contributions by Annex II 
Parties “new and additional” to ODA and set at a level of 
0.5% to 1% of their GNP. The mechanism would fund 
the agreed full incremental costs for the implementation of 
Global Climate Financing Mechanism. The European 
Commission and the World Bank are exploring the 
possibility of selling a bond and using the funds generated 
to finance initiatives aimed at helping the poorest develop-
ing countries deal with climate change. The concept is to 
raise money in the capital market to fund critical invest-
ments immediately and to repay the bonds from future 
ODA commitments, carbon linked revenue (such as 
auctioned allowances for national emissions trading 
schemes) or from another innovative sources. The GCFM 
would provide grants for adaptation actions, and possibly 
mitigation actions that contribute to domestic poverty 
reduction strategies, in LDCs and SIDS.
Questions:
•   What types of adaptation projects will be funded? 
Who will determine which projects are funded? How 
will the funding level be determined? What types of 
mitigation projects will be funded?
4.3.2  Proposals funded by defined contributions from 
developed countries
Some recent proposals move from voluntary contribu-
tions to defined contributions. 
Convention Adaptation Fund, Technology Fund and 
Insurance Mechanism.64 The Alliance of Small Island 
States (AOSIS) has proposed the establishment of a new 
adaptation fund, a technology fund and an insurance 
mechanism. The funds would receive revenue from 
mandatory or assessed contributions from developed 
countries beyond traditional ODA and levies on carbon 
markets. Funds would be disbursed as grants rather than 
loans and Small Islands Developing States (SIDS) and 
LDCs should be given priority access to the Adaptation 
Fund. The Technology Fund would focus on accelerating 
development of renewable energy technologies. The 
Insurance Mechanism would create a pool of funds to help 
SIDS manage financial risk from extreme weather events.
64  http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/application/pdf/barbados_on_behalf_of_aosis. pdf
65  http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/application/pdf/china.pdf.
66  In 2006 ODA by OECD countries amounted to $104 billion, which amounted to 0.31% of their GNI (about the same as GDP). This means that ODA would need to have 
been over $130 billion higher to reach the 0.7% target. At 0.5% the climate change contribution would have been almost $170 billion. This proposal would require 
OECD countries to almost quadruple their ODA, which seems very unlikely given the persistent failure to meet the 0.7% target.
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assigned amount. Basing the levy on the units issued raises 
a little more – the quantity of RMUs – revenue than the 
Norwegian proposal (Section 4.4.1); $5 to $6.5 billion per 
year. This is at least 10 times more than the revenue raised 
if the levy is applied only to units traded internationally. 
Thus, it is critically important to understand whether the 
share of proceeds applies to all units issued or only units 
traded internationally. Applying the share of proceeds to 
all units issued does not inhibit trading, but makes the 
commitment more stringent by the amount of the levy. 
Applying the share of proceeds to units traded internation-
ally may inhibit international trade. But the levy would be 
collected primarily from units issued in countries with less 
stringent commitments; that is, those able to export units. 
Questions:
•  What are the options for applying the share of 
proceeds to JI and international emissions trading?
International Air Travel Adaptation Levy. Müller and 
Hepburn suggest that international air transport emissions 
be addressed through an international air travel adaptation 
levy (IATAL) or an emissions trading scheme with auction 
revenues hypothecated for adaptation (discussed below).77 
The IATAL is a charge based on the (per capita) flight 
emissions levied on the ticket price.
Müller and Hepburn suggest that the IATAL levy be set 
at an average of €5 (2005 $6.5) per passenger per flight to 
generate €10 billion (2005 $13 billion) annually78. Air 
travel is projected to grow at over 4% per year for the next 
decade, so this mechanism is likely to generate increasing 
amounts of revenue over time. A levy on passenger tickets 
would not address the emissions associated with air freight.
Questions:
•  How would the IATAL be implemented? How would 
the money be used? Who bears the cost of the levy?
•  Is implementation of NAMAs by developing countries 
voluntary? How will it be possible to ensure that devel-
oped country commitments are more stringent?
4.5 other possible sources of funds
Several potential sources of funding that do not depend 
directly on developed country contributions have been 
suggested.
Extension of the 2% levy on CDM to other Market 
Mechanisms.74 Some countries have proposed that the 
2% share of proceeds collected from most CDM projects 
for the Adaptation Fund be applied to JI and IET. The 
UNFCCC estimated that applying a 2% levy to interna-
tional transfers of units under JI and IET would gener-
ate $10 to 50 million per year for 2008 – 2012.75 This 
compares with its estimate of $80 to 300 million per year 
for the levy on the CDM.
The UNFCCC does not provide an estimate for the 
post-2012 period because trading among countries with 
commitments will depend on the number of countries 
with commitments, the type(s) of commitments adopted, 
the relative stringency of the commitments, and the 
mitigation cost curves of those countries. The estimates for 
2008-2012 are that extension of the levy would increase 
the revenue by 10 to 20%. The maximum contribution of 
the 2% levy on the CDM to the Adaptation Fund after 
2012 is about $2 billion per year. Based on the estimates 
for 2008-2012, extension of the levy to the other mecha-
nisms would increase the post 2012 revenue by at most 
$0.5 billion per year.
Another interpretation of the extension of the share of 
proceeds is to apply the 2% levy to all units issued to 
developed countries (AAUs and removal units (RMUs), 
which are units issued for removals by land use, land-use 
change and forestry (LULUCF) activities such as reforesta-
tion).76 The quantity of AAUs issued is the country’s 
74  This is being considered by the CMP as part of the Article 9 review of the Kyoto Protocol.
75  UNFCCC, 2007, Table IX-66, p. 186. All CDM units are transferred internationally. Application of the levy to the units (AAUs, RMUs and Emission Reduction Units (ERUs)) issued to 
each country has been proposed by Norway and is discussed below.
76  ERUs are converted AAUs, so the share of proceeds would be applied only to AAUs and RMUs. ERUs would be exempt since the share of proceeds had already been collected for 
the AAUs that are converted to ERUs.
77  Müller and Hepburn, 2006.
78  This proposal is modeled on the ‘international solidarity contribution’ implemented by France in July 2006. It imposes a levy of €1 on all European economy class flights (€10 in 
business) and €4 on international economy flights (€40 in business), which is expected to generate revenue of €200 million per annum that will be devoted to fight pandemics, 
including access to anti-retroviral treatments for HIV/AIDS.
To be fair extension of the EU proposal to all developed 
countries would require agreement on domestic emissions 
trading scheme design including coverage and share of 
allowances auctioned. Some developed countries, such as 
Russia and the Ukraine, may not implement a domestic 
emissions trading scheme, so they would not have any 
domestic allowances to auction. The share of national 
emissions covered by the domestic emissions trading 
scheme varies widely from less than 20% in some Euro-
pean countries to about 90% in New Zealand. The share 
of allowances auctioned also varies widely from zero in 
Canada to 100% in all EU schemes by 2020.
Questions:
•  If developed countries know that a share of the 
assigned amount will be auctioned, will they not insist 
on less stringent commitments?
4.4.2 Nationally appropriate mitigation actions
The Republic of Korea has proposed that developing 
countries implement Nationally Appropriate Mitigation 
Actions (NAMA) with technology, financing and capacity-
building support from developed countries.73 The verified 
emission reductions achieved by NAMAs would earn 
credits that could be used by developed countries for 
compliance with their commitments. In effect, the 
NAMAs are a wholesale form of CDM and the rules, 
modalities and procedures could draw on those for the 
CDM. To create a demand for NAMA credits, developed 
countries would commit to more stringent targets. As with 
the CDM, a share of the proceeds from the sale of NAMA 
credits could be collected to fund adaptation. No estimate 
of the potential scale of NAMA reductions is available.
Questions:
•  How would NAMAs differ from programmatic CDM? 
How would NAMAs differ from sectoral CDM? 
Would NAMA credits be CERs or different units? 
4.4.1 Auction of Assigned Amount Units
Norway has proposed that a small percentage of the 
assigned amount units (AAUs)70 of each country with an 
emissions reduction commitment be auctioned to raise 
revenue for adaptation.71 This proposal has the effect of 
making compliance with the national emissions reduction 
commitments more costly for developed countries. Their 
emission reduction commitments need to take the form of 
quantitative limits so that a share of the units can be 
auctioned.
A target reduction of 25 to 40% from 1990 emissions in 
2020 has been suggested for developed countries. That 
would mean total allowable emissions (assigned amount) 
by these countries of 10 to 13 billion tons of CO2-eq/yr. If 
2% of that amount were auctioned with an average price 
of $25 per tonne, the revenue would be $5 to $6.5 billion 
per year. As national commitments become more stringent 
the revenue generated falls unless the price rises and/or 
additional countries adopt commitments.
The Norwegian proposal differs from Germany’s 
voluntary initiative described above. The Norwegian 
proposal is mandatory for all developed countries. The 
assigned amount units to be auctioned would not be 
issued to countries. They would be sold by a financial 
institution on behalf of the adaptation fund and the 
revenue would go directly to the fund. Germany is 
auctioning some of the allowances for its domestic 
emissions trading scheme. The revenue goes to the 
German government, which decides how it is to be used.
The European Commission has proposed a transition to 
auctioning all of the allowances in the EU ETS beginning 
in 2013 and proposes that member states should use 20% 
of the revenue for specified “green” purposes including 
international climate change action. This would be an 
extension of the German initiative to all European 
countries. If it were extended to all developed countries 
with domestic emissions trading schemes it could raise $6 
to $10 billion per year.72 
70  Parties with commitments under the Kyoto Protocol have accepted targets for limiting or reducing emissions. These targets are expressed as levels of allowed emis-
sions, or “assigned amounts,” over the 2008-2012 commitment period. The allowed emissions are divided into “assigned amount units” or AAUs equal to one metric 
tonne of CO2 equivalent.
71  http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/application/pdf/norway.pdf. 
72  Assume that the national emissions commitments total 10 billion tonnes per year for developed countries. Assume that the commitments for countries with domestic emissions 
trading schemes range from 6 to all 10 billion tonnes. If the domestic emissions trading schemes cover about 40% of the total - 2.4 to 4.0 billion tonnes per year - and half of that 
amount - 1.2 to2.0 billion tonnes - is auctioned at an average price of $25 per tonne it would raise $30 to $50 billion and 20% of that would be $6 to $10 billion.
73  http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/text/plain/non-paper_from_korea .txt.
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receive certificates. Entities with compliance obligations 
under a renewables program could purchase certificates to 
a maximum of 5% of their compliance obligation. A 5% 
share of the renewable energy programs in developed 
countries in 2005 would have provided approximately 
$500 million for renewable energy technologies in 
developing countries.
Questions:
•  What types of renewable energy are produced in your 
country? What are their climate change benefits?
Tobin Tax.87 James Tobin proposed a currency transac-
tion tax as a way to enhance the efficacy of national 
macroeconomic policy and reduce short-term speculative 
currency flows. While the impact of such a tax on 
exchange rate volatility continues to be debated, there is a 
consensus that the tax rate should be 0.1% or lower to 
minimize the loss of liquidity. Although a currency 
transaction tax is widely accepted as being technically 
feasible, how it could best be implemented and enforced is 
still debated. But the biggest barrier is the global political 
consensus needed for universal adoption. 
Nissanke (2003) assumes that the tax rate would need to 
be low for both political reasons (to achieve universal 
adoption) and technical reasons (to minimize market 
disruption and tax evasion). She estimates that a tax of 
0.01% applied to wholesale transactions would generate 
revenue of 2003 $15–20 billion.
Donated Special Drawing Rights.88 In 2002, Soros 
and Stiglitz proposed that the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) authorize a new form of special drawing 
rights (SDRs) to meet a share of the estimated cost of 
meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
SDRs are a form of intergovernmental currency issued by 
the IMF to provide supplemental liquidity for member 
countries. Under the proposal, the IMF would allocate 
new SDRs to all member countries and developed 
countries that do not need the additional liquidity would 
make their new SDRs available to approved international 
government, mainly American, treasury bills with low 
yield and significant exchange risk.85 Countries could 
transfer a small part of their foreign exchange reserves into 
funds that would invest the money in energy efficiency, 
renewable energy and other mitigation measures. The 
investor(s) would establish the policies of the fund such as 
eligibility of investments and target return on investment. 
With an appropriate mix of investments it should be 
possible to maintain the value of the reserves contributed 
and earn a small return. A fund would provide some 
diversification in the foreign exchange reserve investments, 
but would be less liquid than treasury bills. Liquidity is 
important for foreign exchange reserves, so only a small 
part of the total, less than 5%, could prudently be 
contributed to such funds. Global foreign exchange 
reserves at the end of 2004 totaled $3,941 billion. 
Contributing 5% of the reserves to funds would provide 
capital of $197 billion.
Questions:
•  What are the foreign exchange reserves of your 
country? How are they invested? 
•  What would be the advantages and disadvantages of 
investing a portion of them in a fund that provides low 
interest loans for energy efficiency and renewable 
energy?
Access to Renewables Programmes in Developed 
Countries.86 A number of developed countries have 
programs to promote renewable energy, including feed-in 
tariffs, renewables obligations and targets with renewable 
energy certificates. One motivation for these programs is 
the environmental benefits of renewable energy. Reduction 
of greenhouse gas emissions is one such benefit. 
Recognizing that the climate change mitigation benefits 
of greenhouse gas emission reductions do not depend on 
the location of the reductions, such programs could allow 
a share, say 5%, of the renewable energy supply to be met 
by sources in developing countries that meet the program 
requirements. Specifically verified deliveries of power by 
eligible renewable sources in developing countries would 
85  “Some analysts estimate that in local (appreciating) currency terms, the returns from these reserves are close to zero. Given the large reserves-to-GDP ratio of many Asian coun-
tries, the current investment strategies could be costing the countries between 1.5 and 2% of GDP each year.” ADB, 2007.
86 UNFCCC, 2007, Annex IV.
87 UNFCCC, 2007, Annex IV.
88 UNFCCC, 2007, Annex IV.
the projected international marine emissions could 
generate revenue of $12 billion in 2010, rising to $13 
billion in 2020.81
ICAO could implement an emissions trading scheme 
for international aviation. An emissions cap would be 
established for the sector. Airlines could use international 
aviation allowances or other Kyoto units, such as CERs, 
for compliance. Countries would agree to collect data on 
fuel sales by airline for international flights and to 
cooperate with compliance enforcement actions. Each 
airline would report its CO2 emissions (based on its fuel 
use) and remit the necessary allowances and credits 
annually.82 The UNFCCC estimates that auctioning 
allowances equal to the projected international aviation 
emissions could generate revenue of $10 billion in 2010, 
rising to $15 billion in 2020.83
Emissions trading schemes for international aviation 
and shipping could provide special treatment for countries 
that would be adversely affected, such as small island 
nations highly dependent on shipping and international 
tourism. That is very different from exclusion of all 
developing countries. Such an exclusion would benefit 
mainly a small number of relatively wealthy countries 
including Singapore, Dubai, Hong Kong, Malaysia and 
Thailand. Airlines and shipping companies would increase 
the prices of their services. The higher costs would be 
borne mainly by residents of developed countries. If the 
auction revenue were used for adaptation, developing 
countries would benefit most.
Questions:
•  Is emissions trading technically feasible for interna-
tional aviation and shipping? Who would bear the cost 
of the allowances purchased by the airlines/shipping 
companies? 
•  Who would benefit most for the use of the funds?
Funds to Invest Foreign Exchange Reserves.84 
Currently, most foreign exchange reserves are invested in 
International Maritime Emission Reduction Scheme 
(IMERS). IMERS would implement a charge on the CO2 
emissions from international shipping based on fuel use.79 
Ship managers would report fuel use for voyages ended 
during the previous month. The fees would be collected 
from the fuel payers, typically charterers.80 The fees would 
go to a fund established under the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) and be used to:
•  Fund maritime industry GHG improvements;
•  Purchase CO2 credits equal to the actual emissions in 
excess of an established emissions cap;
•  Contribute to climate change adaptation in developing 
countries.
A fee of $10 per tonne of CO2 would raise about  
$3 billion annually and raise shipping costs by about 3%. 
Assuming a market price of $25 for CERs, about half of 
the revenue would go to adaptation.
Questions:
•  Who would collect the revenue? How would the 
money be used? Who would bear the cost of the levy?
Auction of Allowances for International Aviation and 
Marine Emissions. Greenhouse gas emissions associated 
with international air and marine transport are rising 
rapidly and are currently not regulated. CO2 emissions 
from fuel used for international air and marine transport 
could be regulated under a post-2012 climate regime in 
conjunction with the International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation and the International Maritime Organization.
An emissions trading scheme similar to IMERS could 
be established for international shipping. Rather than 
paying the fee of $10/tCO2, fuel payers would be responsi-
ble for remitting allowances for the CO2 emissions from 
the fuel used. The ship managers and/or fuel suppliers 
would provide data on fuel use independently. The 
UNFCCC estimates that auctioning allowances equal to 
79  Stochniol, 2007.
80  Separate emissions limits and fees could be established for different types of ships - container ships, bulk carriers, passenger ships. This would reduce the impact on developing 
countries since much of their ship traffic (food imports and exports) uses bulk carriers and they are growing more slowly than the total, so the fee for these ships would be lower 
than that for container ships. 
81  The IMERS and UNFCCC estimates are not consistent. IMERS estimates revenue of about $3 billion annually for a $10/tCO2 charge. The UNFCCC estimates revenue of about  
$12 billion for an allowance price of $23.60. At that price the IMERS estimate corresponds to revenue of about $7.5 billion per year.
82  Other emissions at altitude also have an adverse climate impact, but it is not possible yet to monitor them accurately enough to include them in an emissions trading scheme.
83  UNFCCC, 2007, Annex IV, Table 2, p. 204. These totals would be about 6% higher if a price of $25 is used.
84  UNFCCC, 2007, Annex IV.
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Table 6: Summary of the options to enhance international investment and financial flows to developing countries
note: A = Adaptation, m = mitigation, n = no, and y = yes
a. the total payment to frontload €5 billion over the period of 2010 – 2014 would amount to €7.2 billion. repayment would start in 2011 at €74 million,  


















increasing the Scale of existing mechanisms
the gEF trust Fund Currently $0.25 n y y y
SCCF and LDCF Currently $0.10 A y n y
the CDm and other possible Crediting mechanisms Currently $25
$25 to $100
m y n n
the Adaptation Fund $0.50 to $2 A y n n
New Bilateral and multilateral funds
Cool Earth initiative $2 n n n y
international Climate protection initiative $0.15 n n y y
Clean investment Fund $1 to $2 n n n y
global Climate Financing mechanism $5a n n n y
Proposals funded by defined contributions from  
Developed countries
Convention Adaptation Fund, technology Fund and  
insurance mechanism
n y y y
Adaptation Fund and multilateral technology Acquisition 
Fund
$170 n y y y
mechanism for meeting Financial Commitments under the 
Convention
$130 to $260 n y n y
Efficiency penny $20 m n y y
Proposals funded by contributions from Developed and Developing countries
World Climate Change Fund $10 n y y y
multilateral Adaptation Fund $18 A y y y
more Stringent commitments by Developed countries
Auction of Assigned Amount units $5 A y y n
nationally Appropriate mitigation Actions m y n n
other Sources of funds
Extension of the 2% levy on CDm to other market 
mechanisms
$0.5 or $5 n y y n
international Air travel Adaptation Levy $13 A n y n
international maritime Emission reduction 
Scheme $3 n n y n
Auction of Allowances for international Aviation and 
marine Emissions
$20 to $40 n n n n
Funds to invest Foreign Exchange reserves Fund of up to $200 m n n n
Access to renewables programs in Developed Countries $0.5 m n n n
tobin tax $15 to $20 n n y n
Donated Special Drawing rights $18 n n n n
Debt-for-clean-energy Swap m n n y
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that would 
convert them to hard currencies and fund implementation 
of MDG projects. 
A modification of the Soros and Stigliz proposal could 
be envisaged to address climate mitigation and/or adapta-
tion. It could be implemented in two stages. First, a special 
SDR issue of $27 billion authorized by the IMF in 1997 
would be released, of which approximately $18 billion 
would be donated. The second stage would see annual 
issues of SDRs, of which some would be donated for 
climate mitigation and/or adaptation.
Questions:
•  A Tobin Tax and donated Special Drawing Rights have 
been proposed to finance economic development and 
poverty alleviation. Are you aware of the reasons these 
proposals have not been implemented?
Debt-for-clean energy Swap.89 Debt swap programs 
could become a new source of funding for clean energy 
(renewable energy and energy efficiency) projects. Under a 
debt swap program creditors negotiate an agreement 
whereby a portion of the debt owed to them is cancelled 
in exchange for a commitment by the debtor government 
to convert the cancelled amount into local currency for 
investment in clean energy projects. 
Since the proceeds from debt swaps are in the local 
currency, they could be used to pay for imported products. 
Where other financing can be found to pay for imported 
clean energy technologies, the proceeds from debt-swap 
programs could be used to finance recurring local costs.
Questions:
•  How much of the outstanding debt of your country is 
in default? In which countries are the creditors 
located? Has your country participated in any debt 
swaps?
4.6 Summary
Clearly, there are many possible options to enhance 
international investment and financial flows to developing 
countries. In choosing which of these possible options to 
adopt, countries may wish to consider:
•  The amount of revenue likely to be generated relative 
to the overall need;
•  Whether the option generates funds specifically for 
mitigation, adaptation or technology cooperation;
• Whether the funds are under the Convention;
•  Whether the funds are based on a defined contribu-
tion; and 
•  Whether the funds pass through government budgets, 
since that could affect the amount contributed to 
international funds.
Table 6 lists the potential options discussed and provides 
the above information where it is available.
Questions:
•  What is the best combination of options to provide 
the additional predictable financial and investment 
flows needed for mitigation, adaptation and technol-
ogy cooperation on a sustained basis?
89 UNFCCC, 2007, Annex IV.
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Disbursement of substantially larger amounts for 
mitigation, adaptation and technology cooperation will 
raise important delivery issues, including:
•  The share of the available funds to be allocated for 
mitigation, adaptation and technology cooperation;
•  Whether the funds are distributed by country or 
project type;
•  Whether funds are distributed for individual projects 
(like the GEF) or for “national programs”; and
•  Whether, or under what conditions, funds can be 
provided through “direct access”.
How to allocate the available funds will be a major 
on-going challenge. Funds will need to be allocated among 
mitigation, adaptation and technology cooperation. The 
creation of separate funds with dedicated revenue sources 
may appear to address this issue. But the assignment of 
dedicated revenue sources is really an allocation of funds. 
And if one fund has a persistent surplus while another is 
continuously unable to fund proposed actions, the 
assignment of revenue sources will need to be reviewed. 
The allocation of funds among mitigation, 
adaptation and technology cooperation is ultimately  
a political decision and will fall to the COP. However, 
an umbrella mechanism to coordinate the management  
of all funds under the Convention could provide advice  
to the COP.91
Within a given objective – mitigation, adaptation, 
technology cooperation – funds will need to be allocated 
among different purposes. Mitigation spending might 
need to be divided among CCS, REDD and several other 
types of mitigation actions. Adaptation spending might 
need to be divided among provision of health care, 
support for irrigation systems, coastal protection, reduc-
tion of the impacts of extreme weather events, etc. 
Technology funds may need to be split among cooperative 
research, demonstration projects, diffusion of available 
technologies, etc. Every allocation decision will implicitly 
involve a regional distribution of spending. The regional 
distribution of projects is a perennial issue for the CDM.
Every allocation decision will implicitly have a temporal 
dimension as well. Allocating funds for technology 
research means less money is available for diffusion of 
available technologies. Possible current mitigation efforts 
are sacrificed for, hopefully, larger future benefits. Funding 
measures to reduce the impacts of extreme weather events 
should yield savings in the future, but it may reduce the 
money available to deal with immediate health care needs. 
These implicit choices cannot be avoided.
Fundamentally, the mitigation, adaptation and 
technology funds can be disbursed by country or by 
project type, or a combination of the two. To the extent 
that the funds are disbursed on the basis of the project 
type, the relevant Convention bodies must establish priori-
ties and so implicitly or explicitly address regional and 
temporal equity. To the extent that the funds are disbursed 
by country, regional equity is explicitly addressed and 
project priorities and their temporal equity are delegated 
to the national government. Governments routinely face 
similar decisions. If the population disagreed with the 
decisions, it may lead to a change of government.
A country allocation may not be appropriate for 
mitigation and technology cooperation because those 
funding decisions have global consequences. A country 
allocation might be appropriate for adaptation since 
adaptation needs are local and an integral part of 
sustainable development. But it requires a basis for 
determining the country allocations that fairly reflects 
their needs. 
The Bali Action Plan indicates that developing countries 
that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of 
climate change, include the LDCs, SIDS and countries in 
Africa affected by drought, desertification and floods. 
More specific criteria are likely to be needed because some 
SIDS are quite rich and some relatively poor vulnerable 
countries would be excluded. The adverse reaction of 
many developing countries to the “pre-set criteria for 
country allocation” established through the resource 
allocation framework by the GEF attests to the difficulty 
of establishing such criteria.
Regardless of how funds are allocated, disbursement 
could be on a project basis or a program basis. A project 
approach enables each proposed project to be reviewed 
carefully, but it each project takes a long time to process 
and incurs high administrative costs. A program approach 
reduces the administrative costs, but may provide funding 
for some less cost-effective actions.
How available funds are delivered will need to change 
if the scale of funding increases significantly. At present, 
6. eFFeCTive diSBURSeMeNT oF The iNTeRNaTioNal FUNdS
91  See the report on the workshop on investment and financial flows to address climate change, June 5, 2008. http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/awglca2/eng/crp03.pdf.
At present the Convention funds are managed by the 
GEF with guidance from the Conference of the Parties. 
Operation of the GEF is directed by the GEF Council, 
which has different representation and rules of procedure 
than the COP. The Adaptation Fund has its own Board 
elected by, under the authority of and accountable to the 
CMP.
Many of the proposals to enhance the financial resources 
involve the creation of new funds for specific types of miti-
gation actions, adaptation needs, and technology develop-
ment and transfer. Establishment of several new funds 
could create a need for an umbrella mechanism to 
coordinate the management of all funds under the 
Convention. Establishment of new bilateral and multilat-
eral funds outside the Convention could lead to fragmen-
tation and inefficient allocation of resources. Some of the 
proposals for enhanced funding allow voluntary participa-
tion and suggest that the fund be managed by the 
participants.
In short, a significant increase in the financial resources 
will raise issues relating to the governance of the funds.90 
Governance issues apply both to the funds collected 
and to the manner in which those funds are disbursed. 
Governance issues include accountability to the COP, 
balanced representation of all Parties, transparency, 
and ease of access to the funding.
Principles proposed for the collection and disbursement 
of financial resources under the Convention include 
equity, common but differentiated responsibility, the 
polluter-pays principle, adequacy, predictability, sustain-
ability, new and additional funding, grant funding, 
simplified access and priority access for the most vulner-
able countries. Agreeing upon and applying principles 
appropriate to each fund under the Convention will be a 
challenge.
Questions:
•  What are the strengths of the current governance 
system for Convention funds? What are the weak-
nesses of the current governance system for Conven-
tion funds?
•  What are the advantages/disadvantages of establishing 
new funds with relatively narrow purposes, such as a 
fund for REDD or a fund for renewable energy 
technologies?
•  Would the creation of several new funds require the 
establishment of an umbrella mechanism to coordinate 
their management?
• How are governance issues best addressed?
5. GoveRNaNCe oF iNTeRNaTioNal iNveSTMeNT aNd FiNaNCial FloWS
90  See the report on the workshop on investment and financial flows to address climate change, June 5, 2008. http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/awglca2/eng/crp03.pdf.
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The Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and a post-2012 
agreement foresee financial assistance from developed 
country Parties to developing country Parties. Developing 
country Parties will need financial assistance for mitiga-
tion, adaptation and technology cooperation. The exact 
amount of assistance needed for each of these purposes is 
not known, but it could amount to tens of billions of 
dollars per year.
The CDM, and possible new market mechanisms, could 
supply a substantial part of the funding needed for 
renewables and non-CO2 emission reduction measures in 
developing countries under a post-2012 agreement. The 
ability of programmatic CDM to stimulate large energy 
efficiency projects remains to be determined. It may be 
better to provide direct financial support for measures 
whose marginal cost is substantially above or below the 
price of CERs and whose scale of the potential reductions 
is large, such as CCS and REDD emission reductions, to 
avoid disrupting the market.
Some potential new sources of funding are better 
suited to mitigation. These include access to renewables 
programs in developed countries, debt-for-clean-energy 
swaps, and funds to invest foreign exchange reserves (due 
to the need to earn a return on the funds).
Most of the contributions to the GEF Trust Fund for 
the climate change focal area have been allocated to 
long-term mitigation projects. Mitigation actions can 
more easily meet the GEF requirement of delivering global 
environmental benefits. The Resource Allocation Frame-
work determines the funds available to each eligible 
country, but the funds allocated to a particular country 
may not be sufficient to support its commitments under 
the Convention.
Most of the funding for adaptation under the Conven-
tion consists of voluntary contributions to the LDCF and 
SCCF. The LDCF supports the immediate adaptation 
needs of the LDCs. The SCCF Program for Adaptation 
supports adaptation projects in all developing countries, 
including LDCs. The Adaptation Fund provides funding 
for concrete adaptation projects and programs in develop-
ing country Parties to the Protocol. It is financed by a 
share of proceeds equal to 2% of CERs issued for CDM 
projects with exemptions for some project types.
The SCCF Program for Transfer of Technology is the 
only mechanism that supports technology cooperation.
The funds likely to be available through these mecha-
nisms are likely to be far less than the needs, especially for 
adaptation and possibly for technology cooperation. 
Several options for increasing the financial support 
provided by developed countries have been proposed. 
Some continue to rely on voluntary contributions, while 
others propose defined contributions. Although, some of 
the proposals focus on mitigation, they could be used to 
raise finance adaptation and/or technology cooperation as 
well.
Potential sources of funding that do not depend on 
developed country contributions are also available. Some, 
such as the Tobin tax and donated SDRs were proposed 
for other purposes but have not been adopted, so the 
prospect of their being implemented to fund climate 
change appears slim. Extension of the CDM levy to the 
other mechanisms is feasible, but the amount of revenue 
raised depends on whether the levy is applied to the units 
issued or those traded internationally. Revenue can also be 
raised from international aviation and shipping, either 
through a tax or through regulation of their emissions.93 
Those options could generate funds on the scale likely to 
be needed.
Ensuring adequate, predictable and sustainable financial 
resources for mitigation, adaptation and technology 
cooperation will be an essential component of a post-2012 
agreement. That is likely to require agreement on a mix of 
investment and financial flows including:
•  Increased funding for the financial mechanism of the 
Convention. The fourth review of the financial 
mechanism will inform the fifth replenishment of the 
GEF. Those funds will be disbursed over four years 
beginning in 2011.
7. CoNClUSioNS
93  Emissions by international aviation and shipping (bunkers) are larger, and growing more rapidly, than those of most countries. Under the Convention Parties are responsible for 
the emissions that occur over their territory, hence international aviation and marine emissions are international emissions not developed or developing country emissions. All 
measures to raise revenue based on international aviation and marine emissions will collect most of the revenue from residents of industrialized countries. Almost all of the rev-
enue raised will benefit residents of developing countries. The revenue flows are a better way to address the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities than efforts 
to apportion “responsibility” for international emissions. Some developing country economies may be adversely affected by measures to raise revenue based on international 
aviation and marine emissions. It should be possible to design the measures to reduce such adverse economic impacts, such as implementing the IMERS levy separately for dif-
ferent categories of vessels, or to accompany them with economic adjustment measures.
tion in Bangladesh. The fund would pool contributions 
from various donors to support climate mitigation and 
adaptation activities in the country over a number of 
years. Priorities would be negotiated between Bangladesh 
and the fund’s contributors. The fund would promote 
robust fiduciary management, donor harmonization, lower 
transaction costs, efficiency and cost effectiveness.
Questions:
•  How are mitigation and adaptation projects approved 
at the present time? Will this need to change if 
significantly more resources are available for those 
purposes? Why?
•  What are the options for disbursing funds? Which 
option do you think is better for mitigation? For 
adaptation? For technology? Is one of these options 
better suited to your country’s capacity?
mitigation projects, whether through the CDM or 
Convention funds, are approved on a project-by-project 
basis. The process is costly and cumbersome, thus provok-
ing calls for changes to administration of the CDM. 
Changes that would reduce the administrative burden for 
individual projects and changes, such as sectoral CDM, 
that would enable much larger reductions to be approved 
by a single decision.
Adaptation likewise is implemented on a project-by-
project basis. The number of projects is still small because 
the funds are limited and few countries have established 
their adaptation needs and priorities. If funds are allocated 
to countries, approval could be based on proposed plans. 
If funds are disbursed for different purposes, suitable 
cost-sharing arrangements may be needed. The cost-shar-
ing arrangements are likely to differ for coastal protection, 
health care, and other purposes. But predictable cost-
sharing arrangements would enable national governments 
and international agencies to prepare and execute imple-
mentation plans. 
The difficulty with the program approach is that the 
implementing agency or the national government must 
have some basis for establishing priorities for measures to 
be funded. Some countries have NAPAs, but they identify 
only “urgent” adaptation actions and do not address 
sectors/program needs. Some countries have Technology 
Needs Assessments, but they do not specify the specific 
actions or the scale of the actions needed by technology. In 
short, few if any countries currently have the information 
needed to support a program approach to mitigation, 
adaptation or technology cooperation internationally or 
on a country basis.
The issue of direct access is directly correlated to the 
issue of a project or programmatic approach as well as 
capacity for budgetary planning and for budget assistance. 
Under the GEF projects require an approved implement-
ing agency; a country cannot access funds from the GEF 
directly. The Adaptation Fund allows developing countries 
to submit project proposals directly. Direct access to funds 
under the Convention is an important issue for developing 
countries.92
Bangladesh is proposing establishment of a multi-donor 
climate fund to promote climate adaptation and mitiga-
92  See, for example, the presentation by Philippines on behalf of the G&& and China available at: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/application/pdf/
philippines.pdf. 
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BiBlioGRaphY
•  More stringent commitments by Annex I Parties to 
generate additional demand for credits from the CDM 
and possibly other mechanism. Changes to the eligible 
project types and crediting mechanisms may be 
required to increase the supply of credits.
•  New sources of funds for mitigation, adaptation and 
technology co-operation. Several options for new funds 
on the scale needed are available. They need to be 
assessed in terms of their political acceptability and 
their ability to provide predictable financial and 
investment flows on a sustained basis.
Raising substantial additional funds for mitigation, 
adaptation, and technology cooperation will give rise to 
important governance and delivery issues that will need to 
be addressed if the funds are to be used effectively.
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Term DefiNiTioN
Adaptation Adjustment in natural or human systems to a new or changing environment. Adaptation to climate change refers 
to adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which 
moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities. various types of adaptation can be distinguished, including 
anticipatory and reactive adaptation, private and public adaptation, and autonomous and planned adaptation.
Asian Development Bank (ADB) ADB is an international development finance institution whose mission is to help its developing member countries 
reduce poverty and improve the quality of life of their people. Headquartered in manila, and established in 1966, 
ADB is owned and financed by its 67 members, of which 48 are from the region and 19 are from other parts of 
the globe. ADB’s main partners are governments, the private sector, nongovernment organizations, development 
agencies, community-based organizations, and foundations.
Annex i parties industrialized countries.
Annex ii parties industrialized countries that pay for costs in developing countries.
Alliance of Small island States (AoSiS) the AoSiS is a coalition of small island and low-lying coastal countries that share similar development challenges 
and concerns about the environment, especially their vulnerability to the adverse effects of global climate change. 
it functions primarily as an ad hoc lobby and negotiating voice for small island developing States (SiDS) within the 
united nations system.
Bali Action plan the united nations climate change conference in Bali culminated in the adoption of the Bali road map, which 
consists of a number of forward-looking decisions that represent the various tracks that are essential to reach-
ing a secure climate future. the Bali road map includes the Bali Action plan, which charts the course for a new 
negotiating process designed to tackle climate change, with the aim of completing this by 2009. it also includes 
the AWg-Kp negotiations and their 2009 deadline, the launch of the Adaptation Fund, the scope and content of the 
Article 9 review of the Kyoto protocol, as well as decisions on technology transfer and on reducing emissions from 
deforestation.
Capacity building increasing skilled personnel and technical and institutional abilities.
Capture and storage (CCS) Co2 is already being captured in the oil and gas and chemical industries. Several plants capture Co2 from power sta-
tion flue gases for use in the food industry. However, only a fraction of the Co2 in the flue gas stream is captured.
Clean Development mechanism (CDm) Defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto protocol, the CDm is intended to meet two objectives: (1) to assist parties not 
included in Annex i in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the 
convention; and (2) to assist parties included in Annex i in achieving compliance with their quantified emission 
limitation and reduction commitments. Certified Emission reduction units from CDm projects undertaken in nAi 
countries that limit or reduce gHg emissions, when certified by operational entities designated by Conference of 
the parties / meeting of the parties, can be accrued to the investor (government or industry) from parties in Annex 
B. A share of the proceeds from certified project activities is used to cover administrative expenses as well as to 
assist developing country parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to meet 
the costs of adaptation.
Certified emission reductions (CErs) A Kyoto protocol unit equal to 1 metric tonne of Co2-eq. CErs are issued for emission reductions from CDm project 
activities. two special types of CErs called temporary certified emission reduction (tCErs) and long-term certified 
emission reductions (lCErs) are issued for emission removals from afforestation and reforestation CDm projects.
Climate Climate in a narrow sense is usually defined as the ‘average weather’, or more rigorously, as the statistical descrip-
tion in terms of the mean and variability of relevant quantities over a period of time ranging from months to 
thousands or millions of years. these quantities are most often surface variables such as temperature, precipitation, 
and wind. Climate in a wider sense is the state, including a statistical description, of the climate system. the classi-
cal period of time is 30 years, as defined by the World meteorological organization (Wmo).




Decision 2/Cmp.3 Further guidance relating to the clean development mechanism
Decision 9/Cmp.3 implications of possible changes to the limit for small-scale afforestation and reforesta-
tion clean development mechanism project activities
Cmp 2
(nairobi 2006)
Decision 1/Cmp.2 Further guidance relating to the clean development mechanism
Cmp 1
(montreal 2005)
Decision 2/Cmp.1 principles, nature and scope of the mechanisms pursuant to Articles 6, 12 and 17 of the 
Kyoto protocol
Decision 3/Cmp.1 modalities and procedures for a clean development mechanism, as defined in Article 
12 of the Kyoto protocol
Decision 4/Cmp.1 guidance relating to the clean development mechanism
Decision 5/Cmp.1 modalities and procedures for afforestation and reforestation project activities under 
the clean development mechanism in the first commitment period of the Kyoto 
protocol
Decision 6/Cmp.1 Simplified modalities and procedures for small-scale afforestation and reforestation 
project activities under the clean development mechanism in the first commitment 
period of the Kyoto protocol and measures to facilitate their implementation
Decision 7/Cmp.1 Further guidance relating to the clean development mechanism
Decision 8/Cmp.1 implications of the establishment of new hydrochlorofluorocarbon-22 (HCFC-22) facili-
ties seeking to obtain certified emission reductions for the destruction of hydrofluoro-
carbon-23 (HFC-23)
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Term DefiNiTioN
international maritime organization 
(imo)
the Convention establishing the international maritime organization was adopted in geneva in 1948 and imo first 
met in 1959. imo’s main task has been to develop and maintain a comprehensive regulatory framework for ship-
ping and its remit today includes safety, environmental concerns, legal matters, technical co-operation, maritime 
security and the efficiency of shipping.
international Emissions trading (iEt) international Emissions trading (Article 17 of the Kyoto protocol) specifies that Annex i countries be allowed to 
trade assigned amount units (AAus) with each other. through emissions trading, an environmental (quantitative) 
target with a defined absolute upper load limit is to be achieved at minimum cost. Emitters will be assigned an 
emissions limit and receive permission to emit the specified emission quantity. the emitters receive certificates 
for the permitted amount of emissions. Emitters who want to emit amounts exceeding the assigned amount must 
obtain an additional certificate for each additional emissions unit. these can be purchased from other emitters who 
do not use up all the certificates assigned to them. through the trading mechanism, a market price for the emis-
sions certificates is established which reflects the costs of emission reduction. Each emitter can decide whether it is 
cheaper to reduce emissions through reduction measures or to purchase certificates for the generated emissions.
investment investment from the perspective of the domestic economy is the purchase of capital equipment, e.g,, machines 
and computers, and the construction of fixed capital, e.g,, factories, roads, housing, that serve to raise the level of 
output in the future. From the perspective of an individual, investment is expenditure, usually on a financial asset, 
designed to increase the individual’s future wealth.
Joint implementation (Ji) under Joint implementation (Article 6 of the Kyoto protocol) an Annex i country or an authorized institution or 
enterprise from an Annex i country A participates in an emission reducing project in another Annex i country B. 
Country A receives a certain amount of the resulting Emission reduction units (Erus).
Least Developed Countries Fund 
(LDCF)
the LDCF was established to support a work program to assist Least Developed Country parties (LDCs) carry out, 
inter alia, the preparation and implementation of nApAs. the gEF, as the entity that operates the financial mecha-
nism, has been entrusted to operate this fund.
millennium Development goals 
(mDgs)
the eight millennium Development goals – which range from halving extreme poverty to halting the spread of 
Hiv/AiDS and providing universal primary education, all by the target date of 2015 – form a blueprint agreed to by 
all the world’s countries and all the world’s leading development institutions.
mitigation An anthropogenic intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of gHg.
national adaptation plans of action 
(nApA)
Documents prepared by least developed countries identifying urgent and immediate needs for adapting to climate 
change. the nApAs are then presented to the international donor community for support.
non-governmental organizations 
(ngos)
organizations that are not part of a governmental structure. they include environmental groups, research institu-
tions, business groups, and associations of urban and local governments. many ngos attend climate talks as 
observers. to be accredited to attend meetings under the Convention, ngos must be non-profit.
renewables, renewable Energy Energy sources that are, within a short time frame relative to the Earth’s natural cycles, sustainable, and include 
non-carbon technologies such as solar energy, hydropower, wind, and biomass.
research, development and demon-
stration (rD&D)
Scientific and/or technical research and development of new production processes or products, coupled with 
analysis and measures that provide information to potential users regarding the application of the new product or 
process; demonstration tests; and feasibility of applying these products processes via pilot plants and other pre-
commercial applications.
resource allocation framework (rAF) in September 2005, the global Environment Facility Council adopted the resource Allocation Framework, a new 
system for allocating gEF resources to recipient countries to increase the impact of gEF funding on the global 
environment. the rAF allocates resources to countries based on each country’s potential to generate global envi-
ronmental benefits and its capacity, policies and practices to successfully implement gEF projects. As such, the rAF 
builds on gEF’s existing country-driven approach and partnerships with implementing and Executing Agencies, 
and provides countries with increased predictability in the allocation of gEF funds.
Sink Any process, activity or mechanism that removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol, or a precursor of a greenhouse gas 
or aerosol from the atmosphere.
Term DefiNiTioN
Climate Change Climate change refers to a change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g, using statistical tests) by 
changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically 
decades or longer. Climate change may be due to natural internal processes or external forcings, or to persistent 
anthropogenic changes in the composition of the atmosphere or in land use.
note that unFCCC, in its Article 1, defines “climate change” as “a change of climate which is attributed directly 
or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to 
natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods”. the unFCCC thus makes a distinction between 
“climate change” attributable to human activities altering the atmospheric composition, and “climate variability” 
attributable to natural causes.
Conference of the parties serving as the 
meeting of the parties (Cmp)
the Convention’s supreme body is the Cop, which serves as the meeting of the parties to the Kyoto protocol. the 
sessions of the Cop and the Cmp are held during the same period to reduce costs and improve coordination 
between the Convention and the protocol.
Conference of the parties (Cop) the supreme body of the Convention. it currently meets once a year to review the Convention’s progress. the word 
“conference” is not used here in the sense of “meeting” but rather of “association,” which explains the seemingly 
redundant expression “fourth session of the Conference of the parties.”
Deforestation Conversion of forest to non-forest. For a discussion of the term forest and related terms such as afforestation, refor-
estation, and deforestation, see the intergovernmental panel on Climate Change (ipCC) Special report on Land use, 
Land-use Change, and Forestry (ipCC, 2000).
Dynamic interactive vulnerability 
analysis (DivA)
DivA is a tool for integrated assessment of coastal zones. it is specifically designed to explore the vulnerability of 
coastal areas to sea level rise. it comprises a global database of natural system and socioeconomic factors, relevant 
scenarios, a set of impact-adaptation algorithms and a customized graphical-user interface. Factors that are consid-
ered include erosion, flooding salinization and wetland loss. DivA is inspired by the paper-based global vulnerabil-
ity Assessment, but it represents a fundamental improvement in terms of data, factors considered (which include 
adaptation) and use of pC technology.
Designated operational entity (DoE) A Designated operational Entity under the CDm is either a domestic legal entity or an international organization 
accredited and designated, on a provisional basis until confirmed by the Cmp, by the Executive Board. it has two 
key functions: 1. it validates and subsequently requests registration of a proposed CDm project activity which will 
be considered valid after 8 weeks if no request for review was made. 2. it verifies emission reduction of a registered 
CDm project activity, certifies as appropriate and requests the Board to issue Certified Emission reductions accord-
ingly. the issuance will be considered final 15 days after the request is made unless a request of review is made.
Emission in the climate change context, emissions refer to the release of greenhouse gases and/or their precursors and 
aerosols into the atmosphere over a specified area and period of time.
Energy efficiency ratio of energy output of a conversion process or of a system to its energy input.
Fossil fuels Carbon-based fuels from fossil carbon deposits, including coal, oil, and natural gas.
global Environment Facility (gEF) Established in 1991, the gEF helps developing countries fund projects and programs that protect the global 
environment. gEF grants support projects related to biodiversity, climate change, international waters, land 
degradation, the ozone layer, and persistent organic pollutants. gEF is an independent financial organization that 
provides grants to developing countries for projects that benefit the global environment and promote sustainable 
livelihoods in local communities.
greenhouse gas A gas that absorbs radiation at specific wavelengths within the spectrum of radiation (infrared radiation) emitted 
by the Earth’s surface and by clouds. the gas in turn emits infrared radiation from a level where the temperature is 
colder than the surface. the net effect is a local trapping of part of the absorbed energy and a tendency to warm 
the planetary surface. Water vapor (H2o), carbon dioxide (Co2), nitrous oxide (n2o), methane (CH4) and ozone (o3) 
are the primary greenhouse gases in the Earth’s atmosphere.
intergovernmental panel on Climate 
Change (ipCC)
Established in 1988 by the World meteorological organization and the un Environment program, the ipCC surveys 
world-wide scientific and technical literature and publishes assessment reports that are widely recognized as 
the most credible existing sources of information on climate change. the ipCC also works on methodologies and 
responds to specific requests from the Convention’s subsidiary bodies. the ipCC is independent of the Convention.
international monetary Fund (imF) the imF is an international organization of 185 member countries. it was established to promote international 
monetary cooperation, exchange stability, and orderly exchange arrangements; to foster economic growth and 
high levels of employment; and to provide temporary financial assistance to countries to help ease balance of pay-
ments adjustment.
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Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) the SCCF under the Convention was established in 2001 to finance projects relating to adaptation; technology 
transfer and capacity building; energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry and waste management; and 
economic diversification. this fund should complement other funding mechanisms for the implementation of the 
Convention. the gEF, as the entity that operates the financial mechanism, has been entrusted to operate this fund. 
the gEF Council approved a proposed program outlining plans to utilize SCCF resources in document gEF/C.24/12 
“programming to implement the guidance for the SCCF adopted by the Cop to the unFCCC at its ninth session”.
Special drawing rights (SDrs) the SDr is an international reserve asset, created by the imF in 1969 to supplement the existing official reserves of 
member countries. SDrs are allocated to member countries in proportion to their imF quotas. the SDr also serves 
as the unit of account of the imF and some other international organizations. its value is based on a basket of key 
international currencies.
Sustainable development Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs.
united nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (the Convention) 
(unFCCC)
the Convention was adopted on 9 may 1992, in new york, and signed at the 1992 Earth Summit in rio de Janeiro 
by more than 150 countries and the European Community. its ultimate objective is the ‘stabilization of greenhouse 
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with 
the climate system’. it contains commitments for all parties. under the Convention, parties included in Annex i aim 
to return greenhouse gas emissions not controlled by the montreal protocol to 1990 levels by the year 2000. the 
Convention entered in force in march 1994.
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UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC  United Nations Framework Connection for 
Climate Change
WBCSD  World Business Council for Sustainable  
Development
WGIII  IPCC Working Group III, assesses options 
for mitigating climate change through 
limiting or preventing GHG emissions and 
enhancing activities that remove them from 
the atmosphere
WMO  World Meteorological Organization
Units and Measures
CO2-eq CO2 equivalent
GtCO2-eq Gigatons CO2 equivalent
GtCO2-eq/yr  Gigatons CO2 equivalent per year
GJ Gigajoules: 109 joules, a billion joules 
Gt Gigatons: 109 tons, 1 billion tons
GW Gigawatts: 109 watts, 1 billion watts
kW Kilowatts (power measurement)
kWh Killowatt hour
kWth Kilowatt thermal
Mt Megatons: 106 tons, 1 million tons
Mt/yr Megatons per year 
MW Megawatt: 106 Watt, 1 million watts 
MWe Megawatt electric 
tC tons of carbon
tCO2 tons of CO2 
t/h tons per hour
Boxes
Box 1. Examples of coordinated international r&D and technology promotion activities 226
Box 2. proposals from parties to the unFCCC 237
figures
Figure 1:  global mitigation cost curve 218
Figure 2:  potential emission reductions per sector, by 2030 219
Figure 3:  technology cost in relation to the number of installations/products 220
Figure 4:  new investment in clean energy by region, 2007 222
Figure 5:  the research, development, demonstration, deployment and commercialization cycle       225
Figure 6:  Development of wind turbine size, 1980-2005 232
Tables
table 1:  types of interventions required to address specific local barriers to 
    technology innovation and diffusion 227
table 2: performance summary for different fossil-fuel-fired plants 229
table 3: typical plant size, efficiency, and capital cost for a range of bioenergy conversion 
    plant technologies 231
table 4: Cost structure for a typical medium-size onshore wind installation 233
table 5: Country average variations in direct use in power plants and transmission & distribution 
    losses as a percentage of gross electricity production, 2005                 234
miTiGaTioN TecHNoloGY cHalleNGeS: coNSiDeraTioNS for NaTioNal PolicY makerS To aDDreSS climaTe cHaNGe214                                        miTiGaTioN TecHNoloGY cHalleNGeS: coNSiDeraTioNS for NaTioNal PolicY makerS To aDDreSS climaTe cHaNGe 215
•  Several key technologies needed to achieve low-cost 
mitigation (in particular for developing countries and 
in the energy sector);
•  The main (information and incentive) barriers that 
hinder the development and deployment of low-cost 
mitigation technologies in both industrialized and 
developing countries;
•  The need to stimulate international technology 
cooperation in order to accelerate RDD&D and 
transfer of efficient climate-friendly technologies;
•  The existence of a substantial financing gap that needs 
to be filled in order to reach the necessary upscaling of 
technology development and transfer. This calls for 
new and improved instruments to this aim. 
However, there are important issues that remain 
controversial, for example:
•  How quickly we can change to a low carbon energy 
world. This has serious implications for the urgency 
and scale of international technology cooperation, and 
concerns for example, whether we should focus on the 
dissemination of existing technologies or on research 
and development (R&D) for new technologies that are 
too costly at present.
•  The policy approach necessary to accelerate 
technology development and deployment. Some 
analysts argue that climate policies alone (e.g., a price 
signal from carbon markets and project mechanisms 
such as Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and 
Joint Implementation (JI)) provide enough incentives 
for technology development and diffusion, while 
others argue in favor of additional technology policy 
instruments (e.g., efficiency standards or goals, 
subsidies, and information diffusion instruments). 
However, in general, it is believed that a package of 
policies will be necessary to encourage innovation and 
large-scale mitigation efforts.
•  Investments for sustainable technologies. Invest-
ments have increased in some countries, but as noted 
in UNFCCC 2007, there is a significant gap between 
current investments in developing countries and the 
level of funding that will be needed to reduce the rate 
of growth in GHG emissions. A significant shift in 
investments to sustainable technologies is needed, but 
how this can be achieved in an efficient way remains a 
subject of some analysis and political debate.  
•  The role of intellectual property rights (IPRs) for 
The international debate on how to enhance and 
upscale the development and transfer of climate-friend-
ly technology for mitigation and adaptation is gaining 
momentum in the framework of negotiations for a 
post-2012 climate agreement. This is reflected in the 
central role that issues relating to technology (notably to 
RDD&D as well as transfer) have had in past delibera-
tions of the UNFCCC Long Term Dialogue and are 
having in current sessions of the Ad Hoc Working Group 
on Long-Term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA). To a 
large extent, the relevance of these issues stems from the 
huge technology challenge posed by emissions stabilization 
at current levels, as well as from the fact that capacity 
building, technology transfer and finance are key to 
facilitate developing countries’ implementation of 
substantial action on mitigation and adaptation. (Informa-
tion on the terminology used in this paper can be obtained 
from the glossary in Annex 3).
Climate change confronts us with a major technology 
challenge. For example, it is estimated that stabilizing 
CO2 equivalent concentrations in the range of 535-590 
ppm would lead to a temperature increase of 
approximately 2.8-3.20 Celcius over pre-industrial levels. 
Achieving this level requires emissions to peak in the 
2010-30 period (IPCC 2007a). Global CO2 emissions 
(mainly from energy use) in 2050 would have to be in the 
range of -30 to +5% of 2000 levels. However, a 
temperature increase of 30 Celcius would have significant 
global impacts according to the IPCC (IPCCb). 
Consequently, serious consideration is being given to 
limiting concentrations to approximately 450 ppm 
equivalent. This would imply the need to reduce global 
emissions between 50-85% by 2050. To achieve such a 
scenario, the world would have to undergo a significant 
transformation in its production and use of energy. 
It is important to note that, for some technology-
related issues, the ongoing international debate reflects 
a growing international consensus; others remain 
highly controversial. Reaching an international agree-
ment on the concerted actions needed to upscale technol-
ogy development and transfer and the means to deploy 
them widely will likely require further dialogue, as well as 
in-depth analysis of the circumstances of each country. 
(For an overview regarding Conference of the Parties (COP) 
decisions relevant to technology, please refer to Annex 2).
A growing consensus is being reached on a number of 
important issues:
1. iNTRodUCTioN
The purpose of this paper is to review the role that 
existing technologies and those under development can 
play in meeting the climate change challenge. Additional 
purposes are to help the reader to consider which tech-
nologies could help meet the development needs of his/her 
country while limiting greenhouse gases (GHGs) and to 
identify specific suggestions under an international climate 
change agreement that could help introduce new tech-
nologies in developing countries.
The paper is an input to a series of workshops that 
UNDP will organize in developing countries with the aim 
of improving their capacity to respond to climate change. 
It borrows extensively from the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) report titled Energy Technology Perspectives: 
2008 and from a United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme (UNEP) report titled Global Trends in sustainable 
Energy Investment 2008. The paper summarizes the scope 
of the technology challenge needed to address climate 
change; the mitigation options and likely global costs; the 
trends in financing sustainable energy investments; and 
the status and issues relating to a selective set of technolo-
gies likely to be of particular interest to developing 
countries.1 An extensive treatment of all technologies has 
not been possible, therefore the reader may wish to review 
the IEA Energy Technology Perspectives 2008 report for a 
broader treatment of technologies. Questions are included 
at different parts of the document to help the reader reflect 
on the circumstances in his/her country. A final section 
provides insights about technology issues and options 
under consideration in the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process to 
negotiate a new climate change agreement.
Climate change confronts us with a major technological 
challenge if we are to reduce GHG emissions to levels that 
will prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with 
the climate system. The good news from the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is that many 
mitigation scenarios for the medium term (i.e., until 
2030) suggest there is considerable economic potential for 
reducing GHG emissions at costs ranging from negative to 
about $100 per ton of carbon dioxide (CO2). However, if 
we are to stabilize GHG emissions – for example, at 
current levels by 2030 as a first step – additional mobiliza-
tion of investment and finance (I&F) flows in the order of 
$200 billion (mostly aimed at the energy supply and 
transportation sectors) would be needed. These additional 
I&F flows are large relative to the funds currently avail-
able, but low as compared to global Gross Domestic 
Product and investment. Recent evidence indicates that 
due to policies in some countries, investment in clean 
energy technologies is growing and that new financial 
products and markets are being developed worldwide. 
There are many existing and emerging technologies, 
such as, advanced fossil fuel power generation, biomass 
and bioenergy, wind power, buildings and appliances, and 
electricity transmission and distribution technologies, that 
can help achieve a low carbon future and other environ-
mental goals. Each of these is at a different stage of the 
research, development, demonstration and deployment 
(RDD&D) cycle, however they are not being developed 
and diffused at the rate required because of a number of 
technological, financial, commercial and regulatory 
barriers. Given the urgency of the climate change prob-
lem, policy makers in developing countries need to 
consider how they will contribute to reducing the rate of 
growth of GHG emissions in their countries, their unique 
circumstances and special technology needs, and how to 
encourage innovation and the diffusion of the technologies 
using both public and private finances. Policy makers also 
need to consider how the international community could 
help their countries through a “full package” approach, 
consisting of equipment, software, enhanced human 
capacities, regulatory and institutional support, and 
financial mechanisms designed for each element of the 
approach.  
FoReWoRd
1    In the context of the current climate negotiations, there is substantial interest in developing adaptation technologies. The paper does not explore this topic because of the 
limited literature on the matter.
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GHG emissions have been on a high growth path for 
the past few decades and will continue on that path 
unless climate change mitigation policies are consider-
ably upgraded. Emissions have grown by 70% between 
1970 and 2004, and in a business as usual scenario  
– i.e., if no further mitigation policies are implemented – 
an increase in a range of 25-90% (in absolute terms, 
9.7-36.7 Gigatons CO2 equivalent (GtCO2-eq)) is 
projected for 2000-2030. 
Most projected GHG emissions growth will  
continue to result from energy use and most additional 
emissions will originate in developing countries.  
More specifically, CO2 emissions from energy use  
are expected to grow 40-110% over 2000-2030, with 
two-thirds of that increase coming from non-Annex I 
(NAI) countries. This reflects the importance of  
technological change in these countries for GHG  
emission stabilization.
It is necessary to substantially increase investment in 
clean energy technology development and deployment 
from current levels. In spite of climate policies, both 
government support and private expenditure on cleaner 
energy R&D are estimated to be low as compared to the 
levels achieved after the oil shocks of the 1970s and 1980s. 
Current government funding for energy R&D is estimated 
to be half of its 1980 level (in real terms). 
It is also important to introduce regulatory and 
economic instruments that provide long-term incen-
tives for technology development, demonstration, and 
deployment.2 Policies introducing a carbon price, 
accompanied by measures to reduce barriers to technol-
ogy adoption could substantially increase the incentives 
for (interest of ) mitigation. For example, a carbon price 
of $20 per ton of CO2, accompanied by measures to 
overcome barriers to technology adoption, would make it 
worthwhile to reduce GHG emissions by 9-18 GtCO2-eq 
per year (that is a 14-34% reduction as compared to a 
high growth business as usual scenario). If the carbon price 
reaches $100 per ton of CO2, mitigation would increase 
but not in the same proportion: it may reach 23-46% 
reduction in emissions relative to the same baseline 
scenario.
In general, it is believed that a mix of existing and 
new technologies and practices will be necessary to 
achieve the relevant mitigation levels predicted in the 
IPCC stabilization scenarios (see Annex 1 for more 
detailed information on available technologies and those 
under development in different sectors as well as for results on 
the relative importance of specific mitigation technologies). 
Even if the relative role of existing and new options  
remains controversial, a recent survey of mitigation 
measures for 2030 found that more than two-thirds of  
the measures with mitigation potential are available today 
(Vattenfall, 2008). 
While there is considerable economic potential for 
reducing GHG emissions, the costs of different mitiga-
tion options (technologies) vary considerably. At one 
extreme, available mitigation options may imply net 
benefits of €150/ton CO2. At the other end, they may 
entail costs approaching €80/ton CO2 (see Figure 1).  
This means that emissions growth could be checked, but  
a careful cost assessment should be made in order to avoid 
high economic impacts (costs) of mitigation. 
There is also a large potential for no-cost mitigation. 
Many mitigation opportunities, mostly related to improv-
ing energy efficiency in buildings, imply negative costs  
(i.e., net benefits) if implemented, but require specific 
action and policies to deal with implementation barriers 
(e.g., minimum regulatory requirements for insulation  
and equipment efficiency). According to IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report (AR4), these no-cost measures add  
up to a mitigation potential of 6 GtCo2-eq/yr. Similarly, 
Vattenfall’s survey estimated that nearly one-quarter  
of the total mitigation potential identified for 2030  
would entail net benefits (see Figure 1 for examples of 
no-cost technologies).
In general, energy efficiency measures play a key role 
for mitigation according to most studies. In particular, 
IEA and IPCC estimates put energy efficiency at the top 
of all mitigation options according to their large potential 
(see Annex I). The Stern Review further stresses that energy 
efficiency provides the best option for the medium term 
(i.e., up to 2025) but for the longer term (up to 2050), 
renewable energy options show a larger potential.  
2.  MiTiGaTioN opTioNS aNd CoSTS 
2    B.Metz et al 2007 (op.cit.), chapters 3 & 13.
the development and deployment of climate-friend-
ly technologies. Some developing countries argue that 
they increase the cost of access to technology and 
therefore act as a barrier to the adoption of climate 
friendly technologies and call for new, specific 
international mechanisms to purchase IPRs for key 
technologies and licencing policies. By contrast, most 
industrialized countries’ representatives stress the need 
to grant IPRs and long lived patents to innovators in 
order to provide enough incentives for the develop-
ment and commercialization of new technologies. 
•  The form that international RDD&D co-operation 
should take. There is some debate over this issue, 
notably, whether the object and financing for such 
cooperation should be decided in the framework of 
the UNFCCC or not. 
•  The role and ultimate scope of carbon markets and 
the CDM for technology transfer. Some suggest that 
CDM has hardly involved new technologies or 
North-South transfer of innovative solutions, while 
others note that many CDM projects have been 
initially developed solely by developing countries.  
Furthermore, most CDM projects have been imple-
mented in a few fast-growing, middle-income 
developing countries (India, China and Brazil). By 
contrast, countries that could benefit the most from 
CDM related technology transfer and sustainable 
development effects – notably least developed coun-
tries (LDCs) – have hardly any participation in the 
CDM. While it is recognized that CDM has helped to 
mobilize investments in clean technology that in the 
mechanism’s absence would not have been implement-
ed (at least not to the same extent), the ability of 
CDM to fill the technology financing gap remains an 
open question.
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As to the regional distribution of the world’s aggregate 
mitigation potential, it is clear that some fast-growing 
developing countries already play an important role. 
When considering the mitigation potential at costs below 
€40/ton CO2 (estimated at 26.7 GtCO2), Vattenfall 
(2008) estimated that the US and Canada may contribute 
with 4.4 Gt (16.4%), China with 4.6 Gt (17.2%), 
European countries of OECD with 2.5 Gt (9.3%), 
Eastern Europe (including Russia) with 1.6 Gt (5.9%), 
other industrialized countries with a further 2.5 Gt 
(9.3%), and the rest of the world with 11.1Gt (41%).
More generally, the magnitude of necessary mitigation 
efforts and costs will depend on a number of features of 
future international climate agreements that should be 
carefully evaluated. More precisely, costs will be higher, the 
greater the ambitiousness of the stabilization goal, the 
lower the number of parties that will share the mitigation 
effort and the more limited the scope for flexibility (such 
as mitigation options allowed and flexibility mechanisms 
available, e.g., emissions trading). 
For lower stabilization levels, the preferred technol-
ogy options are low carbon energy sources (renewables, 
nuclear, etc.) and technologies that are not yet available 
at a commercial stage (such as carbon capture and 
storage (CCS)). If gases other than CO2 and land use, 
land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) options are 
included, then greater flexibility for mitigation is achieved 
(and lower costs result). 
Macroeconomic costs consistent with emissions 
stabilization between 445 and 710 ppm CO2-eq are 
estimated as ranging from a 3% decrease in global GDP 
and a small increase compared with the business-as-usual 
scenario (IPCC, 2007a). However, regional costs may 
differ considerably from the global average. GDP loss may 
be substantially reduced if revenues from a tax or a permit 
auction is spent in low carbon technologies promotional 
programs or to reduce other distortionary taxes. Similarly, 
if induced technological change (i.e., accelerated innova-
tion due to climate policies) is verified, then costs could be 
much lower than the previous estimate. Modelling studies 
consistent with stabilization at 550 ppm by 2100 indicate 
that equilibrium carbon prices would lie in a range of 
$20-$80 per ton of CO2 by 2030 and $30-$155 per ton 
of CO2 by 2050. If price incentives lead to technological 
change, then equilibrium carbon prices would be reduced 
to ranges of $5-$65 per ton of CO2 by 2030 and $15-
$130 per ton of CO2 by 2050.
Irrespective of the precise costs involved, it is clear 
that one barrier to the implementation of cleaner 
technologies is the availability of finance to cover 
upfront costs. For example, renewable energy and energy 
efficiency solutions often face low operation costs (or even 
operation benefits, as reflected in a lower energy bill) but 
higher capital costs as compared to conventional energy or 
existing sources. In this regard, there is room for opti-
mism, as shown by recent trends in clean energy (renew-
Figure 2: potential emission reductions per sector, by 2030
Source: Vattenfall (2008)
Likewise, Vattenfall (2008) shows that measures to 
improve the efficiency of electricity use in three sectors 
(power, industry, and buildings) result in the largest 
mitigation potential identified by 2030 (7.4 Gt CO2, or 
28% of total mitigation potential). At the sector level, 
avoided deforestation shows the highest potential (6.7 Gt 
or 25% of total mitigation potential) (see Figure 2).
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It is increasingly recognized that the challenges to fill the 
finance gaps to upscale cleaner technology development 
and deployment are considerable but not insurmountable. 
First, because some investment and funding reallocation is 
desirable, e.g., in the energy sector, away from conven-
tional carbon-intensive technologies to cleaner ones. 
Second, because the additional funding needs may easily 
become available. In order to stabilize GHG emissions at 
current levels by 2030, additional mobilization of I&F 
flows in the order of $200 billion (mostly aimed at the 
energy supply and transportation sectors) would be needed 
(UNFCCC 2007). These additional flows will be large 
relative to the funds currently available, but low as 
compared to global GDP and investment. As a matter of 
fact, it will only represent 0.3-0.5% of global GDP and 
1.1-1.7% of global investment in 2030. Furthermore, as 
shown below, funds and mechanisms available for finance 
clean energy technologies have grown considerably in 
recent years.
Current trends show that investment in clean energy 
technologies is growing fast and that new financial 
products and markets are being developed worldwide, 
(i.e., I&F mechanisms to this aim are broadening in scope 
and increasing in magnitude). Investment in sustainable 
energy3 has been estimated at $148.4 billion in 2007 
(growing 60% as compared to previous year) (UNEP/
NEF 2008). Furthermore, current projections indicate 
that annual investment between now and 2030 will reach 
$450 billion by 2012 and $600 billion by 2020. Both 
traditional financing (financial system mechanisms for 
large scale projects, public subsidies) and new mechanisms 
(e.g., microfinance, public and private green funds, etc.) 
along with policies such as new regulations and guidelines 
are behind the observed growth in renewable energy 
generation capacities. 
Total I&F in sustainable energy was mostly made up of 
asset finance (generation capacity projects) that reached 
$84.5 billion in 2007. The rest was explained by public 
markets ($23 billion), R&D funding (private and public) 
reaching $17 billion, venture capital/private equity 
(amounting to $9.8 billion), and small scale projects that 
reached $19 billion.
In order to guarantee that the necessary scale of 
(climate friendly) technological change is achieved, 
government budgets for R&D need to double and 
private incentives should be reinforced. Since the private 
sector is responsible for most climate-related I&F efforts 
(86%), private incentives for investment should be 
modified along with an upscale in public support for 
R&D in order to considerably upscale clean technologies 
development and deployment. 
Investment in R&D and for new technologies to  
reach commercial stage is also growing, helped by funding 
from venture capital and private equity as well as public 
(stock and share) markets (UNEP/New Energy Finance 
(NEF), 2008). Furthermore, clean energy technology 
companies from developing countries (notably from  
India and China) have managed to raise funds from 
international capital markets via private equity (convert-
ible bonds) and by raising venture capital and foreign 
direct investment.
As to regional distribution, the European Union 
(EU) is the world leader in sustainable energy invest-
ment (receiving $55.8 billion), followed by the US 
(with $26.5 billion). Developing countries currently 
receive roughly one quarter of global I&F related to 
climate change mitigation (UNFCCC, 2007) and 
sustainable energy investment (UNEP/NEF, 2008). 
However, developing countries should capture an increas-
ing share of global investment to this aim, for various 
reasons. First, in these countries, mitigation investment is 
expected to be highly cost-efficient (due to the availability 
of low-cost mitigation options). It is estimated that 
developing countries will account for 46% of needed 
investment even if – by 2030 – they could produce 68% 
of global emissions reduction. Second, they will retain a 
growing share of energy-related investment and capacity. 
The question is whether developing countries will be able 
to finance the needed investment in order to cover their 
energy demands with clean energy sources.
3.  TReNdS iN CleaN TeChNoloGY FiNaNCiNG
3    This includes investment in renewable energy production, externally financed energy efficiency projects, R&D, and related equipment production capacity.
For a wider deployment of available technologies, even if 
finance mechanisms may abound (e.g., bank project 
finance), purchase incentives should be reinforced to 
overcome adoption barriers whenever these technologies 
have higher cost than less climate friendly alternatives (e.g., 
with policy-driven carbon prices). As the adoption rate 
increases (moving to the right of the horizontal axis in  
Figure 3), technology costs will decrease, technologies will 
become common practice, and the barrier imposed by lack 
of access to finance will disappear. Before that happens, 
local funding sources may be scarce if these technologies 
are perceived to pose high technology or project specific 
risks (e.g., if they are new in a given national context). 
Policy and finance needs at the demonstration stage 
should not be underrated since many technologies with 
high R&D investments sometimes find it difficult to 
overcome barriers in this phase. As an example, it is 
important to consider that promising technologies, such as 
CCS and coal gasification, still need to successfully get 
through the demonstration stage.
able energy and energy efficiency) financing (reviewed in 
the next section).
It is important to consider that technology finance and 
policy needs will vary at different stages of the technology 
development process (i.e., research, development, demon-
stration, commercial development, and deployment), as 
illustrated by Figure 3 (WBCSD, 2007b and UNFCCC, 
2007; chapter 9). For instance, in early stages of develop-
ment, investment and financial flows are high, since 
technology has high costs as compared to competing 
technologies and substantial R&D efforts (investment) are 
necessary. However, private funding is in general unlikely 
to be available due to high perceived risks. At this stage, 
direct assistance (R&D subsidies) as well as public sector 
finance for demonstration may become crucial. 
By contrast, when technologies reach the commercial 
stage, for early deployment to occur, purchase incentives 
and other policy driven signals (such as carbon markets) 
become highly relevant. At this stage, some forms of 
private sector finance may step in (e.g., venture capital). 
Figure 3: Technology cost in relation to the number of installations/products
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energy efficiency investment nearly doubled in Europe 
and the US suggesting that new mechanisms are 
becoming available. Further growth in energy efficien-
cy funding depends on the enlargement and extension 
of newly designed programs that help bundle small 
energy efficiency projects (either at geographical level, 
e.g., municipalities, or sectoral level, e.g., appliance 
efficiency). 
•  Finally, many developing countries are not participat-
ing in the growth in financing for renewables and 
energy efficiency for various reasons, such as low 
investment levels in energy capacity, scarce CDM 
project development, and lack of specific policies to 
foster the application of clean energy sources. This 
may well be due to the lack of skills to promote such a 
public policy or due to other perceived priorities.
All the same, it is important to keep in mind that the 
renewables sector is playing an increasingly important 
role for energy provision and is set to become ever more 
relevant. Even if renewable sources (excluding large 
hydro) still only account for roughly 5% of global 
production and generation capacity, over the past two 
years they accounted for over 20% of new capacity and 
production.
Carbon markets (including the CDM and carbon 
funds) can play an important role for developing 
countries’ uptake of renewable energy technologies. 
However, it should be kept in mind that CDM projects do 
not fund full costs and are highly concentrated, both 
geographically and among project types. According to 
UNEP/Risoe figures,4 China and India concentrate more 
than two-thirds of credits (certified emission reductions 
(CERs)) expected by 2012, and four countries (China, 
India, Brazil, and Mexico) account for two-thirds of total 
CDM projects. China is the leader with 45% of CERs 
expected by 2012, India ranks second with 17%, Brazil 
follows with 10% and Mexico with 4% of total 2012 
CERs. In terms of projects, India leads with 33% of 
projects, followed by China (17%), Brazil (13%), and 
Mexico (11%). This differing ranking has to do with the 
relative scale and global warming potential of different 
GHGs involved in projects of different countries. China, 
for example, generates a large share of its credits from 
solar technologies in 2007, with energy efficiency being 
the second most important technology receiving this type 
of funding, and biofuels ranking third. It is also worth 
noting that the only sector that nearly stagnated in 2007 
was biofuels, to a large extent due to concerns related with 
food availability and high feedstock prices (that, for 
example, led to a freeze in the implementation of new 
biofuel minimum content policies in some countries, such 
as Mexico and China and slower growth in others, such as 
the US).
In spite of the good prospects, many challenges 
remain:
•  First, it is worth noting that sustainable energy 
investment is still small in magnitude. It represents 
only 9% of global energy infrastructure investment 
and 1% of global fixed asset investment. 
•  Second, in spite of expanding policies to foster 
renewable energies, most energy policies still favor 
conventional (fossil fuel based) energy: the annual 
amount of global energy subsidies aimed at fossil fuels 
was $180-$200 billion, while subsidies directed at 
renewable energies totalled $16 billion. 
•  Third, energy related R&D only received 4% of total 
government-funded R&D (UNEP/NEF, 2008). 
Similarly, it is worth noting that private and public 
funding for renewables R&D (amounting to $16.9 
billion in 2007 and involving a 30% growth in the 
past two years) has been growing, but at a much slower 
pace than venture capital directed at renewables 
(which grew 106% over the past two years). 
•  Fourth, with regard to the components of sustainable 
energy investment, a remaining challenge is to increase 
energy efficiency-related investment. Even if it is 
difficult to measure (since most investments in energy 
efficiency are self financed by companies and house-
holds), it is worth noting that (externally financed) 
energy efficiency investment only contributes to 3.7% 
of total investment in sustainable energy. This could be 
partly explained by the difficulties these type of 
projects face to reach traditional commercial funding 
(i.e., low scale, high transaction costs, difficult to 
specify, etc.). As a matter of fact, energy efficiency is 
financed via other channels (such as venture capital, 
private equity, and public markets). Externally funded 
4    Taken from the CDM/JI pipeline as of April 2008. Available from www.cd4cdm.org.
As mentioned above, prospects are good since the 
availability of clean energy funding is rapidly growing 
and given that developing countries (at least the large, 
fast-growing ones such as China, India and Brazil) are 
gaining a higher share of clean energy-related I&F. 
Current investment in sustainable energy is mainly aimed 
at new generation capacities ($84.5 billion in 2007). In the 
high-growth context of renewable energy, developing 
countries managed to double their overall share of global 
sustainable energy investment, which reached 22% in 
2007 (17% concentrated in three countries: China, India, 
and Brazil). This is mostly explained by the fact that China 
received $10.8 billion of asset finance, Brazil accounted for 
$6 billion and India for $2.5 billion. Together, these three 
countries received 20% of global asset finance (aimed at 
energy generation or biofuel production projects). Since 
they are also becoming important players as renewable 
energy technology suppliers (in particular, Brazil for 
ethanol production, India for wind turbines, and China 
for solar panels), they are also capturing an increasing share 
of global public markets and private equity investment.
It is important to stress the contribution of new 
mechanisms to fund distributed generation capacities in 
developing countries (mostly home solar photovoltaics 
(PV), solar water heating and biomass cogeneration) that 
are being offered by microfinance (through specialty banks 
such as Grameen) and public programs receiving interna-
tional finance from multilateral or bilateral development 
banks (e.g., rural electrification devised at national level or 
renewable energy programs at municipality level). These 
technologies and programs help improve access of the 
poor and remote rural areas to (off-grid) energy services, 
most notably in countries (like China, Brazil, and India) 
where rapid growth is leading to increasing pressure to 
raise living standards and mounting energy demand. In 
some cases, host countries have also raised part of the 
necessary funding via carbon markets (in particular 
through the CDM). As discussed below, the CDM does 
not cover full costs. However, the funding raised through 
this channel may prove enough to overcome other 
investment (roll out) barriers. Even if the CDM does not 
cover full costs, the funding raised through this channel 
may prove enough to overcome other investment (roll out) 
barriers. In addition, many countries are expecting the 
CDM to further enlarge the funding opportunities 
available to these programs via new options for “programs 
of activities” and new sectors.
As to the technologies mostly favored by I&F trends, 
it is worth noting that, in recent years, the most favored 
technologies were wind energy, solar, and biofuels. The 
former accounted for $50 billion investment, i.e., 43% of 
new investment, in 2007. Some 60% of new investment 
in wind capacity was installed in the US, Spain, and 
China. Together, wind, solar and biofuels explain 85% of 
total new capacity investment in 2007. For its part, 
venture capital and private equity were mostly directed at 
Figure 4:  New investment in clean energy by region, 2007
Source: UNEP/NEF, 2008
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The International Energy Agency (IEA, 2008) lists over 
300 new key energy technologies that may play a role in 
reaching a low carbon world, but it admits that even this 
list is not exhaustive. This section will focus on just a few 
technologies that may be of particular interest to develop-
ing countries, while recognizing that each country has 
unique circumstances and technology interests which may 
not coincide with those addressed in this section. We omit 
many that are either expensive (nuclear), not sufficiently 
mature (ocean energy) or diverse (industrial processes), but 
first a word about the research, development, and demon-
stration, and deployment cycle (RDD&D). This section 
does not focus on national policies to promote RD&D or 
the deployment of technologies, as this subject is treated in 
another paper in this series, National policies and their 
linkages to negotiations over a future international climate 
change agreement by Dennis Tirpak.
4.1  The research, development, and  
demonstration, and deployment cycle
The generally recognized phases of the innovation and 
deployment cycle for new technologies, while often 
depicted as a linear process, is in reality quite complex, 
with many feedback loops between the market and 
technology users and the R&D community (see Figure 5). 
In 2007, nearly $17 billion was spent on R&D on clean 
energy and energy efficiency, with the corporate sector, 
which generally supports more applied research, account-
ing for $9.8 billion and governments, which usually 
support more basic research, accounting for about  
$7.1 billion. Europe and the Middle East saw the most 
corporate R&D activity, followed by the Americas and 
Asia. Patterns of government spending are the reverse, 
with Asian governments (notably Japan, China, and India) 
investing heavily in R&D. 
4.   KeY TeChNoloGieS – CoNSideRaTioN oF iSSUeS RelaTiNG To TheiR 
developMeNT aNd deploYMeNT iN developiNG CoUNTRieS
Figure 5: The research, development, demonstration, deployment, and commercialization cycle
Source: IEA 2008
 
these challenges in smaller developing countries, especially 
in LDCs, and to find the adequate mix of finance options 
to implement the right technology solutions for their 
energy needs.
Questions:
•  Does your country provide grants or other financing 
to support for research, development, or deployment 
of technologies?
•  How is the construction of energy or other infrastruc-
ture projects financed in your country: development 
assistance, government or private loans, equity 
markets, private capital, or other financial instru-
ments?
•  Are there venture capital funds operating in your 
country or have venture capital funds provided 
financing to new companies in your country?
•  What are the major obstacles to investments in your 
country, e.g., the creation of venture capital funds or 
new equity offerings in your country? What might the 
international community do to help improve the 
investment climate in your country?
HFC projects (large scale and with the highest global 
warming potential of all GHGs). 
As to the importance of energy efficiency and renewable 
energy projects, they are quite salient in China, Brazil, and 
India. India is the leader in these types of projects, having 
developed 79 energy efficiency projects and 197 renewable 
energy projects (111 biomass, 49 wind, 36 hydro, and one 
solar). China has 115 renewable energy projects (56 wind 
energy, 51 hydro, and 8 biomass). For its part, Brazil has 
developed two energy efficiency projects and 64 renewable 
energy projects (37 biomass, 23 hydro and 4 wind), while 
Mexico has developed 37 renewable energy projects (5 
wind, 3 hydro and 29 biogas).
It is estimated that the CDM will generate funding in 
the order of $25 billion annually until 2012 (UNFC-
CC, 2007). Private and public carbon funds raised nearly 
$13 billion by the end of 2007 (UNEP/NEF, 2008). 
Furthermore, even in the uncertain context we face before 
a post-2012 deal is reached, some large development 
banks and brokers are promoting (buying) post-2012 
credits, thus giving continuity to carbon market transac-
tions. However, most analysts believe the carbon market 
contribution should increase at least fourfold in order to 
reach the necessary scale of clean technology adoption in 
developing countries.
The recent developments reviewed above can be seen 
to bring new opportunities as well as new challenges 
for developing countries in order to upscale investment 
in clean energy technologies (and other mitigation 
options). Regarding the opportunities, it is increasingly 
important for these countries to identify them by assessing 
the different finance options available and their relative 
merits as well as their applicability to their national needs 
and circumstances. 
There are considerable differences in technology 
needs and national capacities to identify and address 
them in different developing countries. While large, 
fast-growing countries seem  to be profiting from current 
trends, smaller and lower income developing countries as 
well as LDCs are still to see the benefits of larger I&F mar-
kets for sustainable energy. As to the challenges, it is 
increasingly important that clean energy technologies and 
other mitigation options gain a more important role in 
long-term planning priorities and public/private invest-
ment strategies. International organizations and donors 
should help by providing technical assistance and capacity 
building to enlarge the ability at the local level to deal with 
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4.2 deployment
The deployment stage of the technology cycle is one 
during which the technology has been demonstrated to be 
successful, but is not yet economically competitive except 
in niche markets. It may possibly need government 
support to overcome cost and non-cost barriers. Such 
support may range from providing financial incentives to 
introducing or reforming regulations to overcome barriers. 
Moving a technology forward at this stage often requires 
technical and economic feasibility studies, environmental 
assessments, preliminary approvals by local and national 
governments, technology assessments, and other analyses. 
The prospect that a given technology will be produced 
and sold on the market may stimulate private industry to 
undertake applied research and improvements in the 
manufacturing process. Subsequent market feedback may 
suggest further avenues for improving technology and 
influence the ultimate adoption rate. This process, often 
called the learning rate, varies by technology and country. 
To date, none of the efforts adequately engages the private 
sector, which has the potential to bring far greater 
resources to bear on the challenges, combined with 
different and complementary skills.  
Table 1:  Types of interventions required to address specific local barriers to technology innovation and diffusion
acTiViTY GaP/NeeD aDDreSSeD BeNefiTS
applied research and development
grant funding, open and/or directed at 
prioritized technologies
inadequate support for relevant applied 
research for technologies where private 
funding is minimal due to classic innovation 
barriers
new ideas from local scientific knowledge base 
applied and developed to point of potential com-
mercial relevance
Technology accelerators 
Designing and funding projects to  
evaluate technology performance,  
e.g,, field trials
uncertainty and skepticism about in-situ 
costs and performance, and lack of end user 
awareness
reduction in technology risks and/or costs by 
independent collection and dissemination of 
performance data and lessons learnt 
Business incubator services
Strategic and business development 
advice to start-ups
Lack of seed funding and business skills 
within research / technology start-ups – the 
‘cultural gap’ between research and private 
sectors
investment and partnering opportunities created 
by building a robust business case, strengthening 
management capacity and engaging the market
enterprise creation
Creation of new low carbon businesses 
by bringing together key skills and 
resources
market structures, inertia and lack of carbon 
value impede development of low carbon 
start-ups or new corporate products and 
services
Creation of new high growth businesses to both 
meet and stimulate market demand
Development of local commercial and technical 
capabilities
early stage funding for low carbon 
ventures
Co-investments, loans, or risk guarantees 
to help viable businesses attract private 
sector funding
Lack of financing (typically first or second 
round) for early stage, low carbon businesses 
due to classic innovation barriers combined 
with perceived low carbon market/policy 
risks
Enhanced access to capital for emerging busi-
nesses that demonstrate commercial potential
increased private sector investment in the sector 
through demonstrating potential investor returns
Deployment of existing energy  
efficiency technologies
Advice and resources (e.g,, interest-
free loans) to support organizations to 
reduce emissions
Lack of awareness, information and market 
structures limit uptake of cost-competitive 
energy efficiency or low carbon technologies
improved use of energy resources through ena-
bling organizations to implement energy efficient 
measures and save costs
Catalyzing of further investment from organiza-
tions receiving support
Skills/capacity building
Designing and running training pro-
grams
Lack of capacity to install, maintain, finance 
and further develop emerging low carbon 
technologies
growth in business capacity and employee capa-
bilities to enable more rapid uptake of existing 
and new low carbon technologies
National policy and market insights
Analysis and recommendations to inform 
national policy and businesses
Lack of independent, objective analysis that 
can draw directly on practical experience to 
inform the local government and the market
Enhancing the policy and market landscape to 
support the development of the low carbon 
economy
Source: Low Carbon Technology Innovation and Diffusion Centres, The Carbon Trust, www.carbontrust.co.uk
There are numerous mechanisms for collaborating and 
sharing technology R&D information, although some 
corporate R&D is proprietary (see Box 1).5 The IEA’s 
implementing agreements are the largest of these with the 
participation of more that 60 non-IEA member countries.6 
The aim is to share best practice, build capacity, and 
facilitate technology transfer. 
However, there are limits to these efforts – i.e., not all 
developing countries can participate, some agreements are 
more active than others as progress is driven by the 
resources countries are willing to put into a particular 
agreement, and the participation of companies may be 
limited. Moreover, some efforts may not address topics of 
a high priority to developing countries and they cannot 
hope to capture the customer feedback loops noted above.
Given the large number of technologies and participants 
in the RD&D cycle, the international community, 
particularly the UNFCCC process, faces significant 
challenges if it wishes to accelerate R&D and the transfer 
of information among countries. If such improvements are 
to be made, they will have to be based on the experience 
of countries and their corporations. That being a goal, 
some key questions for the reader are:
Questions:
•  Does your country provide any support for RD&D? 
Which R&D areas are of special interest to your 
country?
•  Are the topics covered by the existing international 
mechanisms relevant to your country? What is 
missing?
•  Are the existing international cooperative mechanisms 
transparent and open to your country?
•  Has your government ever sought to participate in 
such a mechanism? If so, what was the result?
•  What specifically is needed to enhance the participa-
tion of developing countries? Are there high priority 
R&D topics, of special interest to your country, that 
should be included in a future international agreement 
and perhaps subjected to oversight by the Convention 
process?  
5   Gupta, S., D. A. Tirpak, N. Burger, J. Gupta, N. Höhne, A. I. Boncheva, G. M. Kanoan, C. Kolstad, J. A. Kruger, A. Michaelowa, S. Murase, J. Pershing, T. Saijo, A. Sari, 2007: Policies, Instru-
ments and Co-operative Arrangements. In Climate change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the AR4 of the IPCC, B. Metz, O. R. Davidson, P.R. Bosch, R. Dave, 
L.A. Meyer (eds), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. 
6   For a list of existing IEA Implementing Agreements see http://www.iea.org/Textbase/techno/index.asp.
•  international Partnership for a Hydrogen economy: Announced 
in April 2003, the partnership consists of 15 countries and the Eu, 
working together to advance the global transition to the hydrogen 
economy, with the goal of making fuel cell vehicles commercially 
available by 2020. the partnership will work to advance the rD&D 
of hydrogen and fuel cell technologies and to develop common 
codes and standards for hydrogen use. See: www.iphe.net.
•  carbon Sequestration leadership forum (cSlf): this inter-
national partnership was initiated in 2003 and has the aim of 
advancing technologies for pollution-free and gHg-free coal-fired 
power plants that can also produce hydrogen for transportation 
and electricity generation. See: www.cslforum.org. 
•  Generation iV international forum: this is a multilateral partner-
ship fostering international cooperation in r&D for the next gen-
eration of safer, more affordable, and more proliferation-resistant 
nuclear energy systems. this new generation of nuclear power 
plants could produce electricity and hydrogen with substantially 
less waste and without emitting any air pollutants or gHg emis-
sions. See: http://nuclear.energy.gov/geniv/negeniv1.html.
•  renewable energy and energy efficiency Partnership: Formed 
at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannes-
burg, South Africa, in August 2002, the partnership seeks to ac-
celerate and expand the global market for renewable energy and 
energy-efficiency technologies. See: http://www.reeep.org.
•  international energy agency implementing agreements: A 
collaborative effort to share the development of, and information 
on, more than 40 key energy technologies among participating 
countries. See: http://www.iea.org/textbase/techno/index.asp.
•  asia-Pacific Partnership on clean Development and climate: 
inaugurated in January 2006, the aim of this partnership between 
Australia, China, india, Japan, republic of Korea, and the uS is to 
focus on technology development related to climate change, en-
ergy security and air pollution. Eight public/private task forces are 
to consider (1) fossil energy, (2) renewable energy and distributed 
generation, (3) power generation and transmission, (4) steel, (5) 
aluminium, (6) cement, (7) coal mining, and (8) buildings and appli-
ances. See: http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org.
Box 1.  examples of coordinated international R&d and 
technology promotion activities
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There are, of course, other emerging technologies that 
have the potential to make important contributions to the 
production of electricity in the future such as fuel cells. 
While several thousand systems are produced each year, 
more R&D is need before these systems are ready for wide 
deployment. 
CCS – a set of systems to capture CO2 from large 
stationary sources – is also extremely relevant to the fossil 
fuel power sector. While used in the oil and gas industry 
to enhance oil recovery, the challenge is to demonstrate 
the feasibility to deploy this add-on technology at a 
reasonable economic cost. Several pre- and post-combus-
tion processes are being considered to capture CO2 and, 
subsequently, transport and inject it into deep geological 
formations. The most cost-effective capturing technologies 
are likely to add $25-$50 per ton of CO2 avoided and 
result in a loss of generated electricity. Transportation costs 
may add an additional $10-$15 per ton of CO2. Future 
cost projections depend on which technologies are used, 
how they are applied, how fast costs fall as the result of 
RD&D, market uptake, and fuel costs. On a smaller scale, 
there are a number of efforts underway to demonstrate 
other technologies for capturing CO2 such as the use of 
algae. Such technologies are unlikely to play a significant 
role in the power sector, but could find niche markets at 
other industrial facilities. They may also prove to be more 
adaptable to the needs of developing countries.
A number of initiatives relating to CCS have been 
announced by Algeria, Australia, Canada, EU, Norway, 
and the US, and interest has been expressed by China and 
South Africa. However, a number of legal, regulatory, 
environmental, financial, and technical barriers need to be 
overcome before large-scale deployment of CCS is made 
possible. The CSLF noted in Box 1, with the participation 
of 21 countries and the EU Commission, is the largest 
forum for international coordination of CCS activities. 
The CSLF aims to make these technologies broadly 
available and to address the wider barriers to deploying the 
technology.
Questions:
•  What mixture of coal, oil, gas, hydro, nuclear, and 
other sources are used to produce electricity in your 
country? What is the average age and efficiency of 
these facilities?
•  What plans do your utilities have for increasing 
Table 2: performance summary for different fossil-fuel-fired plants
note: mW = megawatt, t/h = tons per hour 
Source: IEA 2008
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gross output mW 500 500 500 500 500 500
Auxiliary power mW 42 42 44 43 11 67
net output mW 458 458 456 457 489 433
gross efficiency % 43.9 45.9 47.6 49.9 59.3 50.9
net efficiency % 40.2 42.0 43.4 45.6 58.1 44.1
Co2 emitted t/h 381 364 352 335 170 321
Specific Co2 emitted t/mWh net 0.83 0.80 0.77 0.73 0.35 0.74
The main barriers to technology deployment include: 
information (persuasive information about a new 
product), financing (to reduce the costs relative to other 
technologies and absolute costs), capacity to introduce 
or use technology, transaction costs, excessive or 
inadequate regulations, including investment policies, 
and uncompetitive markets. Efforts to overcome these 
barriers need to be tailored to individual technologies 
through the unique initiatives of the country wishing to 
deploy a technology and by the country providing the 
technology.7  
However, developing countries, even after taking steps 
to address national barriers, often encounter obstacles to 
the deployment of technologies. One of the elements that 
make technology deployment mores difficult in develop-
ing countries is the relation between the new technology 
and the countries’ resource endowment and scale. In most 
cases, technologies reflect the original combination of 
resources (particularly capital, labor, technological 
capabilities, and, also scale of production) in a given 
country, which may not fit well with the particular 
technology that is to be deployed (see Table 1). The 
challenge facing the international community and national 
governments is to determine how these barriers can be 
overcome. 
Questions:
•  Given the respective roles of industry and govern-
ments, should the international community enhance 
the RD&D learning cycle? If so, how?
•  Which barriers in your country are amenable to an 
international effort to reduce them?
•  What mechanisms would be the most appropriate 
means of addressing each barrier to each technology in 
your country?
•  Could a new international mechanism be a means to 
help your country overcome barriers? If so, what might 
its role be? 
4.3 Fossil Fuel power Generation 
Overall, 40% of the world’s electricity production comes 
from coal, 20% from natural gas, and the remainder 
mainly from nuclear and hydro. This percentage varies by 
country, with South Africa and Poland using coal for nearly 
90% of their electricity, China, 80%, and the US, 50%. 
Russia uses natural gas for nearly 50% of its production. 
The efficiency of coal-fired power plants averaged about 
35% from 1992-2005 globally, but the best operating 
plants can achieve 47%. The efficiency of most plants is 
therefore well below the potential offered by state-of-the-
art technologies. Improved efficiencies can be achieved by 
retrofitting existing plants or installing new generation 
technology. 
Pulverized coal combustion (PCC) accounts for nearly 
all of the world’s capacity, but many smaller, old PCC 
plants have an efficiency below 30%. Improving efficiency 
has therefore been a major goal of many utilities; for 
example, by installing PCC sub-critical technology which 
can reach efficiencies of 35-36%. New supercritical plants, 
which have become common in Europe and Japan, can 
achieve efficiencies in the range of 42-45% (see Table 2). 
There is also considerable scope for improving the 
efficiencies of gas fired plants, primarily by replacing old 
gas-fired steam cycle technology with more efficient 
combined-cycle plants. The costs vary with the age of the 
plant; the younger the plant, the more economical it is to 
retrofit. For example, because most coal plants in China 
are under 15 years old, it is planning to repower many 
facilities with supercritical plants. 
There are newer technologies that are even more 
efficient, e.g, ultra-supercritical plants have been deployed 
in a few countries. Reducing the cost of this technology 
remains a challenge, but advances in metallurgy and 
control problems are expected in the next few years. New 
high alloy steels are likely to minimize corrosion problems 
and new control equipment will allow these types of plants 
to be more flexible.
Combined Heat and Power (CHP) is the simultaneous 
utilization of heat and power from a single source. CHP 
plants range in size from 1 to 500MW and can achieve 
efficiencies of 75-80% using either coal or natural gas. 
Most countries have a significant potential to expand the 
use of CHP, but they must address challenges such as 
finding suitable facilities to use the heat in chemical, food/
wood processing, and refining industries; the resolution of 
interconnection issues; and providing a suitable regulatory 
framework which provides for exit fees and back-up fees. 
7   See the case studies in the paper by Tirpak titled, National Policies and Their Linkages to Negotiations over a Future International Climate Change Agreement, that is part 
of this series.
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Table 3 provides information on plant size, efficiency, 
and investment costs of different bioenergy conversion 
technologies. There are different outlooks for biofuels 
concerning future land availability, the rate of improve-
ment in crop yields, environmental requirements, and 
estimates of available crop and forest residues. Compared 
to coal and gas, biomass is also more difficult to store, 
handle, and combust efficiently. Production costs vary 
with the size of the area to be harvested, types of crop and 
soils, nearness to roads, and storage requirements. Large 
scale plants can achieve economies of scale, but this can be 
offset by transportation costs needed to ensure the 
required volumes of material. In some countries, non-food 
types of crops (grasses) are being cultivated and harvested 
to provide an energy source. A large commercial process-
ing plant of 400K t/yr would require a grass feedstock to 
be bought in from a radius of 100km to ensure 24-hour 
operation, seven days a week. There is however no reason 
why big biomass plants could not develop appropriate 
supply chains. Around 400 Gigawatt (GW) of modern 
biomass heat-production equipment, consuming 300 
Megatons per year (Mt/yr) of biomass, is in operation 
worldwide.
Questions:
•  Are commercial biomass facilities operating in your 
country? If so, what do they produce and on what 
scale?
•  Has your country done an assessment of the potential 
for biomass to fill part of its energy demand? What 
type of biomass facilities would be of greatest interest 
to your country given its capacity and technological 
capabilities?
•  What type of barriers currently exists to expanding the 
use of biomass? What form of international assistance 
would be needed to expand the use of biomass in your 
country? Would your country be interested in joining 
an international biomass R&D consortium?
4.5 Wind power
Wind power has grown rapidly since the 90s. Global 
installed capacity reached 94GW in 2007, with more than 
40 countries having wind farms. In 2007, global capacity 
increased by 40% or nearly 20 GW, with China, Spain, 
and the US the leading the way. A total of $39 billion 
went into building new wind farms while $11.3 billion 
Table 3: Typical plant size, efficiency and capital cost for a range of bioenergy conversion plant technologies
Source: Based on IEA Bioenergy, 2007
coNVerSioN TYPe TYPical caPaciTY NeT efficieNcY iNVeSTmeNT coSTS
anaerobic digestion < 10 mWe 10-15% electrical
60-70% heat
landfill gas <200 kWe to 2 mWe 10-15% electrical







combustion for power 10-100 mWe 20-40% Eur 1 600–2 500/kWe




Eur 2 700-3 500/kWe
Eur 2 500-3 000/kWe
co-firing with coal 5-100 mWe existing
>100 mWe new plant
30-40% Eur 100-1 000/kWe
+ power station costs
Gasification for heat 50-500 kWth 80-90% Eur 700-800/kWth
BiGcc for power 5-10 mWe demos
30-200 mWe future
40-50% plus Eur 3 500-5 000/kWe
Eur 1 000-2 000/kWe future
Gasification for cHP
using gas engines
0.1-1 mWe 60-80% overall Eur 1 000-3 000/kWe
Pyrolysis for bio-oil 10 t/hr demo
100 t/hr future
60-70%
~ 85% with char
Eur 700/kWth for 10 mWth near  
commercial
using restricted oxygen to produce methane and other 
synthetic gases. The gas can be used in engines, gas 
turbines, and co-firing boilers. Small scale gasified 
solid biomass demonstration plants are widespread, 
but investment and operating costs still have to be 
reduced to gain a large market share. 
•  Biomass can also be used in CHP plants to produce 
both heat and electricity. While it is normally more 
costly to build a CHP plants than to have separate 
power and heating plants, such plants are cheaper to 
operate as less fuel is required and the lifetime of such 
facilities is longer.
•  Biomass can also be converted to produce ethanol and 
biodiesel fuel. The use of  sugar cane and grains has 
received a significant boost in the past few years as a 
number of developed countries have set targets for the 
use of ethanol and biodiesel as substitutes/supplements 
for/to conventional gasoline. However, there are many 
hurdles to be overcome and it remains unclear what 
contribution liquid biofuels will make to the global 
energy picture. Considerable research is underway to 
reduce the costs of biofuels using second generation 
technology that will use a wider variety of cellulosic 
materials and may some day be of importance to 
developing countries. Success in the development of 
second generation biofuel technologies will depend on 
many factors including: the level of public and private 
financial support, policies that encourage their 
production and use, demonstration and pre-commer-
cial testing, better understanding of the potential 
resources, and analyses of the social, environmental, 
and other costs. 
electricity in your country? What would be necessary 
to retrofit or replace the coal and gas fired power 
plants? What international assistance (technical, legal/
regulatory, or financial) is needed by your country?
•  Is your country interested in participating in an R&D 
consortium that addresses fossil-fuel power generation 
technologies? 
•  Can you envision a time in the next 10-15 years when 
your country would be interested in implementing a 
CCS project? Is your country interested in participat-
ing in cooperative R&D efforts such as the CSFL to 
stay abreast of developments in this field?
4.4 Biomass and Bioenergy
Biomass – i.e,, organic material grown and collected for 
energy use – is a source of renewable fuel that can be 
converted to provide heat, electricity, and transport fuels. 
Total biomass consumption is estimated to be around 
10% of global primary energy consumption, with 
approximately two-thirds consumed in developing 
countries as traditional fuels for cooking and heating. 
Some countries, such as Nepal, are dependent on tradi-
tional biomass to meet 90% of their total energy demand. 
With more people living in urban areas and because of the 
greater uptake of efficient stoves, such as small scale biogas 
converters and biomass-based liquid fuels such as ethanol 
gels, the overall efficiency of small scale biomass is 
expected to improve in the coming decades.
At a larger scale, biomass is consumed to provide heat 
and power and transport fuels. The scope for biomass to 
make a large contribution to global energy demand is 
dependent on its sustainable production, improved 
efficiencies in the supply chain, and new thermo-chemical 
and bio-chemical conversion processes. 
Biomass can be used in a number of ways: 
•  Biomass can be co-fired with coal in traditional 
coal-fired boilers to produce electricity thereby making 
a contribution to CO2 emission reductions. Co-firing 
has been successfully demonstrated in more than 150 
installations worldwide. For regions with access to  
both coal and biomass, this may be an attractive 
option as it lowers investment costs for new boilers, 
enables higher efficiencies than in a dedicated biomass 
facility, reduces the risk of biomass supplies, and 
requires smaller storage areas.
•  Biomass can also be gasified at high temperatures 
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There are a large number of R&D initiatives that are 
aiming to improve wind power technologies. Examples 
include efforts to:
•  Increase the size of turbines to 8-10MW and make 
them lighter, more reliable and fatigue resistant;
•  Reduce or eliminate the need for gear boxes;
•  Develop smart rotors;
•  Improve grid interconnections and operating control 
systems;
•  Continue cost reductions; and
• Minimize environmental impacts.
Questions:
•  Does your country currently have a wind farm? If so, 
what has been the experience?
•  Has your country conducted a survey of the wind 
potential and feasibility studies of potential wind 
farms? What are the main obstacles to the introduc-
tion of wind power and how could the international 
community help to overcome those problems?
•  Suppose the international community offered to 
subsidize the capital costs associated with the installa-
tion of a wind farm in your country by up to 10%. 
Would this be sufficient to spur the introduction of 
wind power? 
4.6 Buildings and appliances
Residential, commercial, and public buildings encom-
pass a wide array of technologies in the building envelope, 
including: insulation, space heating and cooling systems, 
water heating systems, lighting, appliances, and consumer 
products. Unlike consumer products, buildings can last for 
decades, even centuries. Buildings are, however, often 
refurbished – heating and cooling systems are often 
changed after 15-20 years, while household appliances are 
often changed over 5-15 year time periods. Choosing the 
best available technology at the time of renovation 
therefore is important to long-term energy demand. 
The IPCC (2007) has noted that there is, and will be, 
considerable opportunities to reduce emissions from the 
building sector at relatively low costs using existing 
technologies. Many of these technologies are economical 
based on life-cycle costs, but non-economic barriers slow 
their penetration in many countries. However, in many 
developing countries there is a boom in urban construc-
tion and, as incomes rise, a corresponding demand for 
energy-consuming appliances. 
There are many examples of energy-saving measures. 
Well-designed, passive solar homes can minimize or 
eliminate the need for air conditioning. Evaporative 
coolers work well in hot, dry climates and cost about half 
as much to install as central air conditioners. The thermal 
performance of windows has improved greatly through use 
of multiple glazing layers, low-emissivity coatings and low 
conductivity frames. Solar thermal hot water systems, such 
as those used in China, can reduce the demand for energy 
in many countries at very reasonable costs. It has also been 
estimated that technical potential exists for a 30-60% 
improvement in the energy efficiency of appliances. 
Table 4: Cost structure for a typical medium-size onshore wind installation
Source: IEA 2008
SHare of ToTal 
coST 
%
TYPical SHare of 
oTHer coSTS
%
turbine (ex works) 74-82 -
Foundation 1-6 20-25
Electric installation 1-9 10-15
grid connection 2-9 35-45
Consultancy 1-3 5-10
Land 1-3 5-10
Financial costs 1-5 5-10
road construction 1-5 5-10
years, although this growth is not expected to continue. 
The largest wind turbines today are 5-6 MW units with a 
rotator diameter of up to 126 meters. In a search for good 
sites, many countries are now looking for offshore 
locations which can produce up to 50% more power than 
land-based sites. However, offshore wind farms face several 
challenges, particularly harsh conditions, competition with 
other marine users, environmental impacts, grid connec-
tions and higher costs driven by the need for secure 
foundations (see Figure 6).
The cost of electricity produced at sites with low average 
wind speeds ranges from $0.089 to 13.5/kWh to $0.065 
to 9.4/kWh at high wind sites. The costs are expected to 
continuously drop to $0.05-6/kWh over the next five to 
seven years. The investment cost structure for onshore 
wind farms is shown in Table 4.
was raised in public markets.8 Some of the biggest 
manufactures are located in India and China. Much of this 
momentum, particularly in the US, was provided by 
“renewable performance standards”, i.e., state require-
ments for utilities to purchase a minimum amount of 
renewable energy.9 
The outlook is for continued double digit growth. Costs 
have decreased by a factor of four since the 1980s as a 
result of scaling up of turbine sizes, increased manufactur-
ing capacity, and other technological advances. Wind 
turbines need no fuel, incur almost no CO2 emissions, and 
can be installed relatively quickly. However, turbine prices 
have risen since 2005 as a result of commodity prices.
Power from wind turbines is mainly a function of the 
wind regime at the site, turbine height and turbine 
efficiency. Turbines have nearly doubled in size every five 
8   This total was buoyed by an IPO of Iberenova for $7.2 billion which accounted for 60% of the total raised on the public market.  
9   See the case studies on experience with wind in India, Senegal and Argentina in the paper by Tirpak titled, National Policies and Their Linkages to Negotiations over a Future Interna-
tional Climate Change Agreement that is part of this series.
10  DEWI, Deutsches Windenergie-Institut GmbH (2006), DEWI website: www.dewi.de.
Figure 6: development of wind turbine size, 1980-2005
Source: German Wind Energy Institute (DEWI), 2006 in IEA 2008 10
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emissions such as: increasing the use of biofuels particu-
larly from sugar cane; improvements in drive trains, 
aerodynamics, tires and auxiliary equipment; hybridiza-
tion; and light weight materials. Other technologies such 
as fuel cells and on-board storage of electricity (batteries 
and ultra-capacitors, H2 storage) are not yet mature and 
may take some time before they are ready for widespread 
deployment. 
In addition, modal shifts can have a large impact on 
energy use, but the dynamics of city growth are complex 
and what works in one city may not work in others. 
However, several elements appear to be important: strong 
urban planning, investments in public transport and 
non-motorized infrastructure, and policies to discourage 
car use (e.g., congestion charges and road pricing).
Given the nature of this paper, we cannot hope to cover 
all the emerging technologies or the modes of transport 
(truck, marine and air) in depth. However, this is a critical 
sector for most developing countries that are rapidly 
expanding transportation and facing congestion problems. 
We add a few questions below for consideration by the 
reader with the hope that they provoke more thorough 
and thought-provoking consideration. 
Questions:
•  Does your country have a record keeping system for 
data on motorized vehicles?
•  Does your country have a transportation plan and 
does it encourage cities to develop integrated urban/
transport development plans? Are there efficiency 
standards or other policy measures in place that 
promote the use of efficient vehicles?
•  If your country has used subsidies to offset the price of 
gasoline, has your country adjusted these subsidies in 
light of the recent price of gasoline?
•  How can the international community help to 
encourage a more efficient transport system in your 
country?  
1,000km at 380kW and 8% per 1,000km at 750kW.
•  It has become possible to transmit DC power at higher 
voltages and over longer distances with low transmis-
sion losses – typically 3% per 1,000km. Such systems 
require less land, are easier to control and can now be 
easily integrated with AC grids.
•  New transformers are available that, if used to replace 
those that are 30 years’ old, could reduce transformer 
losses by 90%.
•  Storage options are also expanding beyond the 
traditional use of hydro-pump-storage systems. 
Research is underway to improve the use of super 
capacitors, batteries, and underground compressed air 
energy storage systems.
Questions:
•  Assuming that there is a need to expand the availabil-
ity of electricity for the poor and the reliability of 
electricity supplies for industry in your country, what 
barriers relating to transmission and distribution need 
to be overcome to meet these needs?
•  How could the international community help to over 
come these barriers? What would be the best means 
for the utility operators in your country to gain 
information, know-how and technology needed to 
improve their transmission and distribution systems? 
4.8 Transport
Transport accounts for nearly half of the oil used 
worldwide and nearly 25% of energy-related CO2 
emissions. Since 1990, transport emissions of CO2 
worldwide have increased by 36%. According to IEA 
2008, energy use for transport is likely to increase by more 
than 50% by 2030, with a significant part of this growth 
occurring in developing countries. The fastest growth is 
likely to come from air travel, road freight, and light duty 
vehicles. Two main factors influence the growth in 
emissions: the volume of travel and the changes in 
efficiency of the mode of travel, which have only partially 
offset the growth of the former in recent years. 
Improving the fuel economy of light-duty vehicles is one 
of the most important and cost effective measures to save 
energy. With strong policies, available technologies have 
the potential to reduce the energy use per kilometer of 
new vehicles by up to 30% over the next 15 years. There 
are numerous options to improve efficiencies and reducing 
Countries have typically relied on appliance standards, 
labeling programs, and building codes to curtail the 
growth in the demand for electricity in the building and 
appliance sector. These efforts have had mixed results, 
particularly in countries that are rapidly developing and 
have poor enforcement capabilities. That said, the building 
and appliance sector represents a special challenge – one 
that is less dependent on the availability of technologies 
than on the introduction of well-designed and implement-
ed government policies. 
Questions:
•  Are there technologies that your country has not had 
access to in the building and appliance sector?
•  What obstacles has your country encountered in 
stimulating the introduction of new technologies?
•  Do you view the deployment of technologies in this 
sector as largely a domestic matter or can the interna-
tional community help in some way? If so how?
4.7  electricity Transmission and distribution
Much of the electricity that is produced is never used. 
Transmission and distribution losses account to 8.8% of 
the electricity produced worldwide. The losses are 
significantly higher in developing countries (5-25%), in 
part caused by illegal connections (see Table 5).
Table 5:   Country average variations in direct use in power plants and transmission and  
distribution losses as a percentage of gross electricity production, 2005
note: transmission & distribution losses include commercial and technical losses. Commercial losses refer to un-metered use. 
Source: IEA 2008








india 6.9 25.0 0.0 31.9
mexico 5.0 16.2 0.0 21.1
Brazil 3.4 16.6 0.0 20.0
russia 6.9 11.8 -0.6 18.1
China 8.0 6.7 0.0 14.7
Eu-27 5.3 6.7 0.4 12.5
uS 4.8 6.2 0.2 11.2
Canada 3.2 7.3 0.0 10.5
Japan 3.7 4.6 0.3 8.7
World 5.3 8.8 0.2 14.3
Most grid managers aim to transport electricity over the 
shortest possible distance. In many large countries the grid 
consists of a series of grids, often with different character-
istics so that it may not be possible to optimize the 
demand for electricity in one part of the country with 
supply from another part. To cope with variable demand, 
utilities in developed countries typically use gas turbine 
peaking power plants which have lower capital cost to 
provide a flexible supply. However, developing countries 
often have short falls in electricity production that are met 
simply by curtailing electricity to different regions at 
certain times of the day. In some countries, such as India, 
a significant portion of the population does not have any 
access to electricity; therefore expanding the grid is  a high 
priority. Additional losses, up to 3%, can be incurred in 
systems due to the need to transform the power to lower 
voltages.
Investment costs for transmission and distribution 
systems are of the same magnitude as production plant 
investments. Transmission and distribution costs for 
low-voltage users can account for 5-10% of the delivered 
electricity price. In most countries, these costs are averaged 
among all customers to the benefit of those in remote areas.
There are several technological options available or 
under development to improve efficiencies of the grid:
•  Utilities can increase the use of high voltage lines. 
Losses in high-voltage, AC lines amount to 15% per 
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i)  institutional arrangements for a new enhanced mechanism for rDD&D and transfer of  
technologies in a future international agreement:
the creation of a new body is proposed with mandate to adopt initiatives for enhanced action on, e.g,:
• Compulsory licensing;
• Patent purchase;
• Financing within UNFCCC framework for technology transfer;
• Incentive provisions for technology transfer;
• Funding for technology cooperation activities;
• Further identification of national and regional technology needs;
•  Development of indicators, monitoring, verification and reporting of technology transfer activities and 
their impacts.
ii) New policy initiatives (co-ordinated at international level):
•  Specific technology or sector-based approaches. In this regard, it is necessary to identify parties with an 
interest in particular technologies or sector initiatives for technology cooperation (rDD&D) or relating to 
project based mechanisms;
• Technology and efficiency standards;
• Identification of breakthrough technologies to be focused by multilateral technology cooperation;
•  Creation of excellence centers to promote technology development and deployment, disseminate infor-
mation, and participate in international technology cooperation;
• Information diffusion mechanisms (national and international).
iii) New financial mechanisms:
•  Multilateral Fund (public funding) aiming at the purchase of licenses to support diffusion of existing 
technologies, provide financial incentives for technology transfer, support technology cooperation and 
promote capacity building activities;
• Venture capital initiative (private funding).
Box 2. proposals from parties to the UNFCCCThe previous sections have provided insights into the 
RDD&D cycle, including the roles of industry and 
government, the trends in financing sustainable technolo-
gies, including some financial mechanisms, and the status 
of a few key technologies. In the political forum of the 
UNFCCC, Parties are currently struggling to find means 
to enhance innovation and expand the deployment, 
transfer to and commercialization of new technologies, 
particularly in developing countries. Various proposals 
have been put forth by Parties in submissions for the 
second session of the AWG-LCA and at workshops of the 
Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT) in 2008. 
Examples of these proposals are listed in Box 2, however 
the list is by no means exhaustive.
The reader may wish to consider these proposals in the 
light of the current experience of his/her country in 
developing and deploying technology. Without going into 
the merits of each proposal, it may be useful to consider 
criteria that might guide the consideration of the list in 
Box 2 and/or any additional ideas. However, keep in mind 
that it is generally recognized that a “full package” 
approach, i.e., not only equipment, but also software, 
human capacities, financial resources and assistance in 
developing an appropriate regulatory and institutional 
framework, is often needed. Such an approach would also 
have to address different technological stages: retrofitting 
existing equipment; wider deployment of existing climate 
friendly technologies and the development, and 
demonstration of new technologies. Each of these stages 
have unique barriers that may require a different financial 
solutions. Finally, the international community will need 
to determine how to monitor, report, and verify any 
agreement to enhance RDD&D of technology. A 
comprehensive discussion of options under consideration 
is beyond the scope of this paper, but the reader may wish 
to review FCCC/SBSTA/2008/INF.2 for additional 
information.11 
Following the framework of the RDD&D cycle (rather 
that the structure in Box 2), the following questions 
relating to evaluation criteria are posed for consideration:
a.   expanding technology research, development, and 
demonstration and promoting innovation 
•  Will the proposal encourage or discourage institutions 
from undertaking R&D?
•  Are the technologies to be investigated of importance 
to your country?
•  Is the proposal applicable to all technologies or just a 
few? 
•  What would be required of your government if it 
wished to avail itself of the new proposal? 
•  How might your government or industry benefit from 
the proposal? 
•  Can and, if so, how should the proposal be financed, 
evaluated and implemented?
•  Would the “proposal” help the industry in your 
country? 
B.  deploying, Commercialising, and Transferring  
Technology
•  Is the problem to be addressed a real problem in your 
country?
•  Does the problem warrant an international mechanism 
(and its associated bureaucracy) or would it be more 
appropriately addressed on a case by case basis?
•  Can the “proposal” be implemented to the benefit of 
all or only a few countries?
•  Will the “proposal” inhibit or encourage the participa-
tion of industries in the developed and developing 
country?
•  Will the “proposal” result in additional investments for 
technology and capacity building in your country?
• Can the “proposal” be evaluated?
C.  Financing Technology
•  Does the financial “proposal” address a significant 
need and what are the chances of success if it is 
implemented?
•  Are the financial needs of each part of the RDD&D 
cycle addressed by the proposal and is the proposed 
solution appropriate for each part of the cycle?
•  Does the financial “proposal” address each element of 
the “full package approach” and is the proposed 
solution appropriate for each element? 
•  Can the financial proposal be evaluated and  
monitored?
5.  SoMe iSSUeS RelaTiNG To aN iNTeRNaTioNal aGReeMeNT  
11   FCCC/SBSTA/2008/INF.2 - Proposed terms of reference for a reporting on performance indicators and for a report on future financing options for enhancing tech-
nology transfer (SBSTA: Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice). 
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annex 1.  Main mitigation technologies per  
economic sector 
As shown below, available studies point at a number of 
sectors (power, buildings, and industry) and related 
technologies (energy efficiency, CCS, and renewables) as 
the main contributors to GHG mitigation in the medium 
and long term. 
SecTor exiSTiNG TecHNoloGieS New TecHNoloGieS (aVailaBle BY 2030)
power (energy supply) improved supply and distribution efficiency
Fuel switching (coal to gas)
nuclear power
renewable heat and power
CHp
CCS (early applications)
CCS for gas, biomass and coal  fired electricity generation
Advanced nuclear power
Advanced renewables (tidal, concentrating solar, etc.)
transport Fuel efficient vehicles
Hybrid vehicles
Biofuels
modal shifts from road transport to rail
Land use and transport planning
Second generation biofuels
Advanced electric and hybrid vehicles
Buildings Efficient lighting
Efficient appliances/heating/cooling
improved cook stoves and insulation
passive and active solar design
integrated design including technologies such as intelligent 
meters
Solar pv integrated in buildings
industry Efficient end use electrical equipment
Heat and power recovery
material recycling
Control of non Co2 emissions
process-specific technologies
Advanced energy efficiency
CCS for cement, ammonia and iron
inert electrodes for aluminium production
Forestry Afforestation – reforestation
Forest management
reduced deforestation
Harvested wood product management
use of forestry products for bioenergy
tree species improvement to increase biomass and carbon 
sequestration
improved remote sensing technologies for analysis of seques-
tration potential and mapping land use change
Waste management Landfill methane recovery; waste incineration 
with energy recovery; composting of organic 
waste; controlled waste water treatment; recy-
cling and waste minimization
Biocovers and biofilters to optimize methane oxidation
Agriculture improved crop and grazing land management 
to increase soil carbon storage; restoration 
of cultivated peat soils and degraded lands; 
improved rice cultivation techniques and manure 
management to reduce CH4 emissions; improved 
nitrogen fertilizer application techniques to 
reduce n2o emissions; dedicated energy crops to 
replace fossil fuel use; energy efficiency
improvements of crop yields
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The bars in Figure b show the composition of emissions 
reductions achieved in different models. The IPCC work 
relates to emissions savings in 2020, while the others relate 
to emissions savings in 2050. Separately, the IPCC have 
also estimated plausible emissions savings from non-ener-
gy sectors. 
The IPCC reviewed studies on the extent to which 
emissions could be cut in the power, manufacturing and 
construction, transport, and buildings sectors. They find 
that for a cost of less than $25/tCO2-eq, emissions could 
be cut by 10.8-14.7 GtCO2-eq in 2020. The savings 
presented in Figure b are around the mid-point of this 
range. 
The IEA Energy Technology Perspectives report sets out 
a range of scenarios for reducing energy-related CO2 
emissions by 2050, based on a marginal abatement cost of 
$25/tCO2 in 2050 and investment in R&D of new 
technologies. The ‘ACT MAP’ scenario is the central 
scenario; the others make different assumptions on, for 
instance, the success of CCS technology and the ability to 
improve energy efficiency. Total emission savings range 
from 27 to 37 GtCO2/yr. In all scenarios, the IEA finds 
that the CO2 intensity of power generation is half current 
levels by 2050. However there is much less progress in the 
transport sector in all scenarios apart from TECH PLUS, 
because further abatement from transport is too expensive. 
To achieve further emission cuts beyond 2050, transport 
would have to be decarbonised. 
Figure a: Stern Review estimates of mitigation potential for different technologies
 
Figure b: Stern Review (dennis anderson) mitigation estimates vis-a-vis iea and ipCC: sources of fossil 
fuel related emission savings in 2050
 
 
Source of figures a and b: Stern Review12, chapter 9
12   N.Stern (editor) (2006): The Stern Review Report: The Economics of Climate Change, London, HM Treasury.
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annex 3. Glossary
Term DefiNiTioN
Adaptation Adjustment in natural or human systems to a new or changing environment. Adaptation to climate change refers 
to adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which 
moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities. various types of adaptation can be distinguished, including 
anticipatory and reactive adaptation, private and public adaptation, and autonomous and planned adaptation.
Ad Hoc Working group on Long-term 
Cooperative Action under the Conven-
tion (AWg-LCA)
At its thirteenth session, the Cop, by its decision 1/Cp.13, launched a comprehensive process to enable the full, 
effective and sustained implementation of the Convention through long-term cooperative action, now, up to and 
beyond 2012, in order to reach an agreed outcome and adopt a decision at its fifteenth session. it decided that the 
process shall be conducted under a subsidiary body under the Convention, the AWg-LCA, that shall complete its 
work in 2009 and present the outcome of its work to the Cop for adoption at its fifteenth session.
Afforestation is the direct human-induced conversion of land that has not been forested for a period of at least 50 years to for-
ested land through planting, seeding and/or the human-induced promotion of natural seed sources.
Baseline the baseline (or reference) is any datum against which change is measured. it might be a “current baseline,” in which 
case it represents observable, present-day conditions. it might also be a “future baseline,” which is a projected future 
set of conditions excluding the driving factor of interest. Alternative interpretations of the reference conditions can 
give rise to multiple baselines.
Biomass fuels or biofuels A fuel produced from dry organic matter or combustible oils produced by plants. these fuels are considered renew-
able as long as the vegetation producing them is maintained or replanted, such as firewood, alcohol fermented 
from sugar, and combustible oils extracted from soy beans. their use in place of fossil fuels cuts gHg emissions 
because the plants that are the fuel sources capture carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.
Capacity building increasing skilled personnel and technical and institutional abilities.
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) Co2 is already being captured in the oil and gas and chemical industries. Several plants capture Co2 from power sta-
tion flue gases for use in the food industry. However, only a fraction of the Co2 in the flue gas stream is captured.
Certified Emission reductions (CErs) A Kyoto protocol unit equal to 1 metric tonne of Co2 equivalent. CErs are issued for emission reductions from CDm 
project activities.  two special CErs – temporary certified emission reduction (tCErs) and long-term certified emis-
sion reductions (lCErs)  – are issued for emission removals from afforestation and reforestation CDm projects.
Clean Development machanism (CDm) Defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto protocol, the CDm is intended to meet two objectives: (1) to assist parties not 
included in Annex i in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the con-
vention; and (2) to assist parties included in Annex i in achieving compliance with their quantified emission limita-
tion and reduction commitments. Certified Emission reduction units from CDm projects undertaken in non-Annex 
i countries that limit or reduce gHg emissions, when certified by operational entities designated by Conference of 
the parties/ meeting of the parties, can be accrued to the investor (government or industry) from parties in Annex B. 
A share of the proceeds from certified project activities is used to cover administrative expenses as well as to assist 
developing country parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to meet the 
costs of adaptation.
Climate Climate in a narrow sense is usually defined as the ‘average weather’, or more rigorously, as the statistical descrip-
tion in terms of the mean and variability of relevant quantities over a period of time ranging from months to 
thousands or millions of years. these quantities are most often surface variables such as temperature, precipitation, 
and wind. Climate in a wider sense is the state, including a statistical description, of the climate system. the classic 




Decision 7/Cp.2 Development and transfer of technologies
Decision 9/Cp.2 Communications from parties included in Annex i to the Convention: guidelines, 
schedule and process for consideration
Decision 10/Cp.2 Communications from parties not included in Annex i to the Convention: guidelines, 
facilitation and process for consideration
Decision 12/Cp.2 memorandum of understanding between the Conference of the parties and the Coun-
cil of the global Environment Facility
resolution 1/Cp.2 Expression of gratitude to the government of Switzerland
other action taken by the 
conference of the parties
the geneva ministerial Declaration
Cop 1
(Berlin, 1995)
Decision 1/Cp.1 the Berlin mandate: review of the adequacy of Article 4, paragraph 2 (a) and (b), of the 
Convention, including proposals related to a protocol and decisions on follow-up
Decision 2/Cp.1 review of first communications from the parties included in Annex i to the Convention
Decision 6/Cp.1 the subsidiary bodies established by the Convention
Decision 11/Cp.1 initial guidance on policies, program priorities and eligibility criteria to the operating 
entity or entities of the financial mechanism
Decision 13/Cp.1 transfer of technology
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Term DefiNiTioN
natural gas fired combined cycle 
(ngCC)
ngCC is an advanced power generation technology, which allows improving the fuel efficiency of natural gas. most 
new gas power plants in north America and Europe are of this type. A gas turbine generator generates electricity 
and the waste heat is used to make steam to generate additional electricity via a steam turbine
new Energy Finance (nEF) new Energy Finance is a provider of information and research to investors in renewable energy, low-carbon 
technology and the carbon markets, operating across all sectors of renewable energy and low-carbon technology, 
including, wind, solar, biofuels, biomass, and energy efficiency, as well as the carbon markets.
photovoltaics (pv) this is the direct conversion of solar radiation – sunlight – into electricity by the interaction of light with the elec-
trons in a semi-conductor device or cell.
pulverized coal combustion (pCC) Combustion and conversion systems can generally be categorized into either of the following two categories: 1) 
current commercial technologies or 2) emerging technologies. the CCBs currently produced and used primarily 
result from current commercial technologies, and of these, the most common are pulverized coal combustion, 
cyclone firing, and stoker firing.
reforestation the direct human-induced conversion of non-forested land to forested land through planting, seeding and/or the 
human-induced promotion of natural seed sources, on land that was forested but that has been converted to non-
forest land (unFCCC).
renewables, renewable Energy Energy sources that are, within a short time frame relative to the Earth’s natural cycles, sustainable, and include 
non-carbon technologies such as solar energy, hydropower, and wind, as well as carbon-neutral technologies such 
as biomass.
research, development and demon-
stration (rD&D)
Scientific and/or technical r&D of new production processes or products, coupled with analysis and measures that 
provide information to potential users regarding the application of the new product or process; demonstration 
tests; and feasibility of applying these products processes via pilot plants and other pre-commercial applications.
Scenario A plausible and often simplified description of how the future may develop, based on a coherent and internally 
consistent set of assumptions about driving forces and key relationships. Scenarios may be derived from projec-
tions, but are often based on additional information from other sources, sometimes combined with a narrative 
storyline.
Sector A part or division, as of the economy (e.g,, the manufacturing sector, the services sector) or the environment (e.g,, 
water resources, forestry).
Special report on Emission Scenarios 
(of the ipCC) (SrES)
the storylines and associated population, gDp and emissions scenarios associated with the SrES (nakićenović et al., 
2000), and the resulting climate change and sea-level rise scenarios. Four families of socio-economic scenario (A1, 
A2, B1 and B2) represent different world futures in two distinct dimensions: a focus on economic versus environ-
mental concerns, and global versus regional development patterns.
SrES A1 the A1 storyline and scenario family describes a future world of very rapid economic growth, global population 
that peaks in mid-century and declines thereafter, and the rapid introduction of new and more efficient technolo-
gies. major underlying themes are convergence among regions, capacity building and increased cultural and social 
interactions, with a substantial reduction in regional differences in per capita income.
SrES A2 the A2 storyline and scenario family describes a very heterogeneous world. the underlying theme is self-reliance 
and preservation of local identities. Fertility patterns across regions converge very slowly, which results in continu-
ously increasing population. Economic development is primarily regionally oriented and per capita economic 
growth and technological change more fragmented and slower than other storylines.
SrES B1 the B1 storyline and scenario family describes a convergent world with the same global population, that peaks in 
mid-century and declines thereafter, as in the A1 storyline, but with rapid change in economic structures toward a 
service and information economy, with reductions in material intensity and the introduction of clean and resource-
efficient technologies. the emphasis is on global solutions to economic, social and environmental sustainability, 
including improved equity, but without additional climate initiatives.
SrES B2 the B2 storyline and scenario family describes a world in which the emphasis is on local solutions to economic, 
social and environmental sustainability. it is a world with continuously increasing global population, at a rate lower 
than A2, intermediate levels of economic development, and less rapid and more diverse technological change than 
in the B1 and A1 storylines. While the scenario is also oriented towards environmental protection and social equity, 
it focuses on local and regional levels.
Term DefiNiTioN
Climate change Climate change refers to a change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g,, using statistical tests) by 
changes in the mean and/ or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically 
decades or longer. Climate change may be due to natural internal processes or external forcings, or to persistent 
anthropogenic changes in the composition of the atmosphere or in land use.
note that unFCCC, in its Article 1, defines “climate change” as “a change of climate which is attributed directly or 
indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural 
climate variability observed over comparable time periods”. the unFCCC thus makes a distinction between “climate 
change” attributable to human activities altering the atmospheric composition, and “climate variability” attributable 
to natural causes.
Combined Heat and power (CHp) CHp is the simultaneous generation of usable heat and power (usually electricity) in a single process. through the 
use of an absorption cooling cycle, trigeneration or CHp schemes can also be developed. CHp is a highly efficient 
way to use both fossil and renewable fuels and can therefore make a significant contribution to sustainable energy 
goals, bringing environmental, economic, social and energy security benefits.
Deforestation Conversion of forest to non-forest. For a discussion of the term forest and related terms such as afforestation, refor-
estation, and deforestation, see the IPCC Special Report on Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry (ipCC, 2000).
Emissions in the climate change context, emissions refer to the release of gHgs and/or their precursors and aerosols into the 
atmosphere over a specified area and period of time.
Energy efficiency ratio of energy output of a conversion process or of a system to its energy input.
Finance the science that describes the management of money, banking, credit, investments, and assets.
Fossil fuels Carbon-based fuels from fossil carbon deposits, including coal, oil, and natural gas.
integrated gasification combined cycle 
(igCC)
igCC is a process in which a low-value fuel such as coal, petroleum coke, orimulsion, biomass or municipal waste 
is converted to low heating value, high-hydrogen gas in a process called gasification. the gas is then used as the pri-
mary fuel for a gas turbine. igCC can also be viewed as the two-stage combustion of an opportunity feedstock. First, 
the feedstock is partially combusted in a reactor or gasifier. then the combustion is completed in the gas turbine.
intellectual property rights (iprs) iprs, very broadly, are rights granted to creators and owners of works that are the result of human intellectual 
creativity. these works can be in the industrial, scientific, literary or artistic domains. they can be in the form of an 
invention, a manuscript, a suite of software, or a business name, as examples. in general, the objective of intellectu-
al property law is to grant the creator of a work certain controls over the exploitation of that work, as the unfettered 
ability of others to copy the work or invention may deprive the creator of reward and incentive. For some iprs, the 
grant of protection is also in return for the creator making the work accessible to the general public. intellectual 
property law maintains a balance by (in most cases) granting the rights for a limited time. Some rights require regis-
tration, for example, patent right, whilst other rights accrue automatically upon the work’s creation as in copyright.
international Energy Agency (iEA) paris-based energy forum established in 1974. it is linked with the organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development to enable member countries to take joint measures to meet oil supply emergencies, to share energy 
information, to coordinate their energy policies, and to cooperate in the development of rational energy programs.
intergovernmental panel on Climate 
Change (ipCC)
Established in 1988 by the World meteorological organization and unEp, the ipCC surveys world-wide scientific 
and technical literature and publishes assessment reports that are widely recognized as the most credible existing 
sources of information on climate change. the ipCC also works on methodologies and responds to specific requests 
from the Convention’s subsidiary bodies. the ipCC is independent of the Convention.
investment investment from the perspective of the domestic economy is the purchase of capital equipment, e.g,, machines and 
computers, and the construction of fixed capital, e.g,, factories, roads, housing, that serve to raise the level of output 
in the future. From the perspective of an individual, investment is expenditure, usually on a financial asset, designed 
to increase the individual’s future wealth.
ipCC Fourth Assessment report (Ar4) the main activity of the ipCC is to provide in regular intervals Assessment reports of the state of knowledge on 
climate change. the latest one is “Climate Change 2007”, the Fourth ipCC Assessment report.
ipCC Working group iii (Wgiii) Assesses options for mitigating climate change through limiting or preventing gHg emissions and enhancing 
activities that remove them from the atmosphere.
mitigation An anthropogenic intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of gHgs.
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Sustainable development Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs.
technology transfer transmission of know-how, equipment and products to governments, organizations or other stakeholders. usually 
also implies adaptation for use in a specific cultural, social, economic and environmental context.
united nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (the Convention) 
(unFCCC)
the Convention was adopted on 9 may 1992, in new york, and signed at the 1992 Earth Summit in rio de Janeiro by 
more than 150 countries and the European Community. its ultimate objective is the ‘stabilization of gHg concen-
trations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system’. it contains commitments for all parties. under the Convention, parties included in Annex i aim to return 
gHg not controlled by the montreal protocol to 1990 levels by the year 2000. the Convention entered in force in 
march 1994.
World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD)
the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) is a CEo-led, global association of some 200 
companies dealing exclusively with business and sustainable development.
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Climate change is widely recognized as one of the 
most critical challenges the world has ever faced. The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
confirmed in its Fourth Assessment Report that there was 
“new and stronger evidence that most of the warming 
observed over the last 50 years is attributable to human 
activities” (IPCC, 2007). The IPCC also concluded the 
world faces an average temperature rise of around 3°C this 
century if greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions continue to 
rise at their current pace and are allowed to double from 
their pre-industrial level. The resulting impacts, even at the 
lower end of the range given by IPCC, are likely to be 
severe. 
The land use sector, including forestry and agricul-
ture, is an important source of anthropogenic GHG 
emissions. Land use change, mainly deforestation, 
contributed to about 20% of the GHG emissions from 
anthropogenic sources between 1989 and 1998 (IPCC, 
2000 and 2007c). When adding all emissions from the 
land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF1) sector 
the share is over 30%. In addition, the land use sector has 
great potential in mitigating climate change.
The role of LULUCF activities in the mitigation of 
climate change has long been recognized. The United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) recognizes its importance in achieving the 
goal of stabilizing concentrations of greenhouse gas in the 
atmosphere and includes commitments relating to the 
sector. In addition, several articles of the Kyoto Protocol 
make provisions for the inclusion of land use, land-use 
change and forestry activities by Parties as part of their 
implementation efforts and contribute to the mitigation of 
climate change. 
LULUCF will therefore play a key role in any 
post-2012 international climate change regime emerg-
ing from the current negotiating processes under the 
United Nations. The United Nations Climate Change 
Conference in December 2007 culminated in the adop-
tion of the Bali Road Map, which consists of a number of 
forward-looking decisions that represent the various tracks 
that are essential to reaching a secure climate future. The 
Bali Road Map includes the Bali Action Plan (BAP), 
which charts the course for a new negotiating process 
under the UNFCCC, with the aim of completing this by 
2009. It also includes the current negotiations under the 
Kyoto Protocol, and their 2009 deadline, which focus on 
further emission reduction commitments for industrialized 
countries.
This paper introduces the key issues and challenges 
arising from the discussions on LULUCF under the 
UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol. It provides:
•  An overview of LULUCF activities, including 
challenges in the past and present negotiations;
•  A review of data and information on the key mitiga-
tion options in the LULUCF sector, with particular 
reference to forestry; 
•  A summary of the main LULUCF issues currently 
under negotiation. 
LULUCF activities cut across a number of economic 
and development sectors. They are therefore not only 
important from a climate change perspective, but also in 
light of wider development policies, including food 
security, energy generation and wood production.
1. iNTRodUCTioN
1    In this document, the term LULUCF is used, as all decisions of the UNFCCC are based on this term. The 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories propose a 
new term, AFOLU (Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use). AFOLU has essentially the same meaning as LULUCF in the IPCC Good Practice Guidelines of 2000 but integrating 
agriculture and LULUCF sectors (see annex 5, “From LULUCF to AFOLU”).
UNFF UN Forum on Forests
WG I  Working Group I (of the IPCC, see above), 
assesses the literature on the physical science 
basis of climate change
WG II  Working Group II (of the IPCC, see above), 
assesses the literature on the impacts, 
vulnerability and adaptation to climate 
change
WG III  Working Group III (of the IPCC, see 
above), assesses the literature on the mitiga-
tion of climate change, i.e, reducing GHG 
emissions
WMO World Meteorological Organization
Units and Measures
GtC Gigatons of carbon
GtCO2  Gigatons of carbon dioxide: 1 billion tons 
CO2  
MtCO2  Megatons of carbon dioxide: 1 million tons 
CO2  
tC tons of carbon
tCO2 tons of CO2 
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The Marrakesh Accords also limit eligible LULUCF 
activities in the clean development mechanism (CDM) to 
afforestation and reforestation (A/R). The CDM, one of 
three flexible mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, 
allows emission-reduction (or emission removal) projects 
in developing countries to earn certified emission reduc-
tion (CER) credits. These CERs can be traded and sold, 
and used by industrialized countries to a meet a part of 
their emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol. 
As the CDM was a new market mechanism, the limit on 
LULUCF activities was subject to much debate among 
Parties.3
Under the Marrakesh Accords, the total number of 
credits that an Annex I Party may claim from A/R4 project 
activities under the CDM was limited to 1% of the Party’s 
total emissions in 1990 multiplied by five.5 These agree-
ments apply to the first commitment period of the 
Protocol (2008-2012).
A proposal on “Reducing emissions from deforesta-
tion in developing countries and approaches to 
stimulate action” (REDD) was first considered by the 
COP in 2005. Since early 2006, discussions under the 
2.1.3 Conference of the Parties (COP) 7 (2001)
The Marrakesh Accords, which were adopted at COP 
7, provided the “rule book” for the Kyoto Protocol. The 
Marrakesh Accords provide a forest definition with range 
thresholds (see Box 1). Each Party is asked to define the 
national thresholds to be used during the first commit-
ment period (2008-2012). This decision, to be made inter-
nally by each party, has a great impact on the mitigation 
potential of each country. While there may be different 
forest ecosystems within a country, the definition for the 
Kyoto Protocol has to be a single one for the entire 
country. 
As an example, let us think about a country with two 
main ecosystems: savannas and humid forest with a certain 
level of tree cover degradation that initiated before 1990. 
The definition of the forest thresholds (forest cover, tree 
height and minimum area) will make more or less land 
eligible for future A/R CDM project activities. This and 
other similar requirements agreed in the Marrakesh 
Accords represented over the years a challenge for decision 
makers in all Parties. 
Box 1: Key definitions of the UNFCCC relevant to lUlUCF
forest is a minimum area of land of 0.05-1.0 hectares with tree crown cover (or equivalent stocking level) of more 
than 10-30 % with trees with the potential to reach a minimum height of 2-5 meters at maturity in situ. A forest may 
consist either of closed forest formations where trees of various storeys and undergrowth cover a high proportion of 
the ground or open forest. young natural stands and all plantations which have yet to reach a crown density of 10-30 
% or tree height of 2-5 meters are included under forest, as are areas normally forming part of the forest area which are 
temporarily unstocked as a result of human intervention such as harvesting or natural causes but which are expected 
to revert to forest;
afforestation is the direct human-induced conversion of land that has not been forested for a period of at least 50 
years to forested land through planting, seeding and/or the human-induced promotion of natural seed sources;
reforestation is the direct human-induced conversion of non-forested land to forested land through planting, 
seeding and/or the human-induced promotion of natural seed sources, on land that was forested but that has been 
converted to non-forested land. For the first commitment period, reforestation activities will be limited to reforestation 
occurring on those lands that did not contain forest on 31 December 1989.
Source: FCCC/CP/2001/13
3    Other important requirements of importance for NAI are the need of creating a Designated National Authority, and the request for defining how to deal with proving sustainable 
development in/for the CDM.
4    Afforestation and reforestation refer to the enhancement of sinks through the planting of trees on non-forest land and are eligible activities in the CDM (A/R CDM). A/R CDM is 
ruled, with respect to eligibility, modalities and procedures, by a number of decisions as outlined in annex 5, “Decisional pathway for A/R CDM and REDD”.
5   Even though a cap for A/R CDM project activities has been introduced, to date only a few projects have been submitted and the cap of 1% will most probably not be reached 
until the end of the first commitment period.
LULUCF activities are critical for achieving the overall 
objective of the UNFCCC to avoid ‘‘dangerous interfer-
ence’’ with the global climate system. As reflected in the 
provisions of UNFCCC, this will require the application 
of policies that ‘‘cover all relevant sources, sinks and 
reservoirs of greenhouse gases” (UNFCCC 1992, Article 
3.3). The Convention addresses five sectors considered as 
sources of anthropogenic emissions: industrial processes, 
energy, agriculture, waste and LULUCF.
The commitments by Parties to mitigate climate change 
are defined in Article 4. These commitments take into 
account Parties’ common but differentiated responsibilities 
and their specific national and regional development 
priorities, objectives and circumstances. Article 4 also refers 
to commitments relating to the LULUCF sector, such as to 
“develop, periodically update, publish and make available” 
national inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources 
and removals by sinks of all GHGs (paragraph 1(a)). Also 
included are commitments to promote sustainable 
management, and promote and cooperate in the conserva-
tion and enhancement of sinks and reservoirs of all GHGs, 
including biomass, forests and oceans as well as other 
terrestrial, coastal and marine ecosystems (paragraph 1(d)). 
2.1 Milestones in the process
2.1.1 Initial discussions
Under the Convention, much of the initial discussion 
relating to LULUCF focused on GHG inventories. The 
main issues of concern were how to compile activity data 
(a particular difficulty for poorer countries with problems 
in accessing satellite imageries, inventories or historic data) 
and how, based on this information, to accurately estimate 
emissions and removals by sinks. During the negotiations 
that led to the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, many countries 
highlighted the importance of including sinks and 
emissions from LULUCF in the Protocol’s commitments, 
subject to concerns about definitions, timing and scope. 
However, questions regarding LULUCF were considered 
too complex and a lack of scientific evidence increased the 
difficulties during the negotiations. 
2.1.2 Adoption of the Kyoto Protocol (1997)
Under the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I Parties2 agreed to 
quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives 
(QELROs) and LULUCF activities are eligible for 
achieving these objectives. Annex I Parties therefore must 
report and quantify emissions and removals by sinks in the 
LULUCF sector as part of their potential achievement of 
their targets. Possible LULUCF activities are included in 
two paragraphs of Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol, with 
different methodological and reporting treatments: 
•  Article 3.3 refers to afforestation, reforestation and 
deforestation, and these are mandatory for all Annex I 
Parties. 
•  Article 3.4 refers to additional voluntary activities 
related to changes in GHG emissions by sources and 
removals by sinks in the agricultural soils and land-use 
change and forestry. By the end of 2006, Parties with 
commitments under the Protocol would have to 
decide which activities of Article 3.4 they would 
account towards their mitigation commitments. 
These provisions added a number of new questions and 
issues for discussions, since Parties had to consider in more 
detail what activities qualified for reporting and as 
measures to achieve targets and under which reporting 
requirements. As a consequence, the UNFCCC Subsidiary 
Body for Scientific and Technical Advice (SBSTA), at its 
eighth session in 1998, requested the IPCC to prepare a 
report examining the scientific and technical implications 
of carbon sequestration related to LULUCF. 
This IPCC Special Report on LULUCF, published in 
2000, examines how carbon flows between the atmosphere 
and the five different “pools” (above-ground biomass, 
below-ground biomass, litter, dead wood and soil organic 
carbon) and how carbon stocks change over time (see 
IPCC 2000). Although the IPCC Special Report clarifies 
many issues, uncertainties regarding the real mitigation 
potential and limitations of activities under Article 3.4 
were still significant. 
2.  lUlUCF aCTiviTieS UNdeR The CoNveNTioN aNd 
 The KYoTo pRoToCol
2    The distinction between Annex I Parties (i.e, developed countries) and non-Annex I Parties (i.e, developing countries) corresponds to the Convention. Under the Kyoto Protocol, 
countries with quantified emission limitation or reduction commitments (38 developed countries and countries with economies in transition) appear in Annex B. Over the years 
the terms have been used interchangeably. In this document, when referring to countries included in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol, the term Annex I Parties is used. Non-Annex 
I Parties (NAI) have no quantified emission limitation or reduction commitments under the Protocol and are not included in Annex B.
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and forest management must follow gross-net accounting, 
while net-net accounting rules must be applied to 
revegetation, cropland management and grazing land 
management. 
The gross-net accounting was applied to forest manage-
ment for the first commitment period because net-net 
accounting was seen as disadvantageous for countries 
where the carbon sinks were projected to decline over time 
because of saturation. At the same time, a credit cap was 
established for forest management to avoid the production 
of credits generated by indirect and natural effects as well 
as changes in human management prior to 1990 that 
could be generated in applying gross-net accounting. 
At the COP 6 (part II) in 2001, a cap for forestry 
activities equal to 15% of projected removals, or 3% of 
base year emissions, was established. Natural and indirect 
effects are not taken into account for Article 3.3 activities 
but deforestation must be accounted at the national level 
as an adverse activity to afforestation and reforestation. 
2.2.2 Reporting requirements
Another important requirement for Annex I Parties is 
reporting. According to Article 4.1 of the UNFCCC, 
Annex I Parties must submit to the UNFCCC annual 
inventories of national GHG emissions and removals that 
are subject to an annual review. The inventories must be 
reported under standardized formats and must cover 
emissions and removals from six sectors, including the 
LULUCF sector. 
For LULUCF, the UNFCCC reporting is based on the 
methodologies presented in the IPCC Guidelines and the 
2003 IPCC Good Practice Guidance for LULUCF.8 The 
LULUCF data are presented in the six identified land-use 
categories (i.e., forest management, grassland manage-
ment, etc.). For every land-use category, carbon stock 
changes must be reported. Additional data are required for 
the Kyoto Protocol reporting that are supplementary to 
the information reported under the Convention. This 
additional data and requirements have been agreed during 
the negotiations under the Kyoto Protocol. In principle 
the supplementary requirements and methodologies for 
measuring, estimating and reporting of activities under 
Article 3.3 and 3.4 are also described in the Good Practice 
Guidance for LULUCF. 
By the end of 2006, Parties had to provide additional 
information on the definition of forest that they would 
adopt at the national level – the so-called minimum 
dimensional threshold values. They had also to list the 
Article 3.4 activities that they would elect to report on, 
information on national monitoring system associated 
with the elected activities, and information on how 
definitions are to be applied to national circumstances 
listing criteria to identify areas qualifying for an activity or 
the other. 
During the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period, 
supplementary spatial information on units of land 
subjected to Article 3.3 and 3.4 activities is to be reported, 
as well as information on methods and approaches to 
estimate emissions and removals. Parties must also provide 
information that demonstrates that Article 3.3 and 3.4 
activities are human-induced and have taken place since 
1990. 
The estimates for GHG emissions and removals for 
Article 3.3 and 3.4 shall be clearly distinguished from 
anthropogenic emissions from the energy sector, industrial 
processes, agriculture, waste and solvent and other product 
using compiling specific tables for reporting. Absence of 
overlaps between Article 3.3 and 3.4 activities must be 
demonstrated and uncertainty of emissions and removals 
estimates must be documented (IPCC 2003).
Options for using the above mentioned activities for 
mitigating climate change in a post-2012 regime are 
discussed in chapter 5 of this document.
8    On the basis of the experience using the 1996 IPCC Guidelines for reporting and following a request of the SBSTA, the IPCC prepared the Good Practice Guidance for LULUCF, 
approved in 2003. The Good Practice Guidance for LULUCF were meant to provide clear methodological guidance for a better selection of methods, to facilitate identification of 
more significant GHG emission sources, to provide methods for consistent time series that allow quality improvement and control over time, and to facilitate the review process. 
These materials can be downloaded in various languages from http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/methodology-reports.htm. 
UNFCCC process have focused on: the identification of 
drivers for deforestation; scientific, technical and meth-
odological issues relating to estimating and monitoring 
emissions from deforestation; and costs and technical 
barriers for the implementation of activities to reduce 
deforestation. Parties have also been considering a range of 
policy approaches and positive incentives and deliberated 
the advantages and disadvantages of various financing 
options. 
At COP 13, the Bali Action Plan was adopted, which 
states that: “Policy approaches and positive incentives on 
issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation in developing countries; and the 
role of conservation, sustainable management of forests 
and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing 
countries”. Also at COP 13, another major decision to 
stimulate action was adopted, which provides a mandate 
for several elements and actions, including further 
strengthening ongoing efforts and support for capacity-
building, technical assistance and transfer of technology. 
In 2008, a program of work is being undertaken on 
methodological issues, such finding ways to measure forest 
degradation. 
2.2 lUlUCF activities in annex i parties
Annex I Parties have to fulfil a number of requirements, 
the most important of which relates to accounting rules 
and reporting. Under the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I 
countries are required to identify lands that are afforested, 
reforested and deforested (ARD) over the period of 
1990-2005 and to account separately for net emissions 
and removals from each of these land areas during the 
commitment period. 
2.2.1 Accounting rules
The adoption of clear definitions and criteria at the 
national level is essential to the correct accounting and 
monitoring of LULUCF activities, since different rules 
apply to different activities. The emissions and removals 
from LULUCF activities are accounted according to two 
main rules:
•  Gross-net accounting only considers carbon stock  
changes resulting from the difference between  
emissions and removals in the commitment  
period and does not draw comparison with the  
base year. 
•  Net-net accounting compares emissions and removals 
connected to a certain activity during the commitment 
period with emissions and removals during the base  
year. A credit is created when a net carbon sink can be  
measured comparing the two different periods.
The examples in Table 1 show how, for country A, a 
reduction in removals from LUCF6 sector due to a change 
in age class of the growing forest for example can mean a 
huge increase in net emissions even though gross emissions 
decreased (Ward, 2004). Furthermore, any agreement on 
which an accountability approach is to be used when 
reporting mitigation activities in forestry can have an 
impact on the forest management decisions.7 
During the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period 
(2008-2012), afforestation, reforestation, deforestation 
country Year Gross emissions* lUcf emissions lUcf removals Net emissions
A 1990 100 25 50 75
2010 95 25 25 95
B 1990 100 0 25 75
2010 120 0 25 95
Table 1: a comparison regarding lUlUCF emissions and removals
* gross emissions are from sources not including the LuCF sector
Source: Ward, 2004
6    The term LUCF refers only to land use changes. LULUCF also includes emissions and sinks from land uses that remain the same.
7   The issue of how to account for changes in carbon stocks over time is currently one of the many relevant aspects on how to deal with emission reductions from deforestation 
and forest degradation in a post-2012 mitigation regime (see chapters 3 and 5).
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preparation costs. The major part of these costs has to be 
paid before CDM payments are received. Because of the 
mentioned circumstances many developing countries have 
yet not been in a position to use the A/R CDM, even if 
they consider it as an attractive option.13 
A/R CDM has stimulated new interest for planting 
trees, especially in seriously degraded areas. This can be 
indeed a new opportunity for the forest sector, as it can 
open the possibility to promote long-term activities such 
as restoration of forestland or tree plantations. Nonethe-
less, the forest sector in many countries is reacting very 
slowly to the opportunities provided by the CDM, and 
often A/R CDM activities are proposed without consid-
eration of existing forest strategies. A/R CDM, especially 
of the small-scale variety, offers a possibility to poor people 
to get involved, particularly through the promotion of 
community forestry, which could have an important 
developmental impact in rural areas. However, for the 
time being, small-scale A/R projects have proven being 
largely out of reach for local communities, given the 
complexity in the design of the project, the legal require-
ments in respect to property rights on land, carbon pools 
and carbon credits and the transaction costs involved in 
project preparation. Thus, currently, almost all existing 
A/R CDM projects have targeted either publicly-owned 
reforestation areas or plantations promoted on privately 
owned land. 
The fact that CERs coming from A/R CDM projects are 
excluded of the EU Emissions Trade Scheme (EU ETS) 
also implies a considerable constraint in market opportu-
nities for mitigation activities from the forestry sector in 
developing countries. 
In conclusion, mitigation activities in the forestry 
sector under the CDM have been limited to date. 
Opportunities to increase activities include simplifying 
procedures, developing certainty over future commit-
ments, reducing transaction costs, and building confidence 
and capacity among potential buyers, investors and project 
participants (Robledo et al. 2008). 
until 2012, which are restricted to afforestation and 
reforestation. Activities in bioenergy are also eligible 
until 2012 as far as these are undertaken using an 
approved methodology and considering all other 
clarifications made by the Executive Board of the 
CDM with this regard. Forest management and 
reduced emissions from deforestation are not eligible 
forestry activities under the CDM;
•  Agreement on the modalities and procedures for 
CDM projects in forestry and the process for 
proposing and getting approved corresponding 
methodologies;
•  Definition of small-scale projects and their first 
simplified methodology; and
•  Baseline and monitoring methodologies for the 
CDM, which are to be presented by project developers 
and approved by the Executive Board of the CDM. 
Considering the limited experience in A/R CDM 
compared with CDM projects of other sectors, it is too 
early to make an accurate evaluation of the impacts of the 
A/R CDM on poverty alleviation or in terms of net 
contribution of A/R CDM within the global mitigation 
portfolio.11 Even if the carbon market is active, its real 
development starts only in 2008 with the beginning of the 
first commitment period. Still, some early observations12 
are worth mentioning.
A/R CDM is a well regulated system that creates 
additional costs compared with traditionally designed 
forest plantations; e.g., to assess the carbon potential, new 
and often complex methodologies need to be developed in 
the design stage of the project, and the project cycle needs 
to include many actors and steps that are not yet well 
known locally. A/R CDM projects require, at least at the 
beginning, a high level of knowledge of the internationally 
agreed modalities, procedures and methodologies. 
Since such knowledge is presently barely available in 
many developing countries, there is often a need to engage 
international expertise, which further increases the project 
10  “For the first commitment period, the total additions to a Party’s assigned amount resulting from eligible LULUCF project activities under Article 12 shall not exceed 1% of base 
year emissions of that Party, times five” (FCCC/CP/2001/13, Decision 11/CP.7). 
11   The reason for this is mainly the lack of overall agreement by Parties on how to deal with LULUCF than delay in implementation.
12   These observations are based on the authors’ experience with the A/R CDM in Latin America, Asia and Africa.
13   Some bi- and multilateral development agencies have reacted to this fact and are funding capacity building for the preparation of A/R CDM projects, mainly through workshops, 
tools development and model project development.
2.3 lUlUCF activities in non-annex i parties
According to Article 4 of the Convention, both 
Annex I and non-Annex I Parties have to report their 
LULUCF emissions as part of their national communi-
cations. Information is to be provided using common 
report formats and in accordance with guidance given by 
the IPCC. 
Providing LULUCF information in the national 
communications is not an easy task for many non-
Annex I Parties. The lack of consistent information is a 
major concern. Other concerns relate to: a) the fact that 
the flexibility provided by the IPCC guidance allows 
Parties to use different methods and tiers which lead to 
different results; b) Parties do not always provide equiva-
lent information due to the different methods used; c) the 
information provided and the methods used are not always 
transparent (this is especially relevant when recalculating 
inventories over time); and d) given that reporting is 
obligatory on three GHGs only (CO2, methane (CH4) 
and nitrous oxide (N2O), information on the three other 
relevant GHG emissions, (hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), 
perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and SF6) is insufficient.
With regard to the mitigation strategy, the CDM is the 
only flexible mechanism that allows non-Annex I Parties 
to assist9 Annex I Parties in their efforts to achieve their 
GHG emission reduction targets under the Kyoto 
Protocol. LULUCF activities included in the CDM are 
afforestation and reforestation (A/R CDM) as defined in 
Box 1. While CDM procedures for the other five sectors 
were already agreed upon between before 2003, rules and 
procedures that govern A/R CDM for the first commit-
ment period were only finally decided in 2004 (see list of 
relevant decisions in Annex 4). Hence, it is only since the 
year 2005 that forest sector stakeholders in non-Annex I 
Parties can undertake A/R CDM projects according to 
defined rules. This partly explains the “delay” that 
LULUCF projects have compared with projects in the 
other sector eligible in CDM.
The most important elements of the rules and 
procedures in A/R CDM regulate:
•  The market size for A/R projects, which is limited 
during the first commitment period (2008-2012) to 
1% of the emissions of each Annex I country in 1990, 
multiplied by five;10
•  Eligible activities in the LULUCF sector for CDM 
Box 2: handling of forests in an annex i party: Switzerland
Switzerland informed the unFCCC Secretariat in november 2006 that it would count forest management as a carbon 
sink according to Article 3.4 of the Kyoto protocol. Switzerland has a cap of 1.83 million t carbon dioxide (Co2) per year 
to account for forest management. this corresponds to 40% of the total commitment of Switzerland as an Annex i 
party. in spite of this potential, there are accounting difficulties: (i) the transaction costs for assessment, monitoring and 
reporting are high and only acceptable for large forest owners which are in Switzerland in the minority; (ii) the risk of 
windfalls and thus of creation of a source of gHg-emissions is high due to weather hazards, particularly considering the 
longer term accounting beyond 2012; (iii) to reduce that risk there is a need of silvicultural interventions that eventually 
reduces the sink capacity of forests; and (iv) adaptation measures may be eventually needed to regenerate forests and 
might also reduce the sink capacity. 
Switzerland’s forests sequestered in average 2.7 million t of Co2 per year between 1990 and 1999 because of low harvest 
of wood. Since then, there has been considerable increase of wood harvesting because of increased demand for timber 
and wood energy, but also due to increased frequency and intensity of storms that lead to increased windfall and insect 
calamities. it is not clear yet what the sequestration potential of Swiss forests will be in between 2008-2012.
the mitigation of Swiss forests is highest when (i) the standing volume (carbon reservoir) is maintained or increasing; 
(ii)  the yearly increment in wood (carbon sequestration) is fully used; (iii) harvested wood is used with long-term effects 
(housing, furniture, etc); and (iv) at the end of the production cycle the wood is used as energy source.
With respect to forests in the post-2012 negotiations, it is essential for Switzerland that the assessment methods for 
forest management be simplified and that the missing link between carbon sink and carbon substitution be considered, 
e.g, through accounting for harvested wood products (HWp) that could help encourage silvicultural measures without 
loosing the value of the forest carbon sink.
9    The term “assist” the Annex I Parties is the exact wording in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol.
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As mentioned in sections 2.3 and 2.4, there are a 
number of technical and methodological issues that have 
evolved with the negotiations. Technical and methodologi-
cal issues and requirements for carbon accounting have 
been developed to accurately quantify the mitigation 
potential of a particular LULUCF activity. Technical and 
methodological issues relate mainly to how to define a 
baseline or a reference scenario, how to treat leakage, 
permanence and additionality, and how to monitor and 
report emission reductions or carbon sinks (see the 
glossary for definitions in Annex 2). These technical and 
methodological issues might need – in general terms – to 
be reassessed and complemented according to the LU-
LUCF activities that become an eligible in a post-2012 
agreement. In particular, there is the possibility that 
reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degrada-
tion (REDD) and/or forest restoration become eligible.
3.1 Carbon pools
Carbon in forestry mitigation activities can be found 
and measured in five so called “pools” or “reservoirs.” 
These are:
• Below-ground biomass;
• Above-ground biomass ;
• Litter;
• Dead wood;
• Soil organic carbon (see Figure 1). 
Ideally, one should collect data of changes in carbon 
stocks in all five pools, but doing so in an accurate and 
cost effective manner remains a major challenge. In order 
to facilitate the calculation of such changes, models and 
algorithms have been developed, especially for the two first 
pools. However, basis information on carbon stocks and 
stock change in each pool remains scarce and/or inaccu-
rate, particularly in developing countries. Hence, Parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol have agreed that afforestation and 
reforestation project activities under the CDM (CDM 
A/R) participants may choose not to account for one or 
more carbon pools, as long as the excluded pool is not a 
net GHG emitter (Decision 19/CP.9, later adopted by the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol as Decision 5/CMP.1).








Figure 1: Carbon pools in forests
Source: Robledo et al, 2008
would prefer larger markets for CDM or other credits. For 
non-Annex I Parties, the issue is about creating appropri-
ate incentives. Negotiations on a post-2012 agreement 
provide an opportunity to reassess procedures, to extend 
the list of eligible LULUCF activities, and possibly to 
simplify the manner in which LULUCF activities are 
included in the future climate change regime.
The fact that the contribution of LULUCF to Annex I 
Parties’ reduction commitments was agreed after the 
establishment of Kyoto targets constituted a major 
difficulty for using the whole potential of LULUCF as a 
means for mitigating climate change. That happened 
mainly because LULUCF was seen during the previous 
negotiations as a way to offset emissions, i.e., to avoid 
changing energy and consumption paths of the major 
emitters. A post 2012 mitigation regime will likely need 
to include a wider set of eligible activities in non-Annex 
I countries including agriculture, forestry, and other 
land uses.
Chapter 5 explains the current negotiations and how 
LULUCF is included in the ongoing processes.
Questions:
•  How is LULUCF considered in the national commu-
nication and/or GHG inventory in your country? 
•  Has your country participated in the LULUCF 
negotiations? If yes, how is the process in your country 
to define positions and negotiation strategies regarding 
LULUCF in the UNFCCC?
•  How was the participation of the forest sector 
representatives of your country in the UNFCCC 
negotiations?
•  Which are the lessons learned by your country during 
these negotiations?
•  What incentives would be needed for promoting 
action on LULUCF in your country?
•  According to the questions before, do you consider 
LULUCF as a key sector for your country in future 
negotiations? If yes, please discuss the kind of support 
your country will require to be well prepared for the 
negotiation process.
2.4 lessons learned from lUlUCF 
 negotiations 
Negotiating LULUCF in the framework of the 
UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol has demonstrated to 
be very difficult for both Annex I and non-Annex I 
Parties. While in previous years there was still consider-
able scientific uncertainty on the potential of LULUCF 
activities in mitigating climate change, substantial progress 
has been made in recent years by the IPCC, including the 
publication of the IPCC Good Practice Guidance (GPG) 
in 2003 and the IPCC 2006 Guidelines. Additional to the 
work of the IPCC,a number of tools and instruments to 
design an A/R CDM project activity are available, also in 
developing countries (e.g., ENCOFOR toolbox or 
TARAM for A/R CDM14). Nevertheless, there remain 
some important issues that maintain uncertainty about the 
potential of the A/R CDM. These are related to:
•  Technical issues relevant only to forestry activities 
(carbon accounting, leakage, treatment of environ-
mental and socio-economic impacts etc. See next 
section for more information);
•  Lack of accurate information in many developing 
countries;
•  Link to other critical development issues given wider 
environmental and social impacts;
•  General sense of low governance in the forest sector, 
especially in developing countries;
•  Some Parties argue that LULUCF mitigation options 
could be used to delay emission reductions in the 
energy and transportation sectors. This has had a 
negative influence on how LULUCF activities have 
been considered in the climate change negotiations 
over time.
Based on the first experiences with LULUCF, stakehold-
ers directly involved in the implementation of LULUCF 
activities from Annex I and non-Annex I Parties expressed 
a desire for simpler or more cost-effective ways to support 
the overall objective of the Convention through forestry 
activities. Some Annex I Parties want more flexibility to 
achieve their targets, while some developing countries 
14    ENCOFOR (Environment and Community-based Framework for Designing Afforestation, Reforestation and Revegetation Projects in the CDM) tools can be downloaded from 
http://www.joanneum.at/encofor/tools/tool_demonstration/Tools.htm. The TARAM tool (Tool for Afforestation and Reforestation Approved Methodologies) can be downloaded 
from http://carbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=BioCF&FID=9708&ItemID=9708&ft=DocLib&CatalogID=40526. 
keY iSSUeS iN laND USe, laND USe cHaNGe aND foreSTrY wiTH aN emPHaSiS oN DeVeloPiNG coUNTrY PerSPecTiVeS264 keY iSSUeS iN laND USe, laND USe cHaNGe aND foreSTrY wiTH aN emPHaSiS oN DeVeloPiNG coUNTrY PerSPecTiVeS 265
3.3 leakage 
In the A/R CDM, leakage has been defined as the 
increase in GHG emissions by sources that occurs 
outside the boundary of a given area (in A/R CDM in 
the project area) which is measurable and attributable 
to the particular activities envisaged (Decision 5/
CMP.1). 
A/R CDM methodologies need to include procedures 
for addressing and, if needed, for estimating leakage in the 
baseline and for measuring leakages in the monitoring. 
Considering that defining the system boundaries for 
estimating something “outside the boundary of the 
project” is extremely difficult, A/R CDM approved 
methodologies have dealt with leakages by identifying the 
potential displacement of people or products due to the 
proposed project activity. Based on such analysis the 
methodologies propose a leakage management area where 
the potential displacement of people or activities is 
addressed.17 Specific tools for estimating leakage according 
to this approach have been developed by the Afforestation/
Reforestation Working Group of the CDM Executive 
Board (ARWG).
In the discussion on REDD, some are referring to 
“displacement of emissions” when referring to leakages. 
As displacement of emissions has not been defined yet in 
any of the existing decisions, there is a lack of clarity about 
the differences between “displacement of emissions” and 
“leakages”. 
The main discussion on leakage revolves around 
differences on how to deal with it, depending on whether 
the national and/or the sub-national approach is to be 
used. In general terms, the discussion on leakage tends to 
accept that if an accurate national baseline/reference 
scenario and monitoring system can be set at the national 
level, risks of unaccounted leakage would disappear. This 
affirmation is based on the idea that if any displacement of 
activities or communities due to a REDD activity takes 
place, national inventories will reflect it. Therefore 
emissions resulting from displacement will need to be 
considered in the calculation of the net emission amount 
for the sector in a country.
defined in this context. Negotiations are now mainly based 
on the experience made through the CDM. Similarly, the 
term “reference scenario” has not yet been defined; neither 
in the Convention nor in the Kyoto Protocol. It seems 
that the reference scenario focuses on past (historical) data 
and extrapolates it into the future, similar to one of the 
three approaches defined for the CDM (approach 22a: 
Existing actual or historical emissions as applicable, in 
Decision 5/CMP.1). 
Another important question on the baseline/refer-
ence scenario relates to approaches for estimating GHG 
emissions. As observed in Table 1, the difference between 
gross and net emissions can be significant. A decision on 
net or gross emissions needs to consider the wide range of 
implications of both calculation options. The implications 
linked to these two different options are currently not 
clear in the negotiations and should be considered 
carefully in future sessions before any decision is made. 
It is important to recall that all emission reductions 
and sinks need to be monitored over time. The monitor-
ing reports are those that provide the definitive informa-
tion on the changes in carbon stocks. Hence the baseline is 
only an indicative of the emission reductions or removals 
that are expected from a mitigation activity. 
Questions:
•  How is the data availability in your country? Is there 
data on deforestation and forest degradation rates over 
time? Is there data on land cover by 1999, 2000 and 
current data.
•  With regard to the time period considered when 
defining the baseline/reference scenario, what 
approach would be more accurate for your country 
(only past trends, or past and future)?
•  Which would be the best option for your country: 
Baseline per projects, baseline at the level of a region 
(e.g., an eco-region) or national baseline. Would it  
be the same answer for each mitigation option  
(i.e., reforestation, afforestation, REDD, forest 
restoration, etc)? 
17    For A/R CDM approved methodologies see  http://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/ARmethodologies/approved_ar.html
3.2 Baseline or reference scenario
The baseline concept was defined for those project 
activities to be included in two of the Kyoto Protocol’s 
cooperative mechanisms: Joint Implementation (Article 6) 
and the CDM (Article 12).15
A baseline scenario is a term defined for the CDM. It 
relates to the sum of the changes in carbon stocks in the 
carbon pools within a given area that would have occurred 
in the absence of a LULUCF project activity. 
For the A/R CDM, three approaches were agreed for 
estimating the baseline16:
(a)  Existing or historical, as applicable, changes in 
carbon stocks in the carbon pools within the project 
boundary;
(b)  Changes in carbon stocks in the carbon pools within 
the project boundary from a land use that represents 
an economically attractive course of action, taking 
into account barriers to investment;
(c)  Changes in carbon stocks in the pools within the 
project boundary from the most likely land use at 
the time the project starts.
By August 2008, over 90% of the approved A/R CDM 
methodologies have chosen the approach (a) “historical”.
According to the current modalities and procedures for 
the CDM forestry projects have to define a baseline for eli-
gible activities within the project boundary (local level). 
The only exception is the “programmatic CDM” that was 
agreed at COP 11 in 2005. Some countries are currently 
working an A/R Programmatic CDM (e.g., Pakistan), but 
there is scarce experience on the opportunities and 
limitations of this approach. A shift to regional baselines 
implies a major change in these modalities and procedures 
for the A/R CDM and will need to be agreed by the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.
discussions regarding baseline in a post 2012 regime  
(particularly Redd):
Baselines are an essential part of any arrangement 
aiming at REDD as they provide the necessary refer-
ence against which performance can be assessed. For 
estimating the baseline in REDD activities, two issues 
should be considered when analysing: scale and time 
scenario. 
•  With regard to the scale of the baseline/reference 
scenario, there are three levels to consider:  local, 
regional or national. Local and regional baselines are 
linked to project activities, while national baselines are 
based on the possibility to use mainly national policies 
to reduce GHG emissions. However, it is possible to 
foresee a combination between these approaches where 
national baselines could be used as a reference for 
emission reductions in project activities at the local 
level. Regardless of whether a baseline is developed at 
national or project level, it will be important that the 
methods used are consistent across countries and 
rather conservative in their assumptions and outcomes, 
given the broad uncertainties that prevail in its 
assessment. 
•  With regard to the time period, there are two 
approaches: to consider only past trends or to 
consider past and future trends. The first approach is 
more favorable for countries with high rates of 
deforestation in the past, as these countries would have 
the greatest potential for claiming emission reductions 
in the future (e.g., in the Congo Basin in Africa). The 
second approach would be more favorable for coun-
tries that had a low rate of deforestation in the past but 
are threatened by a high future deforestation rate. 
Another ongoing discussion refers to the appropri-
ateness of baselines at the project level for REDD. Some 
authors argue that a regional baseline could contribute to 
increased transparency and accuracy in the estimations as 
well as to reducing transaction costs (Sathaye and An-
drasko, 2007). Most of the current analysis on regional 
baselines refers to avoiding deforestation activities; there is 
virtually no experience available for reducing forest 
degradation, respectively forest restoration activities.  
Within the ongoing discussion on REDD, two terms 
appear without specific definition: baseline and 
reference scenario. The term baseline has not been 
15    Baseline under Joint Implementation and the CDM: Baseline is the scenario that reasonably represents the anthropogenic emissions by sources or anthropogenic removals by 
sinks of greenhouse gases that would occur in the absence of the proposed project. (Decisions 16/CP.7 and 17/CP.7).
16    See Decision 5/CMP.1 Article 22. 
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impact” is defined by the host country where the A/R 
CDM project activity takes place.
Positive socio-economic and environmental impacts (or 
co-benefits) are not considered in the modalities and 
procedures and therefore there is no need to report on 
them. 
In Annex I countries, socio-economic or environmental 
impacts regarding LULUCF activities or activities in other 
sectors are not ruled under the Kyoto Protocol. Further-
more, CDM projects outside A/R CDM do not need to 
take into account social impacts. This means, e.g., that 
many potential negative impacts of biofuel project 
activities on social systems are simply not considered, 
addressed or monitored. This is an issue of concern, 
especially when discussing the potential of biofuels for 
substitution (see chapter 4 for biofuels as a mitigation 
option). 
Questions: 
•  How are “potential negative impacts” currently defined 
in your country?
•  Do you see a need for identifying and monitoring 
co-benefits?
•  Do you think that socio-economic and/or environ-
mental impacts and benefits are to be considered for 
other LULUCF activities besides A/R CDM? 
3.7 Monitoring and reporting
Maintenance of the reservoirs (pools) needs to be 
regularly monitored, and under the CDM also verified. 
These data have to be consistently reported so that a clear 
quantification of the global emission reductions can be 
calculated. To do so, reliable methods are needed to 
accurately assess emission reductions over time. While 
such methods exist, they tend to be very expensive. The 
experience in the ongoing A/R CDM shows that monitor-
ing costs can be very high (in some cases 25% of the total 
project cost). Similar indications have been done by Annex 
I countries on their costs for monitoring and reporting. 
Monitoring and reporting requirements need to be 
agreed in such a way that accurate quantification of the 
3.5 additionality
Additionality19 is the result of the GHG emissions 
reduced by the project (project scenario) minus those 
emissions that would occur in the absence of the 
project (baseline), minus the leakage caused by the 
project. It is a term used within the CDM and therefore 
applies only to project activities undertaken in NAI. 
Currently, additionality is estimated and monitored using 
the approved A/R CDM methodologies. 
As the current negotiations on REDD are under the 
Convention and financing solutions for REDD activities is 
still under discussion, the question as to whether activities 
in REDD have to be additional or not is open. The same 
occurs with other mitigation options that are not yet 
included in the A/R CDM such as forest restoration. 
Questions: 
•  Under which circumstances should LULUCF be 
additional (e.g., only for projects, or for national 
activities too)?
•  How does national legislation and enforcement affect 
the additionality of LULUCF activities in your 
country (e.g., if there is a forest conservation law)?
•  In your country, which other forestry projects can 
affect the additionality of LULUCF activities (e.g., 
Forest Law Enforcement and Governance - FLEG)? 
•  What about programs in other sectors (e.g., infrastruc-
ture projects affecting natural forests)?
3.6  environmental and socioeconomic impacts 
of mitigation activities
Until now, environmental and socio-economic impacts 
have been considered only in the A/R CDM. According to 
Decision 5/CMP.1, project proponents should ensure that 
there is no potentially significant negative socio-economic 
or environmental impact from the A/R CDM project 
activity. If such a potential impact is identified, project 
proponents must define how to reduce the impact. 
Further, these potential negative impacts will be then 
included in the monitoring. The “potential negative 
19    The definition of additionality, as in Decision 17/CP.7, para. 43: A CDM project activity is additional if anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases by sources are reduced below 
those that would have occurred in the absence of the registered CDM project activity.
3.4 permanence
The issue of permanence is related to the possibility 
that carbon in reservoirs can be emitted at any time, 
making emission reductions non-permanent. Perma-
nence relates to the period of time that carbon remains in 
the biosphere. Due to different risks, including fires and 
pests, carbon can be released into the atmosphere, thereby 
reducing the climate change mitigation effect of a project. 
The IPCC has clarified that a short-term reduction in 
emissions has a positive short-term impact in mitigating 
climate change. However, it is important to promote a 
permanent effect on the atmosphere. Concerns on 
permanence are only related to non-Annex I Parties 
without commitments, because countries with commit-
ments need to regularly report their progress considering 
all emissions from the LULUCF sector. If a given forest is 
degraded or a fire occurs, these emissions will be automati-
cally included in the national inventories.
Proposals for dealing with non-permanence in the 
LULUCF in the future include (a) using temporary 
credits;18 (b) banking credits and debits from one commit-
ment period to the next; (c) reducing future financial 
incentives to take into account emissions from deforesta-
tion above the agreed level; and (d) by mandatory setting 
aside of a share of the emission reductions. Furthermore, 
some Parties consider sustainable forest management as a 
means to promote the permanence of emission reductions.
The treatment of permanence is especially relevant if 
Parties agree on a market mechanism for REDD. In the 
case of A/R CDM, the question of permanence added to 
the transaction costs; the experience has also shown that 
temporary credits are cheaper than permanent credits. 
Thus, in REDD, the possibility of implementing perma-
nence issues will depend on whether the approach is fund 
or market based. 
Questions: 
•  Which proposal for dealing with permanence is the 
most convenient according to the circumstances in 
your country? 
Those supporting a sub-national approach (including 
the possibility for project activities at the local level) argue 
that good experience has been gained through the treat-
ment of leakage in the A/R CDM, which could be used as 
a basis for addressing potential leakage in a REDD project.
As for common points for A/R CDM and REDD, 
one key aspect in the discussion on leakage is how to 
define what “outside the boundary” means. Is it meant 
to consider any displacement of GHG emissions within 
the region, the country or also at the international level? 
There is some literature analysing potential international 
leakage in the forest sector. According to some authors, the 
international wood trade/wood exploitation can be heavily 
affected by activities aimed to mitigating climate change 
(Sathaye and Andrasco, 2007a). This concern has in-
creased after 2005 when the discussion on REDD started, 
as for some the risk for international leakages due to 
REDD activities can be so high that emissions reduced in 
a country could be replaced by emissions in another one.  
International leakage has not been considered for any 
other sector under mitigation yet, even though interna-
tional leakage in sectors such as energy or transportation 
could be even higher than in the forestry sector. There are 
different reasons for it, but perhaps one of the most 
important is that quantifying and moreover monitoring 
international leakage would have strong technical and legal 
implications, e.g., on international liabilities, and therefore 
it is very difficult to implement. 
Questions: 
•  Which are the major risks of leakages in your country?
•  Do you think that these risks can be reduced/ad-
dressed at the local level or is it necessary to define 
procedures and methodologies at the national level?
•  What will be the position of your country if interna-
tional leakages in forestry are to be negotiated in the 
future? Do you think that international leakage in 
other sectors should then also be addressed?
18    Temporary CERs expire at the end of the commitment period subsequent to the commitment period for which they were issued; long-term CERs are valid until the end of the 
project’s crediting period up to maximum of 60 years.
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In order to understand the entire potential of 
LULUCF in climate change mitigation, this chapter 
summarizes the different options in a systematic way. 
They all are open to consideration in a post-2012 
climate change regime. In its Fourth Assessment Report, 
the IPCC concluded that forest-related mitigation 
activities can considerably reduce emissions from sources 
and increase CO2 removals by sinks at a low cost, and can 
be designed to create synergies with adaptation and 
sustainable development. Forest mitigation options have 
to be considered as an immediate option to be applied 
over the next 20 to 30 years. The longer-term mitigation 
potential of such options remains, however, unclear. 
Global change will impact carbon mitigation in the forest 
sector, but the magnitude and direction of this impact 
cannot be predicted with confidence over longer period. 
Global change may affect tree growth and decomposition 
rates, the area, type, and intensity of natural disturbances, 
land-use patterns, and other ecological processes. 
Forestry can make a very significant contribution to a 
low-cost global mitigation portfolio that provides synergies 
with adaptation and sustainable development. However, 
this opportunity is not being taken fully into considera-
tion in the current institutional context and has resulted in 
only a small portion of this potential being realized at 
present (mainly through the A/R CDM). 
Forestry mitigation options include reducing emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation, enhancing 
carbon sinks through enhancing the sequestration rate in 
existing and new forests, providing wood fuels as a 
substitute for fossil fuels, and providing wood products for 
more energy-intensive materials. Properly designed and 
implemented, forestry mitigation options can have 
substantial co-benefits in terms of employment and 
income generation opportunities, biodiversity and 
watershed conservation, provision of timber and fiber, as 
well as aesthetic, cultural and recreational services. Table 2 
presents a simple classification of the mitigation options in 
forestry.20 For each option, the corresponding forest 
management approach is specified. The combined effects 
of reduced deforestation and degradation, afforestation, 
forest management, agro-forestry and bio-energy have the 
potential to increase from the present to 2030 and 
beyond. Thus, they all are important when discussing the 
implementation of the BAP.
The carbon mitigation potential from reducing defor-
estation, promoting forest management, afforestation, and 
agro-forestry differ greatly by activity, regions, system 
boundaries and the time horizon over which the options 
are compared (IPCC 2007c IPCC Fourth Assessment 
Report (AR4), WG III).




mitigation options in the UNfccc 
or its kyoto Protocol (kP) (lUlUcf)
forest management options
reduction of gHg emissions reducing emissions from deforesta-
tion and forest degradation (rEDD)
Sustainable management of (natural) forests
Committing forests for rEDD
Carbon sequestration Afforestation plantation, forestry, agroforestry, agro-sylvo-pastoral systems
reforestation
Enhancement of sinks through forest 
restoration (not yet clearly defined)
in forested areas: enrichment, planting, guided natural regeneration
Carbon substitution Substitution through harvested 
wood products: using forest prod-
ucts for electricity and fuel
Forest Biofuel plantations, sustainable use of wood production
Table 2: Mitigation options in forestry
20  It is understood that these mitigation options consider all five carbon pools, including organic soil carbon. 
emission reduction over time is possible, while at the 
same time making technologies and capacity building 
available for developing countries. 
Questions: 
•  Which forestry activities are already being monitored 
in your country (for the UNFCCC, UN Forum on 
Forests (UNFF), Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) or others)? 
•  Are there some synergies that could reduce monitoring 
costs in the A/R CDM?
•  How could monitoring and reporting requirements  
be simplified? 
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Questions: 
•  Does your country participate in other international 
processes that make decisions on future use of the 
forest resources? Which ones?
• How is the forest policy framework in your country?
•  At which level are decisions made regarding use and 
management of forest resources in your country?
•  Which forest management option would be the most 
promising forest mitigationoption in your country?
4.1  Reducing emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation
In the short term, the carbon mitigation benefits of 
reducing deforestation can be greater than the benefits of 
afforestation. That is because deforestation is the single 
most important source, with a net loss of forest area of 7.3 
million ha/yr between 2000 and 2005. Deforestation, as 
defined in the framework of the UNFCCC, is the direct 
human-induced conversion of forested land to non-forest-
ed land. There is yet no agreed definition on forest 
degradation in the UNFCCC. Of several variations of 
definitions proposed by the IPCC, the most recent is a 
direct human-induced long-term loss (persisting for X 
years or more) of at least Y% of forest carbon stocks (and 
forest values) since time T and not qualifying as deforesta-
tion or an elected activity under Article 3.4 of the Kyoto 
Protocol.24 
Deforestation (including land-use change) and forest 
degradation are the main emission sources in many 
developing countries (Stern, 2007). Latest figures 
released by the IPCC in 2007 indicate that land use 
change contributed to more than 20% of global carbon 
dioxide emissions, of which tropical deforestation very 
likely makes the largest part. Estimates on their share of 
the total global anthropogenic emissions differ according 
Figure 2: illustrative overview of mitigation options in forest management
 
Sustainable management of forests (for conservation, timber or multi-use): Keeping a relatively high carbon stock 
over a specific period of time; this principle is applied for example in a production forest that is managed accord-
ing to sustained yield criteria. A medium carbon stock is maintained over a rotation period, e.g, 30 years.
restoring degraded forests (for regaining the entire range of goods and services): most of the carbon emissions 
from forestry happen through forest degradation processes. restoring lost carbon pools based on close-to-nature 
silviculture and bringing them back into a sustained yield managed forests or in conservation forests is a major 
option to enhance gHg sinks.
Afforestation and reforestation (from non-forests to forests): planting new forests on non-forest land and bringing 
them back into a full carbon stocked forest (e.g, through A/r CDm). Forests are artificially created and can include 
dense plantations of exotic trees or agroforestry systems.
 
Source: Authors’ compilation
24  See also Annex 1 on key definitions in LULUCF
Realization of the mitigation potential requires institu-
tional capacity, investment capital, research and develop-
ment, and knowledge transfer, as well as appropriate 
policies and incentives and international cooperation.21  
Under the mitigation options of reducing emissions 
and increasing carbon sequestration, there are four 
forest management options22 to be considered, includ-
ing: 
•  Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation (REDD);
•  Forest management (sustainable use of existing 
forests);
•  Forest restoration (restoring degraded forest areas to a 
sustainably used forest);
•  Afforestation and reforestation23 (restoring lost carbon 
stocks to a sustainably used forest).
Figure 2 illustrates the link between different forest 
management options. Note that the forest degradation 
process is defined as the loss of existing carbon stocks 
through unsustainable use of forest resources. Degraded 
forests are still considered as forest area and not submitted 
to any land use change. Nevertheless, most of the existing 
carbon stock is lost within forested areas through overhar-
vesting of timber, fuelwood and other forest products. 
Reversing forest degradation through enhancement of 
sinks is here defined as forest restoration.
The assessment of the potential of any of these forest 
mitigation options should include the overall policy 
framework of the sector. Especially important is the 
analysis of the impact of mitigation options on the 
availability and quality of forest goods and services and the 
overall development goals of a given country. International 
processes and agreements such as the non-legally binding 
instrument (NLBI) on all types of forest of the UNFF 
elaborated in 2007 or the 2006 International Tropical 
Timber Agreement (ITTA) can have potentially a pro-
found impact on the future use of forests resources. Global 
and regional cooperation programs such as those from the 
Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF), the Forest 
Law and Enforcement & Governance (FLEG), the Global 
Forest Partnership (GFP), both initiatives of the World 
Bank and more tailor-made approaches towards REDD, 
such as the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) of 
the World Bank or the UN-REDD Initiative of FAO, 
UNDP and UNEP will certainly shape the future 
LULUCF agenda beyond 2012. Equally important are 
national legislation and programs resulting from the 
National Forest Program (NFP) Approaches that define 
goals and strategies for managing forests at a national and/
or sub-national level over decades to come.
21    Many efforts are now underway to provide technology and knowledge transfer. One of the most comprehensive approaches by mid-2008 is the development of the READINESS 
Plan of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility of the World Bank (FCPF). More than 20 countries are preparing such plans with considerable financial support of the international 
community through the FCFP.
22    Other important elements in the overall context of mitigation options in forests are: How to treat reduced impact logging? How to treat “pioneer agroforestry”? How to treat 
synergies between REDD and adaptation? How to treat the substitution potential of wood products?
23    In the newest reports of the IPCC and the Secretariat, “agroforestry” has been included in the agricultural sector. Nevertheless, it needs to be clarified that many A/R CDM 
projects that count under afforestation/reforestation are promoting agroforestry systems.
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As stated earlier, drivers for deforestation and forest 
degradation differ greatly by activities, regions, system 
boundaries and the time horizons. A report prepared for 
the UNFCCC Secretariat (Blaser & Robledo, 2007) 
quantified the mitigation potential of REDD based on the 
analysis of the opportunity costs of different use alterna-
tives. This analysis considered a simplified approach to 
characterize the following direct drivers of deforestation 
and forest degradation (see Table 4):
•  Commercial agriculture (national and international 
markets);
 o Commercial crops;
 o Cattle ranching (large scale);
• Subsistence farming;
 o  Small scale agriculture/shifting cultivation/slash 
and burn agriculture;
 o  Fuelwood and non-timber forest products 
(NTFP) gathering for local use, mostly 
family-based;
• Wood extraction;
 o  Commercial timber (legal and illegal) for 
national and international markets;
 o  Traded fuelwood (commercial at sub-national 
and national level).
Table 4: deforestation and forest degradation according to direct drivers in the 90s
main direct drivers Deforestation & 
degradation (% of total)
area of deforestation & 
degradation (million ha-1)
1. Commercial agriculture
    1.1 Commercial crops 20 2.6
    1.2 Cattle ranching (large scale) 12 1.6
2. Subsistence farming
    2.1  Small scale agriculture/shifting 
cultivation
42 5.5
    2.2 Fuel-wood and ntFp gathering 6 0.75
3. Wood extraction
    3.1  Commercial timber (legal and 
illegal)
14 1.8
    3.2 Fuel-wood/charcoal (traded) 5 0.7
Total 100 12.9
Source: Based on UNFCCC 2007 and 2007a; and Blaser and Robledo 2007 
Database used: FAO-FRA 2000 and 2005
According to the FAO, the rate of deforestation during 
the 1990s was 12.9 million hectares yearly, corresponding 
to emissions of 5.8 Gigatons of CO2 (GtCO2)/yr (FAO, 
2006 and IPCC, 2007c). Nearly all deforestation is 
occurring in developing countries situated in the tropical 
and subtropical climatic belt. Figures about forest degrada-
tion are inevitably not as detailed. The International 
Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) (2002) estimates 
the extent of degraded forest in the tropics to be about 
850 million ha, corresponding to 40% of the entire 
forested area in the tropics. For defining the mitigation 
potential of REDD until 2030 (UNFCCC 2007a), only 
the deforestation figure as advanced by FAO has been 
considered. The regions with the highest emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation are situated in the 
humid and semi-humid tropics, in particular in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America. In temperate areas and boreal 
climatic zones forest areas are stable or increasing. 
Table 3 summarizes existing data on carbon loss from 
deforestation. It gives a good characterization of the range 
of carbon emissions that result from using different 
assessment approaches. This is precisely the type of data 
that leaves many negotiators and also scientists wondering 
about the feasibility of implementing REDD at a national 
scale when the data are so scattered and weak. However, 
techniques are rapidly improving, for example, through 
considerable efforts of technology transfer programs such 
as the World Bank’s FCPF, UN-REDD and the work in 
improving remote sensing forest monitoring promoted 
inter alia by various members of the Collaborative 
Partnership on Forests.
to the source and the type of activity included (Schla-
madinger et al., 2007). Deforestation causes significant 
GHG emissions – an estimated 7.6 billion tones of CO2 
per year in 2000, about 15 to 20% of all GHG emissions 
(Baumert et al., 2005). Houghton (2005a) estimates that 
forest conversion, forest degradation and shifting cultiva-
tion altogether were responsible for carbon emissions 
equivalent to 15-35% of fossil fuel emissions in the 1990s. 
While these figures have a large degree of uncertainty, they 
stress the relevance of including efforts to combat defor-
estation in climate negotiations.
In some circumstances, deforestation and degrada-
tion can be delayed or reduced through the complete 
protection of forests (Soares-Filho et al., 2006), 
through sustainable forest management practices, or by 
providing economic returns from non-timber forest 
products and forest uses not involving tree removal. 
Protecting forests from all harvests typically results in 
maintained or increased forest carbon stocks, but also 
reduces the wood and land supply to meet other societal 
needs. Reducing deforestation and degradation is the 
forest mitigation option with the largest and most 
immediate carbon stock impact in the short term per 
hectare and year globally. The mitigation costs of reduced 
deforestation depend on the causes of deforestation 
(commercial agriculture, subsistence farming, wood 
extraction), the associated returns from the non-forest land 
use, the returns from potential alternative forest uses, and 
on any compensation paid to the individual or institu-
tional landowner.
Table 3: estimates of carbon loss from forests attributed to deforestation
(from different authors; carbon loss to the atmosphere in gigatons of carbon per year  
(gtC/yr) / gigatons of carbon dioxide per year (gtCo2/yr))
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fertilizers or drainage of forest soil (especially in peat 
lands) can have a negative effect on the overall carbon 
balance and should, therefore, be minimized. Moderate 
drainage, however, can lead to increased peat carbon 
accumulation (Minkkinen et al., 2002). Landscape-level 
carbon stock changes are the sum of stand-level changes in 
the different pools, and the impacts of forest management 
on carbon stocks ultimately needs to be evaluated at a 
landscape level. Increasing harvest rotation lengths can 
increase some carbon pools (e.g., tree boles) while 
decreasing others (e.g., harvested wood products)  
(Kurz et al. 1998).
The basic assumption is that the production forest area 
in 2030 will be the same as today. The basis for the cost 
estimates for this to be achieved is the ITTO Expert panel 
report on estimating the costs to achieve the ITTO 
Objective on Sustainable Forest Management (SFM).27 
This report was produced in 1995, based on an analysis 
using Criteria and Indicators for SFM. The ITTO report 
estimated the costs of SFM for all tropical production 
forests in ITTO member countries (about 350 million 
ha.) at $6.25 billion. Considering present values (2007) 
and applying a 5% devaluation factor, this would corre-
spond to about $12 per ha by the year 2030.  
For non-Annex I tropical and subtropical countries, the 
cost estimate for achieving sustainable forest management 
would therefore be around $7.3 billion. For non-Annex I 
countries with temperate and boreal forests that have 
potential to increase carbon stocks through forest manage-
ment, the amount of $20 per ha-1 (as indicated by 
Whiteman, 2006), an additional $1 billion can be 
estimated as cost of forest management for these countries. 
In the long term, a sustainable forest management 
strategy aimed at maintaining or increasing forest 
carbon stocks while producing an annual sustained 
yield of timber, fibre or energy from the forest will 
generate a meaningful sustained mitigation benefit. 
Most mitigation activities require up-front investment 
with benefits and co-benefits typically accruing for many 
years to decades.
Questions:
•  How do you assess the emission reduction potential of 
REDD in your country?
•  What are the capacity needs in your country for the 
development of a national and a project-based 
approach to REDD?
•  What institutions could be used or need to be 
developed in order to ensure equitable sharing of 
benefits derived from carbon credits earned through 
REDD?
•  What is the baseline/reference scenario, and how 
would you assess it in your context: net or gross 
emissions?
•  Discuss and evaluate: national baseline scenario, 
sub-national and project baseline scenario. What are 
the opportunities and risks?
•  Have there been any early actions in your country to 
address REDD?
4.2 Forest management26 
Forest management, as defined by the UNFCCC, is a 
system of practices for the stewardship and use of forest 
land aimed at fulfilling relevant ecological (including 
biological diversity), economic and social functions of the 
forest in a sustainable manner.
Forest management activities include silvicultural 
interventions that promote a greater proportion of the 
desired species, tree population and size structure, which 
in terms of timber means promoting the maximum 
volume of usable growing stock and, therefore, of carbon 
which may not be released to the atmosphere. They also 
include harvesting systems that maintain partial forest 
cover, minimize losses of dead organic matter or soil 
carbon by reducing soil erosion, and avoid slash and 
burning and other high-emission activities. Replanting or 
natural regeneration promotion after harvest or natural 
disturbances accelerates tree growth and reduces carbon 
losses. Economic considerations are typically the main 
constraint, because retaining additional carbon on site 
delays revenues from harvest (IPCC 2007c). The use of 
26   This subsection is based on the report prepared by Blaser and Robledo for the UNFCCC Secretariat, which was used as input for the “Background paper on analysis of existing 
and planned investment and financial flows relevant to the development of effective and appropriate international response to climate change” (UNFCCC, 2007a).
27   See ITTO at: http://www.itto.or.jp
Calculating the cost of implementing REDD is 
extremely difficult and explains the wide variations in 
estimates. When using the opportunity cost of direct 
drivers as a basis for the calculation, and if emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation are to be reduced to 
zero by 2030, a minimum investment of $12.2 billion25 
per year would be necessary to compensate the opportu-
nity costs of deforestation and forest degradation (UN-
FCCC 2007a). According to this calculation, an average 
price of $2.80/tCO2 will cover the opportunity cost of 
deforestation and forest degradation of 8.5 million of 
hectares yearly. This would represent an emission reduc-
tion of ~GtC 3.76 tCO2/year (65% of the emissions). For 
this scenario, the price of $2.80/tCO2 will also improve 
livelihood conditions in many regions, as this price is 
higher that the opportunity cost of the poverty-driven 
deforestation and forest degradation. Such an improve-
ment would depend on various factors, especially on the 
administration and transaction costs of REDD activities 
and the specific conditions of each region (socio-econom-
ic, institutional, access to infrastructure, etc.) (UNFCCC 
2007a).
When the highest marginal cost to completely stop 
deforestation – the “choke price” – is applied to the 
projected deforestation to estimate the cost of reduced 
deforestation prices vary between $11 to $77 per tCO2 
(excluding transaction costs) (Sathaye et al. 2007). 
Applying those prices (to the projected emissions due to 
the loss of primary forest in each region) yields a cost of 
$25 to 185 billion per year to stop deforestation (UN-
FCCC 2007a and Trines 2007).  
Effective implementation of REDD faces a number of 
methodological problems. The key ones – as summarized 
from the analysis in chapter 3 - are the following:
•  “Leakage” or “Displacement”. This is the possibility 
that carbon emissions avoided in one location will 
simply relocate to another location (an issue for any 
carbon emission mitigation approach). The avoidance 
of displacement is a justification for adopting a 
national framework for REDD implementation rather 
than, or in addition to, a project-based approach, 
because calculation of carbon credits on a national 
level would take account of domestic leakage.
•  Permanence. Because of the possibility that forests 
might be destroyed through fire or other natural 
calamities, or through increased pressures on forest 
land, there is no guarantee of a permanent carbon 
reservoir and CO2 sequestration, leading to debate 
over whether REDD carbon credits should be 
temporary or permanent. However, as Watson, Noble 
et al. 2000, section 2.3.6.2, show, even a one-time 
reduction in deforestation rates will have a permanent 
effect on atmospheric carbon levels, unless the baseline 
deforestation rate is exceeded.
•  Establishment of baseline/reference scenarios. This 
issue refers not only to the methodological issues of 
measuring baseline or reference scenarios, but also 
their appropriate definition, as the establishment of 
generous baseline levels would benefit both suppliers 
and buyers of subsequent carbon credits. Also, 
countries that have historically chosen to address 
deforestation rates should not be penalised for this 
form of “early action”.
•  The relative role of market-based and non-market 
financial mechanisms. While market-based approach-
es will most probably play a major role in REDD, 
many developing countries face significant needs to 
built necessary capacity for which market-based 
funding is hardly at disposal. A system to ensure 
equitable sharing of benefits accrued from sale of 
credits derived from REDD needs to be established.  
There are also political issues related to the idea that 
the carbon market could constrain national sovereign-
ty in determining land use and forest management 
policies.
The relative advantages of national or project-based 
REDD frameworks, or a hybrid of the two, needs to be 
assessed in order to develop an effective and comprehen-
sive implementation system. Similarly, the role of tempo-
rary and permanent credits needs to be resolved, as do the 
methodological issues related to the establishment of 
baseline or reference scenarios.  
25  $1 Billion = $1000 Million
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The potential of forest restoration can be summarized as 
follows:
•  Forest restoration is an issue in all non-Annex I 
countries where REDD is considered;
•  The forest restoration potential is estimated to cover 
about 850 million ha;
•  Considering an average carbon stock of 30 tC/ha in 
living carbon pools (above and below ground biomass) 
in degraded forests, this amounts to 25 GtC for the 
pantropical area;
•  Fully stocked, these 850 million ha would amount to 
57 GtC;
•  Hence the maximum carbon stock restoration 
potential through restoration of degraded forest would 
amount to 32 GtC.
Taking a price of $12 per ton of carbon, as paid today 
by some of the CDM A/R projects, there would be an 
additional potential cost of about $38 billion that has not 
been included in the A/R CDM for the first commitment 
period. Still, this activity can be considered for a post-
2012 forest mitigation regime. 
Questions: 
•  How do you assess the sequestration potential of forest 
restoration in your country?
•  What is more convenient for your country: a national 
or a project based approach?
•  What is the baseline/reference scenario, and how 
would you assess it in your context: net or gross 
emissions?
•  Are there ongoing or planned programs on forest 
restoration in your country?
4.4 afforestation and reforestation
Afforestation, as defined in classical forestry science, is 
planting trees on non-forested land (afforestation) or on 
forested land without trees in 1990 (reforestation).29 As 
noted above, under the UNFCCC, these two terms have a 
particular definition and have been used as such for A/R 
CDM.  Both terms, in the LULUCF context, refer to 
planting trees on land that is defined as non-forests.  
In general terms, afforestation and reforestation 
initiatives have been driven mainly by the private 
sector for undertakings such as commercial plantation 
forestry, or by governments, particularly for soil and 
watershed protection. The drivers that influence affores-
tation and reforestation vary according to region and often 
even within a country.
A particular form of A/R CDM is the use of agrofor-
estry. Agroforestry refers to the planting of trees among or 
around crops or on pasture land as a means of preserving 
or enhancing the productivity of the land. In many parts 
of the world, smallholder agroforestry systems are tree- 
and species-rich systems producing non-wood and wood 
products for both home use and market sale. These 
systems can sequester large amounts of carbon that are 
retained in the biosphere over time. While the individual 
systems may be of limited size, on a per area basis 
smallholder systems accumulate significant amounts of 
carbon, equal or beyond the amount of carbon stored in 
degraded forests. Their ability to simultaneously address 
smallholders’ livelihood needs and store large amounts of 
carbon makes smallholder agroforesty systems viable 
project types under A/R CDM, with its dual objective of 
emission reductions and sustainable development. 
Simplified smallholder A/R CDM projects based on 
agroforestry concepts still needs to be refined, in particular 
with respect to the bundling of approaches and to the 
acceptance of a carbon accounting approach at landscape 
level. 
Sathaye et al. (2006) projected the potential land area 
planted and the removals by sinks (including planting 
forests and agroforestry systems) benefits across a number 
of scenarios relative to 2100 and compared them to a 
reference scenario.  For 2050 the range of land area 
planted is between 52 and 192 million ha whereas the 
carbon benefits range from 18 to 94 million t of CO2. 
According to the same authors, the forest establishment 
costs range from $654 per ha to $1580 per ha (ORNL 
1995). Using this range, the initial investment required 
for mitigation equivalent to 18–94 million t CO2 through 
afforestation/reforestation on 52–192 million hectares of 
29    The European Environmental Agency recently defined forest plantations as forest stands established by planting or/and seeding in the process of afforestation or reforestation. 
They are either: a) of introduced species (all planted stands), or b) intensively managed stands of indigenous species which meet all the following criteria: one or two species 
at plantation, even age class and regular spacing. It excludes stands which are established as plantations but which have been without intense management for a significant 
period of time; these should be considered semi-natural.
4.3 Forest restoration
Forest restoration is a combination of planting trees and 
human-induced natural regeneration within a degraded 
forest area that has lost most of its carbon stock.28 Forest 
restoration thus is a strategy applied in degraded forest 
areas. Forest restoration aims to enhance and accelerate 
natural processes of forest regeneration (including carbon 
stocks) in order to regain the desired species composition 
and growing capacity of the forest ecosystem. In terms of 
mitigating climate change, forest restoration becomes 
complementary to reducing emissions from reducing 
forest degradation. One could try to reduce as far as 
possible emissions from degradation. In those areas where 
such a strategy is not completely successful, and where 
degradation has already taken place, one would need to 
restore the forest. Under current conditions there is a huge 
area of degraded forest that could be restored while 
improving overall livelihood conditions (including 
biodiversity, long-term income and health). 
Questions: 
•  How do you assess the mitigation potential of forest 
management in your country? 
•  What is more convenient for your country: a national 
or a project based approach?
•  What is the baseline/reference scenario, and how 
would you assess it in your context: net or gross 
emissions?
•  Are there ongoing or planned programs on (sustain-
able) forest management in your country?
28    In the context of forest management, forest degradation is the reduction of the capacity of a forest to produce goods and services. ‘Capacity’ includes the maintenance of 
ecosystem structure, functions and carbon stocks (ITTO, 2002a).
Table 5:  estimated extent of degraded forest landscapes by category in Tropical 








Degraded primary and 
secondary forest
145 180 175 500
Degraded forest land 125 155 70 350
total 270 335 245 850
Source: Blaser and Robledo, 2007, based on Blaser and Sabogal (2002): ITTO Guidelines for Forest Restoration 
and Secondary Forest Management. 
*Authors’ estimates. Based on FAO (1982, 1990, 1995, 2001); Sips (1997); Wadsworth (1997); WRI-World Bank 
(2000). In tropical America, about 38 million ha are classified as secondary forests.  For the other regions it is 
not possible to distinguish between degraded primary forests and secondary forests.
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b) potential impacts on food security
There are considerable concerns on the impacts of 
biofuel production on food prices and hence global food 
security. This concern is based on the fact that producing 
crops for biofuels increases competition on available land 
and food production. Since available land is a limited 
good, the market price and changes in demand of a given 
forest product has a great impact on decisions regarding 
which crop should be produced and/or brought to which 
market (Peskett et al., 2007). 
If, for example, demand for Jatropha seeds increases due 
to a boom in the biodiesel market, Jatropha plantations, 
which are normally done on “waste land” will become 
competitive for agricultural land (Von Braun and Pach-
auri, 2006). The impact on the global food market has 
already been felt during the first semester of 2008. Further 
stress to the food market will increase social discomfort 
and augment social disparity worldwide.
c) integrated environmental impacts of biofuels
Besides the GHG balance, other environmental impacts 
need to be carefully understood when discussing the 
possibility of using biofuel. Impacts on soil degradation, 
resource depletion, biodiversity loss, ecotoxicity, air 
pollution and water contamination have been included in 
a research study using the Life Cycle Analysis framework 
(LCA) by Zah et al. (2007). According to this report, to 
date almost all biofuels are beyond the environmental 
benchmark for fossil fuels. If the environmental integrity 
of the Convention is to be maintained, a better under-
standing of the real potential impacts of biofuels needs to 
be ensured before promoting large biofuel programs for 
mitigation.
Questions: 
•  Do you have information regarding the potential for 
biofuel crops in your country? 
•  Is there any program supporting biofuel production in 
your country?
•  Is the promotion of forest biofuels a priority in your 
country?
•  Are you aware of the environmental and/or social 
impacts due to forestry biofuel production in your 
country?
Bioethanol and biodiesel are the most common forms of 
biofuels. For the forestry sector, wood substitution, 
ethanol from wood (second generation biofuels) and 
biodiesel from vegetable oils from trees and bushes (e.g., 
palm oil or Jatropha-oil) are the most important options.
Recently, the commercial use of biomass for bioenergy 
has received a boost from high oil prices and the policies 
that governments have initiated to promote renewable 
energy sources. Over the past few years, the areas under 
biofuel plantations have increased dramatically around the 
world, particularly of soybeans and oil palm. This latter 
produces more oil per hectare than any other oilseed, and 
can be blended directly with petroleum-based diesel, 
producing a cleaner fuel. Malaysia and Indonesia account 
for 85% of the palm oil produced worldwide (Carrere 
2006).
Rising demand for intensively produced biofuel outside 
forests, such as palm oil, will decimate biodiversity unless 
producers and politicians can work together to preserve as 
much remaining natural forest as possible. Even if 
recognising that tree crops have a considerable mitigation 
potential, some aspects need to be taken into account 
when assessing the overall benefits for sustainable develop-
ment:
a) potential impacts on deforestation
Because palm oil plantations are often established after 
natural forests have been logged and then burned to clear 
the land for planting, the increasing area under plantations 
of oil palm may seriously threaten the remaining tropical 
forests in some developing countries. Furthermore, large 
parts of palm oil producing countries in South East Asia 
consist of peatlands, initially covered by rainforests. 
Rainforest peatlands are rapidly being destroyed through 
deforestation and drainage for plantations (mainly oil 
palm and pulp wood). 
In other regions (e.g., Latin America), forests are being 
cleared to extend the area under soybean cultivation. 
While the market for soybeans has been traditionally for 
food and animal fodder, there is an increasing interest in 
using this crop to produce bio-diesel.  
land would be $34–303 billion. The IPCC WG III AR4 
estimate of the mitigation potential of afforestation by 
2030, i.e., 1,618 to 4,045 Mt CO2/ year, is substantially 
lower than the estimate of Sathaye et al. (2006). Using a 
similar ratio between carbon sequestered and hectares 
planted, the WG III AR4 estimates would require 4.6–8.2 
million ha. At establishment cost of $654–1580 per ha 
that would be $3–12.9 billion or $0.1–0.5 billion per year 
over 25 years. 
Questions: 
•  How do you assess the sequestration potential of 
afforestation and reforestation activities in your 
country? 
•  What is more convenient for your country: a national 
or a project based approach?
•  What is the baseline/reference scenario, and how 
would you assess it in your context: net or gross 
emissions?
•  In your country, do there exist tree planting programs 
and what are their purposes?
•  Which would you see as promising LULUCF activities 
for a post-2012 climate regime? 
4.5 Substitution and the use of forest biofuel30
Mitigation options in the forestry sector include 
extending carbon retention in harvested wood products, 
product substitution and producing biomass for bio-ener-
gy. This carbon is removed from the atmosphere and is 
available to meet society’s needs for timber, fibre, and 
energy. Biomass from forestry can contribute 12-74 EJ/yr 
to energy consumption, with a mitigation potential 
roughly equal to 0.4-4.4 GtCO2/yr depending on the 
assumption of whether biomass replaces coal or gas in 
power plants (IPCC 2007 AR4, WG III). 
Forest biofuel refers either to energy carriers derived 
from processed or unprocessed plants biomass, such as the 
plantation of Jatropha and other forest trees and shrubs or 
to so-called second generation biofuels - that is deriving 
biofuels from cellulosic material, in particular from wood. 
30    Biofuels are considered normally under the energy sector. This short section intents to present the issue as it is relevant for policy makers in the forest sector. It is not a 
comprehensive presentation nor an analysis on the potentials for and difficulties in using biofuels as a means for mitigating climate change.
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forest management; demonstration of reductions in 
emissions from forest degradation; implications of national 
and sub-national approaches, including displacement of 
emissions; options for assessing the effectiveness of actions. 
There is a clear link between this process and the work of 
the AWG-LCA. It is, therefore, of key importance that 
policy makers keep consistency in their positions when 
participating in these two processes. Submissions made by 
Parties point to priorities for discussion (see Table 6).
5.3  ongoing discussion in the SBSTa with  
regard to Redd 
In accordance with Decision 2/CP.13, the SBSTA 
started a program of work on methodological issues related 
to a range of policy approaches and positive incentives for 
REDD. Parties have been asked to provide their views on 
outstanding methodological issues, including: assessments 
of changes in forest cover and associated carbon stocks and 
GHG emissions; incremental changes due to sustainable 
Table 6: issues under current discussion
The issues The discussion
activities to be considered Some parties would like to concentrate on deforestation and forest degradation as they 
consider that other potential activities bring many uncertainties to the discussion. others also 
want to consider conservation, sustainable forest management and/or enhancements of sinks.
Definitions the definition of forest has a great impact on rEDD as well as on the potential for all other 
mitigation options in forestry. it is imperative to clarify which definition should be used. Some 
parties highlight the need of having a definition that addresses different national circumstanc-
es and different ecosystems types within a country. 
the definition of other terms such as degradation, sustainable forest management and conser-
vation also needs to be clarified in the context of mitigating climate change.
National and sub-national  
approaches
Some parties favor national approaches, while other parties highlight the need to include 
also sub-national approaches with a certain level of flexibility. issues for argumentation are 
treatment of emissions displacement, monitoring requirements, accuracy and treatment of 
uncertainties.
reference scenario or baseline the reference scenario seems to be  linked to historical data while the baseline seems to in-
clude also future trends. For those countries with a high deforestation rate in the past, the ref-
erence scenario appears to be a more adequate option while for those countries with potential 
increments in deforestation rates in the future the possibility to build up a baseline considering 
these future trends looks more adequate.
measurable, reportable and  
Verifiable (mrV) requirements
this issue is discussed under the monitoring requirements. the discussion in the submissions 
is how far satellite imaginary is enough (in terms of adequacy of the technology and installed 
capacities in developing countries) and/or how other monitoring tools and existing informa-
tion can be used (e.g, inventories, ground check, etc). 
funding mechanism this concerns the possibility of having a market mechanism or of creating a fund for rEDD 
compensation. in both cases, it is assumed that some kind of payment needs to be considered 
as a key incentive for rEDD (see table 8 for a detailed information on the mechanisms that 
have been discussed).
effectiveness of support given by  
annex i countries
in the submissions, parties refer to the need to have clarity about the criteria for support, the 
amount of resources invested and a way for assessing its effectiveness.
Currently there are three major negotiation processes 
under the UNFCCC:  the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the 
Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP), the Ad Hoc Working Group 
on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention 
(AWG-LCA) and the ongoing discussions under SBSTA. 
At COP 15 in 2009, these discussions should converge on 
a consistent agreement for a post-2012 mitigation regime.
This section will first present the way LULUCF issues 
are considered in these ongoing negotiation processes. 
After that, some more detailed analysis of the policy 
options on REDD, as well as other mitigation options in 
forestry, will be presented. 
5.1  ad hoc Working Group on Further  
Commitments for annex i parties under the 
Kyoto protocol (aWG-Kp)31 
Article 3.9 of the Kyoto Protocol establishes the need to 
consider future commitments for Annex I Parties at least 
seven years before the end of the first commitment period. 
The AWG-KP was created for pursuing this aim. Results 
should be ready for adoption by the Conference of the 
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol (CMP) at the earliest possible time to ensure that 
there is no gap between the first and second commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol.
Under this negotiating process, there is a specific agenda 
item on LULUCF, where all activities included in Article 3 
of the Protocol are under discussion. The following are 
under consideration:
•  Activity-based approach based on Article 3.3 and 3.4 
of the Kyoto Protocol;
•  Land-based approach based on reporting under the 
Convention;
•  Harvested wood products (HWP).
Besides, potential new activities such as wetland 
management, restoration and degradation and forest 
degradation are included in the discussions. Key elements 
in the discussion include the possibility or need for using 
discounting factors limiting the magnitude of LULUCF 
for Annex I Parties’ compliance and many legal aspects. 
Conclusions and decisions of this process are bound to 
have impacts on monitoring and reporting requirements 
for LULUCF in Annex I Parties. 
5.2  ad hoc Working Group on long-term  
Cooperative action under the Convention 
(aWG-lCa)32 
The AWG-LCA was created to conduct the comprehen-
sive process to enable the full, effective and sustained 
implementation of the Convention through long-term 
cooperative action, now, up to and beyond 2012, as agreed 
in the BAP, Decision 1/CP.13). Regarding forests, the BAP 
includes in paragraph 1(b)(iii):
Policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating 
to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degrada-
tion in developing countries; and the role of conservation, 
sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest 
carbon stocks in developing countries;
In the majority of the submissions for the first meeting 
of the AWG-LCA, LULUCF is mentioned as an impor-
tant option for mitigating climate change.33 The major 
issues for discussion are:
•  Which activities to include. In the submissions, the 
following activities were mentioned when discussing 
mitigation options in developing countries: REDD, 
forest conservation, sustainable forest management 
and enhancements of sinks. Some Parties also men-
tioned afforestation and reforestation as well as forest 
management;
•  Consequences on reporting measurable and verifiable 
emission reductions and enhancements in stocks;
•  Need for consistency with the ongoing work under the 
AWG-KP. 
5.  oveRvieW oF exiSTiNG poliCY opTioNS
31    Bear in mind that only Parties that have already ratified the Kyoto Protocol participate in this negotiation; that is the Parties acting as the meeting of the Parties (CMP) of the 
Kyoto Protocol.
32    All parties in the Convention participate in this negotiation (this process distinguishes between developed and developing countries).
33    These documents can be downloaded under http://unfccc.int/documentation/documents/items/3595.php#beg. 
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Regarding positive incentives, the following options 
have been considered in the submissions: direct regulation 
(e.g., national policies), taxes and subsidies, transfer 
payments and permit trading. While taxes and subsidies 
are defined at the national level, regulation for transfer 
payments and permit trading can also be agreed at the 
international level. There is some literature analysing the 
pros and cons of each of these incentives (e.g., Kaimowitz 
and Angelsen 1998, von Amsber 1998, Lele et al. 2000, 
Espach 2006, Forner et al., 2006). One common conclu-
sion is that a given incentive is not better or worse per se, 
but its success depends on the overall institutional 
framework as well as on the possibilities to enforce the 
institutional agreements at various levels and to monitor 
results. 
Questions: 
•  Which policy instruments have been used in your 
country in the forest sector? Is there any evaluation/
assessment available for these policies?
•  Which incentive mechanisms have been used in your 
country in the forestry sector? Is there any evaluation/
assessment available of these instruments?
5.5 Financing options 
There is general agreement that any mechanism for 
promoting mitigation options in the forest sector in 
developing countries should include the provision of new 
and additional financial resources. However, there are 
different positions on where these resources should come 
from and which kind of mechanism should be agreed. 
Many submissions include proposals on financing 
mechanisms for REDD (see Table 8). How far these 
proposals could include other forestry options has not yet 
been discussed. The following are the key issues and points 
considered during the discussions REDD:
•  Possible sources of funding include: official develop-
ment assistance (ODA), establishment of funds, 
multilateral sources, public-private partnerships, 
payment for environmental services (PES) and market 
mechanisms;
•  Non-market financial resources are acceptable for the 
majority of the Parties, but funding will generally be 
limited. Market-based approaches facilitate private 
sector participation and are more likely to be long-
term and sustainable; 
•  Consideration of approaches to reward actions on 
REDD needs to be broad and include several alterna-
tives;
•  There is a need for additional and innovative financial 
mechanisms, as well as for reinforcing existing 
support;
•  Up-front financing is needed for institutional and 
technical capacity building, technology transfer and 
pilot activities;
•  Implementation of actions on the ground requires 
long-term, sustainable funding; 
•  It is important that rewards or/and compensation 
reach “actors” on the ground; 
•  Governance of the forest resources will play a major 
role in all forest mitigation options;
•  Funding should be provided for demonstrable 
emission reductions from reduced deforestation;
•  There is the concern that market based approaches 
could devalue the price of existing carbon credits 
(under the believe of some that forest based carbon 
could flood the market);
•  A new supply of credits must be met by new demand 
created by deeper reduction commitments by Annex I 
Parties;
•  Any funding mechanism should ensure permanence of 
emission reductions and/or enhancement of sinks. 
Questions: 
•  Which are the advantages and challenges of market 
mechanisms for your country? Which are the advan-
tages and disadvantages of funds? Which financing 
option seems to be more appropriate? 
•  Do you have upfront financing mechanisms for 
forestry activities in place in your country?
•  Which other kind of taxes and subsidies are used in 
the forestry sector in your country?
5.4 policy instruments and approaches 
In the discussion on policy instruments and approaches, 
two elements need to be differentiated: the kind of policy 
instruments that can be used for tackling emissions of 
GHG from deforestation and forest degradation; and the 
level on which this instrument is to be applied – local, 
regional or national (see Tirpak et al. 2008). What kind of 
instrument can be used for accommodating forestry 
mitigation options, including REDD, in a post-2012 
regime? Within the UNFCCC and according to the 
ongoing processes explained before, we can identify three 
options that have different advantages and disadvantages 
(see Table 7):
•  The CDM: Currently, only afforestation and reforesta-
tion are eligible LULUCF activities under the CDM. 
In a post-2012 regime, the mechanism could have 
other eligible activities from the forest sector. Given 
that the CDM is a project-based mechanism, the level 
of action will be mainly local. A national approach 
would be used in the case of developing a sectoral 
CDM in forestry. Funding would depend on the 
market for emission reductions, since the CDM is a 
market mechanism. The major issue under this 
scenario is the appropriateness of the modalities and 
procedures for the A/R CDM as stated in Decision  
5/CMP.1.
•  A new cooperative mechanism within the KP: This 
alternative foresees the introduction of a new mecha-
nism under the Kyoto Protocol.34 In this case, Parties 
would have more flexibility to agree on specific 
definitions for forestry activities, since specific 
definitions can only be set for this new mechanism. 
Additionally, Parties will be free to decide at which 
level each mitigation option should be addressed. 
Further, agreement on modalities and procedures 
would depend on the architecture of the mechanism. 
However, only Parties that have ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol would be eligible for participating in such a 
mechanism.
•  A new protocol: This case provides the greatest 
number of possibilities for setting commitments 
(voluntary or not), definition of activities, mecha-
nisms, modalities and procedures. Besides, all Parties 
to the Convention could participate in a new protocol. 
However, many issues would then need to be negoti-
ated. A potential new protocol should be seen within a 
wider perspective and taking into account all potential 
mitigation sectors.
34    There are three flexible mechanisms defined by the Kyoto Protocol. Article 6 defines Joint Implementation; Article 12 defines the Clean Development Mechanism; and 
Article 17 defines International Emissions Trading. For more information see: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
Table 7: Main positive and negative aspects of different policy instruments
options advantages Disadvantages
An eligible activity under the CDm •  Proven ability of the CDM to provide 
incentives for action
•  Institutional framework already in place
• A political agreement is not likely
• Technical hurdles
• Limited to project-based action
•  Uncertainties related to the international 
price for carbon as a major driver for action.
A new mechanism under the Kyoto 
protocol
•  Ability of the GHG market to provide 
incentives for action
• Flexibility within Kyoto Protocol limits
•  Controversy could lead to less flexibility in 
the design
• Technical hurdles as for the CDM
A second protocol •  Flexible to accommodate realities be-
yond climate change (i.e, biodiversity)
• No institutional framework exists
•  No clarity about modalities and procedures
•  Many issues to be negotiated before action 
can take place
Source:  Forner, Blaser, Jotzi and Robledo (2006), modified.
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Types of mechanism characteristics
market-based mechanism •  Including the CDM and other market mechanisms and coupled with an appropriate demand (e.g, 
by increasing reduction commitments of Annex i countries).
preparatory scheme for a post-2012- 
regime
• Assessment of national implementation of policies to combat deforestation.
• Activities to improve monitoring and reporting capacity required for REDD.
• Process to define baselines or reference scenarios including the anticipation of future trends.
• Positive incentives including:
       o voluntary funding.
       o Similar as during the phase on Activities implemented Jointly. 
       o other sources of funding and support.
Financial mechanism for Compensated 
Conservation
•  Aimed at compensating countries for maintaining and increasing forests as carbon pools as a result 
of effective conservation measures and increasing/improving forest cover backed by verifiable 
monitoring systems.
       o  additionality: proposal of Compensated Conservation intended to be outside the Kyoto proto-
col’s CDm, so no need to prove additionality . 
       o  Baseline: increment/decrease to be evaluated as a gain or a loss against a predetermined base 
year/cut off year (for example 1990).
       o  there is a need for supporting nAi in fulfilling technical and methodological requirements for 
monitoring and reporting. 
       o Verification: through independent inspections.
•  Proposes a new financial mechanism linked to verifiable carbon increments through ODA and 
global Environment Facility (gEF) funds, or the Climate Change Adaptation Fund be enhanced and 
made available for such incentives. 
•  Capacity building would be canalized through the UNFCCC.
• Fiscal incentives to flow against one single National Project. 
•  Recipient country to decide distribution of incentives amongst participating communities, includ-
ing investment in further conservation activities in forests or other wooded lands. 
Forest retention incentive Scheme 
Note: Established under the UNFCCC and 
would relate to REDD
community forest retention Trust accounts
•  Communities that wish to set aside forest areas or manage them on a sustainable basis would seek 
funding to establish a Community Forest retention trust Account (CFrt Account).
•  Sources of funding for the CFRT Account could include:
       o the Special Climate Change Fund.
       o Bilateral oDA.
       o Corporate sponsorship.
       o ngo contributions.
       o government contributions (including through debt-for-nature swaps and similar measures).
forest retention certificates
once the CFrt Account is established communities could apply for Forest retention Certificates. 
these Certificates would be based on an estimate of the amount of gHg emissions reduced by the 
project in a period of time. 
this estimate would be based on current emission trends compared with potential actions to reduce 
these emission trends.
international forest retention fund
Funding for the redemption of these Certificates would come from an international Forest retention 
Fund (iFrt) established under the unFCCC; redemption of the Certificates would be granted ex-post.
Communities could deposit these redeemed Certificates into their CFrt Account or use the money 
as the community sees fit.
procedures for assessment and auditing would be kept as simple as possible to minimize transaction 
costs.
the Certificates could only be redeemed by the iFrt. they cannot be sold, transferred or traded.
Source: Submissions by Parties
Table 8: Some proposals for funding mechanisms on Redd 
Types of mechanism characteristics
rEDD mechanism •  Accounts for gross carbon emission reductions and non-CO2 emission reductions only in existing 
forest areas on a national basis.
•  Market Mechanism (higher accuracy and value) and/or non-market incentives (lower accuracy and 
value). 
• Voluntary policy approaches.
•  Gross reductions of GHG emissions against a reference scenario (defined as a function of the emis-
sions rate and a development adjustment factor) for a reference period.
•  Nationally-based. However, it could be implemented synergistically with the project-based A/R 
CDm.
rEDD Stabilization Fund Accounts for carbon emissions and removals and non-Co2 emissions in countries participating in 
the rEDD mechanism that seek to maintain and stabilize existing forest areas on a national basis. it is 
meant to be especially useful for countries with low deforestation and forest degradation rates and 
for the maintenance of forests. 
new and additional funding as:
• A levy on Emission Reduction Units (similar to that imposed on the CERs generated under the CDM. 
• A tax on carbon intensive commodities and services.
• New and additional ODA.
rEDD Enabling Fund A special purpose group of funds designed to prepare and support developing countries that seek 
to participate in the mechanisms above, including through piloting activities. it is meant to create 
capacities in some developing countries so that they can participate in a rEDD system.
• Means: new and additional financial resources
•  Three voluntary tracks:  REDD non-market (or fund-based) mechanisms; REDD market-based 
mechanisms; and rEDD stabilization instrument
•  REDD is considered solely under the Convention. Therefore, no mechanism aimed at fulfilling com-
mitments by Annex i countries.
•  Related to “avoided deforestation” or “conservation.”
•  Based on voluntary reductions by developing countries.
•  Seeks positive incentives for the net reduction of emissions from deforestation in developing 
countries.
•  Incentives should encompass the provision of new and additional financial resources, technology 
transfer, capacity building and enhancement of endogenous capacities.
• Financial incentives to be provided by Annex I countries voluntarily engaged.
• Means: new and existing national public policies and measures.
• Only ex-post results can be considered.
•  Reductions are to be calculated based on a comparison between the rate of emissions from defor-
estation for a certain past period with the reference emissions rate.
•  Countries can create a credit or a debit. Credits will be converted to financial incentives coming 
from developed country partners according to their obligations under the unFCCC.
• Developing countries will then be either: ready for a prompt start; or require capacity building.
• Scheme based on country’s individual definitions for deforestation.
Credit for early action Early action on rEDD to be also eligible for crediting.
Avoided Deforestation Carbon Fund 
(ADCF)
Note: Many similarities with the REDD 
Stabilization Fund
•  Aimed at providing resources for the implementation of specific activities that: a) reduce emissions 
from deforestation; and/or b) maintain low rates of deforestation. 
• This fund could be financed through:
       o voluntary contributions.
       o An X% levy of Emission reduction units or Assigned Amounts units (similar to the CErs).
       o A tax on carbon intensive commodities and services in Annex i countries.
• Fund replenishment instruments based on the “polluter pays” principle.
Enabling Fund • Aimed at supporting capacity building and piloting activities.
• Sources of replenishment should be identified and additional ODA required
keY iSSUeS iN laND USe, laND USe cHaNGe aND foreSTrY wiTH aN emPHaSiS oN DeVeloPiNG coUNTrY PerSPecTiVeS286 keY iSSUeS iN laND USe, laND USe cHaNGe aND foreSTrY wiTH aN emPHaSiS oN DeVeloPiNG coUNTrY PerSPecTiVeS 287
the basis for their participation in the negotiations. 
•  Parties may also need to coordinate their national 
sectoral policies when defining how to use LULUCF 
activities as a mitigation option. LULUCF can have 
many implications on specific land use planning (e.g., 
whether forests are available for sustainable forest man-
agement; or whether available land is to be used for 
biofuels or food crops production). A country’s 
priorities should be reflected in sectoral and cross-
sectoral policies that allow an appropriate implementa-
tion of LULUCF activities.
LULUCF is a complex but highly important issue 
that will play a vital role of LULUCF in any post 2012 
mitigation regime. The current system of including 
LULUCF activities as climate change mitigation option 
under the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol is not perfect. It 
is the result of complex negotiations that initially focused 
on sectors other than LULUCF. Today, with a far better 
understanding of the problems associated with the 
accounting, compliance procedures and implementation, 
it is possible to improve the existing framework under a 
post-2012 climate agreement.
A range of issues and proposals has been outlined in 
this paper and non-Annex I Parties will need to 
carefully consider the implications of integrating the 
various mitigation options in the LULUCF sector. 
Some key points may warrant further reflection in 
preparing positions in respect to LULUCF:
•  While the land use sector, including forestry, is an 
important source of anthropogenic GHG emis-
sions, it also has great potential for mitigating 
climate change. LULUCF activities, including 
REDD, forest restoration and forest management, can 
contribute to mitigate climate change through both 
GHG emission reductions and removals by sinks. 
Only the LULUCF sector offers these two possibilities 
for mitigation of climate change–all other sectors can 
only contribute through emission reductions.
•  Many LULUCF activities have the potential of 
being an appropriate and cost-effective adaptation 
measure, reducing overall vulnerability of social 
systems and ecosystems to climate change. Forestry, 
in particular, has an important role to play. Managing 
in a sustainable manner the 30% of the global land 
area that is under forest cover will not only contribute 
to the mitigation of climate change and contribute as 
an effective adaptation measure, but has many other 
collateral environmental and socio-economic benefits. 
This integrative view clarifies why it is so important to 
consider forestry options and the whole LULUCF 
sector for mitigation in a consistent way and as part of 
a wider development concept (see also Blair, T. and the 
Climate Group, 2008). In this respect, two additional 
observations are key:
 o  LULUCF mitigation options have to be 
designed as complementary approaches to 
mitigation options taken in other sectors. 
They should also not perpetuate emission 
patterns that are not sustainable; 
 o  LULUCF mitigation options need to be 
based on accurate, while practical, account-
ability methods. Currently, more integrative 
schemes are being introduced in the UNFCCC 
negotiation that are aimed at facilitating a path 
for a better integration of LULUCF in the post 
2012 mitigation regime (The Terrestrial 
Carbon Group, 2008).
•  A post 2012 mitigation regime should include the 
LULUCF sector in a way that the maximum 
mitigation potential can be used. This implies the 
need to agree on general decisions and detailed 
modalities and procedures that allow undertaking a 
maximum of activities in all countries while ensuring 
the environmental integrity of the Convention. 
•  All Parties should strive to fully understand the 
potential role of, and multiple constraints in, 
LULUCF, and in the forest sector in particular. This 
will help ensure that decisions at the international level 
can be applied at the local level at an affordable cost.
•  The UNFCCC, its Kyoto Protocol and any kind of 
agreement for a post-2012 regime will have an 
impact on governing land-use and forests in all 
parts of the world, particularly in developing 
countries. An important consideration for policy 
makers is the need for effective governance in the 
forest sector in order to achieve a meaningful role for 
the sector in mitigating climate change. 
•  With increased attention to forests mitigation 
options, particularly through the ongoing discus-
sion on REDD, it is expected that the countries 
who clarify forest and carbon tenure aspects and 
effectively address illegality in forestry and land-use 
practices are more likely to immediately benefit 
from future forest mitigation incentives. Climate 
change-relevant investment in the forest sector is a 
long-term undertaking. This requires security with 
respect to land-use and long-term commitment by 
involved parties. 
•  Parties negotiating under the UNFCCC may need 
to clarify their own mitigation potential in LU-
LUCF activities, including all possible LULUCF 
options. This, coupled with a clear understanding of 
the potential and weakness of the forest and land-use 
sector at national and sub-national levels, would build 
6. CoNClUSioNS
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The report of the Breaking the Climate Deadlock 
initiative was launched in Chiba, Japan, on 20 March 
2008 in the framework of the preparation of the G-8 
meeting of July 2008. The report aims to build decisive 
political support among the key players – US, EU, China, 
India, Japan, and Russia – for a framework international 
agreement on climate change and the strategies for its 
subsequent implementation that will result in GHG 
emissions reductions consistent with those advocated by 
the scientific consensus. Attached to the report are a 
number of expert briefing papers, the most relevant for 
LULUCF are one on ‘Sustainable Biofuels’ by Richard 
Heap, Royal Society and the one on Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Degradation in non-Annex I 
countries’ by Romain Pirard, IDDRI. The main report can 
be downloaded as pdf document in English, Japanese and 
Chinese under www.theclimategroup.org/index.php/
special_projects/breaking_the_climate_deadlock/.
The Stern report provides valuable background informa-
tion on the effect of climate change on the world econo-
my. It focuses on three policy elements including carbon 
pricing, technology policy and energy efficiency and sets a 
framework for the inclusion of forestry as an effective 
economic mitigation option. Stern, N. 2006. Stern review 
on the economics of climate change. UK Government 
Economic Service. London, www.sternreview.org.uk.
In order to get an inside of the particular perspective of 
a broader group of civil society stakeholders on the issues 
relating to forests and carbon, the following document is 
very useful: Griffiths, T.O, 2007: Seeing ‘RED - Avoided 
Deforestation  and the rights of Indigenous Peoples and local 
communities. Forest Peoples Program. www.fern.org/media/
documents/document_4074_4075.pdf.
Most of the references presented in the section below 
provide valuable information on the various issues 
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forest
UNfccc/kP forests are defined in the marrakech accords as follows:
Forest is a minimum area of land of 0.05-1.0ha with tree crown cover (or equivalent stocking level) of more than 10-30% 
with trees with the potential to reach a minimum height of 2-5 metres at maturity in situ. A forest may consist either of 
closed forest formations where trees of various storeys and undergrowth cover a high proportion of the ground or open 
forest. young natural stands and all plantations which have yet to reach a crown density of 10-30% or tree height of 2-5 
metres are included under forest, as are areas normally forming part of the forest area which are temporarily unstocked as 
a result of human intervention such as harvesting or natural causes but which are expected to revert to forest.
note: According to the modalities and procedures for afforestation and reforestation within the CDm, each non-Annex i 
country had to submit their definition on forest for the first commitment period within the ranges established in the marra-
kech Accords (Decision 5/Cmp.1).
iPcc forest land: this category includes all land with woody vegetation, consistent with thresholds used to define forest land in 
the national gHg inventory, sub-divided at the national level into managed and unmanaged, and also by ecosystem type 
as specified in the ipCC guidelines (since forest management has a particular meaning under the marrakech Accords, a 
subdivision of managed forests as described in Chapter 4 of the ipCC good practice guidance for LuLuCF may be required). 
the category also includes systems with vegetation that currently fall below, but are expected to exceed, the threshold of 
the forest land category.
Further, in the good practice guidelines for LuLuCF the ipCC uses the definition of forest agreed as part of the marrakech 
Accords.
fao 
(forest resources assessment 
– fra- 2005)
Land spanning more than 0.5 hectares with trees higher than 5 meters and a canopy cover of more than 10% or trees able 
to reach these thresholds in situ. it does not include land that is predominantly under agricultural or urban land use.
explanatory notes:
1.  Forest is determined both by the presence of trees and the absence of other predominant land uses. the trees should be 
able to reach a minimum height of 5 meters in situ. Areas under reforestation that have not yet reached but are expected 
to reach a canopy cover of 10% and a tree height of 5 meters are included, as are temporarily unstocked areas, resulting 
from human intervention or natural causes, which are expected to regenerate.
2.  includes areas with bamboo and palms provided that height and canopy cover criteria are met.
3.  includes forest roads, firebreaks and other small open areas, forest in national parks, nature reserves and other protected 
areas such as those of specific scientific, historical, cultural or spiritual interest.
4.  includes windbreaks, shelterbelts and corridors of trees with an area of more than 0.5 hectares and width of more than 
20 meters.
5.  includes plantations primarily used for forestry or protection purposes, such as rubberwood plantations and cork oak 
stands.
6.  Excludes tree stands in agricultural production systems, for example in fruit plantations and agroforestry systems. the 
term also excludes trees in urban parks and gardens.
iTTo iTTo defines various related terms:
Permanent forest estate (Pfe): Land, whether public or private, secured by law and kept under permanent forest cover. 
this includes land for the production of timber and other forest products, for the protection of soil and water, and for the 
conservation of biological diversity, as well as land intended to fulfil a combination of these functions.
Planted forest: A forest stand that has been established by planting or seeding.
Primary forest: Forest which has never been subject to human disturbance, or has been so little affected by hunting, 
gathering and tree cutting that its natural structure, functions and dynamics have not undergone any changes that exceed 
the elastic capacity of the ecosystem.
Production Pfe: that part of the pFE assigned to the production of timber and/or other extractive uses.
protected area: An area of land and/or sea especially dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biological diversity 
and of natural and associated cultural resources, and managed through legal or other effective means.
Protection Pfe: that part of the pFE in which the production of timber (or other extractive uses) is prohibited.
annex 2. definitions of deforestation and forest degradationannex 1. Key definitions in lUlUCF
The Kyoto Protocol establishes which LULUCF 
activities have to be accounted under Article 3.3, and 
those additional LULUCF activities that are accounted on 
a voluntary basis by a Party under Article 3.4. It also lists 
the fundamental requirements for those activities: they 
must be human-induced and they must have taken place 
after 31st December 1989. A clear definition of Article 3.3 
and 3.4 activities was adopted at the seventh session of the 
Conference of the Parties in Marrakech. The adopted 
decisions, part of the so-called Marrakech Accords, also 
give a definition of ‘forest’. (Decision 11/CP.7 in FCCC/
CP/2001/13/add.1). According to Decision 11/CP.7 
Forest is a minimum area of land of 0.05-1.0 hectares 
with tree crown cover (or equivalent stocking level) of 
more than 10-30% with trees with the potential to reach a 
minimum height of 2-5 meters at maturity in situ. A 
forest may consist either of closed forest formations where 
trees of various story and undergrowth cover a high 
proportion of the ground or open forest. Young natural 
stands and all plantations which have yet to reach a crown 
density of 10-30% or tree height of 2-5 meters are 
included under forest, as are areas normally forming part 
of the forest area which are temporarily unstocked as a 
result of human intervention such as harvesting or natural 
causes but which are expected to revert to forest.
Afforestation is the direct human-induced conversion 
of land that has not been forested for a period of at least 
50 years to forested land through planting, seeding and/or 
the human-induced promotion of natural seed sources.
Reforestation is the direct human-induced conversion 
of non-forested land to forested land through planting, 
seeding and/or the human-induced promotion of natural 
seed sources, on land that was forested but that has been 
converted to non-forested land. For the first commitment 
period, reforestation activities will be limited to reforesta-
tion occurring on those lands that did not contain forest 
on 31 December 1989.
Deforestation is the direct human-induced conversion 
of forested land to nonforested land.
Revegetation is a direct human-induced activity to 
increase carbon stocks on sites through the establishment 
of vegetation that covers a minimum area of 0.05 hectares 
and does not meet the definitions of afforestation and 
reforestation contained here.
Forest management is a system of practices for steward-
ship and use of forest land aimed at fulfilling relevant 
ecological (including biological diversity), economic and 
social functions of the forest in a sustainable manner.
Cropland management is the system of practices on 
land on which agricultural crops are grown and on land 
that is set aside or temporarily not being used for crop 
production.
Grazing land management is the system of practices on 
land used for livestock production aimed at manipulating 
the amount and type of vegetation and livestock pro-
duced.
As stated in the Marrakech Accords, by the end of 2006 
each Annex I Party with commitments under the Kyoto 
Protocol has to choose a national definition of forest and 
decide which of the additional activities will be elected at 
the national level. For elected activities a Party has to 
document how the definitions will be applied to national 
circumstances and to list the criteria that determine under 
which activity a land would be assigned in order to 
minimize or avoid overlapping of land categories.
The area qualifying for each activity may change on the 
basis of the elected forest definition. For instance, the 
election of the highest range values may reduce the area 
eligible for afforestation and reforestation. At the same 
time, the forest dimensional thresholds will identify the 
separation between revegetation and afforestation and 
reforestation in countries that will elect for revegetation. 
The establishment of a vegetation cover that does not meet 
the country’s definition of forest may be reported under 
revegetation. Other criteria can influence the area qualify-
ing for a specific activity. Very important here are the 
concept of human-induced and the precedence conditions 
and/or hierarchy among elected activities of Article 3.4.
Deforestation and forest degradation are terms with 
various definitions. The differences may be the result of 
the specific goals for which the definition was set (see 
Annex 2). However, within the framework of the UN-
FCCC, it is important to keep in mind that definitions 
should serve the final objective of the Convention, which 
is the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that prevents dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system. Further, the Article 2 of 
the Convention adds that such a level should be achieved 
within	a	time-frame	sufficient	to	allow	ecosystems	to	adapt	
naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is 
not threatened and to enable economic development in a 
sustainable manner (Text of the UNFCCC). 
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approaches that are currently under discussion within 
the UNFCCC process; 
•  Including methods to estimate CO2 emissions due to 
land use change in wetlands.
Although the IPCC has produced very valuable material 
regarding LULUCF, the sector remains a complex item for 
any negotiation. What are then the difficulties in consider-
ing LULUCF when mitigating climate change? Even if 
there is a general agreement on the importance of the 
sector as “emitter” as well as a “sink” there are some open 
questions on the ability to devise practical means to 
include the accounting of sinks in an equitable manner 
that adequately maintains the environmental integrity of 
any agreement. Two particular issues are of concern given 
associated uncertainties: data and the potential non-per-
manence of removals by sinks. 
The previous work from the IPCC is key in considering 
other issues related to the way emissions and sinks from 
LULUCF are understood and accounted for in the current 
arrangements and in future negotiation. The most 
important of these issues are:
•  Should removals of CO2 from the atmosphere be 
considered as credits against the debit from an 
emission?
•  Which are the advantages and disadvantages of using a 
net-net or a gross-net approach and which are the 
implications of each approach for accounting any 
reduction commitment in the LULUCF sector?
•  Is reducing emissions from LULUCF? as creditworthy 
as increasing removals?
•  How should the emissions from land use (without any 
land use change) in a future agreement be considered?
annex 3.  input from the ipCC on lUlUCF  
matters
The main activity of the IPCC is to provide at regular 
intervals assessment reports of the state of knowledge on 
climate change. The latest assessment, the Fourth Assess-
ment Report, was completed in 2007.
The IPCC produces also special reports, methodology 
reports, technical papers and supporting material, often in 
response to requests from the Conference of the Parties to 
the UNFCCC or from other environmental Conventions
Besides the information in the four assessment reports, 
the IPCC has produced other material that focuses on LU-
LUCF matters:
•  Special Report on Land Use, Land Use Change and 
Forestry (2000)
•  Technical Paper on Climate Change and Biodiversity 
(2002)
• Methodology reports.
•  Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories ( 
2006, 1996, 1994)
•  Good Practice Guidance for Land Use, Land-Use 
Change and Forestry (2003)
•  Definitions and Methodological Options to Inventory 
Emissions from Direct Human-Induced Degradation 
of Forests and Devegatation of other Vegetation Types 
(2003).
The IPCC Guidelines include generic methodologies 
applicable to multiple land-use categories, consistent 
representation of lands, as well as methodologies for the 
six land categories emissions from livestock, manure and 
soil management as well as emissions from lime and urea 
applications. Finally the guidelines also consider harvested 
wood products. With the last Guidelines (2006), the 
IPCC has made an effort in the following:
•  Promoting integration between agriculture and land 
use, land use change and forestry;
•  Using managed land as a proxy for identifying 
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by 
sinks; 
•  Consolidating previously optional categories, and 
ensuring consistency with the concept of managed 
land as a proxy for identifying anthropogenic emis-
sions by sources and removals by sinks; 
•  Providing detailed guidance for inclusion of harvested 
wood products in GHG inventories using any of the 
forest Degradation
UNfccc/kP none available yet.
However, at the 28th session of SBSTA (June 2008), several parties made submissions with recommendations for consideration in 
the development of an appropriate definition.  Most of these recommendations focused on use or adaptation of the IPCC defini-
tion.
iPcc a)  A direct human-induced loss of forest values (particularly carbon). Likely to be characterized by a reduction of the tree 
crown cover. routine management from which crown cover will recover within the normal cycle of forest management 
operation is not included.
b)  Changes within the forest that negatively affect the structure or function of the stand and site, and thereby lower the 
capacity to supply products and/or services.
c)  Direct human-induced activity that leads to a long-term reduction in forest carbon stocks.
fao fao 2000: A reduction of the canopy cover or stocking within the forest through logging, fire, wind felling or other events, 
provided that the canopy cover stays above 10%. in a more general sense, forest degradation is a long-term reduction of 
the overall potential supply of benefits from the forest, which includes wood, biodiversity and any other product or service.
fra 2005: Changes within the forest, which negatively affect the structure or function of the stand or site, and thereby 
lower the capacity to supply products and/or services.
UNeP/cBD/SBSTTa 2001 A degraded forest is a secondary forest that has lost, through human activities, the structure, function, species composition 
of productivity normally associated with a natural forest type expected on that site.
iTTo the reduction of the capacity of a forest to produce goods and services. ‘Capacity’ includes the maintenance of ecosystem 
structure and functions.
Deforestation
UNfccc/kP Deforestation is the direct human-induced conversion of forested land to non-forested land.
iPcc Deforestation is the direct human-induced conversion of forested land to non-forested land (considered in ipCC 2003 as in 
the marrakech Accords for the Kyoto protocol).
fao (fra 2005) the conversion of forest to another land use or the long-term reduction of the tree canopy cover below the minimum 10 % 
threshold.
explanatory notes:
1.  Deforestation implies the long-term or permanent loss of forest cover and implies transformation into another land use. 
Such a loss can only be caused and maintained by a continued human-induced or natural perturbation.
2. Deforestation includes areas of forest converted to agriculture, pasture, water reservoirs and urban areas.
3.  the term specifically excludes areas where the trees have been removed as a result of harvesting or logging, and where 
the forest is expected to regenerate naturally or with the aid of silvicultural measures. unless logging is followed by 
the clearing of the remaining logged-over forest for the introduction of alternative land uses, or the maintenance of 
the clearings through continued disturbance, forests commonly regenerate, although often to a different, secondary 
condition. in areas of shifting agriculture, forest, forest fallow and agricultural lands appear in a dynamic pattern where 
deforestation and the return of forest occur frequently in small patches. to simplify reporting of such areas, the net 
change over a larger area is typically used.
4.  Deforestation also includes areas where, for example, the impact of disturbance, overutilization or changing environ-
mental conditions affects the forest to an extent that it cannot sustain a tree cover above the 10 % threshold.
Sources: ITTO, 2005; IPCC, 2003; FAO, 2004; Decision 11/CP.7; FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1
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annex 5.  From lUlUCF to agriculture, Forestry 
and other land Use (aFolU)
history within the ipCC deliberations:
•  Revised 1996 IPCC Guidelines approach – Land-Use 
Change and Forestry (LUCF)
 o Identifies major likely land use sources
•  2000 Good Practice Guidance an Uncertainty 
Management
 o Defines GPG and applies it to Agriculture
•  Good Practice Guidance for Land Use, Land-Use 
Change and Forestry (GPG LULUCF)
 o Expanded Guidance covering all carbon pools
 o Guidance on the representing Land Areas
•  2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas 
Inventories
 o Now (AFOLU)
 o  Essentially the same as to GPG LULUCF but 
integrating Agriculture and LULUCF sectors
 o  Extended default values & some improved 
methods
Changes from lUlUCF to aFolU in a nutshell:
•  Basic methodological approach continued from 
1996 IPCC Guidelines, GPG LULUCF to 2006 
Guidelines AFOLU:
 o  Stock changes: accounting of emissions and 
removals
  1.  Inputs (e.g., growth) - outputs (e.g., 
harvest, decay)
  2.  Total stock at end minus total stock 
at beginning
•  GPG LULUCF & AFOLU consider all carbon pools
 o  Improved completeness implies both more 
accurate and reliable results and increased data 
needs
•  The AFOLU Guidance in the 2006 Guidelines 
maintains the basic structure, definitions and 
methods of the GPG LULUCF
 o  Improved guidance in some areas
 o More and improved default data
 o  Integration of Agriculture reduces chance of 
double counting or omissions, some simplifica-
tion of categories
 o  Do not pre-empt accounting choices, all the 
information needed is retained
 o  Mapping between the GPG LULUCF 
classification and the AFOLU classification is 
straightforward.
 o  Effort and data requirements much the same as 
for LULUCF
IPCC guidelines in all UN languages can be download-
ed under http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp 
project activities under the clean development 
mechanism in the first commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol and measures to facilitate their implementation.”
coP 12 and cmP 2
•  No major decision on REDD or A/R 
coP 13 and cmP 3
•  Decision 1/CP.13: “Bali Action Plan.”
•  Decision 2/CP.13: “Reducing emissions from deforesta-
tion in developing countries: approaches to stimulate 
action.”
•  Decision 1/CMP.3: “Adaptation Fund”
•  Decision 9/CMP.3: “Implications of possible changes to 
the limit for small-scale afforestation and reforestation 
clean development mechanism project activities.”
annex 4.  decision pathway for a/R CdM and 
Redd
The eligibility, modalities and procedures for forestry 
activities under the CDM are ruled by the following 
decisions:
“marrakesh accords”, coP 7, 2001 (fccc/cP/2001/13)
•  Decision 11/CP.7: “Land Use, Land-Use Change and 
Forestry”
•  Decision 17/CP.7: “Modalities and procedures for a 
clean development mechanism as defined in Article 12 
of the Kyoto Protocol”
coP 9, 2003 (fccc/cP/2003/6)
•  Decision 19/CP.9: “Modalities and procedures for 
afforestation and reforestation project activities under 
the clean development mechanism in the first commit-
ment period of the Kyoto Protocol.”
coP 10, 2004 (fccc/cP/2004/10)
•  Decision 13/CP.10: “Incorporation of the modalities 
and procedures for afforestation and reforestation 
project activities under the clean development mecha-
nism into the guidelines under Articles 7 and 8 of the 
Kyoto Protocol.”
•  Decision 14/CP.10: “Simplified modalities and 
procedures for small-scale afforestation and  
reforestation project activities under the clean 
development mechanism in the first commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol and measures to  
facilitate their implementation.” 
•  Decision 15/CP.10: “Good practice guidance for land 
use, land-use change and forestry activities under 
Article 3, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Kyoto Protocol.”
coP 11 and cmP 1, 2005 (fccc/cP/2005/10)
Two of the decisions above, which were originally drafted 
by the COP, were adopted by the first CMP, which took 
place in Montreal, Canada, in December 2005 and 
re-numbered as follows: 
•  Decision 5/CMP.5: “Modalities and procedures for 
afforestation and reforestation project activities under 
the clean development mechanism in the first commit-
ment period of the Kyoto Protocol.”
•  Decision 6/CMP.1: “Simplified modalities and 
procedures for small-scale afforestation and reforestation 
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social functions of the forest in a sustainable manner.
Grazing land management is the system of practices on 
land used for livestock production aimed at manipulating the 
amount and type of vegetation and livestock produced.
Leakage is the increase in GHG emissions by sources 
which occurs outside the boundary of an afforestation or 
reforestation project activity under the CDM which is 
measurable and attributable to the afforestation or reforesta-
tion project activity.
Long-term CER or “lCER” is a CER issued for an 
afforestation or reforestation project activity under the CDM 
which expires at the end of the crediting period of the 
afforestation or reforestation project activity under the CDM 
for which it was issued.
Net anthropogenic GHG removals by sinks is the actual 
net GHG removals by sinks minus the baseline net GHG 
removals by sinks minus leakage.
Project boundary geographically delineates the afforesta-
tion or reforestation CDM project activity under the control 
of the project participants. The project activity may contain 
more than one discrete area of land.
Reforestation is the direct human-induced conversion of 
non-forested land to forested land through planting, seeding 
and/or the human-induced promotion of natural seed 
sources, on land that was forested but that has been convert-
ed to non-forested land. For the first commitment period, 
reforestation activities will be limited to reforestation 
occurring on those lands that did not contain forest on 31 
December 1989.
Revegetation is a direct human-induced activity to increase 
carbon stocks on sites through the establishment of vegetation 
that covers a minimum area of 0.05 ha and does not meet 
definitions of afforestation and reforestation.
Small-scale afforestation and reforestation project 
activities under the CDM are those that are expected to 
result in net anthropogenic GHG removals by sinks of less 
than 16 kilotonnes of CO2 per year and are developed or 
implemented by low-income communities and individuals as 
determined by the host Party. If a small-scale afforestation or 
reforestation project activity under the CDM results in net 
anthropogenic GHG removals by sinks greater than 8 
kilotonnes of CO2 per year, the excess removals will not be 
eligible for the issuance of temporary CER (tCER) or lCERs. 
Temporary CER or “tCER” is a CER issued for an 
afforestation or reforestation project activity under the CDM 
which expires at the end of the commitment period follow-
ing the one during which it was issued.
annex 6. Glossary
This section presents the definitions regarding mitigation 
as given in UNFCCC decisions.  
Actual net GHG removals by sinks is the sum of the 
verifiable changes in carbon stocks in the carbon pools 
within the project boundary, minus the increase in emis-
sions of the GHGs measured in CO2 equivalents by the 
sources that are increased as a result of the implementation 
of the afforestation or reforestation project activity, while 
avoiding double counting, within the project boundary, 
attributable to the afforestation or reforestation project 
activity under the CDM.
Afforestation is the direct human-induced conversion of 
land that has not been forested for a period of at least 50 
years to forested land through planting, seeding and/or the 
human-induced promotion of natural seed sources.
Baseline net GHG removals by sinks is the sum of the 
changes in carbon stocks in the carbon pools within the 
project boundary that would have occurred in the absence 
of the afforestation or reforestation project activity under 
the CDM.
Carbon pools are those carbon pools referred to in the 
Annex to Decision 5/CMP.1 (Modalities and Procedures for 
A/R CDM) and are: above-ground biomass, below-ground 
biomass, litter, dead wood and soil organic carbon. 
Cropland management is the system of practices on land 
on which agricultural crops are grown and land that is set 
aside or temporarily not used for crop production.
Deforestation is the direct human-induced conversion of 
forested land to non-forested land. 
Forest is a minimum area of land of 0.05-1.0 hectares 
with tree crown cover (or equivalent stocking level) of more 
than 10-30% with trees with the potential to reach a 
minimum height of 2-5 metres at maturity in situ. A forest 
may consist either of closed forest formations where trees of 
various storeys and undergrowth cover a high proportion of 
the ground or open forest. Young natural stands and all 
plantations which have yet to reach a crown density of 
10-30% or tree height of 2-5 metres are included under 
forest, as are areas normally forming part of the forest area 
which are temporarily unstocked as a result of human 
intervention such as harvesting or natural causes but which 
are expected to revert to forest.
Forest management is a system of practices for steward-
ship and use of forest land aimed at fulfilling relevant 




unDp Environment & Energy group
304 East 45th Street
room FF-982
new york, ny 10017
Email: veerle.vandeweerd@undp.org
phone: +1 (212) 906 5020
© Copyright united nations Development programme, october 2008. All rights reserved.
